KONFLIK RUSIA-UKRAINA TAHUN 2014-2022
Abstract
The Russia-Ukraine conflict began in 2014 until now. In 2014, Russia attempted to annex the Donbas region and Crimea. Russia's annexation attempt was carried out through cyber attacks. In 2022 Ukraine will be fully supported by NATO weapons. This research aims to explain why Russia continued its attacks from using cyber operations to full military use. Researchers use offensive realism perspective analysis, great power theory with the concept of "power", to manage conflict transformatively. The findings in this research are that efforts to strengthen Russia's military power are also influenced by the presence of NATO, which has interests in Ukraine. In the struggle for areas of influence between two superpower actors, NATO as a major power has an interest in making Ukraine the closest military stronghold to stem Russia's influence in the Balkan region. In contrast, Russia as a major power in the Balkan region is interested in making Ukraine a buffer zone to anticipate any possible pressure on NATO Russia in all aspects, especially militarily.
References
Andriyanto, Heru. (2022). Ini Kronologi Konflik Ukraina-Rusia Sejak Uni Soviet Bubar. Retrieved from Berita Satu website: https://www.beritasatu.com/dunia/894879/ini-kronologi-konflik-ukrainarusia-sejak-uni-soviet-bubar
Bachmann, Rüdiger et al. (2022). What If? The Economic Effects for Germany of a Stop of Energy Imports from Russia. EconPol (6), 1–35.
Center for Preventive Action. (2022). War in Ukraine. Retrieved from CFR website: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine
CNN Indonesia. (2022). Ukraina Tutup Transit Gas Rusia Ke Eropa Yang Lewat Luhansk. Retrieved from CNN Indonesia website: https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20220511173007-134-795613/ukraina-tutup-transit-gas-rusia-ke-eropa-yang-lewat-luhansk
Devetak, Richard., George, Jim., & Percy, Sarah. (Eds.) (2017). An Introduction to International Relations (3rd ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Digital Attack Map. (2013). What Is a DDoS Attack?. Retrieved from Digital Attack Map website: https://www.digitalattackmap.com/understanding-ddos/
Diuk, Nadia. (2013). EUROMAIDAN: Ukraine’s Self-Organizing Revolution. 9–17.
Dora, Grace El. (2022). Update Perang Di Ukraina: Rusia Kehilangan 4.000 Km2 Dalam Seminggu. Retrieved from Investor website: https://investor.id/international/309017/update-perang-di-ukraina-rusia-kehilangan-4000-km2-dalam-seminggu
Fryer, David. (2006). The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research. Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal 1(1), 57–59.
Khudaykulova, Madina., Yuanqiong, He., & Khudaykulov, Akmal. (2022). Economic Consequences and Implications of the Ukraine-Russia War. The International Journal of Management Science and Business Administration 8(4), 44–52.
Liadze, Iana., Macchiarelli, Corrado., Mortimer-Lee, Paul., & Juanino, Patricia Sanchez. (2022). The Economic Costs of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. National Institute of Economic and Social Research: NIESR Policy, 32(3), 1–5.
Mearsheimer, John. (2014). Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton & Company
Nalbandov, Robert. (2016). Not by Bread Alone: Russian Foreign Policy under Putin. Nebraska: Potomac Books (University of Nebraska Press).
Oktarianisa, Sefti. (2022). Kronologi Dan Penyebab Rusia Menyerang Ukraina. Retrieved from CNBC Indonesia website: https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20220302063202-4-319392/ini-kronologi-perang-rusia-ukraina-apa-penyebab-putin-murka
Olszanski, TA. (2001). Ukraine and Russia: Mutual Relations and the Conditions That Determine Them. CES Studies, 1–18.
Psaropoulos, John. (2022). Timeline: Six Months of Russia’s War in Ukraine. Retrieved from Aljazeera website: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/24/timeline-six-months-of-russias-war-in-ukraine
Putri, Diva Lufiana. (2022). Profil Kekuatan Militer Ukraina Dan Perbandingannya Dengan Rusia. Retrieved from Kompas website: https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2022/03/02/140000465/profil-kekuatan-militer-ukraina-dan-perbandingannya-dengan-rusia?page=all
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2022). World Military Expenditure Passes $2 Trillion for First Time. Retrieved from SIPRI website: https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time
Tan, Weizhen. (2022). Oil Prices Jump after EU Leaders Agree to Ban Most Russian Crude Imports. Retrieved from CNBC website: https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/31/oil-prices-eu-russian-crude.html
The Washington Post Staff. (2022). Read Putin’s National Address on a Partial Military Mobilization. Retrieved from The Washington Post website: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/21/putin-speech-russia-ukraine-war-mobilization/
Trenin, Dmitri., & Novak, Kuzman. (2015). The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great Power Rivalry. Politicka Misao, 52(2), 231–33.
Walidin, Warul., Saifullah., & ZA, Tabrani. (Ed.) (2015). Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif & Grounded Theory. (1st ed). Banda Aceh: FTK Ar-Raniry Press.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Copyright Notice
The Authors submitting a manuscript do so on the understanding that if accepted for publication, copyright of the article shall be assigned to Jurnal Dinamika Global, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani as publisher of the journal.
Copyright encompasses rights to reproduce and deliver the article in all form and media, including reprints, photographs, microfilms, and any other similar reproductions, as well as translations.
Jurnal Dinamika Global, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani and the Editors make every effort to ensure that no wrong or misleading data, opinions or statements be published in the journal. In any way, the contents of the articles and advertisements published in Jurnal Dinamika Global are the sole and exclusive responsibility of their respective authors