

RETHINKING THE "ONE CHINA POLICY": A PATH TO RATIONAL REUNIFICATION

Mutia Hariati Hussin¹, Andini Hayu Agus Putri², Tulus Warsito³

¹³Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political
Sciences, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta

²Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political
Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada

¹mutiahussin.suryo@umy.ac.id

Abstract

This study re-examines the "One China Policy" by analyzing the potential for China-Taiwan reunification through a non-military framework. Based on the "Unification through Systemic Evolution and Integration" model, this paper argues that China is systematically implementing a gradual strategy to achieve unification without military coercion. This strategy rests on three main pillars. First, comprehensive economic integration has created massive dependence, with China absorbing over 40% of Taiwan's exports, supported by legal frameworks such as the ECFA. Second, a "lawfare" approach and social integration through policies such as the "31 Measures," aimed to erode the boundaries of sovereignty by integrating Taiwanese individuals and entities into China's system. Third, socio-cultural integration is being promoted through an "integrated development demonstration zone" in Fujian, aimed at building "emotional bonds" and "spiritual ties." Although this scheme is designed to make reunification a pragmatic choice, its success is severely limited by the strong democratic identity of the Taiwanese people, who reject the "One Country, Two Systems" model, and the balancing role of the United States.

Keywords: China-Taiwan Reunification, One China Policy, Systemic Evolution and Integration, Economic Integration

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan has become one of the most complex and enduring geopolitical issues in East Asia. The roots of this tension lie at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, when the Communist Party of China under the leadership of Mao Zedong successfully took over the mainland and declared the founding of the PRC. This defeat forced the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) party, led by Chiang Kai-shek, to retreat and establish an alternative government on the island of Taiwan (Firsana Dewi & Utami Dewi, 2018: 1). This event marked

the beginning of a political and ideological split that effectively separated Taiwan from mainland China, although no formal peace treaty ever officially ended the civil war (West & Insisa, 2024: 189). Since then, both sides of the Taiwan Strait have fallen into a state of prolonged political confrontation (State Council, 2022).

Over more than seven decades, China and Taiwan have evolved into separate entities with vastly different governmental, social, and economic systems. Mainland China operates under a one-party authoritarian system led by the Communist Party of China (Singh, 2025, p. 21). Conversely, Taiwan has transformed into a vibrant democracy, where its citizens freely elect their leaders and enjoy civil liberties (Maguire, 2022). The development of democracy in Taiwan, which began in 1996, has strengthened a national identity distinct from that of China (Singh, 2025, p. 21). Younger generations of Taiwanese, born and raised in a democratic environment, increasingly see themselves as Taiwanese, not Chinese, thus creating a widening psychological and political gap from Beijing's claims (Singh, 2025, p. 26; The European Institute for International Relations, 2025).

Although Taiwan has de facto functioned as a sovereign state with its own government, constitution, and military, its sovereignty has never been widely recognized on the international stage. This is due to the One China Policy, which Beijing persistently promotes. This policy asserts that there is only one sovereign China in the world, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory (Firsana Dewi & Utami Dewi, 2018, p. 2). Consequently, countries wishing to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC must sever official ties with Taiwan. This strategy has proven highly effective in diplomatically isolating Taiwan, with the number of countries that formally recognize Taiwan continuing to decrease significantly (Singh, 2025, p. 21).

The One China Policy serves as a primary tool of legitimacy for Beijing to assert its sovereignty claim over Taiwan and to reject any move towards Taiwanese independence. Legally, this policy was reinforced by UN Resolution 2758 in 1971, which recognized the representatives of the PRC government as the sole legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and

expelled the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek (State Council, 2022). Beijing interprets this resolution as UN recognition of its claim over Taiwan. Politically, the policy is used to frame cross-strait relations as an internal matter, not a conflict between states, so that intervention from third parties can be considered a violation of China's sovereignty (West & Insisa, 2024, pp. 186–192).

The development of the One China Policy has gone through several phases, from military confrontation in the early days of the Cold War to a period of economic rapprochement under the Ma Ying-jeou administration in Taiwan, which promoted the "1992 Consensus" (West & Insisa, 2024, p. 194). This consensus, although its definition is debated, essentially allowed both sides to acknowledge the existence of "one China" but with different interpretations. However, this approach has been rejected by the current Taiwanese government led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which emphasizes Taiwan's separate sovereignty (Singh, 2025). This rejection has led to increased pressure from Beijing in various areas, including military, economic, and diplomatic spheres.

Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the One China Policy has not only been maintained but also reinforced with the narrative of the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." Xi has explicitly linked the resolution of the "Taiwan issue" with achieving China's strategic goal of becoming a leading global power by 2049 (Blanchette et al., 2023; Singh, 2025, p. 22). This rhetoric reached a peak in Xi's speeches, including his New Year's message on December 31, 2024, in which he firmly stated that reunification "cannot be stopped by anyone" (The Straits Times, 2025). This statement indicates a growing urgency and impatience from Beijing, which considers reunification a historical inevitability and an absolute prerequisite for national revival (State Council, 2022).

China's interest in Taiwan through the One China Policy is multidimensional. Geopolitically, control over Taiwan would allow China to break through the "First Island Chain," a US defense strategy concept, and project its military power further into the Western Pacific (Maguire, 2022).

Economically, Taiwan plays a central role in the global supply chain, especially through its dominance in the advanced semiconductor industry via companies like TSMC, which produces more than 60% of the world's chips (Singh, 2025, p. 26; The European Institute for International Relations, 2025). Integrating Taiwan's economy would provide enormous technological and economic advantages to China. Furthermore, from a domestic perspective, reunification with Taiwan would be an immense symbolic victory for the Communist Party of China, strengthening its legitimacy and fanning nationalism (Maguire, 2022).

With such strong strategic interests and nationalistic drive, China openly declares reunification as a "process that cannot be stopped (State Council, 2022). However, the prospect of this reunification faces significant challenges. A military invasion is considered highly risky due to Taiwan's difficult geography to conquer, resistance from the Taiwanese military, potential intervention from the United States, and the resulting economic devastation (Maguire, 2022; Singh, 2025, p. 26). On the other hand, peaceful reunification appears increasingly unlikely given the opposition of the majority of the Taiwanese people, who value their democratic system and have an ever-stronger identity (Maguire, 2022).

Based on this background, the pressure for reunification is increasing, yet the path to achieving it is fraught with obstacles. This research aims to re-examine the effectiveness and implications of the One China Policy in the context of possible future reunification. This study will analyze whether the path taken by China will lead to a negotiated and mutually beneficial "integration," or is more likely to become a forced "reunification" that could potentially cause regional and global instability. Using this conceptual framework, this paper will evaluate the prospects and future scenarios of China-Taiwan relations.

Theoretical Framework: Reunification

Although there are some similarities, the meaning of integration must be distinguished from reunification. Integration is a new process of uniting several components that has never occurred before, whereas reunification is

the re-uniting of several elements that were once united (Minkler, 2008). Integration is the process of several components coming together into a new, larger system, while reunification is the process of re-uniting several elements that were once united but became separated for some reason (Chow, 2008a). Integration is usually supported by the similarities of various components to unite into a new whole, whereas reunification is the process of redefining the reasons for separation so that the separated elements can be brought back together (Chow, 2008a). The similarity between integration and reunification is the effort to unite several components into a single entity. The difference, however, is that integration is not based on a past experience of being united and then separated. In reunification, the reason for re-uniting must be viewed or linked to the reasons for the original separation. In the case of the One China Policy, the concept of unification is more about reunification than mere integration. The "China" in question here is the China that was once a single entity, then split, and is now being sought to be reunited (Chiang, 2018).

The concepts of integration and reunification contain fundamental differences, although both imply a process of unification. Integration, as occurred in the formation of the European Union, is based on the willingness of nations to join a new entity due to mutual benefits, such as economic integration, labor systems, and security. Conversely, a country that feels disadvantaged, like the United Kingdom in the case of Brexit, tends to withdraw (Gore, 2011; Kämmerer & Schäfer, 2021). If integration considers the unifying reasons of the elements being brought together, reunification implies a cause for an entity's fragmentation that necessitates it being brought back together. This means that to reunite several separated components, one must first understand the causes that made them separate (Chen & Chien-Kai, 2018). The reunifications of Germany and Vietnam both had the same cause of separation (fragmentation): they were each divided into two parts by the victors of World War II (Bromley, 2017). Germany was divided between American and Soviet influence, including the separation of Berlin, which was later physically reinforced by the Berlin Wall (Planck, 2019). Vietnam was also split in two by the 1954 Geneva Accords, with the North

supported by the Soviet Union and the South by the United States (Guan, 2002) However, resistance to this external fragmentation fostered a spirit of reunification. In Vietnam, the military victory of North Vietnam strengthened national unification sentiment, while German reunification was facilitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, which removed the ideological patronage of East Germany (DK Publishing, 2017).

The case of Korea has similarities with Vietnam regarding the cause of its division, namely as a result of Japan's defeat in World War II. Korea was divided into two spheres of influence: North Korea was under the patronage of the communist Soviet Union, while South Korea was supported by the liberal United States. Ideally, the spirit of Korean nationalism could drive a reunification process like that in Vietnam and Germany. However, a stark difference lies in the open military conflict that erupted in the form of the Korean War (1950–1953), which to this day has only ended in a ceasefire, not a peace treaty. This makes the reunification process highly complex, even though the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990 (Sandler, 1995) Different from the previous cases (Welfens, 1992), the cause of China's split was not foreign intervention, but an internal conflict between the Communist and Nationalist factions that led to the exodus of the Republic of China government to Taiwan. Because this division originated from a domestic dispute, not external intervention, the reunification process between mainland China and Taiwan is more politically and emotionally difficult than the cases of Germany, Vietnam, or Korea. Based on the examples above, if the separation of the two Chinas was caused by their own conflict, then the solution for their unification requires their own awareness in reconstructing the cause of separation they once experienced. If the main reason they fell into the Civil War of 1946-1949 was the ideological difference between communism and nationalism, then when Beijing decided on the "One Country, Two Systems" policy (1982), Taiwan should have begun to relax its separatist stance. If it did not, then it can be assumed there are other reasons for Taiwan's behavior.

If integration is the unification of several different or separate components into a new entity, then there must be reasons for those

components to be willing to become part of that new entity (Warsito, 2017). If its new position is considered more advantageous, the component will naturally join. If it is not advantageous, it will automatically reject the unification. This has been exemplified in the case of the European Union, where initially 28 European nations (which had never been united before) were willing to join the EU, adopt the Euro as a common currency, build a joint Armed Forces, abolish state borders, and so on.

To expand the analysis of the One China policy within the framework of reunification, this paper uses the "Three Reunification Scenarios" model as outlined by (Wolf & Akramov, 2005) in a RAND Corporation study. These three scenarios reflect the possible paths Beijing could take to achieve reunification with Taiwan. First, the scenario of Unification through System Evolution and Integration describes a gradual unification through the convergence of political and economic systems, allowing Taiwan to join the PRC without coercion. This model depends on the assumption that systemic differences can be bridged, and that the people of Taiwan will be encouraged to accept unification due to structural incentives, such as shared economic growth and regional stability. Second, the scenario of Unification through Collapse and Absorption imagines that Taiwan's political or economic system collapses due to internal or external pressure, allowing Beijing to absorb Taiwan unilaterally. Third, the scenario of Unification through Conflict involves the open use of military force, including invasion or blockade, to force unification (Wolf & Akramov, 2005, pp. 21–25).

Of the three scenarios offered by Charles Wolf Jr. and Kamil Akramov, the scenario of reunification through system evolution and integration (Unification through System Evolution and Integration) is the most plausible to analyze. This scenario assumes that reunification can be achieved gradually through economic approaches, cross-strait societal relations, and the normalization of non-political relations between Beijing and Taipei. Although the implementation of this scenario faces serious obstacles in the form of different political systems and Taiwanese public resistance to unification under the "One Country, Two Systems" model, this model still

provides a more realistic space for negotiation compared to the other two scenarios. The scenario of collapse and unilateral absorption (Collapse and Absorption) is difficult to realize due to Taiwan's political stability and relatively strong international support. Meanwhile, the military conflict scenario (Unification through Conflict) is high-risk and tends to be counterproductive to the PRC's strategic ambitions and global image. Therefore, this paper will further examine the possibilities of implementation and the limitations of the system evolution scenario as a potential approach within the One China Policy framework towards reunification with Taiwan. The research focus is directed at the dynamics of Beijing's policies in shaping integrative conditions that can be accepted without having to involve coercive force (Wolf & Akramov, 2005, pp. 23–25).

DISCUSSION

The Volatile Dynamics of China-Taiwan Relations

The dynamics of the political conflict between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan (Republic of China/ROC) are rooted in the unresolved remnants of the Chinese Civil War, which ended in 1949 with the retreat of the Kuomintang (KMT) government led by Chiang Kai-shek to the island of Taiwan after its defeat by the Communist Party of China (CPC) led by Mao Zedong (Yuniar & Fitriani, 2022, p. 263). Since then, both sides have claimed to be the legitimate government of all of China, creating a sovereignty dispute that defines cross-strait relations to this day. Although initially both entities adhered to their own versions of a "One China" policy, where the KMT aspired to retake the mainland and the CPC aimed to "liberate" Taiwan, geopolitical realities gradually transformed these aspirations into a fragile status quo, marked by military tension and intense diplomatic competition (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 8). This early political turmoil was marked by the first (1954-1955) and second (1958) Taiwan Strait crises, where direct military confrontations occurred and underscored the ever-present potential for open conflict in the region.

The constant friction between China and Taiwan is fundamentally driven by irreconcilable sovereignty claims and shifting political identities in

Taiwan. Beijing has consistently adhered to the "One China Principle," which asserts that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of it, and the PRC is its sole legitimate government (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 31). This principle serves as a non-negotiable foundation for the PRC in its international relations, effectively forcing other countries to choose between Beijing and Taipei. On the other hand, Taiwan, especially after its democratization process, has developed a different interpretation. The "1992 Consensus," an ambiguous understanding reached between semi-official envoys from both sides, became the basis for interaction during KMT administrations. This consensus allowed both sides to agree that there is "One China" but with their own respective interpretations of who the legitimate government is, an ambiguity that enabled dialogue and economic cooperation (Campagnola, 2024, p. 4). However, for Beijing, this consensus has increasingly been interpreted as Taiwan's acknowledgment of the PRC's version of the One China Principle.

A crucial turning point in the political dynamics occurred with Taiwan's democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The lifting of martial law in 1987 and the first direct presidential election in 1996 marked the birth of a vibrant democracy (Curtis & King, 2023, pp. 15–16). This process directly fostered the growth of a distinct Taiwanese identity, a phenomenon known as "Taiwanization" (Campagnola, 2024, p. 4). An increasing number of the island's residents identify themselves as "Taiwanese" rather than "Chinese," a shift reflected in survey data showing a drastic decline in "Chinese" identification from 25.5% in 1992 to just 2.2% in 2024, while "Taiwanese" identity surged from 17.6% to 64.3% (Campagnola, 2024, p. 12). This divergence in identity and political systems—a liberal democracy in Taiwan versus a one-party authoritarian system in China—has created an ideological chasm that makes the prospect of "peaceful reunification" promoted by Beijing increasingly unattractive to the majority of Taiwanese people.

Cross-strait political turmoil often follows the rhythm of Taiwan's election cycles, creating a timeline of interaction that fluctuates between confrontation and engagement. During the administration of President Lee

Teng-hui (KMT), he introduced his "two-state theory" in 1999, which effectively defined cross-strait relations as state-to-state relations, triggering the third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-1996) in which China conducted missile tests to intimidate Taiwan (Curtis & King, 2023, pp. 24–25). Later, the election of Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2000, whose party historically supports Taiwanese independence, led to a freeze in official relations. In response, China passed the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, which provided a legal basis for the use of force if Taiwan were to formally declare independence (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 33). Conversely, the administration of Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) from 2008 to 2016 marked a period of détente, during which both sides returned to the 1992 Consensus, resulting in 23 formal agreements including the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 28).

The era of Tsai Ing-wen's (DPP) leadership since 2016 has brought cross-strait relations into a new, tense phase. President Tsai has firmly rejected the 1992 Consensus, arguing that it has been equated by Beijing with the "One Country, Two Systems" model, which is unacceptable to the people of Taiwan (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 30). Tsai argues that Taiwan is already an independent, sovereign state with the official name Republic of China (Taiwan), thus no further declaration of independence is necessary. This stance is viewed by Beijing as a step towards de jure independence, prompting the PRC to suspend all official communication mechanisms with Taipei. Tsai's rejection of the 1992 Consensus became the justification for Beijing to significantly increase pressure across various domains (Campagnola, 2024, p. 10).

Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China has adopted a much more assertive and impatient stance on the Taiwan issue. Xi has explicitly linked "reunification" with the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," elevating the issue to the core of the Communist Party of China's legitimacy (Keegan & Churchman, 2022, pp. 79–80). In his 2019 speech, Xi Jinping openly equated the 1992 Consensus with the "One Country, Two Systems" formula, a move that effectively ended any existing ambiguity and hardened Taiwan's rejection

of the consensus, especially after witnessing the erosion of autonomy in Hong Kong (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 33). his perceived urgency from Beijing, coupled with China's growing military power, has shifted China's strategy from slow economic absorption to a more coercive and military-oriented posture.

This political turmoil has tangibly manifested in the form of increased military pressure. Since 2020, military aircraft of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) have conducted near-daily incursions into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and routinely cross the Taiwan Strait median line, which previously served as an unofficial boundary (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 49). Large-scale military exercises, such as those conducted after the visit of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in August 2022, have become more frequent and provocative, simulating a blockade and attack on the island (Yuniar & Fitriani, 2022, p. 267). This military pressure, or "gray-zone" tactics, aims to intimidate Taiwan, wear down its military readiness, and create a "new normal" where China's military presence around Taiwan becomes commonplace, while also serving as a strong signal to the United States and its allies. The gray-zone strategy is the use of national power to achieve objectives without openly using force that could trigger a conventional war between states (Anugerah, 2021).

The international dimension, especially the role of the United States, is a key factor that continuously fuels friction. Under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, the US is committed to providing Taiwan with the means to defend itself (Campagnola, 2024, p. 15). Arms sales, high-level official visits, and transits of US warships through the Taiwan Strait, although consistent with Washington's "One China" policy, are always viewed by Beijing as provocations and violations of its sovereignty. From a realist perspective, Taiwan is a critical flashpoint in the great power competition between the US and China (Azzara & Sholeh, 2022, p. 235). Every step of US support for Taiwan is interpreted by China as an attempt to contain its rise, while every assertive action by China towards Taiwan is seen by the US as a threat to the rules-based regional order.

Besides military pressure, political friction also occurs in the diplomatic and economic arenas. China systematically uses its economic power to isolate Taiwan internationally, persuading the few remaining countries to sever formal diplomatic ties with Taipei through "checkbook diplomacy" (Liu, 2023, p. 139). The PRC also actively blocks Taiwan's participation in international organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO), even in an observer capacity (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 10). Economically, although both sides are highly integrated—with China being Taiwan's largest trading partner—Beijing does not hesitate to use this economic dependence as a tool of coercion, such as restricting tourism or banning imports of certain products as punishment for Taipei's political actions (Liu, 2023, p. 145).

Ultimately, the constant friction between China and Taiwan is the result of a series of intertwined and mutually reinforcing factors: an unresolved historical sovereignty conflict; a deepening chasm between an authoritarian political system and a democracy rooted in a distinct national identity; an eroding strategic ambiguity; the rise of an increasingly powerful and impatient China under Xi Jinping; and Taiwan's position as a proxy in the larger geopolitical competition between China and the United States. This combination of factors creates a "deadlock" where the status quo itself is a source of instability, and any attempt to change it by one side is inherently seen as an existential provocation by the other, ensuring that political turmoil will continue to be a defining feature of cross-strait relations for the foreseeable future (Campagnola, 2024, p. 21).

At the core of the ongoing political turmoil, the reunification effort driven by China is the primary engine of tension. Beijing's approach can be characterized as a dual strategy that combines "carrots and sticks," where economic incentives and calls for cultural brotherhood run parallel to firm military intimidation and diplomatic isolation. This strategy is not static but evolves according to the leadership in China and the internal political dynamics in Taiwan. Initially, after the policy shift from "armed liberation" to "peaceful reunification" in 1979, China actively offered various incentives. This strategy is not static but evolves according to the leadership in China

and the internal political dynamics in Taiwan. Initially, after the policy shift from "armed liberation" to "peaceful reunification" in 1979, China actively offered various incentives (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 32). This persuasive effort culminated in the "One Country, Two Systems" proposal designed by Deng Xiaoping, which promised that Taiwan could maintain its capitalist system, autonomous government, and even its own armed forces, provided it recognized Beijing's sovereignty (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 12).

This "carrot" offer was further detailed through Ye Jianying's "Nine-Point Plan" in 1981, which outlined guarantees of a high degree of autonomy for Taiwan post-unification (Curtis & King, 2023, pp. 12–13). In the economic sphere, China opened its doors wide to Taiwanese investment, providing preferential treatment, tax incentives, and broad market access to attract Taiwanese entrepreneurs. This policy was also extended to individuals, offering scholarships for students and facilitating work for Taiwanese citizens on the mainland, with the hope that economic interdependence and people-to-people interactions would naturally foster pro-unification sentiment and erode the desire for independence. The goal behind this was to "win the hearts and minds" of the Taiwanese people and create conditions where political reunification would become a logical and beneficial inevitability (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 32).

However, behind these persuasive efforts, China has never once relinquished the "stick," or the threat of using force (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 32). This commitment was formally institutionalized through the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 (Campagnola, 2024, p. 16). This law, while stating that the state shall "do its utmost with the greatest sincerity to achieve a peaceful unification," also explicitly provides the legal basis for Beijing to use "non-peaceful means" in the event of Taiwan's secession from China, or if China concludes that all possibilities for a peaceful unification have been exhausted (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 33). This law became a primary coercive tool, a clear red line for Taiwan and the international community regarding the consequences of a formal declaration of independence.

This coercive threat is manifested through various pressures. Militarily, China has drastically accelerated the modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) with a focus on Taiwan contingency scenarios (Liu, 2023, p. 141). This includes the deployment of missiles like the DF-16 capable of reaching all of Taiwan, the development of naval and air power to conduct a maritime blockade, as well as air and missile strike campaigns (Azzara & Sholeh, 2022, p. 234). This pressure is also applied through "gray-zone" tactics, such as near-daily fighter jet intrusions into Taiwan's ADIZ to wear down Taiwan's defenses and morale (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 51). Diplomatically, China implements an "Isolated and Alone" strategy by pressuring countries that still have diplomatic relations with Taiwan to switch allegiance to Beijing, as well as obstructing Taiwan's participation in international forums (Azzara & Sholeh, 2022, p. 234).

In the Xi Jinping era, this reunification strategy has undergone a significant sharpening. Xi has shown a greater sense of urgency, linking the resolution of the "Taiwan issue" to the achievement of the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" (Curtis & King, 2023, p. 35). In his 2019 speech, he controversially equated the "1992 Consensus" with the "One Country, Two Systems" formula, a move that effectively eliminated the ambiguous space that had allowed for dialogue and hardened opposition in Taiwan, especially after seeing developments in Hong Kong (Curtis & King, 2023, pp. 33–34). Thus, the "carrot" being offered has become increasingly unattractive to Taiwan, while the "stick" being wielded has become larger and more menacing. This combination of a rejected offer and increasing pressure is the primary source of the constant political turmoil in cross-strait relations today.

The One China Policy as China's Effort to Reunify with Taiwan

The One China Policy serves as the diplomatic and political doctrine that forms the primary foundation for the People's Republic of China's (PRC) strategy to achieve reunification with Taiwan. At its core, this policy is the articulation of Beijing's "One China Principle," which asserts three fundamental components: there is only one Chinese state in the world, the PRC government is the sole legitimate government of all of China, and Taiwan

is an inalienable part of Chinese territory (Chen, 2022, p. 1028; State Council, 2000). The One China Policy serves as the diplomatic and political doctrine that forms the primary foundation for the People's Republic of China's (PRC) strategy to achieve reunification with Taiwan. At its core, this policy is the articulation of Beijing's "One China Principle," which asserts three fundamental components: there is only one Chinese state in the world, the PRC government is the sole legitimate government of all of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory (State Council, 2000)

As a peaceful path to realize reunification, China under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping proposed the "One Country, Two Systems" framework. This concept was first clearly articulated in the 1980s, taking into account the existing realities in Taiwan (State Council, 2025). Under this framework, China promised that after reunification, Taiwan could maintain its capitalist system, way of life, and a high degree of autonomy as a Special Administrative Region. Taiwan would even be allowed to retain its own military forces, and the central government in Beijing would not interfere in Taiwan's local affairs (State Council, 2025) This policy was promoted as a highly flexible solution that respects China's sovereignty while considering Taiwan's specific history and conditions.

The primary function of the One China Policy is to diplomatically isolate Taiwan on the international stage. Beijing makes recognition of the One China Principle an absolute prerequisite for other countries to establish official diplomatic relations (Bagas Romualdi & Rochmat, 2023, p. 42) The implementation of this policy has proven highly effective; its peak was the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 in 1971, which transferred China's representative seat from the ROC to the PRC (Hsieh, 2009, p. 62). Consequently, Taiwan lost its membership in the UN and most intergovernmental international organizations that require sovereign state status (Fabry, 2024, p. 94). This strategy continues with Beijing's efforts to win over the few remaining diplomatic allies that Taiwan still has, aiming to eliminate all international recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty (Fabry, 2024, p. 98).

Besides diplomatic isolation, the One China Policy is used as a justification to exert political and military pressure on Taiwan. By claiming Taiwan as a "rebel province" or part of its domestic territory, Beijing feels it has the legal legitimacy to use force if necessary to prevent formal secession (State Council, 2000, p. 8). The PRC's Anti-Secession Law of 2005 explicitly codifies the threat of using "non-peaceful means" if Taiwan formally declares independence (Chen, 2022, p. 1030). Military pressure, such as intensive air and sea patrols around the Taiwan Strait, is consistently used to intimidate, erode morale, and deter any political movements in Taiwan that lead towards de jure independence (Chen, 2022, p. 1036).

On the other hand, this policy also functions as a framework for reunification negotiations. Beijing consistently states that cross-strait dialogue can only occur if the Taiwanese side accepts the One China Principle as a common foundation (State Council, 2000, p. 9). The "One Country, Two Systems" model is offered as the final outcome of such negotiations, where Taiwan is promised a high degree of autonomy in its political and economic systems after reunification (State Council, 2025). The "1992 Consensus" formula, understood by the Kuomintang (KMT) as "One China with respective interpretations," serves as an example of how this framework can be applied flexibly to allow for dialogue, even though the interpretations of both sides ultimately remain fundamentally different (Chen, 2022, p. 1034).

On the international stage, the PRC requires other countries to recognize the One China Principle as a prerequisite for establishing diplomatic relations, which effectively isolates Taiwan (Bagas Romualdi & Rochmat, 2023, p. 42). However, many countries, notably the United States, adopt a more ambiguous policy, merely "acknowledging" China's position that Taiwan is part of China, but not explicitly "recognizing" PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. This ambiguity, reinforced by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, allows the US to maintain official diplomatic relations with Beijing while simultaneously continuing unofficial relations and defensive arms sales to Taiwan (De Morais et al., 2018). This foreign policy framework has globally

marginalized Taiwan but has also paradoxically protected it from direct military action (Fabry, 2024, p. 92).

The One China Policy represents China's major effort for reunification. This policy has succeeded in diplomatically isolating Taiwan and providing justification for political and military pressure. However, its effectiveness in achieving the ultimate goal of reunification is very limited. The policy has failed to win the hearts and minds of the majority of Taiwan's democratic society, which possesses an increasingly strong identity. Coupled with the balancing role of the United States, this policy has instead created a deep strategic deadlock, where a tense status quo persists with no final resolution in sight for the future.

The Potential of China-Taiwan Reunification: An Examination of the Systemic Evolution and Integration Scenario

The discourse surrounding the reunification of the People's Republic of China (China) and Taiwan is often dominated by the shadow of military conflict and geopolitical tensions. However, when analyzed through a more gradualist theoretical framework, such as the "Unification through Systemic Evolution and Integration" scenario proposed by Charles Wolf Jr. and Kamil Akramov, a strategic and comprehensive non-military path becomes visible. This theory, initially applied to the Korean context, posits that unification can occur when one economic system (in this case, Taiwan) gradually integrates with and becomes compatible with a larger system (China), ultimately paving the way for political integration (Wolf & Akramov, 2005, p. 22). Although Taiwan's strengthening national identity and international support pose significant obstacles, various supporting factors from the economic, legal, and socio-cultural spheres indicate that China is actively implementing a strategy aligned with this evolutionary and integrationist model.

The "Unification through Systemic Evolution and Integration" theoretical framework asserts that the unification process does not happen forcefully or suddenly, but rather through an evolution where one system gradually adopts the economic model of another, which is then followed by political adjustments. In the China-Taiwan context, this scenario does not

mean Taiwan must abandon its market system, but rather that China leverages its economic power to create an extremely high level of dependency and compatibility. This process would make separation economically irrational. The steps include economic liberalization, increased cross-strait trade and investment, until a mutually complementary economic structure is achieved. When this dependency reaches a critical point, the path towards political integration, such as a federal or special autonomy model, will become more open and acceptable as a pragmatic necessity (Wolf & Akramov, 2005, pp. 22–25).

Supporting Factor 1: Comprehensive Economic Integration as the Foundation

The primary supporting factor for this scenario is the massive and strategically driven level of economic integration pursued by China. Over the last few decades, cross-strait economic relations have grown exponentially. At its peak, China absorbed more than 40% of Taiwan's total exports, and Taiwan's cumulative investment on the mainland reached over \$206.37 billion (Bagas Romualdi & Rochmat, 2023, p. 47; Wu, 2024, p. 3). The phenomenon known as "Chiwan"—products designed in Taiwan but manufactured in China—demonstrates the deep entanglement of the two entities' supply chains (Hsieh, 2009, p. 74). This dependence is asymmetrical; although China benefits, Taiwan's economy is far more vulnerable to policy changes from Beijing (Chow, 2008b, p. 15).

This integration is not merely a result of market mechanisms but is supported by a deliberate legal and policy framework. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), negotiated under WTO rules, became a historic milestone that positioned both as "normal trading partners" (Hsieh, 2009, p. 74). Beijing consistently views Taiwan's economy as "highly complementary with the mainland" (Maguire, 2022). By creating such strong dependency, Beijing strategically narrows the political options for Taiwanese leaders, where any policy leading to separation would bring severe economic consequences for Taiwan's society and industries (West & Insisa, 2024, p. 194).

Supporting Factor 2: Lawfare and Socio-Cultural Integration

China's integration strategy extends beyond the economic domain into the legal and socio-cultural realms, an approach experts call "lawfare" and "hybrid influencing" (West & Insisa, 2024, p. 187). Lawfare in this context is the use of China's domestic legal instruments to shape the perception and reality of cross-strait relations. The most prominent example is the "31 Measures" package launched in 2018, designed to "attract Taiwanese businesspeople and 'compatriots' (tongbao)" by offering equal treatment to Chinese citizens in various national schemes, including access to funding and professional qualifications (West & Insisa, 2024, pp. 195–196). These measures effectively erode sovereign boundaries by integrating Taiwanese individuals and entities into China's social and economic system.

A more recent strategy is the development of a "cross-strait integrated development demonstration zone" in Fujian Province, a project explicitly targeting "economic integration, social integration, and emotional integration." Fujian, claimed as the ancestral homeland for 80% of Taiwanese people, is utilized to build "spiritual bonds" through various traditional connections such as clan ties, similar customs, and religious beliefs like the worship of the Goddess Mazu (Wu, 2024, pp. 3-4). The younger generation of Taiwan is also a primary target through various cultural exchange programs, summer camps, and scholarships, all aimed at "enhancing their cultural and emotional identity" with the mainland. This approach is a manifestation of the ancient doctrine "conquering the enemy's heart is the best option in war" (攻心为上), a form of soft power aimed at eroding the will to resist from within.

The Reunification Scheme through Evolution and Integration

Based on the supporting factors above, the reunification scheme through systemic evolution and integration can be depicted in three gradual and interconnected phases. Each phase is designed to build the foundation for the next, with the ultimate goal of achieving political unification with minimal resistance.

Phase 1: Deepening Economic and Social Dependence (Economics Before Politics)

This phase focuses on strengthening interdependence to an irreversible point. Policies like the ECFA and the development of the Fujian integration zone serve as its main instruments. The goal is to bind Taiwan's economy so tightly to China's that any attempt at political separation would be considered "economic suicide" by business elites and a large portion of the Taiwanese public. At this stage, China actively encourages Taiwanese citizens and companies to live, work, and invest on the mainland, which slowly blurs the lines between "us" and "them" at the individual and corporate levels. China selectively offers economic incentives to groups and individuals in Taiwan deemed "friendly" with the aim of creating pro-integration factions within Taiwanese politics (Dittmer, 2008, p. 182).

Phase 2: Normalization and Political Dialogue (Building Elite Consensus)

Once economic and social dependency reaches a mature level, pressure for political normalization will naturally increase. In this phase, China's united front approach becomes crucial (Wu, 2024, p. 2). Beijing will actively engage in dialogue with Taiwanese political elites considered more accommodative, as has been done with opposition leaders (Dittmer, 2008, p. 188). The narrative constructed is that dialogue is necessary to manage the already highly integrated economic relationship and to ensure regional stability. The 1992 Consensus, with its flexible interpretation, will continue to be promoted as the foundation for resuming formal political negotiations. The objective is to create a political coalition in Taiwan that views reunification as a pragmatic solution.

Phase 3: Political Integration in the form of Special Autonomy (Ultimate Goal)

This is the culminating phase where political reunification is formally negotiated. The "One Country, Two Systems" framework will be offered as the final solution, promising a high degree of autonomy for Taiwan in its domestic affairs, including its legal system and armed forces, in exchange for the

surrender of foreign sovereignty to (Bagas Romualdi & Rochmat, 2023, p. 41; Hsieh, 2009, p. 69). At this point, with the economy fully integrated and support from a significant political faction in Taiwan, resistance to this model is expected to be much weaker. Reunification would no longer be seen as a conquest, but as a logical step to secure the prosperity and stability built during the preceding phases.

Although the potential for military conflict in the Taiwan Strait captures global attention, an analysis through the "Unification through Systemic Evolution and Integration" framework by (Wolf & Akramov, 2005) reveals a sophisticated, long-term non-military strategy from China. This strategy does not rely on coercion, but on creating conditions where reunification becomes the most logical and unavoidable choice for Taiwan. By leveraging its immense economic power, China systematically builds a web of economic, social, and cultural dependencies designed to erode Taiwan's desire for independence and weaken political resistance from within. The success of this strategy is not guaranteed, as it must contend with the strength of Taiwan's democratic identity and the role of the United States. However, this approach is the clearest manifestation of Beijing's ambition to achieve "victory without fighting," a long-held strategic goal (West & Insisa, 2024, p. 186). For the international community, understanding the non-military dimensions of China's strategy is just as important as monitoring its military developments, because it is in this realm that the real battle for Taiwan's future may already be underway.

Benefits of Reunification for Both Nations

Benefits for China

For China, reunification with Taiwan represents the pinnacle of a long-term strategic goal that goes beyond merely resolving an unfinished civil war. The primary benefit is the realization of "national rejuvenation," which has been a historic mission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) since the Mao Zedong era. This is seen as a crucial step to erase the "century of humiliation" and fully restore China's territorial integrity (Moore, 2025; State Council, 2022). Politically, successfully unifying with Taiwan would be a monumental

legacy for the current leader, Xi Jinping, strengthening his domestic legitimacy and consolidating his power amidst internal party competition(Moore, 2025).

From a geo-economic and technological standpoint, controlling Taiwan would provide invaluable advantages. China would gain direct control over the world's leading semiconductor industry, particularly Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which produces more than 90% of the most advanced chips globally. This would not only resolve China's strategic dependence on foreign technology but also give it immense economic and technological leverage over other countries, including the United States (Moore, 2025). With China's GDP already more than 22 times that of Taiwan, this economic integration would further strengthen China's position as a global economic giant (State Council, 2022)

Geopolitically and militarily, reunification would fundamentally alter the security landscape in the Asia-Pacific. By controlling Taiwan, China would be able to break through the "First Island Chain," a strategic defense line that has hitherto hindered its naval power projection into the Pacific (Bukhari et al., 2024, p. 108). This would significantly enhance China's defense posture, thwart containment efforts by the United States and its allies, and eliminate Taiwan as an entity that could potentially be used by external forces against China's interests (State Council, 2022). Essentially, reunification is key for China to secure its sovereignty, security, and development interests on the world stage.

Benefit for Taiwan (According to China's Perspective)

The Chinese government, through its official white papers, claims that reunification will bring extensive prosperity and opportunities to Taiwan. Beijing argues that after reunification, under the "One Country, Two Systems" framework, Taiwan will still be able to maintain its current social system and enjoy a high degree of autonomy. The rights and interests of the Taiwanese people are promised to be fully protected. China asserts that reunification will end the long-standing political confrontation and eliminate the military

threat, thus allowing people on both sides of the strait to "cast off the shadow of civil war and enjoy lasting peace" (State Council, 2022).

On the economic front, China promises that Taiwan's economy will gain enormous benefits from access to the vast mainland market, thereby increasing competitiveness, strengthening supply chains, and boosting innovative. Many of the chronic economic problems facing Taiwan, according to Beijing, can be resolved through integrated development. Taiwan's fiscal revenue could then be more effectively allocated to improve the standard of living for its people. Furthermore, Taiwan's cultural creativity is also promised to flourish, enriched by the broader Chinese civilization (State Council, 2022).

Although China outlines these various advantages, many in Taiwan and international analysts view these claims with deep skepticism. The main counterargument is that Taiwan is currently a *de facto* sovereign state, with a liberal democratic political system, a modern economy, and broad civil liberties. From this perspective, reunification in any form, even the most benign, would mean a loss—especially the loss of sovereignty and the ability to determine one's own destiny—not a gain (Cole, 2015). The promise of "One Country, Two Systems" has lost its credibility for many Taiwanese after seeing the erosion of freedoms in Hong Kong (Schneider, 2020).

Furthermore, the promised economic benefits are also questioned. Taiwan has successfully built strong trade relationships around the world, and many believe that further integration can be achieved through trade agreements without sacrificing sovereignty (Cole, 2015). Concerns have arisen that excessive economic dependence on China could be used as a tool of political coercion by Beijing (Schneider, 2020). Ultimately, the development of a solidifying Taiwanese identity, distinct from that of mainland China, serves as a fundamental barrier to the idea of reunification (Moore, 2025). For many Taiwanese, the greatest advantage is maintaining the status quo: *de facto* independence with the democratic system they have painstakingly built.

CONCLUSION

This research comprehensively asserts that China's reunification efforts toward Taiwan cannot be understood solely through the lens of military confrontation. Beijing's "One China Policy" framework has evolved into a sophisticated, long-term, non-military strategy. By adopting the theoretical model of "Unification through Systemic Evolution and Integration" proposed by Wolf and Akramov, this analysis demonstrates that China is systematically creating conditions where reunification is expected to become a pragmatic inevitability, not a forced conquest. This gradual approach is designed to slowly erode Taiwan's sovereignty from within, with the ultimate goal of achieving a "victory without fighting" through deep integration across various sectors of life, thereby rendering political resistance economically and socially irrelevant.

The implementation of this evolution and integration scheme rests on two main, mutually reinforcing pillars. The first pillar is comprehensive economic integration, which has created massive asymmetric dependence. With China absorbing over 40% of Taiwan's total exports and being the destination for cumulative investment exceeding \$206.37 billion, Beijing strategically narrows Taipei's political maneuverability, where any policy moving toward separation would imply economic devastation. The second pillar, more subtle but equally important, is the use of "lawfare" and socio-cultural integration. Policies like the "31 Measures" effectively integrate Taiwanese individuals and entities into China's socio-economic system, blurring the lines of sovereignty. The development of an "integrated development demonstration zone" in Fujian further aims to build "emotional bonds" and "spiritual ties" to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people.

Although China's integration strategy is meticulously designed and backed by vast resources, its success faces highly significant fundamental challenges. The primary obstacle stems from within Taiwanese society itself: the strengthening of a democratic identity that is fundamentally different from China's authoritarian system. Taiwan's transformation into a dynamic democracy has fostered a strong national identity, wherein a majority of its

citizens—especially the younger generation—no longer identify as Chinese. Rejection of the "One Country, Two Systems" model has hardened, particularly after the Taiwanese people witnessed the erosion of autonomy and civil liberties in Hong Kong, which caused Beijing's promises to lose their credibility. The failure of this policy to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people stands as the most crucial barrier to achieving peaceful reunification.

Ultimately, the interaction between China's push for reunification and Taiwan's resistance creates a "strategic stalemate" that defines current cross-strait relations. On one hand, China continues its non-military integration strategy with patience, believing that economic and social dependence will eventually force Taiwan to the negotiating table. On the other hand, the solidity of Taiwan's democratic identity, coupled with the balancing role of the United States through the framework of the Taiwan Relations Act, forms a robust defense against annexation efforts. Thus, Taiwan's future is not determined by the threat of invasion alone, but by the outcome of a long-term contest between the forces of economic integration led by China and the forces of political identity rooted in Taiwan. The real battle for Taiwan's future has likely been and will continue to be waged in this non-military realm.

REFERENCES

- Anugerah, B. (2021). PENGUATAN STRATEGI PENANGKALAN DALAM MERESPONS AKSI KOERSIF CINA DI LAUT NATUNA UTARA. *Dinamika Global : Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional*, 6(02), 286 - 307. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.36859/jdg.v6i2.701>
- Azzara, H. N., & Sholeh, B. (2022). A conflict between China and Taiwan: An analysis from a realism perspective. *Journal of Social Studies (JSS)*, ISSN(2), 229–236. <https://doi.org/10.21831/jss.v18i2.49721.229-236>
- Bagas Romualdi, K., & Rochmat, S. (2023). Telaah Potensi Reunifikasi Tiongkok Terhadap Taiwan: Tinjauan Teori Attitudinal Factor. *Review of International Relations*, 5(1), 41–53.
- Blanchette, J., Boland, B., & McElwee, L. (2023, May 26). *What is Beijing's Timeline for "Reunification" with Taiwan?* <https://interpret.csis.org/what-is-beijings-timeline-for-reunification-with-taiwan/>
- Bromley, J. E. (2017). *German Reunification : Unfinished Business*. Routledge. <https://www.routledge.com/Routledge->

- Bukhari, S. R. H., Khan, A. U., Ul Haq, I., & Ullah, T. (2024). The Geopolitical Implications of Taiwan-China Relations on Regional Security. *Spry Contemporary Educational Practices (SCEP)*, 3(1). <https://doi.org/10.62681/sprypublishers.scep/3/1/6>
- Campagnola, D. (2024). The status quo between Taiwan and China: The inevitability of a dramatic end? *Taiwan Politics*, November, 1. <https://doi.org/10.58570/001c.125900>
- Chen, & Chien-Kai. (2018). *Political Economy of China-Taiwan Relations: Origins and Development*. The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group.
- Chen, Y. J. (2022). "One China" Contention in China-Taiwan Relations: Law, Politics and Identity. *China Quarterly*, 252, 1025-1044. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741022001333>
- Chiang, F. (2018). *The One-China Policy: State, Sovereignty, and Taiwan's International Legal Status*. Elsevier Ltd.
- Chow, P. C. Y. (2008a). *The "One China" Dilemma*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chow, P. C. Y. (2008b). *The "One China" Dilemma*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cole, J. M. (2015, May 19). *What Would Taiwan Actually Gain from Reunification with China? The National Interest*. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-would-taiwan-actually-gain-reunification-china-12916>
- Curtis, J., & King, W. (2023). *Taiwan: Relations with China*.
- De Moraes, I. N., Deng, B. L., & Colbert, C. R. T. (2018). One China Policy: Origins and Implications for the Current US Taiwan Policy. *Mural Internacional*, 9(1), 8-20. <https://doi.org/10.12957/rmi.2018.36080>
- Dittmer, L. (2008). Triangular Diplomacy Amid Leadership Transition . In P. C. Y. Chow (Ed.), *The "One China" Dilemma* . Palgrave Macmillan.
- DK Publishing. (2017). *The Vietnam War : The Definitive Illustrated History* (M. van Zyl & D. Ganesh, Eds.). DK Publishing.
- Fabry, M. (2024). The Effect of 'One China' Policies of Foreign States on the International Status of Taiwan. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 35(1), 90-115. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2024.2303855>
- Firsana Dewi, I., & Utami Dewi, K. (2018). Strategi Pemerintahan Xi Jinping terhadap Taiwan dalam Mengamankan Kedaulatan Tiongkok. *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional*, 7(2). <https://doi.org/10.18196/hi.72136>
- Gore, C. (2011). *Regions in Question Space, Development theory and Regional Policy*. Routledge.
- Guan, A. C. (2002). *The Vietnam War from the Other Side : The Vietnamese Communists' Perspective*. Routledge.

- Hsieh, P. L. (2009). The Taiwan Question and the One-China Policy: Legal Challenges with Renewed Momentum. *Staaten Im Völkerrecht*, 84(3), 59–81. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23773999>
- Kämmerer, J. A., & Schäfer, H.-B. (2021). *Brexit : Legal and Economic Aspects of a Political Divorce*. Edward Edgar Publishing Ltd.
- Keegan, D. J., & Churchman, K. (2022). China-Taiwan Relations: Taiwan Gains Ground Internationally, but Will China Retaliate? *A Triannual E-Journal of Bilateral Relations in the Indo-Pacific*, 23(3), 79–90.
- Liu, K. (2023). Cross-Strait Relations Between Taiwan and Mainland China: The Economic Imbalance and its Implications. *China Report*, 59(2), 133–153. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00094455231183239>
- Maguire, D. (2022). *Why does China want Taiwan when it's already so big and rich? The answer is about more than land and money.* <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-08-12/why-does-china-want-taiwan-military-strategic-location/101321856>
- Minkler, L. (2008). Integrity and Agreement : Economics When Principles Also Matter. In *University of Michigan*. The University of Michigan Press.
- Moore, G. J. (2025, April 21). *Xi Jinping's Taiwan Dashboard: Considering Xi's Calculus for a Possible Move on Taiwan*. Official United States Air Force. <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/4168508/xi-jinpings-taiwan-dashboard-considering-xis-calculus-for-a-possible-move-on-ta/>
- Planck, C. R. . (2019). *The Changing Status of German Reunification in Western Diplomacy, 1955–1966*. John Hopkins University Press.
- Sandler, S. (1995). *The Korean War: An Encyclopedia* (S. Sandler, Ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315056265>
- Schneider, D. (2020, October 22). *China-Taiwan Cross-Strait Relations: Evaluating Taiwan's Response to China's Reunification Quest*. Institute of World Politics. <https://www.iwp.edu/authors/david-schneider/>
- Singh, G. (2025). Is China Planning to Attack Taiwan? *Journal of World Affairs: Voice of the Global South*, 1(1), 21–29. <https://doi.org/10.1177/29769442251324711>
- State Council. (2000, February 21). *The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue*. Xinhua Nes Agency. <https://interpret.csis.org/translations/the-one-china-principle-and-the-taiwan-issue/>
- State Council. (2022, August 10). *The Taiwan Question and China's "Reunification" in the New Era*. Interpret.Csis.Org. <https://interpret.csis.org/translations/the-taiwan-question-and-chinas-reunification-in-the-new-era/#:~:text=The%20white%20paper%20provides%20a%20comprehensive%20overview%20of,tensions%2C%20and%20a%20policy%20pathway%20for%20achieving%20%E2%80%9Creunification.%E2%80%9D>

- State Council. (2025). *A policy of “one country, two systems” on Taiwan*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China. www.fmprc.gov.cn
- The European Institute for International Relations. (2025, February 25). *Will Taiwan eventually be reunified with China?* <https://www.eiir.eu/international-relations/asia/will-taiwan-eventually-be-reunified-with-china/#:~:text=Despite%20the%20strong%20economic%20links%20between%20them%20and,shape%20the%20possibilities%20of%20reunification%20or%20continued%20separation>
- The Straits Times. (2025, January 1). *Xi Jinping says no one can stop China’s ‘reunification’ with Taiwan*. <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/xi-says-no-one-can-stop-chinas-reunification-with-taiwan>
- Warsito, T. (2017). *Rasionalitas Politik*. Komojoyo Press.
- Welfens, P. J. J. (1992). *Economic Aspects of German Unification: National and International Perspectives*. <https://doi.org/3-540-55006-2>
- West, M. J., & Insisa, A. (2024). Reunifying Taiwan with China through Cross-Strait Lawfare. *The China Quarterly*, 186–201. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741023000735>
- Wolf, Charles., & Akramov, Kamil. (2005). *North Korean paradoxes: circumstances, costs, and consequences of Korean unification*. RAND Corp.
- Wu, G. (2024, November 16). *The United Front, Comprehensive Integration, and China’s Nonmilitary Strategy Toward Taiwan*. Asia Society Policy Institute. <https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/united-front-comprehensive-integration-and-chinas-nonmilitary-strategy-toward-taiwan>
- Yuniar, E. T., & Fitriani. (2022). Review of Regional Developments: The Dynamics of China-Taiwan Relations and the Possibility of Open Conflict: An Overview. *Indonesian Quarterly*, 50(3), 262–273.