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Asymmetric Relations Between Indonesia and Singapore: A Study on the Failure of the 2016 Repatriation Program for Indonesian Citizens' Wealth and Assets Abroad

Mohammad Mohtar Mas'oed

Professor, Gadjah Mada University

The effort to repatriate funds stored abroad by Indonesian citizens, as part of the 2016 Tax Amnesty Program by the government, was deemed a failure. Only 14% of the expected funds were brought back into the country. This is very disappointing, considering the government needs substantial funds to support the financing of Indonesia's economic development, especially physical economic infrastructure development. Given that a significant portion of the funds held abroad by Indonesians is in Singapore and that the Indonesian government had requested Singapore's assistance to facilitate the repatriation of these funds, this phenomenon raises interesting questions. There are even suspicions that the Singaporean government did not care enough and may have even hindered these repatriation efforts. This paper attempts to highlight this issue and place it within the study of a central concept in political science and international relations, namely power. Considering physical geographical size (Indonesia being the largest), demographic (the largest population), and economic (the largest GDP), why can the much larger country not influence the smaller one? Why is "Goliath" powerless in front of "Lilliput"? This case triggers a theoretical discussion about the meaning of power in political science and international relations analysis. How is power discussed in this body of knowledge? Among the various approaches in the literature, one that aptly describes the situation where the "large" is powerless against the "small" is Benjamin Cohen's "power of the balance of payment.".

Even actors blessed with resources and opportunities suffer bad outcomes if they pursue unrealistic goals or employ bad strategies.

(Stephen Krasner. "Preface", Back to Basics, p. 3)

This paper discusses the power relations between two neighboring countries with many differences in various dimensions, namely Indonesia and Singapore. The discussion will be presented in two parts. The first part contains a brief substantive story about the Indonesian government's efforts under President Joko Widodo to mobilize funds for the economic development of his country. One interesting policy is the Tax Amnesty Program designed to mobilize funds and assets of Indonesian citizens scattered abroad. The relationship between this policy and the interactions between Indonesia and Singapore is the subject of discussion in this first part. The second part tries to place this issue into the debate about the most important concept in political science and international relations studies, namely "power." This is especially to understand the phenomenon of smaller countries that can avoid the influence of larger countries without provoking open conflict.

Anomaly?

President Joko Widodo began his administration with a massive infrastructure development agenda. This program was estimated to require IDR 346.6 trillion. Thus, large-scale fund mobilization was necessary. Given the limited government revenue from taxes and other income, alternative funding sources had to be found.

One such initiative was the Tax Amnesty Program launched by the government in 2016. The aim of this program was to increase state revenue by encouraging taxpayers' participation and the repatriation of funds held abroad by Indonesian citizens.

Considering the strong indications that many Indonesian citizens held substantial funds abroad, much of which could be classified as "capital flight," the government set a repatriation target of IDR 1,000 trillion. The program ended on March 31, 2017.

When the Tax Amnesty Program concluded, the achievements fell far short of the target. Only IDR 147 trillion was successfully repatriated, which is only 14.7% of the IDR 1,000 trillion target, and only 3% of the total declared assets amounting to IDR 4,854.63 trillion. Although there was a record increase in the number of taxpayers filing Annual Tax Returns (SPT), reaching 9 million people, only about 956,000 participated in the Tax Amnesty Program. Yet, there were 32.7 million registered taxpayers with a Taxpayer Identification Number (NPWP) and 20.1 million who received SPT forms.

The effort to mobilize funds by appealing to wealthy Indonesians who had placed their capital abroad cannot be considered successful. The government was apparently unable to persuade its citizens to repatriate their assets. This issue becomes more intriguing as it involves the relationship between Indonesia and Singapore, with Singapore being the primary holder of the assets the Indonesian government sought to repatriate.

According to the order of the largest amounts of Indonesian taxpayers' assets held abroad, Singapore ranks first. It is noted that 73.08% of declared foreign assets are in Singapore, amounting to IDR 751.19 trillion. The second position is held by the Virgin Islands (IDR 76.92 trillion), followed by Hong Kong (IDR 56.27 trillion), the Cayman Islands (IDR 52.86 trillion), and Australia (IDR 41.15 trillion). In line with protocol, the Indonesian government under President Joko Widodo requested support from the Singaporean government to allow Indonesian citizens to repatriate their funds and assets from Singapore to Indonesia. Singapore responded to this request by promising support. However, in practice, this promise was not fulfilled.

From a commonsense perspective, considering the magnitude of the funds involved, it is not difficult to understand why the Singaporean government, despite receiving a request from the Indonesian government to assist in repatriating Indonesian capital accumulated in that neighboring country, could not fulfill the request. There are strong indications that Singapore undertook actions to impede the return of assets to Indonesia. Singapore's reluctance was predictable.

However, the more theoretically significant question is "why did the Singaporean government manage to avoid or resist Indonesia's influence to help in the repatriation process?"

Based on conventional power metrics in political and international relations literature, it can be said that Indonesia's potential to "influence the thoughts and behaviors" of others far exceeds Singapore's capabilities. However, in this case, that potential could not be realized. A country with a population of 250 million was powerless against a country with a population of 5 million.

How can this "anomaly" be explained? How can Singapore's behavior towards Indonesia in this case be understood? What conceptualization and theoretical framework are needed to understand the behavior of a small country in handling interactions with a larger country and successfully avoiding its influence?

Tax Amnesty Program July 2016 – March 2017

According to Article 2 of the 2016 Tax Amnesty Law, the program aimed to achieve three goals. **First**, to accelerate economic growth and restructuring through the transfer of assets, which would among other things, impact domestic liquidity, improve the rupiah exchange rate, lower interest rates, and increase investment. **Second**, to encourage tax reform towards a more valid, comprehensive, and integrated tax system. **Third**, to increase tax revenue, which would be used to finance development.

What were the results? According to Enny Sri Hartati, Executive Director of the Institute for Development of Economics and Finance, at the Indonesia Stock Exchange, Jakarta, on Tuesday, April 4, 2017, the results were as follows:

- Domestic asset declaration: IDR 3,676 trillion
- Foreign asset declaration: IDR 1,031 trillion
- Repatriation or transfer of assets: IDR 147 trillion
- Redemption money received by the state: IDR 114 trillion
- Arrears payment: IDR 18.6 trillion
- Initial proof payment: IDR 1.75 trillion (*Kompas*, April 4, 2017).

Based on the results by the end of March 2017, it was concluded that:

The first goal was not achieved. Repatriation only amounted to IDR 147 trillion. “This result did not significantly lower interest rates. Investment (reflected in PMTB/Gross Fixed Capital Formation) did not increase. The Rupiah exchange rate remains very vulnerable to external issues."

The second goal was somewhat successful. The result shows there is still hope for expanding the tax base, although the addition of new taxpayers from the tax amnesty program is far from the potential 45 million who do not have a Taxpayer Identification Number (NPWP). According to Enny, "from the IDR 4,855 trillion, profiling can be done by the Directorate General of Taxes to expand the tax base. This addition will come from those who previously did not fully report their Annual Tax Return (SPT).

The third goal, increasing tax revenue, also did not reach the target. According to Enny, this cannot be achieved solely through the tax amnesty program. The main issue with the low tax ratio is tax payment compliance. (Enny Sri Hartati (Executive Director of the Institute for Development of Economics and Finance) in ibid.)

In understanding Indonesia-Singapore relations, this paper focuses on the first goal, namely the transfer of Indonesian citizens' assets placed abroad back into the country or repatriation.

Why did the first goal fail?

According to many observers, there are two possible reasons: first, the low level of trust in Indonesian banks. Second, the suspicion of obstructions from Singapore's financial authorities.

The low success rate of repatriation is not due to a lack of prepared instruments. It relates to the main nature of banking transactions. The key consideration for someone to place funds or invest is trust. The low level of trust in Indonesian banking is suspected to have caused many fund owners to keep their money abroad.

This paper is more interested in the suspicion that Singapore's financial authorities obstructed the process. How was this obstruction carried out? Based on various reports and analyses, it can be illustrated that the Singaporean government, although possibly not openly, implemented a "carrot and sticks" strategy.

According to Shinta Widjaja Kamdani, Deputy Chair of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, to prevent Indonesian citizens from withdrawing their funds and bringing them back to Indonesia, the Singaporean government offered incentives. Through these incentives, it was hoped that Indonesian fund holders would only declare their funds and assets but not repatriate them to Indonesia (Deny, 2016).

The first scheme is described as follows. The Singaporean government offered incentives by paying the redemption fee for assets that Indonesian citizens wanted to declare. According to the regulations on this repatriation, for the first three months, the redemption fee on the declared foreign assets that Indonesian citizens had to pay to the Indonesian government was 4 percent. The Singaporean financial authorities were willing to subsidize the payment of this 4 percent penalty. By declaring and paying the tax penalty for these assets, Indonesian citizens were entitled to amnesty from the Indonesian government for unpaid tax liabilities. This was the "carrot," the "lure." This way, it was hoped that funds originating from Indonesia would not leave Singapore. Meanwhile, the assets belonging to Indonesian citizens were believed to remain in Singapore because the process of transferring them was much more difficult. (Deny, 2016).

The second scheme involved sanctions (the "stick"). According to this analysis, when President Jokowi's government implemented the "Tax Amnesty" program, Singaporean banks reportedly planned to report suspicious transactions on the accounts of Indonesian citizens. This is actually a common policy in banking practices. In managing customer funds, banks worldwide certainly implement the principle of prudence. For instance, when there are indications of suspicious transactions conducted by their customers, banks will require thorough inspections. However, according to this information source, Singapore's financial authorities did not genuinely apply this prudential principle when accepting funds from their customers. There were no investigations into the origin of these funds. Only when the Indonesian government implemented the program to transfer Indonesian citizens' funds held in Singaporean financial institutions did the financial authorities of the neighboring country require their banks to report suspicious transactions, in accordance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regulations (Deny, 2016).

According to a Reuters news report (September 15, 2016), based on information from Singaporean banking sources, in 2015, the Singaporean police unit handling financial crimes, the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD), required banks to report suspicious transactions (suspicious transaction report or STR) by customers if those customers intended to participate in Indonesia's tax amnesty program. Initially, the banks resisted this because they feared losing customers. However, after the Indonesian government announced the 2016 tax amnesty program aiming to attract back the funds of wealthy Indonesians placed in Singaporean banks, the Singaporean central bank (MAS, the Monetary Authority of Singapore) reinforced the police order.

As a result, private banks in Singapore reported suspicious transactions by their customers without informing the customers about these reports. This means that these banks provided the names of Indonesian clients who wanted to participate in Indonesia's tax amnesty program, many of whom were suspected of holding funds obtained through legally problematic means. This clearly hindered the transfer of funds to Indonesia and disrupted the tax amnesty's objectives. The rationale, of course, was that they did not want to lose the funds, which were estimated to be very large.

After the Reuters report was published, Singapore's central bank (MAS) announced that Singaporean banks were encouraged to prompt their Indonesian clients to take advantage of the Indonesian government's tax amnesty program to regularize their tax affairs. In the release, the central bank stated: "Banks are required to adhere to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standard of filing a suspicious transaction report (STR) when handling tax amnesty cases, similar to the practice in other jurisdictions."

FATF is a global body that conducts regular evaluations of countries' performance in applying anti-money laundering standard rules. The Singapore central bank stated that participating in the tax amnesty program would not cause Singaporean police to launch criminal investigations. As quoted by Reuters, “The expectation for an STR to be filed on account of a client participating in a tax amnesty program should therefore not discourage clients from participation” (Reuters, 2016).

In July 2013, Singapore enacted the "Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (CDSA)." This new law stipulated that tax evasion was considered a criminal offense, akin to corruption, drug trafficking, money laundering, and the like. In September 2014, this law was amended, with an added clarification that the principle of "dual criminality" was not required. This means that if a Singaporean bank customer committed serious tax offenses outside Singapore, the Singaporean police were required to investigate regardless of whether such tax evasion would also be a criminal offense if committed in Singapore. Thus, since July 2013, Singaporean financial institutions that received or helped customers hold funds, knowing that these funds were the result of tax evasion, were deemed to be in violation of this stringent law. Enforcement of this law was tightened following a massive corruption scandal in Malaysia, namely the 1MDB case, which revealed that Singaporean banks were involved in managing problematic funds. The requirement to file an STR was intended to ensure that these banks did not repeat such negligence and seriously evaluated the flow of problematic funds.

As cited in the Reuters report, a senior executive at a Singapore-based asset management firm said: “The moment the client tells you he’s participating in the amnesty, you have a suspicion that the assets with you are not compliant, and so you have to report to the authorities.” Another source, Wilson Ang from the law firm Norton Rose Fulbright, stated: “In light of the toughening regulatory environment, banks need to conduct more proactive checks on the effectiveness of their internal controls and procedures.” (Reuters, 2016). The story about the STR requirement reported by Reuters was confirmed by several senior bank officials, but they declined to comment further.

Why Did Singapore Seem Concerned About the Possible Exodus of Indonesian Capital from Singapore? The following data may provide some insight:

A significant portion of the funds held abroad by Indonesian citizens is in Singapore. Banks in the neighboring country are the primary place for wealthy Indonesians to store their money. According to Finance Minister Sri Mulyani: "A study by a credible international consultant explains that of the US$250 billion or Rp3,250 trillion of the wealth of the richest Indonesians placed abroad, about US$200 billion or Rp2,600 trillion is stored in Singapore.” (Antara News Agency, 2017a).

Most of the repatriated funds of Indonesian citizens abroad come from Singapore. According to data from the Directorate General of Taxes as of September 15, 2016, the amount of asset repatriation from the tax amnesty program from Singapore reached Rp14.09 trillion or 76.14 percent of the total repatriation. Meanwhile, the net assets declared by Indonesian citizens residing in Singapore reached Rp103.16 trillion or 74.51 percent of the total foreign asset declarations.

Nearly half of the assets in Singapore's private banks are owned by Indonesian citizens. According to Reuters: ". . . Indonesians hold an estimated $200 billion in private banking assets . . . 40 percent of the island's total private banking" (Reuters, 2016).

It is very understandable why Singapore would be reluctant to support the possible exodus of Indonesian funds and would refuse to support President Jokowi's Tax Amnesty program. But the more theoretically significant question is why Singapore successfully resisted Indonesia's pressure. How can this be understood?

The Phenomenon of Power

Commonly, we tend to think that since the foundation of power is the abundance of natural resources, large territory, population size, and the like, those with more of these "endowments" will have greater influence. Consequently, they are more likely to succeed in the international arena. However, real-life experiences show that this is not always the case. Many countries with abundant natural resources remain weak and even fail to function as states, such as Congo in Africa and Venezuela in Latin America. Conversely, some island nations with limited territory and resources, like Japan and Singapore, have succeeded in becoming prominent international actors. This is the paradox.

Having abundant natural resources sometimes indeed results in significant power that succeeds internationally, as seen in the story of the United States since the 18th century, but not always. The relationship between power and its impact is not always clear. Even when abundant resources result in significant power, in the form of a large military force and an arsenal of advanced weaponry, this power does not guarantee policy success. This is also evident in the story of the United States during the Vietnam War and the events following the September 11, 2001 attacks.

The gap between "theory" and empirical reality is relevant for understanding the relationship between Indonesia (with various large endowments) and Singapore (which is much smaller in many conventional dimensions of power).

Various Dimensions of Power

The perplexing paradox described above may be related to the lack of clarity in our conceptualization of power. To date, there is no consensus among scholars on how to define power conceptually or operationally.

This confusion and prolonged debate may occur due to three factors.

First, our understanding of "state power" and its impact is often too narrow. Therefore, it is essential to broaden it by considering its various forms, manifestations, faces, or dimensions. Power is not one-dimensional but multi-dimensional. By doing so, we can explain events that were previously inexplicable because they were not apparent.

Second, our understanding of the environment that allows a state to exercise its power is also very narrow. Therefore, it also needs to be broadened. International relations are not the monopoly of states and are not solely about conventional "power politics." The game in the international arena can involve conventional politics, but it can also include non-political dimensions, such as economics. Thus, the players are not only states but also non-state actors, such as giant multinational corporations. The assumption about the conventional distribution of power among states is not always adequate to understand 21st-century international politics. The emergence of various powerful non-state actors in different fields forces state actors to consider their behavior and interests and cannot maintain their prerogative as monopolists.

Third, we still adhere to the concept of national sovereignty formulated in the 17th-century Treaty of Westphalia. However, modern states today generally face a dilemma in this regard. In the world today, there are more than 200 nation-states. Many of these nation-states can no longer be described as autonomous actors, sovereign in domestic politics, and rational in foreign politics. Such assumptions can no longer be used to describe contemporary nation-states. In the process of adapting to changes leading to interdependence, most countries are forced to relinquish at least some of their national sovereignty. In fact, many of them experience a decline in national sovereignty. This dilemma is faced by both small and large countries. In many cases, they have to make "trade-offs," for example, between autonomy and economic growth. The desire to enhance economic growth often forces a country to open itself to foreign influences, thereby compromising its sovereignty and losing some of its national autonomy. Increasing autonomy (to the extreme of isolation) can lead to a decline in economic performance.

The implication of the above discussion is that power must be understood as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, not singular. The concept of power or "state power" is multi-dimensional. This conceptualization was proposed by Barnett and Duvall (2005). In the International Organization journal published in 2005, these two scholars proposed an alternative understanding of the "power" phenomenon.

> *Any discussion of power in international politics . . . must include a consideration of how, why, and when some actors have 'power over' others. Yet one also needs to reconsider the enduring structures and processes of global life that enable and constrain ability of actors to shape their fates and their futures. The extension of sovereignty from the West to the developing world gave decolonized states the authorityt o voice their interests and represent themselves, and the emergence of a human rights discourse helped to make possible the very category of human rights activists who give voice to humanrights norms. Analysis of power in international relations, then, must include a consideration of how social structures and processes generate differential social capacities for actors to define and pursue their interests and ideals* (Barnett dan Duvall, 2005:42).

They begin by defining power as "the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate" (Barnett and Duvall, 2005:42). This conceptualization limits the understanding of power to the production of specific types of effects, namely, effects on the capacity of actors to determine the conditions of their existence. The effects resulting from the application of power create a distinction, benefiting one party and disadvantaging the other. Those who benefit from these effects will experience an increase in capacity, while those who are disadvantaged will experience the opposite.

This means that the analysis of power must involve two dimensions: the type of social relationship used to exercise power and the specificity of the social relationship used to produce effects on the capacity of actors.

In the first dimension (type of social relationship), there are two opposing positions: "interaction" social relationships and "constitution" social relationships. In "interaction" social relationships, power is an attribute of certain actors and the interaction between them. (For example, power is obtained by pointing a gun and ordering the victim to do something). In "constitution" social relationships, power is a social process that shapes actors as social beings, i.e., it shapes their social identity and capacity. (For example, power that emerges from the social structure prevalent in society or a knowledge system that benefits one party and disadvantages the other). In other words, these two types of relationships generate two types of power. "Interaction" social relationships result in "power over"; "constitution" social relationships result in "power to."

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The second dimension (specificity of the social relationship) concerns how directly the social relationship used to exercise power produces effects: directly and specifically directed at certain actors (for example, power emerges instantly when a gun is pointed); or indirectly and non-specifically (for example, power emerges through a diffusion process within international institutions that establish the rules of the game determining who participates in decision-making processes).

Using these two dimensions, Barnett and Duvall developed a taxonomy of power: "compulsory power," "institutional power," "structural power," and "productive power."

Taxonomy of Power

> institutions have shown how evolving rules and decision-making procedures can shape outcomes in ways that favor some groups over others; these effects can operate over time and at a distance, and often in ways that were not intended or anticipated by the architects of the institution.[27] Similarly, scholars influenced by poststructuralism examine how historically and contingently produced discourses shape the subjectivities of actors; the very reason for genealogical and discourse-analytic methods is to demonstrate how systems of knowledge and discursive practices produce subjects through social relations that are quite indirect, socially diffuse, and temporally distant.[28] For instance, students of gender, race, and nation routinely recognize how socially diffuse discourses, and not isolated, direct, and proximate actions, produce the subjects of the modern world.[29]

Source: Barnett and Duvall (2005:48)

In brief, the argument of these two scholars can be summarized as follows: Compulsory power is the power that arises from the direct control of one actor over the existence or behavior of another actor. Institutional power is exercised through institutions that reflect the interests of stronger actors. These two categories of power align with the logic of most political science analyses that emphasize the role of actors. Structural power manifests as constitutive relationships where one actor (usually the stronger actor) determines the identity, preferences, and capabilities of the involved actors. A classic example is the relationship within a slavery system between the "master" and the "slave." Productive relations involve the process of identity and capacity formation through diffuse, non-specific social discourse. This taxonomy is not intended to depict types of power as mutually exclusive: different types of power can emerge in any transaction.

According to Barnett and Duvall, this multidimensional thinking allows us to escape the confines of realism à la Morgenthau and Waltz. Scholars who apply other perspectives, especially constructivism, can discuss power, but the basis of power according to Constructivists is not material factors.

International political theory from a Realist perspective, falling into the "behavioralist" category, as proposed by Hans Morgenthau and Ken Waltz, and domestic American political theory formulated by Robert Dahl, understand power as a phenomenon arising from interactions between actors. In Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy, they fall into the category of "compulsory power."

Theorization emphasizing the significant role of institutions in facilitating interactions between actors by reducing transaction costs ("institutional power") is proposed by liberal-institutionalist international political scientists. In this way of thinking, institutional rules can prioritize one issue for discussion and resolution while ignoring others.

While "compulsory power" manifests as direct control of one party over another and "institutional power" takes the form of control of one party over another socially distant party, "structural power" is understood as "the direct and mutual constitution of the capacities of actors," i.e., power that emerges through direct and mutually-constitutive social relationships. In these relationships, each party forms its identity and capacity reciprocally.

In this structural conception, each party is involved in the mutual formation of their identity, capacity, and interests. The actors are shaped by these social relationships. If the holder of "institutional power" can prioritize one issue and exclude others, the controller of "structural power" can do more than that. An issue is not only overlooked but considered non-existent. Using an example of "structural power" in the issue of slavery: a slave does not only refrain from attempting to escape to freedom but cannot even imagine a life free from slavery.

The last type of power is "productive power." This is similar to "structural power" in that both emphasize constitutive social processes, not controlled by specific actors but by actors through indirect processes. Both consider how the social capacities of actors are formed through social relationships.

However, "productive power" differs from "structural power": "structural power" operates through direct structural relationships, whereas "productive power" operates through more general and diffuse social processes.

What can we learn and apply to understand our phenomenon, namely, small actors who can resist the power of big actors?

As illustrated in the taxonomy, there is no theory that can be satisfactorily used to understand the ability of small actors to negate the power of big actors. But with some adjustments, we can utilize the thinking approach of one theory that can be categorized as power in the upper-left cell: its type of social relationship is direct and actor-oriented, not structural. This can be found in the theorization within the perspective of international political economy proposed by Benjamin Cohen.

Cohen's analysis is still colored by conventional thinking that emphasizes the role of "state power" in International Relations. Applying the International Political Economy perspective, Cohen discusses the connection between power and a country's monetary capacity. This scholar's discussion on the relationship between money and power is rooted in an "actor-oriented" way of thinking (that power functions through actor interactions) and "materially-based" (that the foundation of a country's power is its material capacity, and this is the determining factor for its success). Like most Realist scholars, Cohen holds the assumption that the state is the primary actor, behaving as a "rational utility maximizer," actively taking initiative based on cost-benefit calculations. Such a state indeed faces external constraints, such as the role of other actors in the international arena, such as increasingly active and assertive organizations or international institutions. However, the state is capable of overcoming or adapting to these constraints. What determines a country's success in the international arena is its relative capability compared to other actors in that arena.

However, even though both discuss power as a primary focus of Realist analysts, Cohen employs a different approach. He reveals that there are two elements in the concept of power: first, power as influence, and second, power as autonomy. In the literature of political science and International Relations, the popular conception of power is the ability to "influence" others to do something they do not actually want to do. However, there is another understanding, namely power as "autonomy," which means the ability to act freely, without external constraints due to the lack of need for monetary adjustments. The implication is that autonomy as the second element of power allows a country to resist or avoid pressure or coercion from others.

Defining the concept of power in these two dimensions has actually been done in various fields. Some categorize power into "external dimension" and "internal dimension." Others distinguish these two dimensions as "power over" and "power to." Analysts who focus on power as one actor's control over another ("power over") actually interpret it as influence or its "external dimension." Conversely, scholars who emphasize which actor can achieve something ("power to") are actually discussing power as autonomy or its "internal dimension." This means it is clear that "power" has two dimensions, not a single dimension. Quoting Robert Dahl (1984:33), Cohen asserts that "the logical complement of influence is autonomy."

In conventional International Relations literature, discussions of power are dominated by two schools of thought. Political realism prioritizes the concept of "hard power," which relies on the element of physical coercion; while liberalism focuses on the concept of "soft power," which is formed as a result of the ability to attract.

As an alternative, especially for understanding international political economy phenomena, Cohen introduces the concept of "currency power" or "monetary power." This unique power is described as stemming from a country's ability to implement macroeconomic policies such that its balance of payments remains positive, not in deficit; the continued success in ensuring a positive balance of payments allows the country to accumulate foreign exchange reserves used in international economic relations (foreign exchange, abbreviated as FOREX). This set of international payment instruments functions as a foreign exchange reserve.

Cohen conducts a thorough examination of the international political economy process, particularly international monetary relations, and presents an argument that positions the status of foreign exchange reserves as an indicator of power, something previously overlooked. He also demonstrates that in the international political economy arena, shifts in foreign exchange reserve status can alter the distribution of power among countries, resulting in some experiencing increases and others decreases in power. Cohen finds that countries capable of maintaining high foreign exchange reserve status enjoy macroeconomic flexibility. The larger the foreign exchange reserves, the higher the degree of freedom for the respective country to implement its macroeconomic policies. Consequently, such a country can act without being too dependent on other actors and, in turn, can negate the pressure or coercion from other powers (Cohen, 2013:19). Why and how does this happen? Cohen explains this phenomenon in the following account.

Cohen on Power and International Monetary Relations

Conventionally, power in international monetary relations is understood as the ability of a government to play an authoritative or leadership role in crisis management, financial regulatory politics, or the supply of payment financing. But to truly understand "monetary power," we need to focus on the two elements of power analysis, namely autonomy and interaction.

Autonomy and Influence

Autonomy is the ability to act free from external constraints. In the arena of international monetary relations, the ability to act autonomously is crucial because autonomy is a fundamental prerequisite for exerting influence. If a country is dependent on other actors in monetary matters, it is difficult for that country to exert its influence on other international actors.

In international monetary relations, an open national economy must seriously manage its balance of payments. This balance records the inflow and outflow of money to and from a country due to trade and investment. If the inflow is smaller (-) or larger (+) than the outflow, the balance is said to be imbalanced.

When such an imbalance occurs, especially if the balance is negative, the national government must make adjustments, which are not easy to execute. For example, to restore balance, the government might encourage increased exports and/or reduce imports; cut public spending by reducing development expenditure and/or increase government revenue through enhanced taxation and excise duties; seek foreign investment and foreign aid, and such policies. In practice, these policies can lead to significant domestic and external political challenges. In international monetary relations, many countries that have to make such adjustments end up depending on international creditors. In other words, a country suffering from a balance of payments deficit experiences a decline in autonomy. A chronic long-term balance of payments deficit can cause the respective country to lose independence in making and implementing its monetary policies.

This is the important lesson we learn from Cohen: the condition of the balance of payments, whether surplus or deficit, is an indicator of "monetary power." A positive balance reflects an increase in monetary strength; whereas a negative or deficit balance indicates a decline in monetary strength. A country with a sustainable positive balance of payments will be able to cultivate monetary power. Such a country will be able to avoid the risk of bearing the burden of adjustments due to balance of payments imbalances. In other words, the respective country can enjoy autonomy.

A country that is autonomous in this way becomes strong. Strength in this conception can be understood in the "internal" sense, which means being able to avoid the influence of other powers, as well as in the "external" sense, which means being able to influence others. A country with monetary power has power in the sense of autonomy, i.e., free from the influence of other powers, while also having power in the sense of influence, i.e., having the opportunity to exert influence over others. Conversely, a country with a persistently deficit balance of payments is threatened with a loss of power, unable to be autonomous.

In social reality, "influence" is inherently present in "autonomy." Because monetary relations are reciprocal, if one party is capable of being independent, then that party has the potential to have "leverage." If the independent party refuses to make adjustments, then the other party has to bear the burden of adjustments to restore balance to the balance of payments. This is passive influence, which arises from the ability to be independent. Passive influence does not take the form of "purposeful acts," as conventionally understood.

Monetary autonomy (which gives rise to passive influence) can be transformed into conventional influence (influence as an element of power aimed at affecting the actions of others) if the potential for leverage is consciously applied to achieve economic or political goals.

The conception of monetary power based on the ability to maintain the equilibrium of the balance of payments can explain the ability of small countries to evade the influence of larger countries. If the small country has an independent position, i.e., free from the necessity of making adjustments because its balance of payments is in positive condition, then it has the potential to avoid the pressure of influence from larger countries experiencing a balance of payments deficit.

Social Power and Relational Asymmetry

In conventional International Relations literature, interactions between countries are understood using the "resources-as-power" approach, where power arises from the possession of power-forming factors. For example, Morgenthau describes a country's power as depending on its possession of "elements of national power." The more of these elements a country possesses, the more powerful it is. In this context, power is associated with tangible resources.

In the context of international monetary relations, this approach is not useful. The more important source of power is the "structure of transactional relationships between countries." This can be understood using the "social power" approach, power formed in the context of social relationships. In monetary matters, what is important is not "what resources are possessed," but "who depends on whom and in what matters."

In the context of contemporary international monetary relations, the relationship between countries with a balance of payments deficit and those with a surplus creates asymmetrical relationships. Therefore, the important question to ask when examining international monetary relations is how asymmetrical the ongoing relationship is and how central a country's position is in the global interaction network. Relational asymmetry is the root of monetary autonomy. Therefore, it can be considered that relational asymmetry is the source of influential ability.

Explaining Singapore's Ability to Deny Indonesia's Influence

In summary, it can be argued that Singapore's ability to resist Indonesia's influence to help implement the Tax Amnesty program arises, among other things, from its ability to ensure its monetary economic autonomy by maintaining a balance of payments that is not in deficit. Meanwhile, Indonesia's difficulty in obtaining Singapore's support for the implementation of the capital repatriation program is related to the fact that Indonesia's balance of payments performance tends to be negative. This "relational asymmetry" in the monetary context is what can explain this phenomenon more convincingly.

The data in the following charts show the performance of Singapore and Indonesia in monetary policy. The pattern is clear that, although experiencing ups and downs, Singapore has been more consistent in maintaining a positive balance of payments from 1980 to the present; whereas Indonesia tends to face more challenges in its monetary economy. From Cohen's theoretical perspective on monetary political economy, it can be said that Singapore has been able to develop "monetary power," primarily in the form of the ability to avoid pressure from other actors (autonomy), whereas Indonesia, on the other hand, faces significant challenges in maintaining the ability to influence other actors (influence).

Figure 1: Singapore - Balance of Payments, 1980-2020

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

Figure 2: Singapore - Net Financial Balance, 1972-2017

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

DATE	VALUE	CHANGE, %
2017	61,075,728,226	3.87 %
2016	58,802,514,442	7.09 %
2015	54,910,115,833	-8.08 %
2014	59,736,000,947	20.37 %
2013	49,627,027,891	-1.41 %
2012	50,339,039,676	-15.42 %
2011	59,519,983,932	-0.40 %
2010	59,761,130,906	71.85 %
2009	34,774,553,693	20.45 %
2008	28,870,259,914	-39.74 %
2007	47,911,299,945	32.31 %
2006	36,210,392,716	

Source: Knoema

Note: In 2017, Singapore's net financial balance was recorded at 61.075 billion USD. Although Singapore's net financial balance has experienced significant fluctuations recently, the trend has been steadily increasing from 1998 to 2017, reaching 61.075 billion USD in 2017.

The net financial balance represents the acquisition and disposal of net financial assets and liabilities. Conceptually, the net financial balance is equal to the current account balance plus the capital account balance. This balance illustrates how debt transactions with foreign entities (non-residents) are financed.

Figure 3: Indonesia - Balance of Payments, 1981-2009



Figure 4: Indonesia – Balance of Payments, 2000-2016



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Figure 5: Indonesia: Balance of Payments, 2008-2016

Sources: www.tradingeconomics.com and Bank Indonesia

Figure 6: Indonesia – Balance of Payments as a Percentage of GNP



Figure 7: Indonesia - Trade Balance, 2018



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Figure 8: Indonesia – Foreign Exchange Reserves, 2014-2015



Figure 9: Singapore vs. Indonesia - Balance of Payments Performance, 1972-2017



Source: Knoema

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Figure 10: Indonesia - Current Account, 2000 – 2016



Notes: The current account is the sum of the balance of trade (the value of exports minus imports of goods and services), net factor income (such as interest and dividends), and net transfer payments (such as foreign aid).

Figure 11: Indonesia – Balance of Payments, 2008-2018



Conclusion: Not an Anomaly

The phenomenon of the inability to achieve the goal of repatriating funds owned by Indonesian citizens stored in Singaporean banks through the Tax Amnesty Program, from the perspective of International Political Economy, particularly the international monetary analysis proposed by Cohen, is not unusual. This phenomenon may not be apparent when viewed through conventional lenses, such as those used by Realist and Liberal analysts who believe that power is solely a matter of resources and has a single dimension. Applying a perspective that differentiates the concept of power into two dimensions, namely influence and autonomy, can easily reveal phenomena that were previously considered anomalies.

The conduct of political relations is closely related to each country's ability to manage its domestic affairs, particularly monetary affairs. Countries that implement "good housekeeping policies" generally enjoy national autonomy.

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Counterterrorism Diplomacy:

ASEAN's New Chapter of Regional Engagement

Frega Ferdinand Wenas Inkiriwang

Republic of Indonesia Defence University (UNHAN) &

Indonesian Army Command and General Staff College (SESKOAD)

Counterterrorism has become a global trend since 9/11. Following the incident, the U.S. launched the Global War on Terror, which developed numerous international partnerships in dealing with terrorism. This included the Southeast Asia region. Most ASEAN countries have leveraged their cooperation through counterterrorism diplomacy ever since. This approach, however, endorsed the law enforcement agency due to the adopted criminal justice model. With the rise of the Islamic State (IS) movement, which links with various terrorist networks, the threat of terrorism has gained more attention in Southeast Asia, particularly after the Marawi incident. Complicatedly, the IS merged with separatist and terrorist groups in the South Philippines. Many observers predicted that if it is still uncontrollable, it may create a spillover to surrounding ASEAN countries. Thus, this circumstance has generated an opportunity for greater collaboration among ASEAN countries in dealing with ISIS in the region. Unlike past cooperation, this new chapter may facilitate a more substantial portion of military-to-military engagement. Counterterrorism diplomacy may potentially strengthen regional engagement, which has been restrained due to the South China Sea dispute with China.

The world was shocked when a terrorist attack struck the World Trade Centre (WTC) in September 2001. It collapsed when Al-Qaeda, a group of terrorists, hijacked aircrafts and hit the building twice (Wright, 2006, pp. 357-358). At a different location, the same method was also used to aim Pentagon, the headquarters of the U.S. military. Both incidents resulted in a high number of casualties in addition to the destruction of the targeted infrastructures.

Following the tragedy, the U.S. launched the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which developed numerous cooperation with international partners. It was intended to cope with any terrorist threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its affiliated networks. This collaboration included the Southeast Asian countries, which the U.S. considered its "second front" in combatting terrorism (Gershman, 2002). Consequently, most of the ASEAN countries have increased their engagements through counterterrorism diplomacy ever since. The initial approach, nevertheless, focused on the law enforcement agency due to the adopted criminal justice model, which was perceived as a more efficient means to apprehend terrorists in urban centres and rural religious schools (Dillon, 2004). Thus, the U.S. military organised joint training and exercises to exchange knowledge and information with several police counterterrorism units in the region, including Indonesia (Acharya, 2015, p. 232).

After over a decade, there have been unbearable dynamics in the development of terrorist networks in the region. In the last few years, with the rising of the Islamic State (IS) movement, known as the Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), numerous terrorist groups in Southeast Asia have linked themselves to demonstrate their solidarity. This phenomenon has gained more attention since numerous ASEAN countries are still struggling to deal with terrorism. Indonesian security apparatus apprehended Abu Wardah, known as Santoso, a local terrorist group leader who was pursued by the police for a year. Santoso and his group have declared their allegiance to IS. With the involvement of the military in the joint operations against terrorism, the fugitive was eventually seized in July 2016 (Cochrane, 2016).

Not only Indonesia but also the Philippines has also included the role of the military in dealing with terrorism. With the occurrence of the Marawi incident, the country adopted martial law, which legitimised the military to take further action to neutralize the situation. Complicatedly, in the Marawi case, IS has merged with local separatist and terrorist groups in the South Philippines. Although the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has been involved, it has not been fully able to cope with the existing problem (Gita, 2017). Many observers predict that if it is still uncontrollable, then it may potentially affect the surrounding ASEAN countries.

Thus, this circumstance has generated an opportunity for greater collaboration among ASEAN countries in dealing with terrorism. Different from past cooperation, this new chapter may facilitate a more considerable portion of military-to-military engagement. Counterterrorism diplomacy is perceived as a means to strengthen regional engagement, which has been restrained due to the South China Sea dispute with China (Tong, 2016).

This article attempts to analyse the shift of ASEAN's regional engagement regarding its counterterrorism agenda. It tries to examine the difference between the phase after the WTC tragedy and the subsequent period after the development of IS. The analysis refers to archival documents posted in books, journals, and the internet, including publications relating to ASEAN countries and their counterterrorism activities.

With the shifting development of terrorism threat in the Southeast Asia region, from Al-Qaeda to ISIS, the article argues that there has been a substantial change in how countries implement their counterterrorism agenda. Since terrorist network is linked regionally and globally, ASEAN member countries, in particular the Philippines and Indonesia, view that it cannot be handled by only employing law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the role of the military has increased in terminating terrorism. How ASEAN countries manage their militaries to be part of their counterterrorism diplomacy has provided an opportunity for greater regional cooperation, which can renew the regional engagement chapter.

The Origin of ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967. Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore on that day committed to initiating a regional intergovernmental organisation through the inception of ASEAN. The initial aims of forming ASEAN were to foster greater cooperation in numerous vital sectors such as economic, socio-cultural, educational and several others. Additionally, it was intended to promote regional peace and stability by expressing respect for justice and the rule of law as well as obedience to the fundamental principles stipulated in the United Nations Chapter (Flores & Abad, 2017).

The Bangkok Declaration stipulated numerous critical points on regionalism in Southeast Asia. It stated that ASEAN was initially established as a foundation to promote regional cooperation in the spirit of equality and partnership (ASEAN, 1967). It also included seven primary aims and purposes. As a regional organisation, ASEAN has managed to develop its Charter. The ASEAN Charter was entered into force on 15 December 2008 (ASEAN, nd). It covers thirteen chapters and fifty-five articles in total. Article 1 defines the fifteen purposes of the organisation, which have developed from the original points in the Bangkok Declaration (ASEAN, 2008, pp. 3-5). The Charter also affirms the motto of ASEAN which is “One Vision, One Identity, One Community” (ASEAN, 2008, p. 29).

Since its establishment, ASEAN has included five additional members along with its development. Brunei Darussalam joined ASEAN as the sixth member country in January 1984. After gaining independence from Britain, the nation joined the regional organisation. It aimed to use the regional cooperation and participation through ASEAN to guarantee its political autonomy (Thambipillai, 1998, p. 80). Brunei has positioned great importance on ASEAN. In 1987, the Sultan of Brunei participated in the ASEAN summit which signified its commitment (Thambipillai, 1998, p. 85).

Following Brunei, Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995. Vietnam shared numerous things in common with other ASEAN member countries. As Vietnam switching to a market economy, its trade and economic relations with ASEAN countries had grown significantly since 1986 (Binh, 1999, p. 25). Joining ASEAN was based on economic consideration. Following its membership in ASEAN, trade and investments have rapidly developed between Vietnam and ASEAN countries. The country viewed that its membership could accelerate the industrialisation and modernisation which had been set as a priority by the government (Binh, 1999, p. 28).

Not only Vietnam and Brunei, but Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR) also joined the organization on 23 July 1997 (Stuart-Fox, 1998, p. 75). It was the time when ASEAN commemorated its 30th anniversary. Sharing the same consideration as adopted by Vietnam, Lao also perceived that its membership could have a long-term impact on its economic development. Following its membership, the country is more connected to ASEAN, in which more infrastructures have also been constructed to facilitate the integration (Stuart-Fox, 1998, p. 77).

Like Lao, Myanmar also decided to join ASEAN. The country gained its membership within the regional organization on the same day as the Lao's People Democratic Republic. Despite the criticism from the West, ASEAN admitted the country as its newest member. The fear of China's influence over Myanmar was one of the reasons (Cribb, 1998, p. 49). Additionally, its resource-rich economy was accounted to help develop ASEAN's economy (Cribb, 1998, p. 49).

Furthermore, Cambodia was the last country to join ASEAN. The country submitted its proposal to join ASEAN together with the Lao PDR and Myanmar in 1995. However, the unstable domestic political circumstances delayed its admission (Thongpakde, 2001, pp. 59-60). Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia led to the Cambodian conflict. This conflict became a crucial issue in ASEAN where it attempted to exercise a limited degree of influence in mediating the dispute (Narine, 2002, p. 59). When the situation in the country stabilised, ASEAN officially admitted Cambodia as its tenth member in April 1999 (Thongpakde, 2001, p. 60). The acceptance concluded ASEAN's eventual goal to establish cooperation among all the Southeast Asian countries.

Since its inception, ASEAN has significantly leveraged the interaction between member countries. However, there has been a distinct behaviour demonstrated within the recent years, regarding the South China Sea dispute. ASEAN countries have not concluded in dealing with the dispute. There are six claimant states involved in the conflicted territory. They are China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan (BBC, 2016). Four of them are ASEAN member states. Despite its commitment to foster regional unity, ASEAN high officials failed to deliver a joint communique at the Cambodia Summit in 2012, which has since challenged the unity of the regional organisation (Panda, 2016). Thus, the South China Sea dispute has been perceived as a fiasco for ASEAN's regional cooperation practice.

"War on Terror" and ASEAN Countries

ASEAN has a long record in the case of counterterrorism. Most member countries have experienced terror attacks. The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia are acknowledged as the top three ASEAN countries with the highest incident records in the period of 1970-2016 (see Table 1).[1]

Table 1. ASEAN Countries and the Number of Terrorism Incidents

(Period of 1970-2016)

No	Country	Terrorism Incidents
1	The Philippines	6,212
2	Thailand	3,668
3	Indonesia	735
4	Myanmar	430
5	Cambodia	258
6	Malaysia	95
7	Lao PDR	26
8	Vietnam	10
9	Singapore	7
10	Brunei	1

[1] Adapted by author from (START, 2016)

According to the Global Terrorism Database, the Philippines has suffered from 6,212 terrorism incidents within nearly five decades (START, 2016). The presence of several separatist and terrorist groups in the country have been the primary reason. The perpetrators have also varied. Among them are the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). These groups were initially formed as separatist movements. Hence, the government has considered them as armed rebellion groups (de Inza, 2012). They aim to establish an independent Islamic state since most people in Moro are Muslim.

The former and latter have established peace talks with the government. The MILF signed a peace agreement with the Aquino's administration four years ago (The Guardian, 2014). Meanwhile, MNLF and Duterte's administration also discussed further a peace talk between the two (Romero, 2017). However, there are still different positions taken by the two groups which has slowed down the negotiation (Bacungan, 2017).

Additionally, there is also the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) which was initially instituted from dissenting members of MILF, and it subsequently maintained a connection with terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a close affiliate of Al-Qaeda (AQ) (de Inza, 2012). ASG beheaded a German tourist, Jürgen Gustav Kantner, after holding him for three months. The ransom was not paid which ended up with the barbaric killing of the German (Al Jazeera, 2017). There are similar killings of the local people performed by the group. Seven farmers were found decapitated in Basilan last year (Tayug, 2017).

In addition to ASG, there is another group known as the Maute Group. Maute and ASG have pledged their allegiance to ISIS (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016). This development has complicated the security dynamic in the country. In fact, the recent case of Marawi has taken more attention from the government. In Marawi, the Maute Group cooperated with Isnilon Hapilon and his supporters. Hapilon is head of the Southern militia who has also pledged his loyalty to ISIS (Hincks, 2017). The incident started when the government attempted to capture Hapilon. Unexpectedly the Philippines forces had to face stronger resistance. President Duterte decided to authorize martial law in the region for optimising the counterterrorism efforts, which have been more problematic because of the collaboration of both separatist and terrorist groups.

Meanwhile, Thailand is in second place. The country has experienced 3,668 incidents (START, 2016). Referring to the Global Terrorism Database, most of the perpetrators are unknown. However, there is a group, namely Barisan Revolusi Nasional

(BRN), which has continuously staged terror attacks (START, 2016). BRN was formed initially as a separatist movement in the Northern part of Malaysia (TRAC, 2017). But it has operated in Thailand's Southern territory. Bombing has been used by BRN to convey its political message (Montesano, 2017). Hence, it is sometimes perceived as a terrorist group instead of an armed separatist organisation.

In addition to both the Philippines and Thailand, Indonesia has also been identified as a country with the highest terror incidents. The country has experienced 735 incidents (START, 2016). There are some terrorist groups which have been identified as perpetrators of those incidents. Among them are Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Al-Qaeda (AQ), Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). JI has been viewed as AQ's affiliate in the Southeast Asia region.

JI has launched several bombing attacks in Indonesia. Among the deadliest ones was the Bali Bombing in October 2002 which killed 202 people (BBC, 2012). Additionally, it was also involved in the JW Marriott Hotel bombing in August 2003 and the Australian Embassy bombing in September 2004. Its founder Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was detained and prisoned in 2011. One of the top operatives, Noordin M. Top, a Malaysian national, was killed in September 2009. Following the capture of its senior operatives and leaders by the Indonesian Police Counterterrorism Unit, Densus 88 (Mackey, 2016), and the killing of Osama Bin Laden by the U.S military, JI's terror attacks significantly decreased.

The recent development of terrorism in Indonesia has also become more complicated with the emergence of new groups which link themselves to ISIS. Santoso, the leader of MIT terrorist group, pledged his loyalty to Al-Baghdadi, ISIS' leader, in 2014 (ABC, 2016). He was among the first Indonesian terrorist leaders who showed allegiance to ISIS. By early 2015, he had fifty combatants operating with his group, and several of them were Uighurs who fought with the Indonesian ISIS members in Syria (IPAC, 2017).

However, Santoso was killed when the Indonesian government launched joint counterterrorism operations in 2016. The government decided to employ military special operations units to supplement the existing law enforcement effort. For years, the Indonesian Police pursued Santoso and his MIT group but were not able to capture him. A military unit successfully terminated him and his aide during a fire contact (DW, 2016).

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This demonstrated that military involvement in a counterterrorism effort was effective. The decision was made based on Decree No. 34/2004 on TNI, which authorised the use of the military in the counterterrorism role (DPR RI, 2004).

In the Southeast Asia region, terrorism incidents have significantly increased within the last two decades (see Graphic 1). This increase occurred after the WTC tragedy in 2001. Post the tragedy, terrorist incidents in the region have levelled up (START, 2016). Regional and domestic terrorist groups in ASEAN countries, like Jemaah Islamiah, operated and linked with Al-Qaeda, the perpetrator of the 9/11 terror attack (de Inza, 2012).

Interestingly, another substantial rise has been identified in the period after the emergence of ISIS in the period of 2011-2012 (START, 2016). Similar to the previous behaviour in linking to global terrorist groups like AQ, many terrorists and, in fact, separatist groups in the region have also pledged their allegiance to ISIS (BBC, 2015). Indonesia's most wanted terrorist group, MIT, adopted the same stance. Like, ASG and Maute Group in the Philippines also demonstrated their connection to ISIS (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016).

Two significant climbs in the case of terrorism incidents in the region, as depicted in the graphic, indicate that there are two essential phases of counterterrorism in ASEAN countries. The first period is between the WTC tragedy in 2001 and the emergence of ISIS in 2011. The second period is after the development of ISIS since many IS supporters have come from ASEAN countries. They fought in Iraq and Syria with ISIS and then returned to their respective or neighbouring countries. This trend has nurtured ISIS' influence in the Southeast Asia region (Muñoz & Taylor, 2017).

Figure 1. Trend of Terrorism Incidents in the Southeast Asia Region (Period 1970-2016)



Source: (START, 2016)

The situation has become more complicated when there are varying perpetrators in the region. Over time, numerous key groups have been acknowledged as the actors behind all the incidents in Southeast Asia (see Table 2). Thus, this article identifies ten separatist and terrorist groups which have extensively performed their terror attacks in ASEAN countries (START, 2016). The first three are the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). They all have predominantly operated in the Philippines. But ASG has also been recorded to launch its attacks in Malaysia. Meanwhile, the Jemaah Islamiah (JI), the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, and the Al-Qaeda (AQ), have mostly operated in Indonesia, though JI also conducted its terror in the Philippines (START, 2016). Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), as explained earlier, is also a principal perpetrator of terrorism incidents in the region, chiefly in Thailand. Lastly, ISIL or ISIS, has also been able to link with its regional affiliates and staged terror attacks in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The complexity of perpetrators makes counterterrorism efforts in the Southeast Asia region not an easy task to do.

Table 2. Prominent Terrorist Groups in ASEAN Countries

(Period of 1970-2016)

No	Group	Country	Terrorism Incidents	Period
1	Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	Philippines, Malaysia	486	1994-2016
2	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	The Philippines	374	1986-2016
3	Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	The Philippines	200	1975-2015
4	Jemaah Islamiah (JI)	Indonesia, Philippines	80	2000-2013
5	Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)	Thailand	39	2002-2007, 2012-2016
6	Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT)	Indonesia	23	2013-2016
7	The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria (ISIL/ISIS)	Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia	11	2016
8	Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)	Indonesia	9	2011-2012
9	Jamaah Ansharut Daulah	Indonesia	6	2015-2016
10	Al-Qaeda (AQ)	Indonesia	2	2002

Source: Adapted and collated by the author from (START, 2016)

Before the WTC incident in 2001, ASEAN countries had recognised terrorism as one of the most important transnational crimes that should be dealt with through regional cooperation. In 1997, ASEAN adopted the Declaration on Transnational Crime

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(Pushpanathan, 2003). Also, the ASEAN Action Plan to Combat Transnational Crime was also formulated in 1999. ASEAN developed the initiative at the regional level to cope with terrorism, which was perceived as a transnational crime at that time.

Post the 9/11 terror attack, ASEAN countries expressed their commitment to fighting against terrorism. On 5 November 2001, the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism was officially announced as a response to the terror attacks in the U.S. (ASEAN, 2012). Later in 2002, there was the Declaration on Terrorism condemning the Bali Bombings in Indonesia, and also terror attacks in the Philippines (ASEAN, 2012). ASEAN also used the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the United Nations, as well as ASEAN+3, which includes China, South Korea, and Japan, as parts of the forum to declare its joint commitment to counter-terrorism with external partners. ASEAN has worked with China, the U.S., and the European Union (EU) in further discussing collaborative counter-terrorism agenda. With the rise of ISIS, there are more events and activities proposed by ASEAN to facilitate counterterrorism issue.

"Criminal Justice Model" vs "War Model"

Some countries have consistently used the police to deal with terrorist acts. Meanwhile, some others have started to involve military units as part of their counterterrorism strategy. There is a big debate on whether it is better to focus on the "criminal justice model," the "war model," or even combine the two into a hybrid one.

There is a big difference between the "criminal justice model" and the "war model." The first prioritises the role of law enforcement. Police carry the primary responsibility. The Rules of Engagement (RoE) which is used in this model to minimise the use of force where it needs an exercise of judgment. Meanwhile, the war model is dominated by the role of the military. As the primary responsible agency, the military leads the process. The RoE utilised in the model is the maximum use of force. This is oriented at overpowering the enemy (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 48).

Both models have their benefits and limitations. The "criminal justice model" serves several functions. First is a delegitimating function where any use of terrorism will be stigmatised through a criminalisation process. This model also provides a general educative function. Any unacceptability of terrorism will be publicly confirmed through a criminal justice process where it is aimed at capturing terrorists. The third is a deterrent function where the threat of criminal sanctions is expected to prevent any terrorist acts. Fourth is a retributive function, those who use terrorism will be reprimanded according to due process. Fifth is a rehabilitative function which allows giving chance for convicted terrorists to leave the use of violence. And lastly is an incapacitation function. This means that imprisoned terrorists will be isolated from any possible environment that may facilitate their will to execute any terror activities (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 58).

However, the "crime justice model" also deals with several limitations. The existence of "nullum crimen, nulla pena sine lege" principle, argues that there will be no crime or punishment without law. Terror activity will always be performed in secret. Thus, it will be difficult to collect evidence when doing a criminal investigation of a terror incident. Moreover, bringing a terrorist to a trial is difficult. This has become more complex when it comes to the detention and imprisonment process. Every case is different and will end up with different treatment of prisoners. Not only that, but also extradition, expulsion, and deportation will be challenging, and especially there is a probability of a country renouncing extradition should it feel that there will be no fair trial for the suspect. Lastly, the criminal justice model has a problem in addressing the root cause. The model cannot resolve broader contexts like group terrorist. This model relies more on a complex bureaucracy. Hence, the process may be slow and can be perceived to favour the perpetrators over the victims (Crelinsten, 2009, pp. 59-72).

Like criminal justice, the "war model" also shares benefits. The model helps boost morale at home, especially if it is aimed at pursuing the root cause abroad. The war model allows a country to choose a unilateralism approach. The war model also helps maintain a robust image in the international environment as performed by the U.S. This model facilitates the use of science and technology in tackling the terrorism problem. The military is allowed to use its cutting-edge technologies to help trace and terminate terrorists. The use of drones to conduct targeted killings can assist in minimalizing casualties (Crelinsten, 2009, pp. 78-79).

Despite its benefits, the "war model" also has numerous limitations. The model is perceived to possibly lead a play into terrorists' hands where the severe reaction may induce sympathy for the terrorist cause. This may generate more support for the terrorists, which can be counterproductive. The model can also escalate violence and spark revenge. The use of the military may facilitate an anti-democratic practice where the approach is used as an excuse to intervene in privacy for the sake of intelligence. The effectiveness of the model, to some extent, has been questioned since it relies on intelligence, but sometimes it is not reliable. Thus, the war model may not be adequate for a medium or long-term agenda.

There was a significant shift adopted by the U.S. in implementing its overall counterterrorism strategy after the WTC terror attack. Before the incident, the military was placed as a last resort and would be used only in aid of civil power. Nonetheless, the policy changed afterwards, where the military was positioned as the central and primary role while civil power was secondary regarding counterterrorism strategy (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 13). The pre-WTC period was dominated by the perspective of the criminal justice model. Meanwhile, the post-WTC period was influenced by the war model (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 13).

Choosing between the two models is difficult. Therefore, there has been a significant development which attempts to combine both models. This combination is acknowledged as a hybrid model. The model is used in dealing with a complex crisis without compromising the need to tackle the threats and ignoring the legal framework (Steinberg & Estrin, 2014, pp. 206-207). Not only the U.S. but also some of the ASEAN countries have started to adopt this model. Among them are the Philippines and Indonesia. The Philippines has used its military units to deal with terrorist groups in its Southern territory (Griffiths, 2017).

With the latest dynamic in the Philippines, the terrorist group has merged with the separatist group. ASG collaborated with the Maute Group, which both have linked to ISIS. This made the situation in the country more challenging. Thus, President Duterte declared martial law, which legitimised the role of the military. After five months of battle, the military successfully killed Isnilon Hapilon, the Abu Sayyaf Group leader, and Omar Khayam Maute, the leader of the Maute Group, on 16 October 2017 (Regencia, 2017). However, the AFP has not been able to fully terminate the threat. The fighting with the terrorist group in Marawi is continuing (Al Jazeera, 2017).

Similarly, Indonesia has also adopted the hybrid model. In the recent case of capturing Santoso, the Indonesian National Defence Forces (TNI) was involved. The unit which apprehended Santoso was a special operations unit from Kostrad. It is the Army Strategic Reserve Unit which can conduct special operations, including hostage-taking and counterterrorism. Santoso had been chased for years by the police, but he could not be apprehended. When TNI was assigned to the joint operations, he was eventually terminated (DW, 2016).

Counter Terrorism Diplomacy and Regional Engagement

Ronald Crelinsten defines terrorism as "the combined use and threat of violence, planned in secret and usually executed without warning, that is directed against one set of targets (the direct victim) in order to coerce compliance or to compel allegiance from a second set of targets (targets of demands) and to intimidate or to impress a wider audience (target of terror or target of attention)" (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 6). In dealing with international or regional terrorism which is transnational in nature, diplomacy and negotiations are viewed as key counterterrorism means (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 12). Thus, counterterrorism can be used as a means of diplomacy, especially in engaging with international partners, to optimise the domestic and regional counterterrorism efforts.

However, there is no universal definition of counterterrorism diplomacy. The U.S. has used the terminology in its counterterrorism strategy. It is viewed as an effort in diplomacy which is consistent with the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Kerry, 2014, p. 91). The country exercises counterterrorism diplomacy by constructing the capacity of its international partners. Similarly, it also strengthens foreign relations with those partner nations in bilateral and multilateral contexts. Counterterrorism has been perceived as a tool for diplomacy in engaging with other countries. Within the last few years, the country has also formulated its strategy to advance counterterrorism diplomacy (Siberell, 2017). Nonetheless, the U.S. has not adequately explained its meaning.

Other countries have also attempted to exercise counterterrorism diplomacy. China has implemented counterterrorism diplomacy at the United Nations. This effort has been made at the Security Council, the Sanction Committee, and the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) (Duchâtel, 2016, p. 5). China has also used its military in the context of counter-terrorism diplomacy.

Surprisingly, the Chinese military has circumcised the Foreign Ministry. There are three reasons for this. The first reason is to promote intelligence and border control cooperation. Additionally, it is intended to encourage counterterrorism cooperation with partner nations. Lastly, there is the anxiety of facing the rise of ISIS that may threaten China. Within the last few years, there has been a rising number of Chinese nationals killed by terrorist groups abroad (Duchâtel, 2016, p. 9). In November 2015, ISIS executed a Chinese citizen for the first time (Duchâtel, 2016, p. 1). Also, in the same year, 3 Chinese nationals were also killed in Mali by the local terrorists. China's approach to global terrorism has been militarized due to those kinds of terror attacks towards its people.

Nevertheless, despite the existence of counterterrorism diplomacy in practice, there has been no definition proposed to help understand the matter. Thus, based on the practices of several key countries, this article tries to offer an understanding of counterterrorism diplomacy. Paul R. Pillar argues that "[d] iplomacy touches at least as many aspects of counterterrorism as does any other instruments" (Pillar, 2004, p. 73). Incorporating his argument with the previously mentioned international practices, the article tries to define counterterrorism diplomacy as **"the use of available counterterrorism measures as a tool of diplomacy for engaging with partner countries through a comprehensive manner which involves key and related national elements, like the police, the foreign affairs ministry and perhaps the military; such practice may also help exchange information, facilitate and strengthen cooperation in the area of counterterrorism that can ultimately support in achieving national security objectives".**[2] With the presence of counterterrorism diplomacy, every country can interact with other countries by fostering counterterrorism collaboration.

When the Cold War ended, the U.S. put a low priority on the Southeast Asia region. Nevertheless, the attention changed when the WTC incident occurred (Wright, 2006, p. 629). Following the tragedy, the country began to engage with ASEAN countries. The arrest of JI members in Singapore revealed the plan of the regional terrorist group, which was affiliated with Al-Qaeda, to attack Western targets (Wright, 2006, p. 629). This evidence further highlighted the importance of engaging with the region in coping with its counterterrorism strategy. Hence, it was not surprising when Southeast Asia was viewed as the "second front" by the Bush administration (Gershman, 2002). The U.S. managed to use counterterrorism diplomacy in interacting with ASEAN countries since then.

Like his predecessor, Obama also favoured counterterrorism. It became one of his top priorities. He openly expressed his expectation to assist the transnational counterterrorism efforts while undercutting support within the Muslim world for groups like Al-Qaeda (Dueck, 2015, p. 48). He sent troops to Afghanistan. Eventually, the U.S. military killed Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda's top leader, in 2012 (Bowden, 2012). The raid against Osama was considered Obama's most enormous success (Dueck, 2015, p. 49). The U.S., under both the Bush and Obama administrations, consistently supported the counterterrorism efforts in ASEAN countries.

[2] This definition of counterterrorism diplomacy is interpreted and proposed by author to help understand the meaning of counterterrorism diplomacy.

Despite the killing of Osama, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (QAI) used the momentum of the absence of U.S. forces in Iraq from 2012 through 2013 to reorganise under the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as ISIL (Dueck, 2015, p. 50). The terrorist group demonstrated its violence resurgence during this time frame. Since then, it began staging terror attacks globally, including in the Southeast Asia region.

ISIS is perceived to have produced one of today's best narratives. The group has used falsehood and betrayal of faith to call young people to join in building the Caliphate, the Islamic nation, which the group has aimed (Seib, 2016, p. 129). Sadly, it has proven useful for influencing people, including those who are from Western countries. The presence of social media has facilitated their efforts to spread their propaganda. A speech that is broadcasted through the internet can reach a broader audience (Fletcher, 2015, p. xii). This indicates that social media has reshaped the standard for outreach which has also covered the Southeast Asia region.

With the window of opportunity to implement a hybrid model, the military will have a more significant role. Thus, it needs to be appropriately managed to efficiently support law enforcement (Steinberg & Estrin, 2014, pp. 206-207). With the existing military-to-military cooperation between countries, including intra-ASEAN, it is prospective to use the opportunity to share knowledge and experience in the context of counterterrorism. The Philippines and the U.S. have continuously trained together to help refine their counterterrorism strategies.[3] Additionally, ASEAN, under the ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) Plus, managed to conduct a joint counterterrorism exercise (Commander of U.S. Navy Task Force 73 Public Affairs, 2016). This event involved not only ASEAN countries but also extra-regional partners. The event linked militaries between participating countries. It also facilitated an initiative to share further intelligence that may support the participating countries.

Military cooperation between countries in the Southeast Asia region is important in helping tackle regional and domestic terrorism. Diplomacy, which is required to facilitate international engagement, may also cover counterterrorism. This is why counterterrorism diplomacy is critical since it can connect countries. Historically, numerous terrorist groups in the region have linked themselves with domestic networks. JI, for instance, has operated not only in Indonesia but also in the Philippines. Similarly, ISIS has also acted in several Southeast Asia countries.

[3] Balikatan 33 Strengthens U.S.-Philippine Defense Partnership through Counterterrorism and HADR Training.

The reveal of domestic and regional terrorist plots to attack Western targets in the region in 2001 has influenced the shift of U.S. counterterrorism strategy towards ASEAN countries. Since 9/11, there has been a rise of counterterrorism engagement between the U.S. and ASEAN. This has facilitated counterterrorism diplomacy in the region. During Obama's tenure, Southeast Asia was perceived as an important geographical zone for U.S. interests. Despite a different approach implemented by his successor, President Donald Trump, counterterrorism diplomacy can still be used by ASEAN countries, not only to engage with the U.S. and other partner countries but also with their fellow ASEAN countries, especially with the shifting front of ISIS from the Middle East to the Southeast Asia region. The Marawi incident is an example of how ISIS has managed to link with its regional affiliates.

With ASEAN's disunity in responding to the South China Sea dispute, the regional association is predicted to falter. Nonetheless, having observed the new security dynamic in the region, where local and regional terrorist groups have linked with ISIS, counterterrorism diplomacy is possible to use to leverage engagement between ASEAN member countries. Thus, counterterrorism diplomacy is important in driving this process.

Most ASEAN countries have experienced an increasing trend of terrorism in recent years. This requires cooperation between member countries. Especially with similar terrorist groups that have linked themselves to ISIS, ASEAN countries may adopt a collaborative approach to cope with the threat. They may also implement a hybrid counterterrorism model that employs the military as one useful means to tackle the terror threat. Hence, the use of the military to engage with other militaries and non-military agencies is vital.

Conclusion

The 9/11 tragedy surprised everyone since sudden terror attacks stormed the U.S. in its territory. Two attacks employing hijacked aircrafts destructed the WTC, one of the tallest buildings in the country (Wright, 2006, pp. 357-358). Not only this landmark but also the Pentagon has been targeted by an orchestrated terror designed by Al-Qaeda. Striking the U.S. military headquarters with a civilian aircraft was never thought of earlier. Many casualties resulted from the terror attacks at both sites.

In response, the U.S. declared its global war on terror. This facilitated a significant number of international cooperation with partner countries. The primary aim was to trace and terminate Al-Qaeda, the perpetrator group of the 9/11 attacks, and its affiliates. The campaign also covered Southeast Asian countries since there was an indication of collaboration between local terrorist groups in the region with AQ. Thus, the region was perceived as the "second front" by the U.S (Gershman, 2002). Following this engagement, most ASEAN countries have leveraged their interactions via counterterrorism diplomacy, not only with the U.S. and its allies but also among themselves. Initially, the engagement endorsed the "criminal justice model", which promoted the primary role of law enforcement agencies. Especially with the operating environment like urban centres and rural religious schools, it would be more effective to capture terrorists by using this model (Dillon, 2004). In supporting this effort, the U.S. military assisted through joint exercises and training which facilitated the process of information, knowledge and expertise exchanges with various police counterterrorism units in ASEAN countries (Acharya, 2015, p. 232).

Over a decade since the WTC tragedy, there have been unexpected dynamics in the region's terrorist network development. The war on terror was able to terminate a high number of AQ operatives, including Osama Bin Laden. However, in recent years, there has been a significant rise of the Islamic State movement, which was developed by AQ affiliates. Sadly, various terrorist groups in the Southeast Asia region have pledged their allegiances to this IS group. This fact has got more concerns since several countries in the region are still struggling to cope with terrorism. Santoso, the local terrorist group leader, was tracked for a couple of years by the police. His group demonstrated its support for IS. Eventually, the government's decision to involve the military special operations unit in a joint counterterrorism effort with the police was able to capture and terminate him (Cochrane, 2016).

The same approach in employing the military as part of a joint counterterrorism operation has also been adopted by the Philippines. In the recent Marawi incident, President Duterte declared martial law, which even legitimised the military to take further action in dealing with the threat in the area. In Marawi, the situation is more complicated since ISIS has been linked with both local separatist and terrorist groups. The military could eventually kill both the commanders of the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Maute Group, after struggling to fight for over several months. Despite the involvement of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the actual threat has still challenged the country (Gita, 2017). Spectators have predicted that if it is still uncontrollable, then it may affect the neighbouring countries in the region.

Therefore, this situation may potentially develop an opportunity for greater cooperation among ASEAN member countries in dealing with ISIS as well as its local and regional affiliated networks. Unlike past engagements, this new chapter may accommodate a more substantial role of the military through military cooperation. The military can be used to supplement ASEAN's counterterrorism diplomacy in engaging with other international partners. In fact, counterterrorism diplomacy can help strengthen regional engagement, which has been restrained due to the South China Sea dispute (Tong, 2016).

This article tries to analyse the change in ASEAN's regional engagement in the context of counterterrorism efforts. The article identifies the distinction between the period after the 9/11 tragedy and the recent period after the emergence of IS. With the rise of ISIS, replacing the dominance of AQ in Southeast Asia, there is a key dynamic in the region. Hence, the article argues that there has also been a substantial change in ASEAN countries' implementation of their counterterrorism policies. Referring to lessons learned from the past where the terrorist network is linked regionally and globally, ASEAN member countries perceive that it cannot be managed by only utilizing the law enforcement agencies, primarily the police counterterrorism unit. The involvement of the military is critical to supplement the police effort as depicted in the hybrid model. This strategy has been increasingly practised in coping with terrorism by many ASEAN countries. With this military involvement, ASEAN countries have more opportunities to develop their counterterrorism diplomacy since the military has been consistently used as a diplomatic tool in recent years in the region. By introducing this new approach of counterterrorism diplomacy, it helps set a new chapter of regional engagement.

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The Logic of U.S. Deployment in Norway: The Trump Administration and NATO's Northern Front

Dylan Motin

Ph.D. Candidate, Kangwon National University

Observers generally assume that domestic concerns or Donald Trump's personality oriented his administration's foreign policy. In this piece, I discuss the United States' decision in 2017 to base military forces in Norway. I argue that the Trump administration's decision is mainly explainable by balance-of-power motives and has likely little to do with domestic concerns. After showing the importance of Norway to the United States and describing the military balance of power in Northern Europe, this study considers competing International Relations theories. It suggests that realism and balance-of-power theory are more amenable for describing U.S. policy toward Norway.

A few days before Donald Trump's inauguration in January 2017, the United States deployed in Norway 330 Marines on a rotational basis for a duration of six months. Knowing Trump's vocal disinterest in alliances and maintaining troops abroad, one could have expected this deployment decided by the Obama administration not to be renewed. However, six months became one year, one year became two, two became five more, and the 330 Marines eventually became 700 (Lemon 2018). This additional American deployment also came as a surprise since Norway is quite far away from the customary hot spots of East Asia, the Middle East, or Eastern Europe. How to explain this unlikely troop commitment?

This study proposes to explain the rationale behind this deployment and suggests that the United States acted upon realist motives.[1] Indeed, the Trump administration's foreign policy has been read by many observers as based on Donald Trump's actual or alleged personal traits: alt-rightist, isolationist, or even pro-Russian. Contrary to the dominant view based on *Innenpolitik* explanations, I argue that the U.S. foreign policy under Trump was far more conventional and can be explained from a realist viewpoint

[1] Major realist works are Aron (2004), Mearsheimer (2014), and Waltz (1979).

(Abrams 2017; Chung 2017; Kroenig 2017). This case is representative of a new era of international politics, or in the words of the then-U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, a shift toward "great power competition" (Ali 2018), which the Trump administration could not escape.

Today, great power competition is front and centre, and the Ukraine War has brought back realist insights to the forefront. However, in 2018, the Norway deployment represented a fundamental rupture with the foreign policy doctrine of the 2000s focused on terrorism, counterinsurgency, and peacekeeping operations. I argue here that this can only be explained by competition with Russia. Washington was reacting to an unfavourable balance of power on the Northern Front and was attempting to correct this military weakness.

Balance of power appears as a necessary and sufficient variable for explaining U.S. deployment in Norway. It is hard to demonstrate balance-of-power motives since diplomats and leaders usually do not discuss power politics openly. Studying the Trump administration's decision-making process and accessing documental evidence would be necessary to make a robust assessment. However, this Norwegian deployment is very recent history, poorly documented, and has elicited little scholarly interest. Therefore, this study cannot offer a definitive account and modestly attempts to make a first cut. By showing why a balance-of-power policy for the United States made sense and why other theories available fare poorly in the case of Norway, this study hopes to offer a 'hoop test' for the balance-of-power hypothesis (Collier 2011). Firstly, I describe U.S. interests in Norway and the need for American troops there. Then, I show that possible alternative explanations (alliance inertia, domestic politics, and economic gain) are less amenable for describing this case.

Troops Deployment in the International Relations Literature

Several International Relations theories could explain the Trump administration's dispatching of Marines to Norway. In this paper, I consider four of the scholarship's most prominent explanations of foreign basing: alliance inertia, domestic politics, economic gain, and balance of power.

Alliance Inertia. The United States and Norway are allied through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Alliance inertia may create incentives to deepen a relationship and eventually deploy troops to an allied country even if the threat level does not justify such a presence. Alliances can form their own dynamic due to material causes (institutional frameworks, military-industrial cooperation, similarity in military doctrine, etc.) and/or ideational ones (shared identity, common threat perception, trans-societal links, etc.). Therefore, alliance relationships can evolve independently from the exterior threat that originally elicited the formation of the alliance (Suh 2007).

Domestic Politics. Dispatching troops may also simply be explained by purely domestic causes. Some influential individuals or interest groups may push for it. It can also be a byproduct of the American regime and political equilibrium. Some parts of the government and/or the bureaucracy may desire such a deployment to promote parochial interests. U.S. leaders may use foreign policy to divert the attraction from the domestic arena and find scapegoats for internal problems. It can also result from a particular ideology (Allison & Halperin 1972; Allison and Zelikow 1999; Levy 1988).

Economic Gain. Some explain the presence of troops on foreign soil by economic motives. Indeed, deploying troops in a specific country could mean that "wealth is extracted from peripheral areas and redistributed to the imperial center" (Lutz 2009, p. 7). The presence of U.S. armed forces in Norway would primarily be a way to jockey for some economic benefits. A potential example could be the case of Japan in the 1980s; Japan's dependence on U.S. forces for its defence put it in a difficult position when the Reagan Administration started to ask for economic concessions.

Balance of Power. Balancing means mobilising additional resources for deterring a hostile state or, if necessary, waging war on it. It can be done internally (e.g., by increasing military spending) or externally (e.g., by recruiting allies; Morrow 1993; Motin 2024, pp. 19–25; Parent & Rosato 2015). A relationship is balanced when the two states have an overall parity in terms of military power. It becomes unbalanced if one state has a crushing superiority over the other. To survive, it is essential to prevent hostile countries from gaining military supremacy (Mearsheimer 2014). In this case, if the United States and their allies were superior in the region, there would be no incentive to deploy more troops there. On the contrary, if NATO forces were outgunned, America would be tempted to deploy troops to correct this misbalance.

As of 2017, Norway neighboured an increasingly powerful Russia, which had for several years displayed aggressive intentions towards recalcitrant surrounding countries in what appeared to be the beginning of a 'Cold War II' (Kroenig 2015; also, Cottey 2022; Tabachnik & Miller 2021). The Ukraine Crisis of 2014 and the annexation of Crimea were fresh in the minds of decision-makers, pushing Oslo to rethink its defence posture. Unsurprisingly, the Norwegian government had a growing sense of a renewed existential threat coming from the East (Fouche & Solsvik 2018). It broke with the experience of the

1990s and the 2000s when Russia was more of a potential threat for a distant future than an actual problem. However, since the United States' interest in defending Norway may not be apparent, it must be described first.

The Importance of Norway

The strategic importance of Norway may not be obvious. It is a country large like Poland and populated by a little more than five million inhabitants. Norway nevertheless has significant oil resources, which is quite a unique situation in NATO Europe. Furthermore, a country's value is foremost determined by its geographical position within an international system and in relation to the location of the great powers (Aron 2004). The fundamental importance of Norway lies in its 200-kilometre-long border with Russia. Norway matters to both NATO and Russia for defensive and offensive motives. As noticed by Frühling and Lasconjarias (2016, p. 111), Kola's "strategic significance to NATO as a whole derives from the presence of Russian SSBNs, and the potential threat to Atlantic Sea lines of communication" (SLOC). Indeed, the Russian Navy has four priorities in case of war: 1) "Provision and protection of the SSBN arm of the strategic nuclear deterrent"; 2) "Homeland defence"; 3) "Conventional strategic precision strike"; 4) "SLOC interdiction" (Allport 2018, p. 52).

The problem of the defence of Norway has grown more complex since the 1990s. Finland has vastly downsized its defence posture since the collapse of the Soviet Union and is thus a far less formidable buffer than before for Norway. If the Russians were to control Finland totally or partially, it would allow them to access northern Sweden and then reach all of Norway far more easily (Bowman 1984). During the Cold War, the Soviets would, of course, have preferred to pass through a neutral Finland to access Norway effortlessly. However, they were ready to bear the costs of Finland's belligerence if it decided to resist. The main Russian objective in Finland would be to seize Inari and its regions to allow a rapid advance toward Norway. In a more ambitious scenario, the Russians would aim at the strategic city of Rovaniemi and its 3,000 meters-long runway for opening the gates to future operations toward northern Sweden and central Norway (Petersen 2014, pp. 18, 26, 40). Furthermore, Sweden was a force to be reckoned with during the Cold War and even maintained the fourth most potent aviation on the planet for a while. However, the recent decline in military spending has seriously degraded its warfighting capabilities.[2] Consequently, Norway's security problem can be seen as more acute than it used to be.

The centrality of Norway was not lost on the Nazis when they invaded it in 1940. The power that controls southern Norway has a strong base for launching attacks deep into the Atlantic Ocean. During World War II, Norway was an essential staging area for German U-boats hunting down Allied convoys. Indeed, now as then, in case of a contingency, U.S. troops would have to be shipped to European ports via the Northern Atlantic. During a war against NATO, the Russians would be very tempted to try to interdict these SLOC. It was estimated during the 1980s that more than 85% of U.S. reinforcements would have had to transit by sea (Alexander 1984; Ries 1984). Debilitating Norway's military apparatus would disable the first layer of the NATO anti-submarine barriers that impede the free movement of Russian submarines back and forth to the Atlantic. Southern Norway would also be a perfect place for basing long-range aircraft able to strike the Atlantic SLOC. Land-based aircraft in Norway can be a good way for the Russians to correct a very unfavourable balance of power at sea for them (Underwood 1981). During a war, Russia would probably want to "seize some Norwegian ports or fjords for use as forward submarine bases. These bases would not be constrained by ice, would reduce the transit distance from the Kola by about 1,000 miles and would ease the [Russian] logistic support problem" (ibid, p. 46). To secure the Norwegian and Barents Seas, Russia could attack Spitzbergen, Iceland, Jan Mayen, and Bear Island (Kernan 1989; Wither 2018). To protect its SLOC, NATO has to interdict Russian ships from entering the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic by defending and retaining control over Denmark, Iceland, and Norway (Underwood 1981).[3]

This explains the centrality of the Kola Peninsula for the Russian war machine. The aforementioned submarines of the Northern Fleet are based on this peninsula (notably at Severomorsk). Coincidentally, Kola lies on the shortest flight path between North America and the heart of the Russian homeland. It is thus essential for strategic air and missile defence and can serve as a departure base for Russian strategic bombers.

[2] The Norwegians and NATO understand very well that Norway is indefensible if northern Sweden does not stand. That is why the equivalent of half of the Norwegian army, alongside other Allied forces, participated in the recent 'Northern Wind' exercise in Norrbotten, Sweden northernmost county (Nilsen 2019). On Nordic cooperation, see Saxi (2022).

[3] The Soviet General Staff referred to Iceland and Norway as the "Artic gates to the Atlantic". However, because of the great difficulties of landing on Iceland, the Russians could possibly land only a very small number of troops. Consequently, if NATO were to deploy some ground forces on Iceland soon during a crisis, it could easily deter the Russians from attempting an attack on the island (Petersen 2014, pp. 98, 105).

Moreover, Kola offers Russia its only ice-free access to the world ocean. The other main one, Petropavlovsk (Kamchatka), is very remote and fades compared to Kola, and it is not ice-free in winter. All other accesses (the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Japan) are limited by chokepoints held by hostile countries (Ries 1984).[4] Only Kola can provide Russian SSBNs with sufficient air and naval defences against NATO's submarines and anti-submarine platforms. It also offers access to the Arctic, a region vital to the survival of the SSBNs:

> *The best submarine sanctuary would be in waters where the enemy detection systems have difficulty operating. This is precisely the case in the Artic where submarine detection is complicated by three factors—acoustic refraction caused by salinity differences between the water layers under the melting ice cap and those deeper down, the constant background noise caused by shifting pack ice which provides the submarines with acoustic cover, and the physical barrier represented by the ice itself against any form of surface or air ASW operations. Finally, the Soviet Union's proximity to the Arctic makes it possible to provide a degree of airborne cover over these waters (ibid, pp. 874-875).*

Kola's importance only increased as Russia's submarine activities returned to their Cold War levels, it reestablished continuous at-sea deterrence and its underwater fleet is set to grow (Sutton 2018; Woody 2018a).[5]

Hence, Norway is essential to Russia for deterrence, defensive, and even offensive purposes. The importance of Norway mainly lies in the strategic centrality of Kola. The loss of Kola's facilities would deal a severe blow to the credibility of Russia's nuclear deterrent. It would also eliminate Russian naval power from the Atlantic and secure the West's SLOC. Without Kola, northern and central Russia would become more vulnerable to NATO's conventional and nuclear atmospheric operations. Needless to add that Saint-Petersburg, the second largest Russian city, is only 150 km away from the Finnish border in a straight line and 200 km by road. Wheeled vehicles need only three hours to travel such a short distance.

The Russians certainly remember that during the 1939-1940 Winter War, the Allies initially planned to send troops to fight with the Finnish against the Soviets through Norway and Sweden, which nevertheless refused to cooperate (Underwood 1981). Moreover, the Germans tried to use Finnish and Norwegian territory to conquer Kola

[4] Namely the Danish Straits, the Dardanelles, the La Pérouse, Tsugaru, and Tsushima Straits. Nevertheless, the recent rift between the West and Turkey and the consequent rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara leave the Russians some hope to change this deadlock.
[5] During the Cold War, the Soviets expected both themselves and NATO to attack the other's nuclear capabilities in a general conventional conflict. Hence, it is likely that the Russians too expect the Americans to attack their nuclear deterrent over the course of a conventional war (Petersen 2014, p. 97).

and outflank Leningrad during World War II. Russian planners can only worry that during a general war, a NATO-controlled Norway could serve the same purpose. Norway can not only home NATO aircraft but can also be a penetration axis for U.S. cruise missiles flying toward Russia. The Russians are thus interested in pushing their air defence bubble as far west as possible (Petersen 2014, p. 96). As summarized by Kernan (1989, p. 21), "Norway's geographical position necessitates an offensive strategy by [Russia]. Defense of its strategic assets and Mother Russia itself only add incentive to the employment of an invasion into Norway early in the war". For Washington, the constant progress in cruise missile technology now means that the threat to the continental United States is no longer limited to ballistic weapons. Russian attack submarines departing from Kola equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles could engage targets on the U.S. eastern seaboard (Allport 2018). New classes of long-range cruise missiles actually present Europe with a threat of a new 'Blitz' where NATO's political and command centres, logistic hubs, air bases, missile defence installations, and even nuclear-related sites could be attacked without escalating to the use of ballistic missiles and without sacrificing precious bombers. Frühling and Lasconjarias (2016, p. 105) summed up the problem:

> *The Kola bastion is of importance to Norway, which is once again growing concerned about the defence of its Finnmark region and Russia's forward air and naval operations (which now often extend to the UK-Iceland gap), in defence of its northern bastion. During the Cold War, these concerns gave rise to the creation of the 'Allied Mobile Force' (a conceptual forebear of today's VJTF), extensive prepositioning of equipment (in particular for the US Marine Corps, which still uses facilities in Norway) and increased NATO exercises in the High North during the 1980s. While all of these also figure prominently in NATO's reassurance of the Baltic countries today, the Alliance's increased attention to the High North has so far been largely limited to some additional exercises. During the 1980s, the maritime strategy of the US Navy included a forward battle by nuclear attack submarines and multiple carrier groups to break into the Kola bastion.*

This maritime strategy seems to be making a comeback today. The recreation of the Second Fleet and the role played by the USS Harry S. Truman during recent manoeuvres testify to it (Holmes 2018).

The Need for U.S. Forces in Norway

Russia has identified Norway and its policies as a potential cause for a future war and so as a threat (Nilsen 2017b). Moreover, Moscow started in the late 2000s an extensive military modernization program and moved or raised new units near its western borders. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2019), its Western Military District and Northern Fleet possessed in 2018 one tank division, three motor rifle divisions, one tank brigade, five motor rifle brigades, one naval infantry brigade, one reconnaissance brigade, and two Spetsnaz brigades (without counting artillery, missile, and other support units, but including Naval Infantry units). Moreover, Russia maintained the equivalent of six airborne divisions. I conservatively assume here that it employs only one of them. If we follow a simple mathematics of 10,000 men per division and 3,000 per brigade, it represents a force of over 70,000 men. Such a force looks reasonable and coherent with what Russia employed in Georgia in 2008. It gives Russia a sizeable numerical superiority without depleting Russia's other fronts.

The Norwegian army pales in comparison. Its only major unit is a light armoured brigade. The country can count at best on 36 tanks.[6] Even with all of its ground forces and its Home Guards Rapid Reaction Force, Norway would barely be able to assemble 10,000 men.[7] It is hard to imagine the Home Guard reservists playing a very active role on the frontline since they are very lightly armed. They would more probably be used as rear security forces. The country's air force is more impressive, notably because it musters 57 F-16AM and F-16BM, and also 16 F-35A (IISS 2019). If we use Mearsheimer's methodology (1982) and assume a 50 km wide front, Norway would not have enough troops to field the equivalent of around one division for 20 km of front. Beyond the troops count, Russia's relative superiority in terms of tanks, armoured vehicles, and G-RAMM (guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles) should also be kept in mind. The Russians would have no serious difficulties in creating a 3:1 advantage in combat power and potentially overrun Norwegian forces.[8]

The Norwegians would likely focus on mounting a strong defence of Tromsø and Bardufoss. They can hardly defend more in the east and risk major units there because they could easily be flanked through the Finnish border. Geometrical logic also shows that the bigger the numerical superiority of the attacker is, the more the defender has to base its troops far from the initial border so as not to be bypassed (Gupta 1993). Moreover, since Finnmark's terrain is relatively flat, it would be harder for the light Norwegian forces to stop heavy Russian units there than more to the West in the mountains. In addition, logistical constraints would heavily favour the Russians if they engage the enemy directly at the Russian border. Russia would likely start any war by advancing along the E6, from Kirkenes to Lakselv. Such an offensive along the coastal

[6] All from Leopard 2A4 design. Only 30 are said to be operational (Military Leak 2018).
[7] 8,100 men in the ground forces where I retrenched a notional 10% for general headquarters and overhead (an estimation used in Posen 1991).
[8] This '3:1 rule' states that an attacker mustering a 3:1 advantage in combat power would have reasonable chances to overpower the defender and break through its defenses. For a more detailed description (and criticism) of this rule, see Motin (2020b).

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road would probably be accompanied by coordinated airborne and seaborne operations to nullify NATO efforts to block the way and defend efficiently. Indeed, if NATO fails to reach air superiority, the Russians could use their air assault assets to outflank strongpoints or for rear attacks. This is made possible by the weaknesses of Norwegian air defences (Petersen 2014, pp. 20, 24, 51). In conclusion, Finnmark would probably be lost in the first stage of any Russian attack. The main stake is then to impede the Russians from advancing further since the more they progress to the South, the more Allied Atlantic SLOC to Europe would become vulnerable.

Such a scenario is quite similar to the one of the 2018 NATO exercise in Norway 'Trident Juncture', which "envisages an 'enemy' invading from the north of Norway (from the Russian border), occupying land and pressing south to Oslo from the Trondheim area" (Felgenhauer 2018). Indeed, in December 2013, a snap exercise included in its scenario the quick seizure by Russian troops of northern Norway along the Åland Islands and the islands of Gotland and Bornholm (Lucas 2015). The Allies would need time to assemble enough forces to mount a counterattack to liberate Finnmark, and it would not be easy work (quite similarly to the risk of a land grab in Baltic countries). Friis noticed that "military planners also regard a partial extension of [Russian] land defence into Northern Norway as likely in such a scenario. One could, for instance, envisage the deployment of mobile air defence systems in Northern Norway as part of an offensive defence of the Kola bases. In such a scenario, allies would have difficulty providing reinforcements to Norway due to the Russian denial efforts in the North Sea" (2018, p. 131). Hence, the balance of power favours Russia. Unsurprisingly, the United States and NATO would like to redress this imbalance (Motin 2020a).

The Alliance would have, at best, two weeks of clear warning. According to Bowman (1984), it would take five days to move a division from Moscow to Saint-Petersburg (700 km), one week to move a division from Saint-Petersburg to the Norwegian border (1200 km) and two weeks to move a division from Moscow to the same point (1,800 km). With recent upgrade works on the E105 road, the movement could be faster still, with a far better road from Murmansk to Norway (Nilsen 2017a). Although the distances involved are greater, the RAND estimated that NATO would only have one week of warning in a Baltic contingency (Shlapak & Johnson 2016). This limited warning time is a significant problem for Allied planners; "NATO must rely on a best case scenario of seven to ten days notice of impending attack for any chances of retaining control of the Northern Front" (Kernan 1989, p. 26). Since the Russians can bring in overwhelming firepower within two weeks, what reinforcements could other Allied countries deploy to face the Russians within the same amount of time?

As aforementioned, the United States is now basing 700 Marines in Norway. The Marine Corps also has, since 1981, prepositioned stocks of material at several sites near Trondheim. This equipment, once manned, would make up for a Marine Expeditionary Unit and an artillery battalion (IISS 2019). Flowing troops to Europe, taking possession of the prepositioned equipment and moving them to the combat zone should take 9 to 14 days (Allport 2018). It is also noticeable that Britain maintains 800 Royal Marines in Norway (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence 2018). Therefore, this initial American/British force would represent around 4,500 men (the artillery battalion included).

The 2018 exercise 'Trident Juncture' is telling. The Allies started deploying their assets in August, while the exercise began on October 25. NATO needed around 180 flights and 60 shiploads to transport its equipment from the rest of Europe and America. The total force numbered around 50,000 men for 10,000 vehicles, 250 aircraft, and 65 vessels (Porteous 2018). It means that the deployment of this force necessitated at least two months. Of course, in peacetime, NATO logisticians are in no rush. In wartime, shipping would be accomplished at a faster rate. However, the number of troops and equipment deployable to Norway on short notice should be quite limited.

The first ground reinforcements would come from airlifts from Allied countries with significant projection capabilities. The U.S. 82nd Airborne Division boasts its ability to deploy a battalion anywhere in the world in 18 hours (South 2018). It means that a brigade can be airlifted in around five days. France says it can move 700 paratroopers in 60 hours (Lagneau 2018). I will assume the same capability for Britain. This would mean *ceteris paribus* that around 12,000 U.S. soldiers, 4,000 French soldiers, and 4,000 British soldiers could be airlifted within two weeks.[9]

Reinforcements coming from the sea should be rather limited. American Fast Sealift Ships moving at full speed (around 60 km/h) can theoretically travel from New York to Oslo in around four days and from Amsterdam to Oslo in 15 hours. But in a real-world situation, those ships would probably go slower. Moreover, moving the equipment from the depots, loading it on the ship, unloading it upon arrival, and then moving it to

[9] Those numbers are more optimistic than those of Shurkin (2017). This study is concerned only with light units airlift while Shurkin inquires heavy units' deployment capabilities. For a study of the behaviour of middle powers like Britain and France, see Kerdodé & Motin (2024).

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the destination also takes considerable time. It is doubtful that major reinforcements could be sealifted fast enough.

NATO commanders would also be reluctant to risk transport ships to Russian submarines and long-range anti-ship missiles. The recent introduction of Yassen-class nuclear attack submarines, which are among the quietest submarines ever, does nothing to relieve this fear. According to Allport calculations, 20% of the Northern Fleet attack submarines should be available for SLOC interdictions. Although it does not represent a massive number of ships (around five), it should be enough to inflict painful losses on NATO's shipping. Contemporary ships are far bigger and carry far larger volumes than World War II boats. An armoured brigade combat team's heavy equipment is transportable on as few as three ships. Hence, a sunken ship could represent the destruction of a staggering one-third of a brigade (Allport 2018).

To sum up, the troops available to oppose the 70,000 men-strong Russian force assumed in this study can be divided into three tiers. The first is the Norwegian troops, mustering at best 10,000 men. The second is a U.S./British force composed of troops already based in Norway and of units raised from prepositioned equipment of 4,500 men. The third is an airlifted force of 20,000 men urgently deployed from NATO countries. This result is grossly coherent with NATO's 'Four 30s' policy, "the ability to deploy 30 infantry battalions (as many as 30,000 troops), 30 ships and 30 air squadrons (about 700 aircraft) within 30 days" (Ragozin 2018). The total force available within two weeks is so almost 35,000 men. This 2:1 ratio, although still worrying for the Alliance, means that it could still have a chance to stop the Russians somewhere in northern Norway or at least to impede a quick victory. However, airlifted NATO units and Norwegian troops are lighter than Russian heavy units and would lack punch. Russia would also have a superiority in the air on the sea, at least in the first days of the conflict.[10] Furthermore, getting troops to Norway is one thing. Getting them to the Troms region under missile strikes, air strikes, and Spetsnaz attacks is another. The 1940 Operation Weserübung shows what could possibly happen in Norway; the Germans

> used extensive unconventional warfare activities to confuse and disrupt the Norwegian mobilization. The British Fleet delivered a coalition counter-invasion force within three days, but the campaign was ill-conceived and poorly executed. The reinforcing British,

[10] Maybe more than Russian fighters, long-range antiaircraft defense systems such as S-300, S-400, and S-500 would pose the most severe threat to NATO planes operating near the frontline. "Russian ground forces are typically heavily defended with air defense systems rather than by air support; in a situation of mutual air denial, Russian ground units would most likely enjoy a substantial advantage derived from their numerical superiority in ground-based fire support" (Boston & Massicot 2017, p. 7).

> French, and expatriate Polish units lacked cohesion, heavy weapons, tactical mobility, and air cover. In seven weeks they were driven out of Norway (Alexander 1984, p. 183).

The U.S. rationale for deploying troops in Norway is clear. Although the situation on the Northern Front is not totally hopeless, Russia has a massive advantage in terms of firepower. Maybe more than anywhere, it could reasonably hope to score an easy victory against NATO and grab a big chunk of territory before NATO can mount a counterattack. The Allies could correct this weakness by the early use of tactical nuclear weapons on Russian spearheads, but the cure could be worse than the disease. Washington was thus incentivized to base troops in Norway because of this unfavourable balance of power.

Another clue of the increasing attention given by the United States to the Northern Front is the creation of a NATO Atlantic Command (based at Norfolk) and the reactivation of the U.S. Second Fleet, both with the undisguised aim of countering the Russian naval threat over the North Atlantic region. The Americans are probably willing to prevent a Russian *fait accompli* that would change the strategic equilibrium in the North Atlantic and the Arctic region.

Alternative Explanations

The preceding case study should have made clear that balance-of-power theory is amenable for explaining the U.S. force basement in Norway. Even if definitive evidence is lacking, testing how competing theories fare is valuable.

Alliance Inertia. Norway is a cofounder of NATO and is fully integrated into NATO structures. It participated with other Allied countries in the Afghan War. It dispatched military instructors to Iraq to support U.S. efforts. It also participated in the coalition fighting ISIS in the Middle East. Although small, U.S.-Norway military exchange programs create human connections (Kapustka 2012; U.S. Army War College 2015).

Norway is one of the major arms importers of Europe and has a dependency on the United States, especially concerning its air force. For example, it acquired 52 F-35 fighters to replace its older planes (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2018). Although this order is not insignificant, Lockheed Martin is bound to produce hundreds of F-35s for numerous customers worldwide. It is hard to imagine how Norway and its limited arms purchases could have a decisive influence on U.S. policymaking.

Furthermore, it seems that emigration from Norway to the United States is rather limited. "From 2007-2016, less than 1,000 Norwegians naturalized as US citizens, according to US Department of Homeland Security data. That's an average of 100 Norwegians a year -- less than .000001 percent of Norway's population" (Fox 2018). There are far more Russians than Norwegians living in the United States. Yet, it does not seem to elicit U.S. policies friendly toward Russian interests. Hence, it is doubtful that trans-societal relations pushed America to deploy troops in Norway.

Although probably real, the power of the U.S.-Norway alliance inertia is certainly not stronger than for most other American bilateral alliances. It is unlikely to explain the Trump administration's decision. This theory, although not very convincing in this case, looks more robust than the next one.

Domestic Politics. The first argument against a domestic source of the Marines' deployment in Norway is straightforward. It goes contrary to President Trump's promise not to defend allies which are not serious about defence expenditures. As he remarked, "Norway ... remains the only NATO ally sharing a border with Russia that lacks a credible plan to spend 2 percent of its gross domestic product on defense" (Adomaitis 2018). It would make little sense for the Trump Administration to criticize Norway for its weak defence effort while deploying forces there at the same time. Norway is just too important to be left facing Russia on its own.

In the case of Israel, it is often heard that U.S. politicians are favouring pro-Israeli policies to please the Jewish electorate. However, as aforementioned, because of small numbers, the influence of the Norwegian-born voters is probably more than limited. Politicians have few incentives to show their care for a potential Norwegian lobby.

As noticed by Kupchan and Trubowitz (2007), politicians can favour foreign deployments as a way of increasing military expenditures and boosting defence-related industries. As more weapons are needed, the voters living in districts with weapons factories should be thankful to their representatives and/or the government. However, 700 Marines do not represent a significant part of a 1,400,000 men-strong military. Few additional spending is required, and it cannot boost the economy of American industrial regions in any meaningful way.

There is, however, one argument which is less easy to debunk. Parts of the American opinion and the media consider that Donald Trump is unhealthily sympathetic towards Russia and Vladimir Putin. Deploying troops in Norway could be a way for the Trump administration to show toughness towards the Russians and showcase its willingness to resist Russian aggression in the face of domestic criticisms. Hostility towards Russia is indeed one of the few topics which unite most Democratic and

Republican constituencies. Nevertheless, such an argument fails to explain why the Trump administration chose Norway for a show of force. It would have been at least as efficient and visible to send troops anywhere near Russian borders — such as Poland or the Baltic states. The last theory is weaker still in explaining the Norwegian case.

Economic Gain. Oil is often a usual suspect for explaining the presence of U.S. troops on foreign soil. Although Norway is an important oil producer, since the United States is now one of the biggest oil producers in the world, it is hard to see why it would need Norwegian oil. There are few obvious benefits for a country independent in oil for trying to control non-vital foreign oil reserves.

The United States does not import from Norway anything that is essential and cannot be replaced: "U.S. imports from Norway include mineral fuel and oil, machinery, nickel and nickel products, and Atlantic salmon. Reported U.S. direct investment in Norway is led by the mining and manufacturing sectors. Software and IT services, coal, oil and natural gas, and metals, account for the top three sectors in Norway's reported direct investment in the United States" (Bureau of European Affairs 2018). Although Norwegian salmon is reputed, there is no visible need for a U.S. military presence to secure some strategic resources.

In 2017, the two countries' trade represented around 10 billion dollars, with a relative balance between exports and imports (United States Census Bureau 2018). This figure is smaller than the total trade between Austria and the United States, yet there are no U.S. troops in Austria. In the same vein, Norway's GDP in 2017 was worth almost 400 billion dollars (Trading Economics 2018b). In 2017, Austria's one was around 415 billion dollars (Trading Economics 2018a). So even if Austria is a wealthier country and represents a potentially bigger market, it does not house U.S. forces.

Conclusion

The second part of this article explained the strategic importance of Norway. Norway is a strategic thorn in the side of Russian power in Europe and the North Atlantic. The third part justified the need for U.S. troops in Norway. Åtland (2016, p. 172) summarises the problem well: "While NATO as an alliance still enjoys a clear conventional advantage over Russia at the aggregate level, its limited forward presence on the periphery of Europe implies that Russia still retains a conventional superiority over its smaller neighbours at the local level. For instance, in the Barents Sea region, Norway is not, and will never be, able to 'match' the Russian naval, air, and ground forces that are located on the Kola Peninsula". If, for some reason, NATO reinforcements were unable to reach Norway on time, NATO would have no other choice than to use tactical nuclear weapons or to surrender Norway or parts of it. After all, as noticed by Friis (2018), the Norwegian government did not have a serious plan for defending its border or even Finnmark during the Cold War; the Soviets were to be stopped in the Troms region. That is why the United States has an incentive to deploy forces to Norway.

Although tentative, this study determined that competing theories existing in the IR field, although not irrelevant, cannot explain the situation as efficiently as realism. Two arguments may be part of the story: the mutual Norway-U.S. sympathy induced by their almost 70 years-long alliance and President Trump's need to showcase toughness towards the Russians for domestic reasons. However, both arguments seem to fade in the face of power-politics considerations. Further research would be invaluable since this case is recent and poorly documented. However, this case does not imply that the Trump administration was consistently realist. Driving a wedge between North Korea and China would have significantly helped stabilise East Asia's power balance (Motin 2022a, 2022b). Yet, Washington forewent realism by dropping diplomacy with North Korea to return to the neoconservative focus on denuclearization. Moreover, Trump abandoning the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran and stopping engagement with Cuba makes little sense in a multipolar world where the United States should focus on great power competitors. The Trump administration remained an occasional realist one.

The balance of power in the North Atlantic inherited from the 1990s is evolving, and some already talk of a 'Fourth Battle of the Atlantic'. Maintaining free access and shipping from America to Europe may become more complex as Russian naval power expands (Foggo & Fritz 2016). Russian naval bases in Syria and maybe one day in Libya will increase the threat to Allied SLOC in the Atlantic from a southern angle. At the same time, potential basements in Cuba or Venezuela would allow Russian submarines to attack the SLOC without having to cross first NATO-controlled chokepoints and so limit their attrition.

Norway would likely be a secondary theatre in a general war compared to the East-Central European theatre. The Russians may be content to secure a little defensive buffer in Finnmark. In any case, they will be reluctant to deploy a significant part of their troops in Norway or suffer too many casualties. Due to political uncertainties, it is hard to prognose much more. If a general war starts elsewhere, will Norway allow NATO to use its territory for offensive use? Will Finland and Sweden fight proactively with Norway and NATO or focus on national territorial defence? On favourable terms, a prolonged attrition war in Norway may benefit NATO. The Allies enjoy in Norway the advantages associated with defensive warfare. Moreover, Northern Norway is far away from any industrial or demographic centre. Hence, the Allies would not have any remorse to turn it into a 'free-fire zone'. Since NATO has an overall superiority in mobilisation capabilities and Russia's troops are less numerous than their Soviet ancestors, tying down Russian firepower on the Northern Front would facilitate victory on the Eastern Front at a low cost. Of course, this depends on mustering a robust defence posture in Northern Europe. Since U.S. heavy units are a scarce commodity, capable European allies should take a greater part of the burden.

Norway should be the first concerned with its own fate. However, this country has limited potential for raising a massive conventional military up to the task. The problem can be partially circumvented by focusing on low-cost passive defences such as anti-tank ditches and obstacles, fortifications, minefields, pre-chambered bridges, tunnels and roads, and even remotely controlled weapons. It is also possible to generate combat power from local inhabitants by forming quick-reaction militias equipped with readily available (for example, stocked into police stations, town halls, etc.) small weapons, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft missiles (Saperstein 1987). Finnmark is populated by around 76,000 people, including around 67,000 Norwegians. People aged 20 to 40 are almost 20,000 (City Population 2019). Assuming that 10% of them are foreigners leaves 18,000 young people at the height of their military potential. Even if only half of them could eventually be armed, it would represent a quite formidable force for facing an offensive. Those militias would impose attrition on Russian invaders and gain time for NATO to mount a counterattack (Flanagan et al. 2019).

Even if an all-out war between the East and the West seems unlikely, a limited conflict is still possible. However, any military encroachment would entail severe risks of nuclear exchange. Americans naturally tend to send their attack submarines close to the theatre, even during secondary international crises. Hence, the risk of a hostile encounter between a U.S. attack submarine and a Russian SSBN during a limited crisis over Norway would exist even if both sides were unwilling to escalate the confrontation (Kasiski 2018). Fighting near Severodvinsk and other essential elements of Russia's nuclear deterrent or the destruction of one or several Russian boomers would entail real inadvertent escalatory pressures (Posen 1991). Indeed, U.S. troops close to Russia's northern borders, alongside the growing naval competition in the Arctic Ocean likely increased Moscow's fears about its nuclear deterrent's survivability.

When considering relations with Russia, finding the delicate balance between deterrence and escalation is vital. Recent years have seen a sharp rise in East-West hostility. The Zapad 2017 exercise witnessed a Russian deployment of force on the Kola Peninsula unprecedented since the Cold War era (Friis 2018). Russian aircraft practised in February 2018 a mock attack on a Norwegian radar station in Vardø situated around 60 km away from the Russian border (Mizokami 2019). NATO's exercise 'Trident Juncture' in late 2018 was a strong message sent to Russia. Moscow, in turn, temporarily jammed GPS signals over Norway and Finland, causing alarm in both countries and among the Allies (Associated Press 2019). At the same time, the USS Harry S. Truman became the first U.S. aircraft carrier to enter the Arctic Circle since the end of the Cold War. This move was not lost on the Russians (Woody 2018b). The war in Ukraine, ongoing at the time of writing, made the situation all the more volatile, and Moscow has vowed to reinforce its military means on the Northern Flank following Finland and Sweden's decisions to join NATO (Friis & Tamnes 2024).

According to one school, a weak defence can invite aggression and leave the defender no other choice than to surrender or use nuclear weapons. For the other school, increasing force levels exacerbates the security dilemma and is essentially an escalatory step. This debate cannot be solved here. What is sure, however, is that perfect security for Russia means insecurity for the West and vice versa. This basic logic makes some level of conflict unavoidable.

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Angela Merkel's Leadership in Germany's Open Door Policy on Handling the Refugee Crisis in Europe

Muhamad Dasep

Master's Student in International Relations, University of Indonesia

This study examines Angela Merkel's leadership in the Open Door Policy to address the refugee crisis that occurred in Europe in 2015. The conflict in Syria caused its citizens to seek refuge in other countries, leading to a surge in global refugee numbers. Europe, due to its geographical proximity to the Middle East, was significantly impacted by this wave. In response, Germany, under Chancellor Angela Merkel, decided to open its borders to Syrian refugees, contrasting with other EU countries that chose not to accept them. This policy also faced domestic opposition from the AfD party and the anti-Islam PEGIDA movement. Using the concept of leadership, this paper aims to answer the question: how did Angela Merkel's leadership influence Germany's Open Door Policy towards handling the refugee crisis in Europe?.

Introduction

Since the end of World War II, political upheaval and conflicts in the Middle East have brought the refugee issue to international attention. The conflict in Syria, driven by political and ideological issues, has resulted in numerous casualties, prompting Syrians to seek refuge elsewhere. This has led to a global increase in refugee numbers (Fahham & Kartaatmaja, 2014). Syria, with 7.9 million refugees, has the highest number of refugees worldwide (European Commission Directorate-general for Communication, 2014). Europe, due to its geographical proximity to the Middle East, has become a strategic region for receiving refugees. According to Eurostat data, the EU received 626,715 refugees in 2014, the highest since 1992 with 672,000, and granted asylum to more than 185,000 refugees. This number doubled to 1,221,885 asylum seekers in 2015 (Eurostat, 2019).

The EU, through the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) established by the European Commission under the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) framework, set minimum common standards for the treatment of refugees in member states to ensure shared responsibility (Muharjono and Eflar, 2015). In response, Germany, under

Chancellor Angela Merkel, decided to accept refugees through the *Flüchtlinge Willkommen* or *Open Door Policy* on August 24, 2015. This policy opened Germany's borders to anyone in need, especially refugees from conflict countries like Syria. Germany accepted over 1 million refugees. The German government stated that Syrian refugees would be welcomed and allowed to stay, regardless of which EU country they first entered.

Germany created several large-scale programs to handle the refugee crisis, providing around 11 trillion rupiah in total aid, including 5.6 trillion rupiah in humanitarian aid, 4.5 trillion rupiah in bilateral aid, and 1.2 trillion rupiah for crisis resolution (Federal Ministry of The Interior, Building and Community, 2015). The German government established the Financial and Socio-Political Development (ISFD) to manage additional financial assistance for refugees in Germany. This aid included education and health funds, aimed at helping refugees become independent in Germany. During the refugee crisis, the German government also increased the number of BAMF (Federal Ministry of Migration and Refugees) staff by 4,000 to expedite the asylum process. The asylum rejection process for migrants from safe countries was accelerated, as was the acceptance process for asylum requests from refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, and Iraq (ibid, 2015).

However, this policy faced domestic opposition from the right-wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party and the anti-Islam PEGIDA movement, which argued that Middle Eastern refugees were disrupting Germany's established order (European Islamophobia Report, 2015). The PEGIDA movement, which became active in 2015, had 25,000 followers and held weekly demonstrations in Dresden. They demanded that Germany stop the *wilkommenkultur* program (Bojovic, 2016). Additionally, they criticized Angela Merkel's slogan "we could stand for it," claiming that Germany's acceptance of refugees was futile.

Despite protests and opposition, both internal and external, to *the Open Door Policy*, Chancellor Angela Merkel reaffirmed her stance that Germany would uphold its principles of providing protection to those in need. As Merkel emphasized in her speech (MENAFN, 2015):

> *What we are experiencing now is something that will occupy and change our country in the coming years. We want this change to be positive and we believe we can accomplish that.*

This study aims to explain Angela Merkel's leadership in Germany's Open Door Policy in handling the refugee crisis in Europe in 2015. Using the concept of leadership, the study analyzes how a country's actions are influenced by the identity of its leader. It examines the personality and background of Angela Merkel in formulating refugee acceptance policies during the 2015 European refugee crisis, despite significant pressure from the AfD party and the PEGIDA movement, as well as other EU countries opting not to accept refugees. Thus, this research will analyze Angela Merkel's leadership in Germany's Open Door Policy in handling the refugee crisis in Europe.

Research Methodology

Concept of Leadership

In constructivism, identity is defined as the attributes of international actors that provide motivation and drive their actions. Identity is an inherent characteristic of actors that arises without the need for differentiation from others, or more clearly, identity is something that actors are aware of themselves without needing intersubjectivity. Identity views actors as unique individuals who are distinct from others (Wendt,1999).

In this case, the actor is Angela Merkel as Chancellor of Germany. While leaders of other member states restricted or closed their borders to refugees, Angela Merkel chose to open Germany's borders and accept refugees beyond the set quota. This also highlights how the actor's subjectivity towards others differs. Other countries viewed refugees as a security threat, whereas Germany considered them a responsibility.

Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan (1998), in their work "International Decision Making: Leadership Matters," explain that leaders determine internal and external constraints based on their interpretations formed by experiences, goals, beliefs about the world, and sensitivity to political contexts. These interpretations drive the government to support decisions or strategies made based on their assessments of what is likely to happen and to determine their position. This forms the basis for a country's foreign policy decisions. This assumption highlights the importance of a leader's role in policymaking, where the ultimate decision-maker and director of bureaucratic actions are the leaders themselves.

Leadership has a strong influence on the policy-making process. The formulation of a country's foreign policy is related to the personal characteristics of its leaders, who have a significant impact. According to Margaret Hermann (1980), policy orientation is influenced by the personality of the leader at the time. The leader's background and life experiences play a role in shaping their character and personality, as these analyses provide a clear picture of the personal tendencies of leaders or the reasons behind their actions.

This study will explain four leadership indicators influencing foreign policy-making according to Margaret G. Hermann (1980). First, beliefs, which are the basic assumptions of national leaders about the world. Beliefs refer to the leader's interpretation that can influence their environment, role, and strategies. In a political context, beliefs relate to ideology, nationalism, or the leader's control or power. Second, motives, which are the main reasons why a leader takes certain actions. Third, decision style, referring to the methods a leader uses in decision-making. This includes openness to new information, risk consideration, complexity of structure, information acquisition process, and tolerance for ambiguity. Fourth, interpersonal style, or personal characteristics, which describe how policymakers interact with others. Two personal characteristics are paranoia, meaning suspicion or distrust of other policymakers, and Machiavellianism, meaning immoral or manipulative behavior.

Literature Review: Leadership in International Relations

Leadership plays a crucial role in international relations and the process of foreign policymaking. In Andrea K. Grove's book Political Leadership in Foreign Policy: Manipulating Support across Borders (2007), Grove argues that leaders are not just bound by structural forces and constraints; they can actively manipulate elements in both domestic and international environments to gain support for their foreign policies. According to Grove, the correlation between domestic and international politics provides political leaders with opportunities to garner support for their foreign policy decisions.

Angela Merkel's success in *the Open Door Policy*, which focused on refugee acceptance, brought humanitarian issues from the Holocaust as a collective memory of the German society. According to Grove (2007), individuals play a significant role in leveraging the interconnection between domestic and international situations. Many leaders benefit from such situations, exemplified by President Soekarno's strategy in his confrontation policy against Malaysia.

Furthermore, Grove (2007) asserts that leaders are critical actors during crises or periods of uncertainty. In the tradition of political psychology, there are two important approaches supporting this argument. The first is the "Great Man" approach, which focuses on the leader's qualities, such as charisma, personality, historical background, and political experience. The idea is that these qualities make certain individuals particularly suited to lead during difficult times. The second approach is the "Firefighter," which emphasizes the leader's drive and determination to solve problems. In crises, a strong leader is seen as someone who can take control and find solutions.

Leaders play a vital role in shaping foreign policy during crises, such as the Cold War or the refugee crisis. Angela Merkel had previously succeeded in leading Europe out of the Euro crisis and leveraged this to gain support for her refugee crisis policy. The implication is that the decisions and actions of individual leaders can significantly influence a country's foreign policy strategy in such situations.

Operationalization of Theory

Based on Margaret Hermann's (1980) explanation of the concept of Leadership, leadership influence is shaped by four variables: beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style. The operationalization of the leadership concept can be seen in the chart below:

Chart: Operationalization of Leadership Theory



Source: (Created by the Author, 2023)

Analysis Model

Following the operationalization of the above concept, the model for analyzing the operation of these variables is illustrated as follows:

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Chart: Leadership Theory Analysis Model



Source: (Created by the Author, 2023)

Data Collection Method

This paper employs qualitative research methods and document study methods to answer the research question, referring to Christopher Lamont (2015) in the book Research Methods in International Relations. Archival and document-based research involves collecting data from official documents, original reports, policy statements, legislation, and media reports, which can be used to reference and analyze primary sources (Lamont, 2015). Internet-based research is used to gather data from media sources, articles, journals, ebooks, and official government and international organization websites (Lamont, 2015) involved in the issues discussed in this paper.

Discussion: Analysis of Angela Merkel's Leadership in Germany's Open Door Policy Toward Handling the Refugee Crisis in Europe

Beliefs

Beliefs, according to Margaret G. Hermann (1980), refer to a political leader's assumptions or views about the state of the world, which influence their interpretation of their environment and, consequently, the strategies they employ. In this context, the perspective on both domestic and international environments shapes Chancellor Angela Merkel's leadership in formulating her foreign policies. Beliefs in politics often refer to ideology or nationalism (Hermann, 1980). This perspective places the nation as the top priority. Leaders with a strong sense of nationalism have a deep bond with their country, making their actions and policies emphasize national honor and identity. Additionally, beliefs are grounded in self-confidence to control events (Hermann, 1980).

According to Alexander Wendt (1999), a nation's identity can change due to events and how a leader interprets those events. The Holocaust drastically changed Germany, with the largest genocide forcing European Jews and non-Jews to become refugees and seek help from other countries. This event left a traumatic mark on European society, particularly in Germany.

Besides the Holocaust, the mass migration from East Germany to West Germany during the Cold War, driven by the desire for a better life, also left a significant impact. The communist government's restrictions in East Germany limited people's activities, leading to traumatic experiences. Angela Merkel, who lived in Brandenburg, East Germany, witnessed these events firsthand. Seeing East Germans striving to cross the border for a better life in West Germany, Merkel viewed the Berlin Wall as a symbol of tyranny. These traumatic experiences became a collective memory of humanitarian events in Germany.

Halbwachs (1992) argues that collective memory occurs when a group of people shares memories of significant cultural events, shaping how individuals within the group view themselves socially. Halbwachs asserts that all memories are seen and recorded, with people perceiving them through shared social experiences. This collective memory underpins Angela Merkel's perspective on German national identity and secures public support for her Open Door Policy. In her speech, the Chancellor stated (Knight, 2019):

> *We cannot view this as something that just happened, that a constitution can endure the test of time for seven decades as a foundation of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law as the Grundgesetz. Diversity, including through immigration, has been here in the heart of Europe for centuries. We have learned how immigration changes our country, and how it will continue to change our country, and we have learned that our country must become a country of immigration and integration.*

Moreover, Angela Merkel used this policy to improve and restore Germany's humanitarian image internationally. The Chancellor emphasized that this policy was a form of Germany's accountability for past events. Merkel became the first Chancellor to visit the Nazi concentration camp 'Auschwitz' (Flurry, 2008). She courageously acknowledged that the Holocaust was Germany's responsibility and fault, stating in her speech (ibid, 2008):

> *The mass murder of 6 million Jews, carried out in the name of Germany, has brought indescribable suffering to the Jewish people, Europe, and the entire world. Germans are filled with shame over the Nazi Holocaust.*

On another occasion, Merkel reiterated that this history cannot be forgotten but must be a responsibility and a lesson for Germany's future. In her speech, she emphasized (CNN, 2015):

> *This is taught in German schools for a good reason, and it will not be forgotten. I see no reason to change our view of history in any way. We know that those responsible for these crimes against humanity were Germans, and we ourselves.*

In her speeches, Merkel consistently highlighted that the Holocaust was Germany's past mistake and an integral part of the nation. This became a central agenda in her decision to accept refugees during the European refugee crisis. She used it to evoke the German people's collective memory to support *the Open Door Policy*, despite domestic opposition.

Motives

Chancellor Angela Merkel, as the head of the German government, played a crucial role in shaping foreign policy. A leader's behavior in governance can be seen as the reason behind their actions. According to Margaret G. Hermann (1980), motives are the primary reasons why a leader takes certain actions. Every political leader's actions, especially in decision-making, are based on their motivations.

Motives influence a leader's interpretation of their environment and the strategies or policies they employ in response. Hermann (1980) identifies two types of motives: the need for power, which is the most analyzed reason for a political leader's policy-making, and the need for affiliation or approval.

The Open Door Policy became Angela Merkel's main policy during the refugee crisis in Europe, enabling Germany to accept over 1 million refugees from Syria. Prior to this, Merkel had successfully helped the European Union navigate the Euro crisis, propelling her to the pinnacle of her political career as both Chancellor of Germany and President of the European Council. Her success in managing the Euro crisis led to her third term as Chancellor in 2013 (Westervelt, 2011). In her victory, Merkel was determined to gain power as Chancellor and form affiliations with other countries. In her campaign speech, Merkel stated (Hewitt, 2017):

I ask the people of Germany to give us a strong mandate, so I can continue to serve Germany for the next four years, for a stronger Germany, a country highly respected in Europe, that will defend its interests and also befriend many countries.

During the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe, Merkel implemented a bold policy that differed from other EU member states. *The Open Door Policy* was also aimed at securing legitimacy, recognition, and support in the next election. Merkel received widespread praise and was dubbed "Mutti" or mother by Europeans (The Local, 2018). This opened the opportunity for Merkel to serve a fourth term as Federal Chancellor in 2017, making her the longest-serving Chancellor.

Decision Style

Decision style refers to a leader's decision-making method (Hermann, 1980). Chancellor Angela Merkel is a leader who considers the level of risk in her decisions. In formulating *the Open Door Policy*, Merkel weighed various factors. As a leader, Merkel is known for assessing risks in each policy she adopts. Through *the Open Door Policy*, Merkel viewed refugees differently from other countries; while others saw refugees as a burden, she saw them as an opportunity (BBC, 2015).

Merkel's view that refugees are an opportunity is grounded in truth, as Germany, an advanced industrial country, faces a shortage of productive-age workers. Germany's demographic development is marked by a declining birth rate, increasing life expectancy, and an aging population, leading to a future labor shortage (Hewitt, 2015). This demographic challenge threatens Germany's economic stability as decreased production output would follow a lack of a productive workforce.

In 2015, Germany had a population of 83 million, with a negative growth rate. Germany faced population decline due to higher death rates compared to birth rates, coupled with increased life expectancy. Life expectancy was 77 years for men and 82 years for women, and the population aged 80 and above saw an increase, according to the German Federal Statistical Office (Prameswari, 2018).

Based on German Federal Statistical Office data, the population aged 15-24 was only 8.5 million, a small number compared to Germany's total population of 83 million, representing just 10.3 percent of the total population (Prameswari, 2018). In 2015, Germany was the second oldest country globally after Japan, and it was projected that by 2060, the population would only reach 260 million if no actions were taken (ibid, 2018). Therefore, Germany sought to prevent this worst-case scenario by implementing *the Open Door Policy* as a solution.

Germany faced demographic issues requiring productive labor, with population increases since 2011 during the European refugee crisis. German statistics recorded a 0.9 percent population increase in 2015, with 717,000 from initial refugee additions. In 2015, refugees entering Germany were predominantly male (65 percent), with the rest being female. Half of the refugees were under 24 years old, 25 percent were under 15, and the rest were elderly (ibid, 2018).

This made the arrival of refugees in Germany an opportunity for Angela Merkel to alleviate the demographic pressure faced by the country. Germany has provided various services for refugees, such as housing and healthcare. In relation to solving this demographic pressure, several educational programs have been provided, including German language classes, job training and skills programs, and efforts to facilitate refugees' integration into the labor market (OECD, 2017).

The arrival of refugees provided a demographic balance for Germany, as most were under 35, positively impacting the economy. Refugees were given decent lives through employment and better living conditions. As Chancellor, Merkel demonstrated that she was a rational actor, considering the risks and benefits in her policies.

Interpersonal Style

Interpersonal style refers to how a leader interacts with other policymakers, whether they are aligned or opposing. Foreign policy often results from these interactions. According to Margaret G. Hermann (1980), interpersonal style encompasses how policymakers interact with others, with two personal characteristics: paranoia, meaning suspicion or distrust of other policymakers, and Machiavellianism, meaning immoral or manipulative behavior.

The relationship between policymakers influences the resulting policies, whether they are directed as resistance or hostility or as friendship. Regarding *the Open Door Policy*, Merkel issued this policy as a reaction to EU countries closing their borders and not accepting refugees during the crisis. In her speech, Merkel stated (Siadari, 2015):

We cannot close the borders; if we build fences, people will find other ways. There is no stopping the arrival of refugees.

Border walls symbolize tyranny for Merkel, recalling her past reality of seeing East Germans striving to cross the border to West Germany for a better life. Merkel strongly opposed EU member states closing their borders to refugees, stating in her speech (ibid, 2015):

We Eastern Europeans, I consider myself an Eastern European, have seen that isolation does not help," she said. "The refugees will not stop if we only build fences, and I have lived behind a fence long enough.

Hungary, the most vocal country opposing the influx of refugees into Europe, particularly those from Syria, responded poorly to Germany's policies. Hungary began constructing a 175-kilometer-long fence along the Hungary-Serbia border, specifically to reject and redirect the flow of refugees from that border area to other regions (Dearden, 2016). The border consisted of a double-layer fence made of barbed wire, three meters high, and was patrolled by 3,000 officers.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban stated that the arrival of predominantly Muslim refugees would damage Europe's predominantly Christian order. In a speech at the Royal Palace in Budapest, he said (Dearden, 2016):

Christianity is the last hope of European countries. With mass migration, we will see our nightmare come true. Western countries fail to see Europe under attack,... If hundreds of millions of young people are allowed to move north, there will be immense pressure on Europe. If all this continues, major European cities will be populated by a Muslim majority.

This statement naturally received a response from Chancellor Angela Merkel. In her speech, she said (Siadari, 2015):

When someone says, 'This is not Europe, I will not accept Muslims,' I must say, this is non-negotiable... Who are we to defend Christians around the world if we say we will not accept a Muslim or a mosque in our country? We will not do that.

She argued that the Christian values in Europe had nothing to do with rejecting refugees. Instead, these values should be demonstrated by a welcoming and open attitude towards refugees. This open-door policy was a form of resistance against countries deciding not to take responsibility for handling the refugee crisis in Europe.

Analysis of the Relationship Between Leadership Variables

According to Margaret Hermann (1980), leadership is influenced by four variables: beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style. However, the author sees that analyzing the relationship between these leadership variables depends on the actor being analyzed, as some variables may directly influence others or have an indirect impact. In analyzing Angela Merkel's leadership in Germany's open-door policy regarding the refugee crisis in Europe, the dominant variable is beliefs. Angela Merkel's beliefs were shaped by the collective memory of humanitarian events in Germany, such as the Holocaust, which caused the largest refugee wave in history, and the separation of West and East Germany. This background led Chancellor Angela Merkel to become a leader who places humanitarian issues at the core of her foreign policy.

This policy faced opposition both internally and externally. Internally, it was opposed by Germany's right-wing party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), and the anti-Islam movement, Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (PEGIDA). Externally, the policy was contested by EU member states in the Visegrad Group, which includes Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

To achieve consistency and maintain the open-door policy in handling the refugee crisis in Europe, Angela Merkel needed strong legitimacy. Thus, while beliefs influenced other variables indirectly, the motives, decision style, and interpersonal style were all aimed at securing legitimacy for the open-door policy, reflecting Merkel's humanitarian beliefs.

Analysis of the Relationship Between Leadership Variables



Source: (Created by the Author, 2023)

The motive variable refers to Angela Merkel's reasons for creating policies during crises. Merkel was re-elected as Chancellor after successfully developing policies to help the EU out of the Euro crisis and handling the refugee crisis in Europe. This shows that legitimacy is achieved when policy-makers have the power to maintain their policies.

The decision style variable highlights Merkel as a leader who considers risks in policy-making. The arrival of refugees in Germany could address the demographic pressure or the grey population issue. This demonstrated that refugees were not a burden but an opportunity to improve Germany's economy. Changing the German public's perception from viewing refugees as threats or terrorists to seeing them as a solution to demographic problems was crucial for gaining positive public support.

Lastly, the interpersonal style variable describes Merkel's characteristic of paranoia or distrust of other policy-makers who oppose her policies. The open-door policy was a response to Hungary closing its borders to refugees, claiming it would disrupt Europe's Christian order. Merkel aimed to deconstruct the idea that humanitarian issues would harm Europe's religious order. To gain international legitimacy, particularly from EU countries, Merkel emphasized Germany's successful policy to handle the refugee crisis. In her speech at the Annual Reception for the Diplomatic Corps in Meseberg, she stated (The Federal Chancellor, 2016):

Of course, remedying the causes of flight and displacement is even better than mitigating their effects. That is why we continue to focus our efforts on bringing peace to the conflict in Syria. Our Federal Foreign Minister is intensely involved in this. The basis for a political transformation process is that the agreed ceasefire is respected and that it is possible for the millions of internally displaced persons to receive assistance. There must be an end to the use of outlawed weapons such as barrel bombs. There must be an end to targeted attacks on hospitals and humanitarian personnel. There must be an end to starvation policy.

Merkel explained that Germany had worked to achieve peace in Syria through political processes such as ceasefire agreements, particularly stopping the use of chemical weapons. This demonstrated that Merkel's policies were a form of resistance against actions contrary to her beliefs.

Conclusion

Based on the research, it can be explained that Angela Merkel's leadership in the open-door policy has had a significant impact on handling the refugee crisis in Europe, assessed through Margaret Hermann's four leadership indicators.

First, beliefs or faith are tied to nationalism rooted in Germany's national identity, namely humanitarianism. Second, motives or reasons for Merkel's open-door policy during the refugee crisis aimed at gaining power and affiliation with other countries, particularly Turkey, to help Germany handle the refugee crisis. Third, decision style shows Merkel as a leader who considers risks in policy-making, viewing refugee arrival as an opportunity to balance Germany's productive age demographic. Lastly, interpersonal style or individual interaction highlights Merkel's distrust of other policy-makers who oppose her policies. The open-door policy was a response to Hungary closing its borders to refugees.

Germany's identity, formed by collective memory, led Merkel to position Germany as a country upholding humanitarian values. This was reflected in Merkel's open-door policy, which allowed refugees from Syria and other conflict-affected countries. Despite the significant risks, Merkel believed Germany had a moral obligation to assist refugees in need of protection.

Merkel's decision garnered substantial support from the German public, though there was notable opposition due to concerns about the increasing refugee numbers potentially causing social and economic issues. Ultimately, the open-door policy significantly impacted managing the refugee crisis in Europe, saving many lives and setting an example for other countries to show solidarity with refugees.

Among the four indicators, beliefs or faith most strongly influenced the other three: motives, decision style, and interpersonal style in the open-door policy. This is because the open-door policy created by Chancellor Angela Merkel reflected Germany's identity shaped by the collective memory of the Holocaust and the separation of West and East Germany.

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The Separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate as a Reflection of Ukrainian State Identity

Civa Syadza Masnun

Bachelor of International Relations, Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani

This article discusses the formation of Ukrainian state identity in the struggle for the status of an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate. Since Ukraine's independence in 1991, the country has had two national churches and one Orthodox church originating from Russia, namely the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate. The presence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate prompted national church figures to establish an independent (autocephalous) church to become a truly independent country without Russian oversight. However, establishing this church was difficult due to Russian intervention until events occurred that successfully pushed for the ratification of Autocephaly status in 2019. Using Ted Hopf's Constructivism theory regarding identity formed from a country's interaction with external actors and its internal construction, this article examines events between Ukraine and Russia and the social construction within Ukraine. It also highlights the strong public opinion, church actions, and government actions unified in one identity: an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

Introduction

The status of Autocephaly, interpreted as the separation of Russian control over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, was finally ratified in 2019. This means that Ukraine is no longer under Russian control in religious affairs. Initially, Russia was the parent of one of the Orthodox churches in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate. This church was the canonical or legitimate church recognized by the Orthodox world in Ukraine, while the other two national churches, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, were not recognized in the Orthodox world (Ukrainian Research Institute, 2019). The difference in canonical status between the church under the Moscow

Patriarchate and the national churches persisted for years in Ukraine. However, Ukraine, one of the countries that emerged from the Soviet Union, should have shared identities such as race, language, and culture with Russia but had different views that extended to religious issues.

The formation of this independent church shocked the Orthodox world and became an important international historical record (Wilson, 2018). The separation of the Orthodox church is interpreted as a reflection of Ukrainian state identity, which did not form instantly but through internal and external factors from events in Ukraine. Identity is formed through social construction within the country and prolonged interaction with other actors, so identity is not something given (Steans, 2010). In this case, Ukrainian identity formed through social construction within the country and its interaction with Russia, which had controlled Ukraine for years.

The issue of Ukraine represents the notion that identity is important for a country, especially in the current development of international relations. Since the end of the Cold War, physical power is no longer the only debated issue; ideas, norms, ethnicity, culture, and even religion influence countries worldwide. A world without identity is chaotic because identity answers questions about who you are and tells you who others are (Hopf, 2012, p. 174). In this matter, Ukraine tries to depict its state identity through the decision of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church's autocephaly, which also reflects its view of Russia. This decision becomes an international relations event affecting Russia's position and its relationship with Ukraine, starting with the Maidan Revolution.

The Maidan Revolution was the beginning of the idea of separating the Orthodox church, attracting pro-Ukrainians to fight for it. Thus, Ukraine's dependence on Russia became less important, prioritizing its religious identity. This resulted from protests against President Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian president who canceled economic cooperation with the European Union. This event escalated to military battles between Ukraine and Russia during the Donbas War, further responding to the Maidan Revolution. The military debate between the two countries led to religious issues (Borovkova, 2019). In the Donbas War, attacks on churches, kidnappings, and persecutions were based on declarations to adhere to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (Kovalenko, 2015). Russian military involvement united civilians and the church in a common cause, as civilians and church figures participated in the Donbas War, with church leaders praying and joining other demonstrators, considering themselves representatives of civilians (IECS, 2016). The Donbas events shocked all of Ukraine, as important state elements were involved.

The elements referred to are the roles of society, church figures, and the government in the Ukrainian church decision. The idea of eliminating Russian influence on the Orthodox Church became strong under Poroshenko's leadership as a pro-Ukrainian president who took office after Viktor Yanukovych was ousted in the Maidan Revolution. Poroshenko's cooperation with other Ukrainian churches in fighting for the autocephaly status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church became highly discursive and accepted by the Orthodox world (Borovkova, 2019). Poroshenko's leadership showed that the three state elements—society, church, and government—were unified in one identity. Poroshenko's role was a significant factor in bringing Ukraine to its desired identity. Therefore, Poroshenko's role, along with society and the church, will be internal factors analyzed in forming Ukrainian identity.

This study focuses on identity with the indicator of religion. Religion has long been considered an indicator to be separated from international relations research due to secularism. Secularism sidelines religion from state affairs, international politics, and international law, considering religion irrelevant in analyzing state affairs and international relations (Hurd, 2013, p. 943). This understanding prevented events like the World War, believing religion was the root cause of global issues, leading to religious disputes and wars between countries, making religion something to be avoided in studies (Sandal and James, 2010, p. 5). However, the researcher sees that with the Ukrainian issue, religion still plays a role in depicting state identity. The research aims to reinstate religion as an important indicator in international relations, particularly in illustrating a country's identity.

Besides reinstating religion as a critical indicator for international relations, this issue is crucial for discussing the formation of state identity through the separation of the Orthodox Church. With the successful separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate, this article will discuss how the Ukrainian state identity was formed. The article assumes that the decision to separate the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate is an identity of the Ukrainian state formed by events between Ukraine and Russia during the Maidan Revolution from 2013 to 2019. The article also examines the unity between the Ukrainian government, church, and society as an identity reflected by Ukraine through the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 2019.

Theory: Constructivism

The constructivist approach is one of the post-positivist theories that emerged at the end of the Cold War. The key idea of constructivism is that human construction creates a country's social conditions, including broad scopes such as international relations (Jackson and Sorensen, 2005, p. 307). This human construction forms a state's identity, and constructivism focuses on the social conditions of the state and international relations. Constructivism emerged to address issues that other theories could not answer regarding the importance of a state's identity. The belief that identity is something given is considered incorrect by constructivism (Jackson and Sorensen, 2005, p. 307). Constructivism believes that identity is formed through a process.

Ted Hopf states in his book "Reconstructing the Cold War" that each country has different identities, which are social products from the interaction between states and their domestic society, forming a state's identity (Hopf, 2012, p. 8). This statement reinforces that identity is not something given or created spontaneously. The researcher concludes that constructivism views a state's social conditions as internal factors and interactions with other actors as external factors, leading to a state's identity. Ted Hopf's theory is used to analyze Ukrainian identity through events during the Maidan Revolution from 2013 to 2019.

The relationship between identity and state interests is explained through two constructivist principles: 1) Structure formation results from ideas, not material power, and 2) The identity and interests of actors are not natural but the result of these ideas' construction (Mellon, 2009). These constructivist statements show that identity is essential for a state. It does not mean that material needs are unimportant, but constructivism helps understand how material relates to a state's actions, where material strength is determined by an idea or concept (Pfefferle, 2014). In this issue, the researcher sees that Ukraine is striving for its strength through ideas, not merely to maintain its material needs.

Constructivism views identity as a state's preference, and actions taken by a state result from its identity (Hopf, 2012, p. 175). Ukraine's decision to separate the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate is a consequence of its state identity formed through its interaction with Russia. Therefore, to understand Ukraine's view of Russia, it is not seen structurally but based on its actions. State actions do not stem from a single or absolute idea, and each state has different abilities to interpret its identity and understand phenomena. Constructivist logic illustrates that identity, interests, and actions are interrelated, all returning to an idea, as shown below:

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

Therefore, if this constructivist thinking logic is related to the issue raised in this study, it is that social construction within domestic Ukraine and its interaction with Russia is a product of Ukraine's identity. Thus, Ukraine has an interest in establishing an Orthodox Church with autocephaly/independent status. Following this interest, the action taken by Ukraine to reflect its identity and interests was to decide to separate the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate in 2019. This action by Ukraine was an effort to avoid Russian influence in its religious affairs, emphasizing that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is an identity of the Ukrainian state.

The action taken by Ukraine in the religious context is the subject of this research, examining religion's role in international relations. The researcher aims to challenge the secularism notion that modernization has shifted religion out of international view. Religion can form the background for a country's foreign policy (Djatmiko, 2017, p. 9). The policy of separating the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate shows that religion remains an important aspect in analyzing a country's foreign policy, with identity as the answer.

Jeremy Menchik (2017) in his article "The Constructivist Approach to Religion and World Politics" explains that international relations scholars are trying to reintroduce religion into world politics as a relevant aspect by using constructivist theory. The recent emphasis on religion strengthens the issue for analysis with a constructivist approach, which can address the identity of the Ukrainian state. Using this approach, international relations scholars attempt to understand how religion in international relations becomes an important subject to study rather than something to be avoided.

In resolving religious issues, religious leaders and communities are involved, becoming variables to explain the cause and effect of conflicts, impacting international relations (Hurd, 2013, p. 944). Religion also influences policymakers, potentially affecting decisions that could lead to peace or conflict, impacting international conditions

(Djatmiko, 2017, p. 72). This research aims to understand how religious identity is formed by examining the social construction within Ukraine, correlating church leaders, Ukrainian society, and even the Ukrainian leader as variables.

Interaction Between States

The interaction between Ukraine and Russia during their time in the Soviet Union inspired Ukraine to separate from Russian control both in its church and state. According to Ted Hopf's constructivist thinking, identity formation involves Ukraine's identity towards Russia and Constantinople, as countries possess multiple identities (Hopf, 2012, p. 8). This identity first emerged from the interaction between Ukraine and Russia, leading Ukraine to view Russia as an aggressive state and a threat to be avoided, disregarding cultural, linguistic, and historical ties within the Soviet Union.

Ukraine's view of Russia began with the Maidan Revolution, which involved Russia. This event drew international attention as the largest demonstration. President Yanukovych, a pro-Russian president, canceled Ukraine's cooperation with the European Union, angering Ukrainians and leading to Yanukovych's removal, despite Eastern Ukraine's pro-Russian support (Withnall, 2014). This indicated that Ukraine already had its identity, wanting to align more with the European Union. The Maidan Revolution shifted public identity to pro-European, evidenced by a survey showing 53% of Ukrainians favoring closer ties with the EU (Kucheriv, 2019). The Euromaidan movement aimed to remove Russian influence from Ukraine's economy, although it did not initially involve religious conflict. However, this event highlighted strong public opinion at that time.

Although the Maidan Revolution did not cause religious conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Russia's aggressive stance on religious affairs surfaced during the Crimea annexation. Russia's requirement for re-registration of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate and the Crimean referendum triggered a response from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate. Kiev's patriarchate in Crimea refused re-registration, believing it signaled acceptance of Crimea's separation from Ukraine (Savchuk, 2014). This resistance was a reaction to Russia's perceived intervention and restriction of spiritual activities in Crimea.

The Kiev Patriarchate's response demonstrated its nationalist stance, indifferent to Russia's interests in Crimea. Diplomatic efforts with Russia failed, resulting in restrictions and property seizures, leaving only eight active parishes (Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, 2018). During the annexation, the Russian Orthodox Church, alongside the Russian military, engaged in various diplomatic efforts for Crimea's separation from Ukraine. Pro-Russian Crimean priests supported this by providing churches for the military and weapon storage (Yapparova, 2020). One source stated, "the Cossacks would stay in Simferopol at the Peter and Paul Cathedral. When priests allow military people carrying weapons into their church, this stops being a church and starts being an organization that answers to the state" (Yapparova, 2020). This statement further indicated that the Russian Orthodox Church's actions contradicted the church's role in promoting peace, instead supporting state-driven intervention and violence for political or defense purposes.

Russia attempted to maintain its influence in Ukraine with the support of pro-Russian clergy and ethnic Russians in Eastern Ukraine. This intervention aimed to subdue Ukraine amidst the created crisis. However, Crimea's annexation made Ukraine increasingly indifferent to Russian economic or military needs, as these could still be met through the European Union. Hence, the researcher views Ukraine's efforts as solidifying its identity.

This identity strengthened with the Donbas War, which unified two national churches and some bishops from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-MP. Russia's increasing pressure to restrict religious freedom in Ukraine only reinforced Ukraine's identity in establishing its national church. Russia's extreme actions in the Donbas War, including deploying the Russian military, propagating separatism, and rejecting other national churches, led to persecution, abductions, church property seizures, and shootings at prayer tents. These actions violated spiritual norms and values, prompting national church leaders to focus more on separating from Russia. Consequently, the war was considered the largest conflict between Russia and the West since the Cold War (Katchanovski, 2016, p. 2).

In response to Russia's actions, Ukraine declared the separation of the Russian church's control, leading church leaders to integrate and seek support from the Orthodox world. Ukraine-Russia interactions before and after the Maidan Revolution showed that Russia's aggressive actions against the Ukrainian church heightened Ukraine's reaction, manifesting in its separation ideology. These events demonstrated Ukraine's process in forming its identity, transitioning from an idea among Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church leaders to integration with other bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-MP due to Russia's actions.

This analysis confirms that Ukraine's idea did not emerge spontaneously. As basic constructivist theory suggests, identity is not given but a social product. After Ukraine-Russia interactions during the Maidan Revolution and Crimea annexation, the researcher observed a stronger identity formation in the Donbas War. "Although this event did not change the ethnic population of Eastern Ukraine, which still connects and supports Russia, these three events sharpened the identity conflict between Ukraine and Russia" (A. Arifianto, personal communication, August 31, 2020). Thus, it can be concluded that the tensions from the interactions between these two countries strengthened Ukraine's efforts to counter Russia's increasingly aggressive actions, violating church norms and international standards.

Domestic Societis

Public Opinion in Ukrainian Society

The interaction between Russia and Ukraine in these three events influenced public opinion on the European Union and Russia. Nationalism tends to rise during crises or conflicts, prompting support for national identity (A. Arifianto, personal communication, August 31, 2020). A 2015 survey shows that Ukrainians had already formed an identity towards Russia:

Survey of Public Support for the European Union and Russia



Source: Pew Survey Center

This survey shows a shift towards a dominant pro-European identity, weakening Russia's political influence. Maidan transformed Ukrainians into a crucial element for state "legitimacy," becoming a priority for state actors (Pishchikova & Ogryzko, 2014, p. 10). The public also increasingly identified with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate, switching from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, particularly after the Donbas War. This shift was due to social norms perceived negatively by the public, with some stating their parish switched from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-MP to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-KP because the former refused to conduct funerals for Euromaidan activists and Ukrainian soldiers killed in the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) zone (Korniichuk, 2016, p. 248). Thus, some parishes viewed this treatment as incompatible with their teachings, reflecting the significant influence of pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian views on their faith and spiritual activities.

Change in Public Trust in the Moscow Patriarchate and the National Church



Source: Kyiv Post

The graph above shows that initially, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate was far more dominant than the other two national churches. In 2010, during Yanukovych's early leadership, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate's membership surged by 23.6%, compared to the Kiev Patriarchate's 15.1%. As explained in the previous section, Yanukovych favored the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, as evidenced by the religious restriction index rising from 26 in 2007 to 44 in 2012, remaining at 4 in 2013 (Cooperman, 2016). However, after the Ukraine-Russia conflict, public membership shifted to pro-Kiev Patriarchate with the membership of 22.4% of the population, while the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate's membership continued to decline to 17.4% by 2016.

The public's concern about this matter is indeed supported by a survey regarding the decision of autocephaly, which showed dominant support from 58% of Western Ukraine and 10% from the Eastern part, as explained in the previous section. Thus, the three surveys above indicate that the Ukraine-Russia religious issue is significant for the Ukrainian public, and as the majority are Orthodox Christians, this has become the main focus of the society rather than prioritizing relations with Russia.

The conflict of 2013 had an effect on the society that was forced to choose churches that were not considered before 2014. In this context, the public realized that having an autocephalous church was a form of Ukraine's struggle to gain acknowledgment, justice, and respect in the international and Orthodox worlds (Hladio, 2019, p. 37). The decisions and views of the Ukrainian public show that the community element is very important and becomes a legitimacy for the identity of the Ukrainian state. Thus, the percentage change in society, which showed a decline in the Moscow Patriarchate and an increase in the Kiev Patriarchate, proves that the interaction between Ukraine and Russia has changed public opinion, which is part of the process of forming the Ukrainian state identity.

Petition Submission by Church Leaders to Constantinople

The role of church leaders is crucial in the formation of Ukrainian identity. Church leaders have been actively working to separate the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate since the establishment of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which was further strengthened by the annexation of Crimea and the Donbas War. These events encouraged church leaders to declare the establishment of an independent church in the midst of the conflict with Russia due to the norms practiced by Russia that were not aligned with the church leaders. Therefore, in November 2014, the seriousness of the church was reaffirmed with the declaration of the establishment of an autocephalous church by church leaders, including the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-MP (IECS, 2016, p. 10). This event truly convinced church leaders that the national Ukrainian church must be legitimate and recognized by the Orthodox world, becoming a strong unity for the Ukrainian people.

Another impact of this event was the unification of churches in Ukraine, including some bishops from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, who created a document for the unification of churches from 2013 to 2015. Although this document was ultimately not signed by the leaders of each church, it marked the beginning of a clear unification between national church leaders and the Moscow Patriarchate on a shared idea (Korniichuk, 2016, p. 248). On this occasion, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church agreed to merge with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-KP, stating that there were no differences between them, so there was no harm in integrating.

Ukrainian church leaders agreed to apply the principle of "one church, one nation," which underscores Ukraine's right to have an independent church (Liik, 2019). With Constantinople's condition for establishing autocephaly requiring unity among the Orthodox churches in Ukraine, church leaders fulfilled this condition by the decision of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church to merge with the Kiev Patriarchate during the Donbas War. This was strengthened by the fact that the values provided by the Moscow Patriarchate no longer aligned with the national Ukrainian church, leading to the perception that this church was used by Russia to assert control over Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk, based on the "Russian world" ideology, which had resulted in the deaths of several church leaders and the destruction of religious facilities. This event culminated in Constantinople's statement that the petition from church leaders and some bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate had been accepted. The support from Moscow Patriarchate bishops further encouraged the Ukrainian church leaders, leading to the conclusion that the efforts of the church before the fall of the Soviet Union and at the end of the Donbas War had shaped a reflected identity through their actions. Many statements from church leaders supporting an independent church indicated that this was the identity they desired (A. Arifianto, personal communication, August 31, 2020). This was further strengthened by the declaration and opposition to Russian regulations by church leaders.

Pro-Ukrainian Leaders' Diplomacy with Constantinople

Although the idea of church separation had existed for a long time, it was difficult to realize, especially during the Ukrainian crisis in 2013 caused by President Yanukovych. President Yanukovych was the only Ukrainian president who did not support autocephaly out of the five presidents who served in Ukraine (Kuzio, 2019). His lack of support for church separation highlighted the presence of both pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian cultural influences even among the country's leaders. Public perception of leaders as pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian was shaped by their association with specific churches at various events, indicating the seriousness of leaders in reflecting Ukrainian national identity in their political agendas.

However, after the change in presidency, the policies issued by Ukrainian leaders became the ultimate weapon for the decision to separate Ukraine from Russian influence, particularly in matters affecting public perception. A country cannot reflect its identity if its leaders do not enact policies to manifest it. The Maidan Revolution made public opinion a legitimate basis for policy and a priority for Ukrainian political elites. Thus, the change in leadership to President Poroshenko became a key factor in supporting the establishment of an independent church, as he observed the shifting public opinion and the bold actions of society in voicing pro-European sentiments.

Poroshenko saw that the unity among churches in Ukraine prompted his support for the idea of separating the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate, which he viewed as a crucial identity to be carried out and reflected in his policies. Therefore, in 2015-2016, Poroshenko supported the church leaders' petition and held various meetings with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople to consider establishing an independent church, using the support and societal changes as a basis, with 58% support for autocephaly from the western region and 10% from the eastern region (Wilson, 2018). Poroshenko deemed this sufficient to include the issue of separating from Russian control in his political agenda. President Poroshenko stated that his advocacy for an independent church was part of the "national identity" of Ukraine (Kamenev, 2018). This determination drove him to pursue an identity for Ukraine without Russian influence in religious matters. His campaign across Ukraine aimed to inspire the movement towards a second independence for the national Ukrainian church. Poroshenko also sought support from the Turkish and US presidents, who also believed in the importance of establishing an independent church for the freedom of the Ukrainian people.

The president expressed his views on the establishment of an independent church as a discursive issue, emphasizing Constantinople's consideration and urging the Orthodox world to understand that granting this power was not something Constantinople should have done. In a TV channel event, he stated: "I'd like to emphasize – there was no Russian Orthodox Church at that time. If the Constantinople Church is the Mother Church for Ukraine, then the Ukrainian Church is the Mother Church for Russia. Because it originated here, not vice versa. And the mother cannot ask for independence from the daughter. In terms of historical, spiritual, and state justice, Ukraine deserved the right to have an independent Ukrainian church," (Unian Information Agency, 2018). This statement was made to emphasize to Russia that

Ukraine preferred to be under the authority of Constantinople to be equal with other countries, rather than under Russian control. He clarified that an independent church was not wrong but rather Ukraine's right.

President Poroshenko met with the leader of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church in Istanbul, Turkey, Patriarch Bartholomew, in November 2018 (Kamenev, 2018). Diplomatic efforts with Constantinople began to show promise when Constantinople stated that it would grant autocephaly to Ukraine, explaining that the rights previously given to Russia in 1686 were merely rights for consecration (Archbishop Job of Telmessos, 2019, p. 49). Consequently, President Poroshenko's efforts were seen by the Ukrainian Public and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople as a struggle to restore peace and religious freedom previously intervened by Russia.

Poroshenko's diplomacy and efforts were eventually approved by Constantinople with the issuance of the decree on January 6, 2019 (Metreveli, 2020). President Poroshenko announced this as a victory from the shackles on Ukraine's religious life, which also affected geopolitical security (Rohtmets, 2019). This was officially documented by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople with a written document, Tomos, signifying that the autocephaly status had unified the two national churches of Ukraine into the legitimate Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Thus, with the Tomos, the Moscow Patriarchate was no longer considered legitimate and had no right to control the national Ukrainian church (Martyniuk, 2018). All members of the global Orthodox community must recognize that Ukraine is no longer part of the Moscow Patriarchate.

This success demonstrated that Poroshenko's actions were aligned with the Ukrainian identity, as seen in his diplomacy with Constantinople and his speeches. It can thus be concluded that Poroshenko's role was very influential in the separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate, based on the statement from the Patriarchate of Constantinople that: the establishment of this independent church became very strong due to the petition from Poroshenko as President of Ukraine (Liik, 2019). In this issue, the interests of church leaders and the state were the same, with the church and state walking together because they had a common enemy, Russia, thus strengthening and increasing this identity during the 2014 conflict (A. Arifianto, personal communication, August 31, 2020). This proves that the coordinated actions of the church and the state brought Ukraine to a unified identity, eventually convincing Constantinople to grant the autocephaly status to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, especially with some bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate also helping in this process by personally sending petitions to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of

Constantinople. Additionally, it is important for a country's leader, elected by the people, to be able to reflect the country's identity by considering public opinion and other important elements.

Conclusion

This article concludes that based on the basic constructivist theory of identity that generates interests and actions, the separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate is a reflection of the Ukrainian state identity formed through prolonged interaction between Ukraine and Russia, from the Soviet Union era to the end of the Donbas War. In this case, inter-state interaction is the most influential indicator in the process of forming the Ukrainian state identity itself, as this interaction between Russia and Ukraine influences public opinion on the autocephaly status, encourages church actions in making declarations, and the submission of petitions also serves as an experience for President Poroshenko to bring this identity into his political agenda. It is clear that Ukraine desires a country free from Russian influence and control in terms of politics, economy, society, and religion, leading to the establishment of the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church as its identity.

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Interview

Interview with Dr. Alexander R Arifianto, researcher on *Religion in International Relations* in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Singapura. 31 August 2020.

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