

JGSS

Journal of Global Strategic Studies

Vol. 02 No. 01 June 2022

'Fake News' about the Indonesian Past

Adrian Vickers

Islam, Christianity, and the Formation of Secularism in Indonesia
1945-1960

Alexander R. Arifianto

Revisiting New Global Governance in Capture Fisheries:
Lessons from Indonesia under COVID-19 Pressures

Dinna Prapto Raharja

Defining Terrorism: How Ambiguous Definitions and Vague Classifications
Open Doors for Power Acquisition

Anastassiya Mahon

Duterte and Alliance Behavior of the Philippines

Taylor A. Rodier

Understanding Indonesia's Response to Russia's War in Ukraine:
A Preliminary Analysis of the Discursive Landscape

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NOTES FROM THE EXECUTIVE EDITOR

Yohanes Sulaiman
Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani

Dear readers:

Again, it is my honor and pleasure to write an introduction to this issue of Journal of Global Strategic Studies. I am thankful to continuing support from you, our dear readers, and hard work from our editorial team, reviewers, and especially our contributors to bring this issue to fruition.

Similar to our previous issues, this issue is again filled with excellent contributions from all over the world.

History often has resonance to contemporary politics, especially with how history is often misinterpreted and weaponized as tools for political gains. Adrian Vickers's article is an excellent example of the misuse of history by discussing recent attempts by Islamist activists to "revise" the history of the birth of Indonesia's pro-independence movement. Using doctored and faked historical materials, they attempted to show that *Sarekat Islam*, the oldest Islamic political organization in Indonesia's history, was the real originator of the pro-independence movement, and thus Islam was the real foundation of Indonesian nationalism. Vickers' article also show that Indonesia's pre-independence history is still very contested and open to new interpretations, yet increasingly it is being interpreted by individuals and groups with political agenda instead of by independent and objective historians.

Alexander R. Arifianto's article provides another point of view by discussing a watershed political contestation in Indonesia's colonial history during the deliberation of The Investigative Committee to Prepare for Indonesia's Independence (BPUPKI) in 1945. Based on his analysis of speeches by BPUPKI members, Arifianto concluded that it was an alliance between the secular nationalists and the Christian members that finally prevented the Jakarta Charter that is being advocated by members from reformist Muslim background from being enacted. This later gave rise to the 1945 constitution and the Pancasila national ideology of the independent Indonesian nation-state.

Our third article is written by Dinna Prapto Raharja how global governance helps solving problems and alleviating pressure facing fishers and fisheries industries due to Covid-19. Global governance links the perspectives of problem solving at the global level with the local and national contexts where regular fishers operate. At the same time, the article also highlights the limits and problems of global governance, notably the divergence between the perspectives from the stakeholders, notably the state and the fishers themselves, who don't necessarily trust the state.

Anastassiya Mahon wrote our fourth article on how unclear definition and classification of the threat of communism creates opportunities for states to acquire more power and to

misuse them, to the detrimental of people's rights and freedom. This is evident in how politicians are using the threat of terrorism for securitization purpose and to achieve their political goals, ironically, not including genuine counterterrorism.

Taylor A. Rodier, in our fifth article, explores the shift in the Philippines' foreign policy under President Rodrigo Duterte. He looked how big of an influence an individual had on a country's foreign policy, whether Duterte was exceptionally important or whether this is just a longstanding pattern of alliance behavior that is impacted by the Philippines' own domestic politics and regional security environment.

Last but not the least, Radityo Dharmaputra contributed an excellent think piece that tries to understand the discourse on Russia's war in Ukraine in Indonesia, and how much impact the discourse has on Indonesia's foreign policy. This is an important contribution to further our understanding on the impact of the social media on foreign policy and in turn also what factors influences social media discourses on foreign policy events. And this is also an excellent article to end this issue, as this article dovetails nicely with the first article in this issue, on the use and misuse of history in social media, which has a lot of negative impacts on political discourses all over the world.

Finally, I again thank the readers for reading this note, and I hope you will enjoy reading this issue as much as we enjoy working on them.

Cimahi and Bandung, June 2022

Yohanes Sulaiman
Executive Editor

CONTENT

NOTES FROM THE EXECUTIVE EDITOR	i
CONTENT	iv
‘FAKE NEWS’ ABOUT THE INDONESIAN PAST by Adrian Vickers.....	6-22
ISLAM, CHRISTIANITY, AND THE FORMATION OF SECULARISM IN INDONESIA 1945-1960 by Alexander R. Arifianto	23-53
REVISITING NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN CAPTURE FISHERIES: LESSONS FROM INDONESIA UNDER COVID-19 PRESSURES by Dinna Prapto Raharja ...	54-83
DEFINING TERRORISM: HOW AMBIGUOUS DEFINITIONS AND VAGUE CLASSIFICATION OPEN DOORS FOR POWER ACQUISITION by Anastasiya Mahon	84-97
DUTERTE AND ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR OF THE PHILIPPINES by Taylor A. Rodier ..	98-114
UNDERSTANDING INDONESIA’S RESPONSES TO RUSSIA’S WAR IN UKRAINE: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE DISCURSIVE LANDSCAPE by Radityo Dharmaputra	115-128

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‘Fake News’ about the Indonesian Past

Adrian Vickers
The University of Sydney

(Submission 12-3-2022, Review 18-4-2022, Revision 30-4-2022, Published 28-06-2022)

After the fall of the authoritarian Soeharto Regime in 1998, new versions and theories about history emerged in Indonesia. Some of these, such as theories about the origins of the nationalist movement to overthrow Dutch colonial rule, were based on sources and arguments going back to the 1950s. The foundation of the nationalist movement has been a key point for ‘history wars’, revealing fault lines in the ways that citizens see themselves within the Indonesian nation. The case of the origins of the nationalist movement demonstrates how alternative versions of ‘truth’ can be mobilized for political ends. It also demonstrates how Islamic movements have re-centred themselves in Indonesian political and social life.

Keywords: Fake news, Indonesia, Islam, Sarekat Islam, Islamist, Budi Utomo, National Awakening

Introduction

‘Fake news’ has been high in the minds of journalists, netizens and politicians since the term was first popularized by the former President of the United States, Donald Trump. For historians, truth in history is a foundation of the discipline’s claim to authority and standing as a public institution. In political arguments, truth is often less important than supporting particular interests or viewpoints. While historians recognize the contentious nature of claims about the past, teachers of history emphasize to their students the primacy of fidelity to evidence, including the need to accumulate as much as evidence as possible about a claim. How is it, then, that something that is most likely not true can become accepted as a ‘fact’ of Indonesian history, and what does that tell us about the politics of history in Indonesia? The case of the founding of the

Indonesian nationalist movement provides insight into the processes by which claims are made and alternative versions of narratives come to be accepted as 'true.'

Up until very recently, standard accounts of Indonesian history in Indonesian, English and Dutch sources identified the year of origin of the Indonesian nationalist movement as 1908. George Kahin's major account, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, was the product of research on Dutch and Indonesian sources, as well as interviews with many of the leading figures in the nationalist movement. It simply stated that 'the first organized cultural-nationalist movement was launched between 1906 and 1908 through the efforts of ... Mas Wahidin Soediro Hoesodo', who inspired students in the medical school in Batavia (STOVIA), notably Raden Soetomo and Raden Goenawan Mangoenkoesomo, by whose struggles 'there was founded in October 1908, an organization called Boedi Oetomo (Pure Endeavour)' (Kahin 2018, 64–65). In line with this standard account, Indonesia celebrates 20 October 1908 as the 'Day of National Awakening' (*Hari Kebangkitan Nasional*). In Indonesian interpretations of the day, the modern nationalism embodied in this moment led to the Indonesian nation being 'restored' after 300 years of Dutch rule (see Soeleiman 2008). Such interpretations were re-emphasized in conjunction with the centenary of Boedi Oetomo, which came a decade after the fall of the Soeharto regime.

In this standard account, the successor of Boedi Oetomo was Sarekat (also spelt Sjurekat or Syarekat) Islam, the Muslim Association or Muslim League, acknowledged by the majority of historical sources as the first mass political movement in Indonesia. Kahin and others date its founding to 1912 (Kahin 2018, 66). Indonesian history text books from recent years continue to support this chronology, providing the more detailed information that Sarekat Islam came out of organisations founded by two people, Haji Samanhudi in the city of Solo and Raden Mas Tirtoadisuryo of Bandung in 1909. These organisations were trade associations set up to challenge ethnic Chinese trade monopolies, particularly so for Haji Samanhudi's organisation, Sarekat Dagang Islam (the Association of Muslim Traders) (Ernawati and Ismawati 2009, 78).

This dating is supported by multiple sources. US historian of the city of Solo, George Larsen, critically examined the Dutch sources in documenting the details of the early years of the development of nationalism in that city. The sources that Larsen investigated were based on information from one or more informants in Sarekat Islam, who said that Haji Samanhudi first became involved in organising when he became a member of Boedi Oetomo in 1909, before joining forces with Kong Sing, a renegade organisation of Chinese traders. After splitting with Kong Sing, Samanhudi and his followers then sought help from Tirtoadisuryo to turn their ‘*reksorumekso*’ (mutual guardianship) group into a formal branch of Tirto’s Sarekat Dagung Islam (Larsen 1987, 38–39).

For those familiar with this account, it is surprising to see how publications coming from a new generation of Indonesian postgraduate scholars have emerged unchallenged. In these accounts, the order has been reversed: Boedi Oetomo was preceded by Sarekat Islam! To take one example, an article on resistance to colonialism published by two students in the *International Journal of Nusantara Islam* states categorically that Sarekat Dagang Islam was founded on 16 October 1905, equivalent to the Muslim Javanese date of Sha’bān 16, 1323 H, Legi Monday (Mustakif and Mulyati 2019, 8). The fact that the authors are students indicates that their supervisors and the editors of the journal in which they published had no problems with their statement of the founding date.

How, and why, should such a fundamental reversal, which also changes the sequence and explanations of Samanhudi’s actions, have come to be accepted as an alternative ‘fact’?

Centennial Disputes

Discussion of the date of the founding of Sarekat Islam emerged in public in 2008, the centenary of Boedi Oetomo. That particular year saw a variety of articles in the media retelling the story of the 1908 founding and discussing its importance for the Indonesian nation. Such accounts focussed on the idea of

'rebirth' or 'reawakening' under the darkness of Dutch colonial rule (Soeleiman 2008).

Such praises for the importance of the day encountered a backlash. For example, according to one critical blogger writing at the time of the centenary, the date of 20 May 1908 as the beginning of the nationalist movement had become a commonplace of history, legitimized in textbooks, without reference to the facts:

The tendency to reprint this tradition of national awakening has implications in two areas: on the one side this recognition is the most popular and all sides wish to celebrate that popularity; yet on the other hand it's as if we've closed the debate about whether there are different facts which, viewed objectively, truly are closely connected with the moment of national awakening.

The Facts of the History of National Awakening that have been Marginalized

It's common for us to hear that Highest Endeavour was recognized by the Dutch as the first nationalist movement, and this colonial legacy has, as a 'tradition,' succeeded in marginalising the reality that there is another version which has been proclaimed by activists from the Islamic movement, especially from the Greater Family of the Crescent Moon [Political Party], that the real truth is that SI [*Syarikat Islam*] which was founded on 16 October 1905 was the true motor of national awakening.¹

The writer, Badrut Taman Gaffas, used the language of 'objectivity' to raise the status of the 'fact' of the 'real' nationalist movement. Specifically, by referring to it as '*hakikat*', a word of Arabic origin that refers to Divine Truth, Gaffas presented his view as having a higher, indeed unassailable, level of veracity. His account was backed by reference to a number of other sites, specifically linked to Muslim organisations.²

¹ The original of the last section is, '*Sudah lazim kita dengar bahwa Boedi Oetomo diakui oleh Belanda sebagai organisasi kebangsaan pertama dan warisan penjajahan tersebut secara "tradisional" berhasil meminggirkan kenyataan bahwa ada versi lain yang disuarakan oleh aktivis – aktivis pergerakan Islam khususnya Keluarga Besar Bulan Bintang bahwa hakikatnya SI (Syarikat Islam) yang berdiri 16 Oktober 1905 adalah motor kebangkitan nasional yang sesungguhnya.*'

² 'Pergerakan Umat Islam Dalam Sejarah Nasional Indonesia,' *ICMImuda.org*, March 22, 2007. *Wayback Machine* <
http://web.archive.org/web/20181202062927/http://www.icmimuda.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=43&Itemid=33>, '20 Mei Bukan Hari Kebangkitan Nasional,' *Swaramuslim.net*.

Gaffas then established a genealogy of sources to show how Muslim publications had presented this ‘critical’ view, but been ignored or suppressed by the mainstream. His main authority was Kiai Haji (titles implying Muslim authority) Firdaus A.N., who turned out to be the main source for other writers he cited on this topic. The author of this blog went on to explain that Firdaus was a leader and Muslim writer who struggled to challenge the received wisdom in his 1997 book, *Syarikat Islam Bukan Budi Utomo: Meluruskan sejarah pergerakan bangsa (Muslim League Not Highest Endeavour: Correcting the History of the National Struggle)*. Gaffas regretted that this work was very difficult to obtain and observed that it deserved wider readership through re-publication and the internet. I eventually tracked down Firdaus’ book. It turned out on close reading to rely on circular arguments, *ad hominem* attacks on key Boedi Oetomo documenters, rhetorical flourishes and quotations from scripture that sought to give Sarekat Islam a theological foundation.

I had to trace the key evidence for the revision of the history of Boedi Oetomo through a variety of sources. The student article by Mustakif and Mulyati referred to a small publication by A.C. Rofiq which is a critique of the most recent attempt to create an authoritative account of Indonesian history. The history being criticized was *Indonesia dalam Arus Sejarah (Indonesia in the Course of History)*, the multi-volume product of a major revision by a large number of well-recognized Indonesian historians (Gunawan *et al.* 2012). Among the ‘errors’ Rofiq identified in his critique of the book was the date of the founding of Sarekat Islam. Rofiq was careful to explain that the date of the founding of Syarikat Dagang Islam on 16 October 1905 was preceded by the Arab ethnic association, Jamiat Khair, founded on 17 July 1905. He stated that Syarekat Dagang Islam’s 1905 founding was followed by the establishment of Sarekat Islam in 1906, thus further shifting key dates. Rofiq gave his main source as Haji Tamar Djaja, who was given the information directly by Samanhudi on 25 July 1955. This source, according to Rofiq, was confirmed by Mohammad Roem, an early nationalist leader and former prominent member of

Sarekat Islam, who had led the negotiations with the Dutch for recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty in 1949 (Rofiq 2016, 125). Rofiq's cited source for this was *Api Sejarah (The Fire of History—or History on Fire)* by a self-proclaimed 'Muslim historian', Ahmad Mansur Suryanegara (2009). The book-cover claimed, 'This book will drastically change your view of Indonesian history', and included a circular stamp asserting that the book was 'stating that which is hidden and has been hidden away.' Suryanegara in turn also mentioned his source as a book by Mohamad Roem, (2009: 373 n.68). Roem's book, however, only mentioned the year of 1905 without giving a source, and did not refer to Samanhudi by name (1972, 16).³ The book was published by the Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon) political group. Roem's authority may have stemmed from his membership, but he was born in 1908, and so could not have been an eyewitness.

All of the references I have been able to trace via trains of citation go back to a series of newspaper articles, the longest of which was helpfully reprinted by Firdaus (1997, *lampiran 1*). This was by journalist Tamar Djaja, head of the Society of Muslim Writers, and originally published in the first issue of the newspaper *Daulah Islamiyah* in 1957. Djaja had interviewed the aged Samanhudi in 1955, a year before the latter's death at the age of eighty-eight. Samanhudi provided the founding date and information on his background as a wealthy batik merchant from the Laweyan quarter in Solo. However, when Djaja knew him, Samanhudi was a poor and forgotten man. He split from Sarekat Islam in 1915 after a falling out with the chair, Cokroaminoto, and explained that this was the source of his misery. All of Samanhudi's money had gone into the organisation, so that when he was expelled, he was left with nothing. His factories were taken over by ethnic Chinese merchants. His misery was slightly alleviated in the last two years of his life, when the Indonesian government granted him a pension for his service to the movement (1997, 37–42). Djaja's article channelled Samanhudi's sense of outrage.

³ He provided the interesting information that in a 1916 demonstration, Sarekat Islam members were prevented by the Dutch authorities from using a Turkish flag.

Djaja himself (b. 1913) was an active politician in the Islamic party, Masyumi, particularly associated with the Bulan Bintang group. The name 'Bulan Bintang' was revived as a separate political party in 1998, after the fall of the Soeharto regime. Djaja's early education in West Sumatra was in schools that followed the Wahabi reformist movement in Islam. He was active from the late 1930s onwards in publishing articles and booklets documenting nationalism and the role of Islam in Indonesia's national struggle, and by the 1950s was head of the publishing section of the Department of Religion, including being on the board of the magazines *Aliran Islam* (the Islamic Stream), *Al Islam* and *Anti-Komunis* (JejakIslam1 2015). It is likely that it was thanks to Djaja, who published a series of articles on the Islamic origins of the nationalist movement in the mid-1950s, that Samanhudi's pension was granted. These same articles led, in 1956, to a successor organisation to Sarekat Islam, Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia or PSII, claiming its fiftieth anniversary (Matanasi 2020). Firdaus, according to the biodata on the back cover of his book, had been a member of Djaja's Society of Muslim Writers and the PSII and had been one of the writers with Djaja who had been active in the mid-1950s in advocating for greater recognition of Muslim leaders. The Djaja version of the founding of the nationalist movement circulated in the Muslim educational system of *pesantren* during the New Order era, but only re-emerged into wider public discussions after the fall of Soeharto in 1998.⁴

The respected historian of Islamic nationalism, Deliar Noer, was the first to raise questions about Djaja's account based on some of the newspaper articles. Noer claimed that he rechecked Tamar Djaja's assertion with Haji Samanhudi while he was still alive, and the latter denied it. Noer also implied that Samanhudi's mental health was in decline.⁵ Deliar Noer further demonstrated through his own archival and oral history research that there was no evidence at all to support the 1905 date (Noer 1973, 102 note 2). He took Djaja to task over this in debates in the daily *Abadi* in 1957 (Matanasi 2020).

⁴ Information from Nadirsyah Hosen, July 2009.

⁵ Firdaus 1997, 12, refuted Noer's claims about Samanhudi's health by saying that he had been well enough to travel to Jakarta from Solo, and moreover must have been of sound mind because he could remember the details of the founding of Sarekat Islam. This is one example of Firdaus using circular arguments.

Noer's writing is significant here, because he was a follower of Muhammadiyah, and represented its rationalist approach to Islam that could reconcile it with the social sciences. He was, as C. W. Watson observed in a commentary on Noer's biography, from the last generation of founding nationalists, with conservative views on Islam (Watson 2006, 163–165). Noer elsewhere said of the debate that Tamar Djaja, 'just believed whatever Samanhoedi told him, and moreover promoted it' (Matanasi 2020). Djaja's claim for Samanhudi represented a position of one faction of conservatism Islam.

Samanhudi had a lot of reasons to make his claim. Along with a desire for recognition, he was also motivated by dislike of Tirtoadisuryo, and so wanted to play down the latter's role as a founder of nationalist activism that led to Sarekat Islam (Van Niel 1970, 10). At the same time as Samanhudi's role was being elevated by Muslim politicians, Tirto was being promoted on the left side of politics. One of the chief proponents of this elevation was the famous novelist, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who had been carrying out research into early activists before his arrest during the anti-communist purges that began in 1965. After his release from prison in 1979, Pramoedya published a non-fiction version of the story of Tirto, while also fictionalising it by making Tirto the protagonist of his famous series of four novels, *Bumi Manusia (This Earth of Mankind)* (Pramoedya 2003). Pramoedya's advocacy reclaimed a radical heritage for Indonesian nationalism and located the origins of Indonesian nationalism in the modernity of the early twentieth century. Tirto's role as a hero of the left was not acceptable to anti-communist Muslim politicians who were strongly opposed to Pramoedya.

However, there is more to the debate than either settling old scores or right-wing antipathy towards Tirto. The publications promoting 1905 as the founding date of the nationalist movement also express antipathy to Boedi Oetomo (and ignore Larsen's evidence that Samanhudi had been a member!). By asserting their own legitimacy through claiming priority, the people who saw themselves as heirs to Sarekat Islam also sought to de-legitimize Boedi Oetomo. At the heart of this debate was the question of what constituted the basis of Indonesia's nationalist movement. Firdaus, and those who drew on his writings,

claimed that Boedi Oetomo was ‘anti-Islamic’ and based on regional and ethnic exclusivity, not on true nationalism. The standard histories agree that promotion of Javanese culture was an important element in Boedi Oetomo’s formation and platform. Tirto, as a member of the Javanese aristocracy who had studied at the medical school where Boedi Oetomo was founded, was closely associated with this stream of nationalism.

In the accounts of Firdaus and others, evidence that Boedi Oetomo was problematic was that the organisation used Dutch rather than Malay (later Indonesian), and that it collaborated generally with the colonizers, meaning that it was favoured by colonial authorities, who were responsible for elevating it in historical accounts (Firdaus 1997; Suryanegara 2002). However, while Boedi Oetomo members did use Dutch, much of its writings were in Malay (Indonesian) or in Javanese. At this stage of the nationalist movement, the Indonesian language had yet to gain general acceptance and Javanese provided a potential vehicle for expressing national sentiments. Further, none of the founders of the movement evidenced anti-Islamic sentiments in their writings, although their form of Islam was the more traditional mixed Javanese style. Finally, the founder of the modernist movement Muhammadiyah, Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan, was, like Samanhudi, a member of Boedi Oetomo.

The main evidence for saying that Boedi Oetomo was anti-Islamic was that a number of its members were apparently also Freemasons. Freemasonry is, in literature associated with Islamic groups, part of a great Jewish conspiracy. Proponents of piety draw on a literature that has deep roots in the Middle East to advocate their version of history. This same conspiracy literature has been used to demonstrate that such a conspiracy was aimed against Islam, which as a religion under threat, was in need of strong defensive action. This literature, including *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, had been in underground circulation at least since the 1980s. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, *Mein Kampf* was also freely available in Indonesian translation, and Holocaust denial was, and is, common in Indonesian discourse. The main culprits in the conspiracy against Islam were identified as the Jews. Much of the anti-Semitic literature in circulation in Indonesia has been directly translated from, or drew upon, Arabic-

or English-language propaganda (eg Barraniq and Al Mahjub 2001; Husaini 2002; see Hadler 2004; Suci 2008). Saudi funding of education and religious institutions, including translations of Islamic texts that have a decidedly Wahabi leaning, have played an important role in directing Islamic discourse in the post-Soeharto era (Salim, 106). There is no awareness in Indonesia that the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* is a Russian forgery. The Masons were, in the paranoid world-view spread in Islamic writings such as this, part of the World Jewish Conspiracy (Al-Buhairi 2001; Maulani 2002; Djaelani 2003; Maheswara 2008).

Local variants on the Zionist conspiracy literature raised the intensity of paranoia. Freemasons were linked to Theosophists as a way of discrediting the latter, and both were lumped in as participants in the global conspiracy with Rotary, Marxists, Coca Cola and the Australian-born Protestant media baron, Rupert Murdoch. There was also an attempt to identify Chinese with Jews, ironically going back to British colonial racism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One of these conspiracy theories specifically included the Javanese feminist, Kartini, and the leftist writer, Pramoedya, as part of the plot. Boedi Oetomo was likewise identified by association with Theosophical streams of Javanism (Saidi and Rizki 2008). A short history of Freemasonry originally published in English was translated into Indonesian in 2012 in a way that deliberately added references to Zionism that were not in the original. The original refuted the ‘myth’ of Freemasonry’s link to Zionism as a Nazi fabrication; the new version not only reversed the meaning of this explanation but also added a new subtitle ‘The Oldest Zionist Network to Control the Indonesian Archipelago (Van der Veur 1976, 2; 2012). President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur)’s advocacy of dialogue with Israel fed directly into the hands of the conspiracy theorists (Tim Peneliti 1999). While much of this conspiracy literature should not even be dignified with the designation ‘history’, there are few Indonesian works that question its factual status. I have attended seminars in which university historians treated these fantasies seriously.

Decolonisation and Opposition to the New Order Regime

What might seem a minor dispute over a date, points towards larger problems with separating fact from fiction in popular views of Indonesian history. These are ultimately problems that go back to the authoritarian New Order regime of General Soeharto, and especially to opposition to that regime's ideological agenda.

The 2008 debates over Boedi Oetomo's status, particularly in social media, revealed the kind of double obstacle that Indonesians were facing in writing history. One commentator on the blog by Badrut Gaffas summarized this double problem well. Ni Sulistyowati, a respondent to the original posting, supported Gaffas's aim of correcting (the Indonesian term most often used is 'straightening', *meluruskan*) history, saying that it was important to get rid of the colonial legacy of history, and that young people have been adversely affected by government manipulation of history during the Soeharto period. A number of complex arguments were caught up in these statements. They draw on the general problem of New Order 'manipulation' (*rekayasa*) of information and laudable attempts to decolonize history.

The Soeharto regime's 'manipulation' of history drew on its hostility to open and critical views of the past. 'Education' for the regime was about producing compliant and docile citizens. Children were taught using text books with a single authoritative view that could not be questioned. 'Learning' consisted largely of repeating by rote. The hegemonic discourse of the New Order state precluded challenging authority. (Parker 1992). Thus, when the New Order fell, people were suspicious of any government-supported views, but left without critical tools to evaluate either these views or alternatives to them.

For Muslims, unravelling the New Order's views of Islam meant going back to the colonial period and challenging its views. Prejudice against Islam pervaded most aspects of Dutch scholarship of the colony, particularly studies of Java. The Dutch study of the court cultures of the central Javanese kingdoms had been marked by a particular blindness towards the religion (see Day 1983; Florida 1998). In the post-colonial period, fascination with other aspects of Indonesian culture, such as Bali's exotic version of Hinduism, emphasized the

difference between Indonesia's Hindu-Buddhist past and its predominately Muslim present (Vickers 1987). Only a handful of Western scholars of Indonesia wrote on Islam in the mid-to-late twentieth century.

Exemplary Indonesian scholarship on this problem of Orientalism can be found in the writing of Ahmad Baso, whose 2005 book on deconstructing Orientalist views of Indonesia was a major breakthrough in Indonesian post-colonial writing. Baso, from Makassar, has been a significant public figure, serving a term on the national Human Rights Commission (Komnasham). He comes from the stream of Nahdlatul Ulama, NU, inspired by Gus Dur and non-government social organisations linked to the movement (Watson 2006, 202–208). He published a series of works on Indonesian Islamic thinking, under the title of *Pesantren Studies*, taking inspiration from the Indian *Subaltern Studies* writers. Baso was also a student of Azyumardi Azra, the major Indonesian writer on the history of Islamic thought, and one of the most senior and highly respected Muslim academics in Indonesia. Baso's work demonstrates that the activist Islamist scholarship that has produced conspiracy theory literature is not representative of all Muslim writing. Baso's work is one of many serious challenges to the version of history created by the New Order.

Soeharto's rule was based on a vision of Javanism, and in this vision, Islam played little part. Champions of Javanism, such as the powerful Presidential Advisor in the early years of the regime, Soedjono Humardani, bolstered Soeharto's own preference for this reified and monumental vision of culture (see Pemberton 1994). This cultural vision overwhelmed the category of 'religion', deliberately pushing Islam into the background. It also led to an unfortunate backlash against Javanism, which explains why Boedi Oetomo was viewed negatively by some Muslim groups. During the New Order period, marked symbols of Islam, such as the crescent moon, were absent from performances of national culture. For a while in the early 1980s there were even attempts to ban girls from wearing the Muslim head-dresses for women (called *jilbab* in Indonesian) at school, largely in reaction to the boost given to public expressions of Islam by the Iranian Revolution and the initial flows of Saudi funding. Up until the end of the 1980s, Islam was regarded as a threat to the

regime, and military intelligence incited terrorist acts from Muslim groups in order to enact suppression of religious groups as a ‘threat from the extreme Right (*ekstrim kanan*)’, balancing out the ‘threat from the extreme Left (*ekstrim kiri*)’ of communism. Heavy-handed tactics such as the 1986 massacre at a mosque at Tanjung Priok, Jakarta, and the 1989 wiping out of a religious sect in Lampung, ultimately proved counter-productive. Such actions legitimized the use of violence as the last resort of anti-government groups. In the case of the Lampung massacre, government force provided support for the hard line taken by preachers such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, spiritual guide for the movement later infamous as Jemaah Islamiyah.

The New Order’s patent lack of success in sidelining Islam from the national political culture was revealed in the failure of one of the government’s many propaganda museums. Katharine McGregor has documented the creation of a museum dedicated to presenting Islam as a threat, the Museum of Eternal Vigilance, *Museum Purba Wisesa*. This was one of the more obvious attempts by the Soeharto regime to impose its version of history on the nation. It was also one of the most unconvincing—the precise aims and even the name of the museum kept changing. The final naming reflected the confusing nature of the enterprise, since it was in a form of esoteric Old Javanese with no clear reference to the museum’s contents. This museum presented the 1980s threat of militant Islam as a continuation of the House of Islam (*Darul Islam*) movement’s attempt to overthrow the Republic in the period between the late 1940s and 1962, when Kartosuwiryo, the head of the House of Islam, was executed. More generally, the regime favoured the use of terms such as ‘*ekstrim*’ or ‘*fanatik*’ to describe what they regarded as a dangerous version of Islam (McGregor 2006; Formichi 2015).

Thus, the New Order version of history located Islam, or at least Islam as a political force, outside the mainstream of Indonesian society. This identification and removal of Islam as a social threat had the effect of making advocates of Islam a ‘majority with a minority mentality’, as leading Dutch sociologist, W.F. Wertheim, put it (1987). By the end of the Soeharto period, Islam had become a major rallying-point against the regime, and the role of

Muslim former political prisoners and political exiles in resistance to the New Order enhanced their credibility. Some even became Reform-era parliamentarians.

This Soeharto-era background explains both why Muslims felt that their religion was under attack, and why such sentiment was a fertile breeding ground for conspiracy theories. The conventional historiography facing Muslims in the 1990s limited the credit attributable to Islam as a force in the struggle against the Dutch. Muslim writers could quite correctly point to continuities between colonial and New Order ways of presenting Islam in history. Thus, it was easy for writers with a political agenda of re-instating Islam at the centre of Indonesian political and social life to selectively make use of pre-Soeharto texts such as the writings based on Djaja's work.

The general trend in historical writing on Islam, as in other historiography, confirmed Gadjah Mada University historian Agus Suwignyo's (2014) view that writers have been shifting from 'Indonesia-centred' to 'Islam-centred' history. In some of the cases he cited, from the new versions of national history, the authors went further than those quoted above and rejected Darwin's theory of evolution, denied that Hinduism and Buddhism created civilisations in Indonesia, and attacked Indonesia's founding feminist nationalist Kartini because of her opposition to polygamy. Generally, they threw out any aspect of history that did not suit their narrative. As Suwignyo pointed out, such shrill intolerance does not always make for convincing history, but it is indicative of a more totalising trend in history writing. In the heady rush to overthrow New Order authoritarianism in historical writing, evidence was one of the first casualties. Indonesian Muslims have responded to exclusion with new resurgent histories to fill the ideological vacuum left by the fall of Soeharto.

The Islam-centred re-writing of history has been part of broader trends in early twenty-first century Indonesia. One of these is a push to make Islam the centre of the Indonesian state, that is to use Islam as a way of challenging liberal or secular views of the nation state. On national and regional levels, Muslim political leaders have attempted to shape legislation and preclude attempts at opposition as anti-Islamic (Salim 2015). An example of this was the movement

to depose Basuki Tjahaja 'Ahok' Purnama as governor of Jakarta. Ahok's opponents seized on a statement they deemed as blasphemous, and under the banner of defence of Islam mobilized supporters in large numbers in a mass demonstration in Jakarta that led to his removal from office and jailing.

At the same time, a range of other groups have evoked interpretations of history in support of a plural state or in opposition to Islamicized politics. These other groups cover the full political spectrum, from leftists seeking redress over the mass murder of people associated with communism in 1965, to rightists seeking to revive or reclaim aspects of Soeharto's military-dominated power base. The Hindu-Buddhist past of Indonesia is one of the many points of contestation in this struggle over history, as it provides an example of the multi-religious basis of the modern nation for liberal pluralists.

Indonesia provides an object lesson in how and why 'history' can be politicized. The case of Sarekat Islam's origins shows how focus on one legitimating event can feed upon and in turn feed into broader conspiracy theories. Studies of the politics of history are often based on Western, particularly US, examples, such as recent controversies over slavery. Indonesia demonstrates wider tendencies, especially how an event can move from fiction to fact. Observers in the West were surprized by the way that the Q-Anon conspiracy theories took hold during the Trump Presidency. Perhaps if they had been paying attention to cases such as Indonesia, they might have seen such a calamity coming.

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Islam, Christianity, and the Formation of Secularism in Indonesia 1945-1960

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(Submission 17-4-2022, Review 27-4-2022, Revision 12-6-2022, Published 28-06-2022)

In this article, I will apply the varieties of secularism theory developed by Elizabeth Shakman Hurd and Ahmet Kuru in the case of Indonesia. Following Kuru's typology, I argue that Indonesian secularism resembles that of passive secularism. This form of secularism came about from an alliance between secular nationalists and a religious minority (Christianity). The alliance between the two groups had successfully prevented Islam from becoming a dominant religion when an independent Indonesian state was formed in 1945. It was also successful from preventing reformist Muslims from instituting a state based on the *sharia* law during the crucial period of state-building in Indonesia between 1945 and 1960. However, this alliance also results in the formation of two authoritarian regimes that ruled Indonesia for four decades (1959-1998), and in the often-tenuous relationship between two religious groups that sat on the opposite end of this conflict, namely Indonesian Muslims and Christians.

Keywords: passive secularism, Indonesia, secular nationalists, Muslims, Christians, Jakarta Charter

Introduction

In recent years, there has been a renewed attention among scholars working in the field of religion and politics, on the origins of secularism and separation of religion and the state in different parts of the world. This renewed interest occurs in conjunction with a growing recognition that religious actors throughout the world are increasingly contesting the boundaries between religion and politics that are determined based on the rules and regulations that separate the public and the religious realm. Recently, social scientists have started to study the varieties of interactions between religion and the secular in different historical contexts in multiple countries around the world. The varieties of secularism theory developed by Elizabeth Shakman Hurd and Ahmet Kuru is instrumental

in establishing the study of varieties of secularism as a research program within the field of religion and politics and in opening doors for future research in this emerging research program.

In this article, I will apply the varieties of secularism theory that were developed by Hurd and Kuru in the case of Indonesia, from the time of Dutch colonial rule in late 19th century to the new nation's early state-building period between 1945 and 1966. I shall argue that the Indonesian case could bring a new insight in the study of religion and politics, by the country's adoption of a passive form of secularism that preserves a space for religion to remain active in the public sphere while leaving the state to be run as a secular entity. This form of secularism came about from an alliance between secular nationalists and a religious minority (Indonesian Christians) and arose from their concern that while religion should be allowed to have some voice in the public sphere, no hegemonic religion should be allowed to dominate it either. The alliance between the two groups had successfully prevented a dominant religion (Islam) to impose its theology (through the *sharia* law) on the majority of Indonesians. However, the secular state that was formed from this alliance was not a strict secularist state, but a passive secularist one. This came about because this alliance also established a space where all religions (including Islam and Christianity) would have a voice in Indonesia's public sphere.

The above assertions will be elaborated in the following manner. First, I will review the theoretical literature on the relations between religion and the secular, as well as on the varieties of secularism, focusing primarily on the recent works of Elizabeth Shakman Hurd and Ahmet Kuru. Next, I will introduce the Indonesian case and show the historical conditions during the Dutch colonial period in Indonesia that served as the basis for the cleavage between secular nationalists and Christians on the one hand and Indonesian Muslims on the other. Then I will analyze the debate between secularist and Christian political leaders with Muslim leaders on the eve of Indonesia's independence in 1945, resulting in the enactment of the Jakarta Charter that was quickly abrogated when Christian political leaders issued a threat to secede from the newly declared republic in August 1945. The debate between the three groups continued throughout much of the 1950s and only ended with President

Sukarno's decision to dissolve Indonesian Constitution Assembly in July 1959. Finally, I will show how the Indonesian case could contribute to the theoretical debate on the relationships between religion and the secular, specifically to the typologies proposed by Hurd and Kuru. I will also show how the alliance between secular nationalists and Christians in Indonesia have long-term consequences in Indonesia's political development, specifically in the formation of two authoritarian regimes in Indonesia that lasted for nearly four decades, and in the often tenuous relationship between Indonesian Muslims and Christians during this time period.

Explaining Varieties of Secularism: New Approaches

Until recently, social scientists have not paid attention to the historical conditions and trajectories that contributed to the origins of secularism in different societies throughout the world. This is because for many decades, the most dominant theoretical framework that sought to explain why secularism takes hold in modern society was the secularization hypothesis. It assumes a linear movement in all modernizing societies towards secularism signified by the gradual retreat of religious expressions from the public sphere, the decline of individual religiosity and adherence to a given religious institution, which finally contributes to the decline of religious institutions due to the loss of its social welfare function (taken over by the state) as well as spiritual function (taken over by secular ideologies such as liberalism, nationalism, and socialism) (Gill, 2001, p. 122).

However, recent events as well as new empirical evidence, have raised serious doubts on the validity of explanations offered by the secularization hypothesis. The resurgence in the political activities of religious groups and actors that occurred simultaneously throughout much of the world in both advanced industrial as well as developing societies have caused a serious blow to the theory's assumption that religion will decline as societies became more developed (Gill, 2001, p. 122). The failure of the secularism hypothesis to explain religious resurgence and the return of religion in the public sphere of many "secular" countries has led critics of the theory to declare that "the old

theory of secularization can no longer be maintained” (Casanova, 1994, p. 19). Finally, new empirical findings also show that highly developed countries tend to have a much higher percentage of instituting an official religion than countries that have lower level of development (Kuru, 2007, p. 574). Such findings directly contradict earlier predictions of secularization theory that predicted highly developed countries to have little or no involvement in religious affairs whatsoever. The inability of the secularization hypothesis to explain these contradictions have resulted in its disreputation and abandonment by most contemporary social scientists studying religion and politics, and even by some of its earlier proponents (Berger, 1999).

There is also a growing recognition among scholars studying religion and politics that secularism is not a value-neutral philosophical idea that many of its proponents have claimed it to be. Instead, like other political ideologies, it seeks to dominate the public sphere in the hope that it will prevail over other ideologies that try to preserve a space for religion in the public realm. Supporters of secularism also do not hesitate to use coercive power that they have to impose their views to other citizens, particularly those who come from a religious background and want to keep religion as a relevant voice in public discourses (Smith, 2003).

Finally, religion and politics scholars have also begun to recognize that the secularist policy in different parts of the world are not similar and that the degree of separation between religion and the state in every countries in the world are path dependent, based on the historical relations between religious and political sphere in each respective countries, as well as the degree of conflict or cooperation between religious actors and their secular counterparts. Within the last few years, scholars have developed a new theory of secularism that maps the different interactions between religion and the secular in different parts of the world, as well as the outcomes of these interactions in the development of either more restrictive or less restrictive policy that regulate the role of religion in the public sphere. The theory is commonly known as varieties of secularism theory.

One scholar that has developed this theory is Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, who argues that there are two different forms of secularism prevailing in our

contemporary world. The first one is laicism, which is based on a philosophy that was developed during Enlightenment period by figures such as Immanuel Kant. Laicist form of secularism has the following purpose:

....to create a neutral public space in which religious belief, practices, and institutions have lost their political significance.....or been pushed into the private sphere. The mixing of religion and politics is regarded as irrational and dangerous. For modernization to take hold, religion must be separated from politics. In order to democratize, it is essential to secularize (Hurd, 2008, p. 5).

Proponents of laicism argue that “a fixed and final separation between religion and politics is both possible and desirable” (Hurd, 2008, p. 5) They view secularism as a “neutral public philosophy that arose from the messy debate over religion and politics, standing over and outside the melee in a neutral space of its own creation” (Hurd, 2008, p. 5). Examples of countries that impose a laicist policy toward religion include France and Turkey.

A second form of secularism proposed by Hurd is what she calls Judeo-Christian secularism. What differentiates Judeo-Christian secularists from laicists is that unlike the latter, the former “does not attempt to expel religion, or at least Judeo Christianity, from public life. It does not present the religious-secular divide as a clean, essentialized, and bifurcated relationship, as in laicism” (Hurd, 2008, p. 6). Judeo-Christian secularists believe that secularism is “part of a Christian, later Judeo-Christian, theopolitical inheritance that constitutes the “common ground” upon which Western democracy rests” (Hurd, 2008, p. 6). However, while Judeo-Christian secularists allow some space for the Judeo-Christian religious tradition to play a part in the public life of Western countries, they are skeptical that other religious groups, particularly Islam, have the capacity to differentiate between religion and politics in their public discourses. Thus, they are more likely to support a strict separation between religion and politics in non-Western (and non-Judeo-Christian) societies (Hurd, 2008, p. 6). An example of a country currently practicing Judeo-Christian secularism is the United States.

Hurd states the possibility that other forms of secularism that are based from different philosophical, religious, historical, and institutional legacies could

have been developed in other countries as well (Hurd, 2008, p. 28). However, she does not pursue this possibility further in her study. Thus, she leaves the door open for other scholars to investigate this possibility further. Non-Western countries where Judeo-Christianity is not the dominant religious tradition could serve as an interesting location to further test the validity of her theory.

Another scholar that has recently developed a typology of secularism is Ahmet Kuru. He categorizes proponents of secularism and secularist policies into two categories: passive and assertive secularism. Kuru defines passive secularism as one that while avoids the establishment of any religious tradition as the official religion of a state, also allows the public visibility of religion (Kuru, 2007, p. 571). He considers it as a “pragmatic political principle that tries to maintain state neutrality toward various religions” (Kuru, 2007, p. 571). On the other hand, assertive secularism occurs when “the state excludes religion from the public sphere and plays an “assertive” role as the agent of a social engineering project that confines religion to the private domain. It seeks to eliminate religion from the public sphere altogether” (Kuru, 2007, p. 571).

Kuru argues that the historical relationship between religion and the state in a particular country is determined on whether secularists chose to pursue passive or assertive secularism. He argues that the presence of an *ancien* regime that promoted and supported a particular religion would result in more hostile relations between religious and secular actors. This leads to an assertive form of secularism. On the other hand, the lack of an *ancien* regime that promoted a particular religion would result in a more cooperative relationship between religious and secular actors, which leads into a passive form of secularism (Kuru, 2007, p. 572). In his comparison of secularist policies in France, Turkey, and the United States, Kuru argues that the first two countries adopted an assertive form of secularism because of secularists’ reaction against political regimes that promoted a dominant religious tradition in these countries (Catholicism in France and Islam in Turkey). On the other hand, passive secularism prevailed in the United States due to the lack of any dominant religion that was favored by the British colonial government in the United States. This made it easier for secular and religious actors in the United States to reach a consensus in drawing a proper boundary between religion and the state

in the United States, while allowing active participation of religion in America's public discourses (Kuru, 2007, pp. 583-591). Kuru also predicts that passive secularism tend to arise when a consensus is reached between religious and secularist actors within a society, while assertive secularism tends to prevail when these actors are not able to reach such a consensus (Kuru, 2007, pp. 583-584).

The varieties of secularism theory developed by these scholars have made a significant contribution in understanding different forms of secularism in the world that arose largely from different historical conditions in "crucial case" countries that underwent secularization process as well. The theory is especially useful when we seek to expand the arguments made by these scholars beyond the initial case studies that were used in their analyses. The two authors studied an identical set of case countries because they wanted to develop a strong test to prove that their theories would hold in countries that were frequently analyzed by scholars studying the interactions between religion and secularism (i.e., French, Turkey, and the United States).⁶ However, in order to gather additional evidence to prove the theoretical claims of these two scholars, we will need to evaluate the validity of their theories in other countries that have not been studied by them.

In order to provide a comparably strong test to the theories developed by Hurd and Kuru, I choose to study the interaction between religion and the secular in a non-Western country that is predominantly Muslim, yet has a significant number of religious minorities that could play an important role in shaping the country's policy on the proper role of religion in its public sphere. I choose to study Indonesia because it serves as a good case to test the following theoretical arguments: 1) the country is both a non-Western country with a Muslim-majority population, therefore according to Judeo-Christian secularists, a secular and democratic political regime would be difficult, if not impossible, to

⁶ Arguments to select "crucial cases" that serve as "strong tests" for one's theory in social science research are provided by qualitative methodologists such as Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methodology for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997) and John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Another recent work with many useful advice for social scientists using qualitative case study method in their research program is Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Study and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005).

be established there, and 2) there is a strong contention between secular nationalists, Muslims, and the Christian minority that aligned themselves with the secular nationalist group, during the process of establishing a secularist state in Indonesia. According to Hurd and Kuru's hypotheses, assertive and laicist secularism will be more likely to prevail under the above conditions. This article will test whether this prediction is indeed correct. Indonesia also serves as a good testing ground for the varieties of secularism theory because to my knowledge, so far no scholars have applied the theory in the case of Indonesia.

The primary data source of this research is the meeting minutes of The Investigative Committee to Prepare for Indonesia's Independence (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (BPUPKI) that highlighted the debate between secular nationalist, Muslim, and Christian political figures that were tasked to draft a new constitution for the independent Indonesian state between May and mid-August 1945. The minutes were compiled by Mohammad Yamin, a member of committee who belonged to the secular nationalist faction (Yamin, 1959). In addition to this collection of minutes, previous works that studied the political discourses between secular nationalists, Indonesian Muslims, and Christians from the late 19th century to the late 1960s were also consulted.⁷

Based from this data, I shall argue that the Indonesia case serves to cast some doubts on the validity of varieties of secularism theory proposed by Hurd and Kuru. A secular state was established in Indonesia in 1945 and it was successfully maintained for more than six decades, despite strong challenges at various times in this period. However, despite many contentious conflicts between secular nationalists, Muslims, and Christians, Indonesia does not become an assertive and laicist secularist state. Instead, the type of secularism that prevails in Indonesia is closer to passive secularism, because religious groups and actors could freely articulate their views in Indonesia's public

⁷ Since this study focuses on the interaction between secular nationalists, Muslims, and Christians from the 1940s to the 1960s, it does not deal with the interaction between these groups from the late 1960s onwards (during much of Suharto's New Order regime and in the aftermath of its collapse in 1998). Readers interested in the interaction between these groups from the 1970s onward should consult studies such as Jacques Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); and John Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006).

sphere. At the same time, the Indonesian state provides considerable financial support to religious organizations through the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Lastly, I shall argue that Indonesian secularism is supported and sustained by the country's Christian minority, which has consistently endorsed secularist policies proposed by the country's secular nationalist leaders in order to preserve its interests (maintain its religious liberty as well as the rights to proselytize to non-Christians) as well as protect its members from potential reprisal/persecution from conservative Muslims. However, such a support came at a high price for Indonesian Christians, in the form of their support to two successive authoritarian regimes that ruled the country for nearly four decades and the frequent conflicts they have had with conservative Muslim groups.

Interactions between Muslims, Christians, and Secular Nationalists during the Dutch Colonial Period (1888-1942)

There are three major actors who were involved in the political struggles over state-religion relations in Indonesia: secular nationalists, Muslim groups (which after 1952 were divided into reformists and traditional/syncretic Muslim groups), and Christian minorities. Muslims comprise approximately 88 percent of Indonesia's population. Virtually all Indonesian Muslims are Sunni Muslims. However, they are about evenly divided between the scripturalist reformists and the syncretic traditionalists.⁸ Christians comprises about 9 percent of the population. About 5 percent of Indonesian Christians are Protestants while another 4 percent are Catholics.⁹ The contention between these groups dated back from the *ancien* regime period in Indonesia's history, when the Indonesian

⁸ Reformist Muslims tend to embrace the original literalist interpretation of Islam as propagated by the Prophet and reflected in the sacred scriptures (Koran and Hadiths). In Indonesia, they tend to become members of *Muhammadiyah* and its political party, *Masyumi*. Traditionalist Muslims tend to blend syncretic local religious traditions (e.g., honoring local saints and shrines, faith healing, etc.) with original Islamic teachings. In Indonesia, traditionalists tend to become members of *Nahdlatul Ulama*. For a typology that differentiates the politics of reformist and traditionalist Muslim organizations, see Yahya Sadowski, "Political Islam: Asking the Wrong Questions?" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9 (2006), pp. 219-222.

⁹ For the demographic statistics of Indonesia's religious groups, see Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, and Aris Ananta, eds., *Indonesia's Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape* (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2003). Most of Indonesia's Christian population is also members of an ethnic group that dominates the population of more remote areas within Indonesia (e.g., the Bataks in North Sumatra, the Manados in North Sulawesi, and the Flores, Moluccans, and Papuans in Eastern Indonesia) (R. William Liddle, "Coercion, Co-optation, and the Management of Ethnic Relations in Indonesia," in *Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific*, ed. Michael Brown and Sumit Ganguly (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), p. 274). This is attributed to the relative success of Christian missionaries in converting the population of these areas vis-à-vis population centers (e.g., Java) that were already dominated by Muslims (see this section for more details).

territory was occupied and colonized by the Dutch, and was then called the Dutch East Indies.¹⁰ The primary cause of their contention could be traced from the state-religion policy of the Dutch colonial government, which assigned different status and privileges to these religious groups.

Officially, the Dutch colonial government in Indonesia embraced a policy of separation between religion and the state. According to article 119 of the Dutch Colonial Constitution (*de Regeeringsreglement*) adopted in 1854, religious freedom was granted to all religious traditions (including Islam) and the government would take a completely neutral position on religious matters (Noer, 1973, pp. 165-166). Increasingly, however, Dutch colonial officials viewed Indonesian Islam as a dangerous movement that could be used to inspire indigenous Indonesians to rebel against its rule over the East Indies (Noer, 1973, p. 167; Hefner, 2000, p. 90). They began to believe that indigenous Christian converts were likely to develop more cooperative attitudes toward the Dutch and were more likely to be loyal to the Dutch colonial government as well (Klinken, 2003, pp. 25-26). They were hoping that conversions by Christian missionaries could help reduce Islamic influence among the Indonesian population.¹¹

Beginning in 1888, the Dutch colonial government began to actively support Christian missionaries' evangelization effort in the Dutch East Indies, with a special emphasis "to reduce the danger of (Islamic) resistance in the heathen areas against the introduction or spread of Christianity" (Noer, 1973, p. 167). The colonial government designated rural and remote areas that were considered as "borderlines" between Islamic and Dutch influences (usually urban population centers where the regional administrations were centered) as mission areas. Its goal was to turn these areas into "buffer" zones that protect

¹⁰ The Dutch first came to Indonesia in the late 16th century to contest and then took over the very lucrative spice trade in the Indonesian archipelago that from the Portuguese. The Dutch gained effective control over much of Java and Sumatra by the end of the 17th century, and then gradually expanded this control throughout other areas of Indonesia between mid-19th century and early 20th century.

¹¹ Not all Dutch colonial officials supported the new policy. Some Dutch officials, including the Islamologist Snouck Hurgronje, opposed the Dutch colonial government's active support of Christian missions in Indonesia, on the grounds that Islam had a much firmer roots in Indonesia and missionary activities could aggravated tensions between Muslim leaders and the colonial government. However, these officials were in the minority within the Dutch colonial officialdom and the Dutch government proceeded with its policy to support Christian missions (Harry J. Benda, "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia," *Journal of Modern History*, 30 (4) (1958), p. 341).

Dutch-controlled urban centers from the encroachment of “radical” Muslim elements in the surrounding villages.¹²

In 1890, the Dutch crown gave authority to the Dutch Governor General in the East Indies to grant direct subsidies to Christian missions. Such an authority had not been previously granted, for fear that it could create further tensions between the Dutch and local Muslim authorities (Noer, 1973, p. 168). The Dutch colonial government spent a significant amount between 1890 and the end of its colonial rule in 1942 in subsidizing Christian missionaries and education institutions. While the colonial government also provided subsidies to Islamic schools and organizations, the amount was much smaller in comparison to the support given to Christian missionaries. Between 1936 and 1938, the Dutch government spent approximately 689,000 gulden per year to support Protestant missions and 294,000 gulden each year to support the Catholics while spending only 7,500 gulden per year to support Muslim missions. In 1939, subsidies for Protestant missions were increased to 844,000 gulden and those for Catholic missions were increased to 336,000 gulden. Subsidies for the Muslims remained flat at 7,600 gulden (Benda, 1958, p. 223).

Finally, the Dutch colonial government also gave preferential treatment to indigenous Indonesian Christians in its recruitment of civil servants and soldiers. Indonesian Christians from Ambon (Moluccan Island) and Manado (North Sulawesi) were preferred to be hired into the colonial civil service (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 178; Chauvel, 1990). The few Muslim civil servants that were recruited by the colonial government tended to come from noble (*priyayi*) families who were syncretic in their religious expressions. Virtually none of them came from conservative Muslim families (Hefner, 2005, pp. 90-91). In addition, in the recruitment of the colonial armed forces, the Dutch preferred to recruit soldiers from the Moluccas, who were mostly Christians and were considered to be more “loyal” to the colonial government than the Muslim Malays or Javanese (Klinken, 2003, p. 23).

¹² Examples of this policy could be seen for instance in North Sumatra (using Batak Christians to isolate Aceh and Malay Muslims), East Borneo (putting Dayak Christians between Banjar and Malay Muslims), and North Sulawesi (isolating Buginese Muslims with Tobaku and Minahasan Christians) (Ismatu Ropi, “Depicting the Other Faith: A Bibliographical Survey of Indonesian Muslim Polemics on Christianity,” *Studia Islamika* 6 (1) (1999), p. 83).

As a result of the Dutch colonial government's encouragement and support for Christian missionary efforts and the lack representation of Muslims within the colonial civil service and armed forces, many Indonesian Muslims viewed their Christian counterparts as willing partners of the Dutch colonial government's effort to strengthen its rule in Indonesia. Muslim organizations started to aggressively oppose Christian missionary campaigns and accused Indonesians who converted into Christianity as members of "the Dutch religion," thereby labeling them as Dutch collaborators (Ropi, 1998).

Beginning in the 1910s, reformist Muslims began to establish organizations *Muhammadiyah*, *Sarekat Islam (SI - United Islam)*, and *Persatuan Islam (Persis - Islamic Union)*, that were established to promote their Islamic reform agenda as well as to counter the Dutch's campaign to promote Christian missionaries (Benda, 1958, pp. 47-51; Laffan, 2003, pp. 161-171). As a reaction against these Islamic revivalist movements, traditionalist Muslims founded their own organizations, the *Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)* to preserve and protect their local customs and rituals that were considered heretical by these reformist organizations (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 223). These organizations later became the center of Islamic nationalist movements in Indonesia, with the ultimate goal of turning Indonesia to become an independent state based on Islamic principles.¹³

While reformist and traditionalist Muslims differed greatly in terms of theological interpretations as well as tradition, what united them during the colonial period was not only the desire to liberate Indonesia from the Dutch's rule, but also their resentment to the fact that Indonesia was occupied by an alien power that did not share the Islamic faith. They believed that colonial rule

¹³ I am not claiming that most Indonesian Islamic organizations (esp. *Muhammadiyah* and NU) remain committed to the goal of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia at more contemporary times. During the 1970s, continued repression under the Suharto government motivated figures such as Nurcolish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid to develop a new philosophy that helped to move these organizations away from the Islamic vision they had advocated earlier towards one that accepts the legitimacy of secular nationalist *Pancasila* state. This philosophy prevails among the current leadership of these organizations, although some within these organizations are still advocating the replacement of the secularist *Pancasila* state with one based on *sharia* law. I do claim, however, that during the period covered in this study (from 1910s to the late 1960s) the establishment of a *sharia*-based Islamic state was the goal of the majority of leaders and members of reformist and traditionalist Muslim organizations in Indonesia, including the ones cited above. For the political thinking of post-1970 generation of Islamic leaders and the impacts of the organizations they lead, see for instance Hefner, *Civil Islam* & R. William Liddle, "Improvising Political Cultural Change: Three Indonesians Cases," in *Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics*, ed. R. William Liddle (Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin 1996), pp. 143-178.

prevented Muslims from practicing their faith in full and their antidote against it was to put their faith at the center of their struggle to achieve Indonesia's independence (Elson, 2008, pp. 81-82). Islamic activists such as the future Prime Minister and *Masyumi* party leader Mohammad Natsir believed that it was not enough for the future Indonesian state to guarantee the religious liberty for all religions, including Muslims. Instead, Muslims should be in charge of granting these rights to other religions, under the auspices of an Islamic state (Noer, 1973, p. 278). In the mind of these activists, an Indonesian state based on Islam was the only way to remedy centuries of Islamic subjugation under the Dutch colonial rule.

However, the role of Islamic organizations within the anti-colonial nationalist movements was severely contested by secular nationalist activists, which sought an independent Indonesia based not from Islamic principles but instead as a secular state that tolerates religious liberty of all Indonesians regardless of their religious background.¹⁴ Secular nationalist activists were influenced by the works of the 18th and 19th century European political philosophers such as Ernest Renan and Otto Bauer in forming their own conceptualization on what a nation is and who among its population should be included into it.¹⁵ These elite believed in the idea that a nation is formed by the people who lived in a particular territory and shared a common experience, regardless of their ethnic, cultural, and religious differences. They transformed this idea in their conceptualization of how the future Indonesian state should be constructed.

The secular nationalist's vision that rejected an Islamic state for Indonesia in favor of a state that was based on the principles of secularism and equality for all religious traditions could be seen from the writings of future

¹⁴ The core group of these secular nationalist activists was comprised from the children of the traditional Indonesian noble class (*priyayi*) who received Western education in the Netherlands in the 1910s and 1920s. Due to the Western education they received, most of these *priyayi* children were Western-oriented modernists in their view of the world. While most of them were Muslims (along with a few Christians from Indonesian regions such as Moluccas and Manado (North Sulawesi)), many of them only practiced their religious faith nominally, and often mixed their faith with traditional syncretic beliefs.

¹⁵ Both Renan and Bauer advocated the idea of a nation that belongs to a population that shares a common history and experience regardless of the different ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds of members of this population. For an example of their thought, see Renan, [1882] 1994, pp 17-18.

president Sukarno. In a response to Mohammad Natsir's argument for an Islamic state in Indonesia cited earlier, he wrote the following:

....how do you realize your ideals [about this unity] in a country in which you will uphold democracy and in which part of its population are non-Muslims, as in Turkey, India, and Indonesia, in which millions of people are Christians or embrace another religion, and in which the [secular] intellectuals in general do not entertain Islamic thoughts?....If you become the government of the country in which many of its people are non-Muslims, do you want to decide by yourselves that the state be an Islamic state, the constitution be an Islamic constitution, all the laws be the laws of the Islamic sharia? If the Christians and those professing other religions do not want to accept [your decision], what will you do? Do you want to force them.....to agree with your decision?.....do you want to play dictator, to force [them] with arms and cannons? If they will still not obey, what will you do? You do not want to eliminate them all, do you? (Noer, 1973, pp. 285-286)

Sukarno predicted that proposals to incorporate Islam into the constitution would certainly be rejected, for "non-Muslim representatives will reject it with all efforts, and other representatives although Muslims will [also] not agree with it" (Noer, 1973, p. 286).

Thus, secular nationalist *priyayis* wanted to establish a state where all Indonesian ethnic and religious groups could live and work together as a single nation. Given this vision, secularists believe that only a state philosophy based on secularist principles would be acceptable to all Indonesians. Thus, secular nationalism principle had to dominate other ideologies, including Islamic-inspired ones (Ricklefs, 2001, pp. 229-230). Christian minorities, as predicted by Sukarno, became increasingly worried about the political agenda of Muslim groups to establish an Islamic state, and increasingly found themselves in alliance with the secular nationalists (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 230).

The different vision of independent Indonesia between the Islamic and the secularist groups set the stage of confrontation between the two groups, with Indonesian Christian minorities caught in the middle of this confrontation. Indonesian Muslims, who were politically and economically marginalized during the Dutch colonial rule, believed that Islam should be established as the state's official religion because it was the religion of most Indonesian

population. On the other hand, Christian minorities, uncomfortable with Muslim nationalists' goal to establish an Islamic state, sought to protect their religious liberty as well as the economic and political privileges (e.g., subsidies and appointments in the civil service and the military). They saw themselves to be in agreement with the secular nationalists who rejected the Islamic state in favor of a state that would not officially establish a state religion and promise to guarantee the religious liberty of all religions. Secular nationalists also advocated a secular state that would be inclusive toward ethnic, religious, and cultural minorities in order to realize their vision of a single united Indonesian state. The stage was set for a confrontation between Muslim nationalists versus their secularist counterparts, who were supported by Christian minorities.

The Crafting of Indonesian Secularism: The 1945 Debate over the Indonesian Constitution

The Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia ended in March 1942, when the Japanese invaded Indonesia as part of its greater conquest of East and Southeast Asia in the Second World War and managed to defeat the Dutch colonial force in Indonesia in less than two weeks. The harsh treatment of the Dutch against pro-independent Indonesian politicians (both secular nationalists and Muslims), as well as the economic misery of the Indonesian population that started during the Great Depression and was never resolved by the Dutch colonial government, led most Indonesians to welcome the Japanese as a liberator instead of a new colonial power. Indonesian nationalist leaders such as Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, as well as Islamic leaders such as Agus Salim, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, and Wahid Hasjim, considered the Japanese as a transitional power that would eventually grant independence to Indonesia. Thus, they all cooperated with the Japanese occupying forces in Indonesia.

Given that Islamic organizations such as *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama* had networks of activists that had access to most villages in Indonesia, these organizations received much political supports as well as favors from the Japanese. As a result, Muslim clerics sat on various governmental departments and committees. They also served as officers within the Japanese occupational

army (Benda, 1958, pp. 135-139). Thus, the power of Islamic groups in Indonesia during the Japanese occupation increased significantly compared to their limited influence under the Dutch colonial period. They were also influential in promoting Indonesian nationalism and independent campaign efforts among the general population, something that secular nationalist leaders (who came mostly from *priyayi* noble background) were never able to accomplish (Benda, 1958, pp. 140-141).

As the Japanese began to incur heavy losses in its war efforts in 1944 and early 1945, it came under increasing pressures from Indonesian leaders to grant independence to Indonesia. On March 1, 1945 the Japanese occupational government issued a declaration that formed a preparatory committee that would design the constitution of an independent Indonesia. The committee was called *Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (The Investigative Committee to Prepare for Indonesia's Independence – BPUPKI) (Benda, 1958, p. 184).

Indonesian Muslim leaders were confident that given the favors they have enjoyed from the Japanese in the previous three years, they would be able to command a majority of members in this preparatory committee. Based on this perceived majority status, they began to prepare for an Indonesian state based on Islamic principles, arguing that Islam should become the ideology of the new state because it constituted the vast majority (in 1945 more than 90 percent) of the Indonesian population. The Muslim leaders' proposal for an Islamic-inspired state was supported unanimously, regardless of the theological debate between modernist (reformist) and traditionalist Muslims that historically often divided the two groups.

However, when BPUPKI's composition was finally announced on May 15, 1945, Muslim leaders were surprised to learn that the vast majority of the committee's members came from the secular nationalist group. Secular nationalists received 47 seats in the preparatory committee (out of a total of 62 seats), which left Muslim groups only 15 seats in the committee.¹⁶ Secular

¹⁶ Jan Aritonang, *Sejarah Perjumpaan Kristen dan Islam di Indonesia* [History of Christian and Muslim Encounters in Indonesia] (Jakarta, Indonesia: PT BPK Gunung Mulia, 2004), pp. 235-236. Note that this number not only includes the pro-independence secular nationalist leaders, but also includes older

nationalists had successfully argued to the Japanese military leaders that they were in a better position to face the Allied military forces once Indonesia became independent, given that they received European education and shared the political philosophy of the Allies (e.g., liberal democracy and secularism), unlike the Islamists whose relatively alien religious tradition as well political motives would continuously be questioned by the Allied forces.

Once BPUPKI started to meet on May 29, 1945, secular nationalists immediately went on the offensive, arguing that despite Indonesia's Muslim majority population, the country should be organized as a secular state in order to survive as a unitary, multiethnic, and multi-religious state. This could be seen from the speech made by Supomo, a leading secular nationalist who was trained as a constitutional lawyer, on May 31, 1945. Referring to an earlier speech made by another key nationalist leader Mohammad Hatta, he made the following argument against the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia:

Do we want to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia?Based on its geographic locations, Indonesia has a different characteristics compared to countries such as Iraq, Iran, Egypt, or Syria, all of which have an Islamic political culture (*Corpus Islamicum*). Indonesia is part of the Greater East Asia. In this vast region, there are countries such as Japan, China, Manchuria, Philippines, Thailand, and Burma, and all of them are not Islamic states (emphasis added).

....If we choose to establish an Islamic state, this means that we would not establish a unitary state. Establishing an Islamic state means that this country will associate itself with the largest religious group in the country, the Muslims. If we establish an Islamic state, there would be problems with smaller religious groups that are in the minority, Christians, for instance. Despite the assurances from the Muslim group that it will protect the rights of these minority groups, they would never be considered as full-fledged (Indonesian) citizens. Thus, the goal for an Islamic state is not in accordance with the goal for a unitary (and secular) state that we all are striving to achieve (Yamin, 1959, pp. 115-117).

members of Indonesia's *priyayi* aristocracy (who were ambivalent about the prospect of Indonesia's independence due to their privileged position under the Dutch colonial rule), as well as members of Indonesia's ethnic (Chinese, Euroasians) as well as religious (Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist) minorities.

Supomo's speech was followed by that of Sukarno. In a speech delivered on June 1, 1945, Sukarno proposed five principles that would serve as the foundation of a secular nationalist Indonesian state. Among them was a principle he named as "Belief in One God" (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*), which recognized the diversity of religious beliefs in Indonesia and respected the teachings of each of these religious traditions, without elevating any one of them as the ideology of the independent Indonesian state. Specifically, Sukarno made the following argument in his speech:

Indonesians not only share a belief in God, but it is expected that each Indonesian should worship their own God. Christians should worship God according to the teachings of Jesus Christ. Muslims should worship God according to the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad.....Each of us should worship a God. The Indonesian state should ideally be a state where each of its citizens could worship their God according to their own belief.... There should be no privileges enjoyed exclusively by any one religion over the others (Yamin, 1959, p. 77).

With this speech, the cornerstone for a secular Indonesian state was laid. It should be noted that this is not a strict secularism as prescribed by laicists, but one that mirrors passive secularism. Secular nationalist leaders recognized not only the strong religious belief of Indonesian citizens, but also the diversity of such beliefs. A multi religious Indonesia could survive only when the state does not favor any particular religion. Thus, religious diversity could only be guaranteed by a secular Indonesian state.

However, Muslim members of BPUPKI did not give up their fight for an Islamic state in Indonesia. They were proposing an alternative to the constitution drafted by the secular nationalist camp. This draft contained a clause that proposed the implementation of the *sharia* law as the foundation of the Indonesian state. Besides this clause, Muslim leaders also circulated the following proposals. One called for the appointment of either a monarch who would serve as God's Caliphate on earth, or a republic with an *imam* as the head of state. This proposal was defeated on July 10, 1945, when the vast majority (55 members) of BPUPKI members voted to institute a republic with a president as the head of state (Yamin, 1959, pp. 181-184). Another proposal, introduced

by traditionalist Muslim leader Wahid Hasjim, called for the president of the Indonesian state to be a native-born Indonesian citizen who is also a Muslim and for the establishment of Islam as the official religion of the Indonesian state (Yamin, 1959, pp. 261-262).

As tensions arose from the debate between secular nationalist and Muslim members of BPUPKI over the future Indonesian constitution, Christian members of BPUPKI started to play an active role in opposing the proposals made by Muslim members for an Islamic state and supporting proposals made by secular nationalists for a secular Indonesian state that will protect the religious liberty of all religions. There were three BPUPKI members who were Christian: Alex Maramis (a Manadonese), Johannes Latuharhari (an Ambonese), and Samuel ("Sam") Ratulangie (another Manadonese whom had served as a member of the Dutch's *Volksraad*). Maramis was appointed to a special committee that was tasked to reconcile the differences between secular nationalists and Muslim factions over the proposed Indonesian constitution (Aritonang, 2004, p. 242).¹⁷ Latuharhari made a formal objection against the Muslims' proposal to implement *sharia* law as part of the Indonesian legal system, arguing that "it could create negative repercussions against non-Muslim religions, as well as conflict with traditional customary laws" (Yamin, 1959, p. 259).

Nevertheless, the original compromise that was reached by secular nationalists and Muslims did not fully satisfy these Christian leaders. The preamble of the constitution that was agreed upon by the two groups contained a clause that seemed to have promoted Islam, not as an official religion, but perhaps as a favored religion, of the Indonesian state. The clause read: "*Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*" (Belief in One God, with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice the *sharia* law). This clause later became known as the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*). While the clause explicitly stated that the *sharia* would only be applicable to Muslim Indonesians, Christians (as well as other religious minorities) were concerned that the clause seemed to have put Islam into a

¹⁷ The special committee also included four members from the Muslim group and four from the secular nationalist group.

favored, if not privileged, status in the Indonesian state, thereby threatening the religious liberty of other faiths that is implied by the words “Belief in One God,” (*“Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa”*) (Yamin, 1959, p. 259).¹⁸

However, despite the objections made by Christians as well as some secular nationalists, BPUPKI adopted this compromise constitution by acclamation on July 16, 1945. In asking for this acclamation vote, Sukarno, the chairman of the special committee that drafted this compromise, made the following plea:

Let us now commit ourselves to this sacrifice, and the sacrifice that I demand from all of you who are not in agreement with the Muslim group is for you to unanimously endorse what I am about to propose. This is my proposal: that in our new constitution we insert a clause that states that the President of the Indonesian Republic must be a native-born citizen who is a Muslim. That the (Indonesian) state is based on the belief in one God, with the obligation to follow the *sharia* for those who are obliged to do so (i.e., Muslims). And lastly, that the state guarantees the freedom of all citizens to adopt a religion and to worship according to the teachings of their respective religions.

I ask again that the above proposal be approved unanimously by each of you, even when I recognize that this is a great sacrifice for my brothers, the patriots Latuharhari and Maramis, who are not Muslims, and have made their objections clear. With my tears, I ask that you all will accept this offer for the sake of our motherland and our country....so that we can peacefully declare the independence of our beloved Indonesia (Yamin, 1959, pp. 392-393).

In this speech, Sukarno made clear that this compromise was difficult to achieve and while he recognized the objections made by Christian BPUPKI members such as Maramis and Latuharhari, as well as those made by other secular nationalists, he believed that this was the only compromise that would make Muslim members agreed to this constitution draft and cleared the way for the constitution to be approved unanimously by all BPUPKI members. Thus, the draft of the constitution was finally approved, with the Jakarta Charter

¹⁸ Some secular nationalists had also objected to this clause, arguing that it could promote “religious fanaticism” and would force nominal and syncretic Muslims to follow the *sharia* against their will. See the statements delivered by BPUPKI members Wongsonegoro and Husein Djajadiningrat

clause calling for the implementation of sharia by Indonesian Muslims and another that called for future Indonesian presidents to be a Muslim left intact.

Christian leaders made numerous behind-the-scene efforts to revoke the above clauses, which they perceived as favoring Muslims over other religious traditions in Indonesia. Their lobbies intensified after Indonesia declared its independence on August 17, 1945 and they realized that the pre-approved Indonesian constitution would need to be reconfirmed by another preparatory commission, *Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia's Independence – PPKI) that was formed after BPUPKI was abolished by the Japanese occupation government on August 6, 1945.¹⁹ Christian leaders communicated their objections to the BPUPKI draft to several Japanese military officers on the evening of August 17, 1945, who went to see the secular nationalist leader Mohammad Hatta. This encounter was recalled by Hatta in his memoir, quoted below:

On the evening after the Declaration of Independence was read, I received a phone call from Mr. Nishijima, assistant to Admiral Maeda (the highest ranking Japanese naval officer stationed in Indonesia), who stated that a Japanese Navy officer wanted to see me to relay a very important message for the Indonesian people....This officer.....came to tell me that he had just had a meeting with representatives of the Protestant and Catholic communities from Eastern Indonesia, whom have strongly objected to the preamble of the proposed Indonesian constitution, which contained the following clause: "Belief in One God, with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice the *sharia* law." They recognized that this clause did not directly applicable to their group (Christians), only to Indonesian Muslim citizens. Nevertheless, they argued that this clause, if remained as part of the Indonesian constitution, could be interpreted as a discrimination against religious minorities like themselves. If this discriminatory clause remains intact, they prefer to secede their regions from the newly declared Republic of Indonesia (Hatta, 1956, p. 57).

Christian leaders issued a threat to the secular nationalist leaders that they will not become a part of the newly declared Indonesian Republic if the *sharia* clause favoring Muslims remained in the draft Indonesian constitution

¹⁹ PPKI consisted of 25 members, most of them were former members of BPUPKI, including Sukarno and Hatta.

(Ngelow, 2000, p. 126). Despite its minority status nationwide, in Eastern Indonesia Christianity was (and remains) the majority religion of the population living in regions such as Maluku, North Sulawesi, and East Nusa Tenggara. Secular nationalists like Hatta, whom had dreamed of an independent Indonesian state that comprised multiple ethnic and religious groups, took such a threat, which would have shattered their lifelong dream for a united Indonesian state, very seriously.

The following day (August 18, 1945), Hatta and Sukarno convened a PPKI meeting, which they both chaired. They informed other members of the committee that they, along with several key Muslim leaders (Aritonang, 2004, pp. 254-255),²⁰ had agreed in an early morning meeting held on the same day, to delete all clauses that were perceived by Indonesian Christian leaders as privileging the status of Islam in the newly declared Indonesian state. These deleted clauses included the controversial Jakarta Charter clause, along with the clause requiring future Indonesian presidents to be of Muslim faith (Yamin, 1959, pp. 401-402). In place of the *sharia* clause, they installed the original civil religionist principle introduced by Sukarno on June 1, 1945, “Belief in One God” (“*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*”). This amended constitution was unanimously approved by all PPKI members later on the same day, and they remained in their precise languages to this day. However, the PPKI meeting also approved a major compromise to Muslim leaders, by establishing a Ministry of Religious Affairs (*Departemen Agama*) that were primarily staffed by Muslims and administered public programs and subsidies that primarily benefited Muslims.²¹ This was done despite the objection of Christian leaders (e.g., Latuharhari) (Yamin, 1959, p. 457; Aritonang, 2004, p. 257). This compromise shows that the Indonesian state is not a strict secularist state, but instead one that still give much room for religious actors (including Muslims) to participate in the public sphere.

²⁰ Muslim leaders who were consulted by Sukarno and Hatta on this last minute changes were Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Kasman Singodimedjo, Teuku Mohammad Hasan, and Wahid Hasjim, although some accounts have expressed doubts on whether Hasjim was actually present at this meeting

²¹ By tradition, the Minister of Religious Affairs in Indonesia normally came from the traditionalist organization *Nahdlatul Ulama*, a practice that continued throughout much of the Liberal Democratic period in the 1950s and is restored after the restoration of democracy in Indonesia in 1998. This gives NU access to patronage funds (e.g., revenue from hajj pilgrims) that are very crucial for the sustenance of the organization.

1950-1960: Continuing Struggles between Muslim, Secular Nationalists, and Christians

While Indonesian Muslim leaders were very upset with the failure to enact Jakarta Charter, they were willing to set aside their disagreements with the secular nationalists and Christians during the first ten years of Indonesia's independence (1945-1955). The Muslims (then united under a single *Masyumi* party) were willing to participate in various Indonesian cabinets that govern the country during this period. Masyumi politicians such as Mohammad Natsir, Syafruddin Prawiranegara, and Mohammad Roem, became known for their moderate, sometime liberal stance on non-religious issues (primarily on economic affairs) that they were hailed as "socialist Muslims" (Kahin, 1952) or as "administrators" (Feith, 1962) by Western scholars studying Indonesian politics in the 1950s. They were hoping that their moderate stance could convince secular nationalists and Indonesian Christians to accept their agenda to turn Indonesia to become an Islamic state. They were also hoping that their moderate stance would result in an overwhelming victory for the *Masyumi* party in the upcoming 1955 election, a victory that was assured given the majority of Indonesians were Muslims, at least nominally (Boland, 1971).

However, Indonesian Muslims was dealt with a heavy blow on April 1952, when the division between reformist and traditionalist Muslims that first arose in the 1920s but were overlooked in the 1930s and 1940s resurfaced. The two groups were now separated into two political parties: *Masyumi*, which represented the reformists, and *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), which represented the traditionalists. The split was initiated by traditionalists for purely strategic reason: traditionalists clerics, who then lived primarily in rural areas with little reliable revenue sources, were not given enough ministerships in previous cabinets and had recently stripped from its right to nominate the Minister of Religious Affairs from its own rank (Fealy, 1997, pp. 22-23). Traditionalists believed that by forming their own political party and presented itself as a moderate alternative to the more conservative *Masyumi*, and thus were more attractive coalition partner for secularist parties. The strategy paid off: in the

1955 election NU won 45 parliamentary seats and were now getting more ministerial positions as well as patronage opportunities than were previously (Fealy, 1997, p. 30).

In contrast, *Masyumi's* influence declined after the 1955 election. Its insistent campaign to include *sharia* in the Indonesian constitution made it vulnerable to frequent attacks from secularists, Christians, and sometimes, from traditionalist Muslims as well. Nevertheless, *Masyumi* held on into this principle and when a newly formed constituent assembly met in 1957 to consider possible revisions to the Indonesian constitution, it intensified its efforts to reintroduce *sharia* into the constitution. The debate that took place in the constitution assembly echoed the 1945 debate, with the same casts of characters: Muslims (both reformists and traditionalists), secular nationalists, and Christians.

Muslim politicians insisted on the return of the Jakarta Charter in any new constitution adopted by the constitution assembly. On the other hand, Christian politicians, backed by their secular allies, continued their opposition over the charter on the grounds that it constituted a threat to their religious liberty. There is not enough space in this article to discuss the statements and arguments made by Christian politicians to support their position. However, the following remarks made by Wilhelm Rumambi, from the Indonesian Christian Party (*Partai Kristen Indonesia – Parkindo*), well-illustrated their argument:

We believe that the Indonesian state and its government are God's servants who are called to promote justice. It is our belief that the duty of the state is also that of God's. However, while (the state and the church) are serving the same God, their duties, as outlined by God himself, are different. The duties of the state are to promote security, justice, and liberty among its citizens. In performing its duties, the state could use the sword as well as forced coercion. However, the church could never use sword and coercion in its duties. Instead, it should rely on God's eternal mercy. We believe that this is the proper relationship between the state and the church. Our Lord Jesus Christ has said "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's" (Matthew 22: 21). Thus, it is difficult for us to accept the view that the state has to be based on a particular religion [read: Islam] (Aritonang, 2004, pp. 315-316).

This time, the debate between secular nationalist, Christians, and Muslims over the future of Indonesia's constitution was irreconcilable. No compromise proposal emerged from their debate, since while the secular nationalist and Christian factions were successful in blocking any drafts made by the Muslim faction that contained the Jakarta charter, the Muslims were successful in preventing a quorum to be reached that would have enabled the draft developed by secular nationalists and Christians to be passed.

Facing the threat of the country falling apart over this issue, as well as to deal with emerging threats of regional rebellion and a possible army coup,²² Sukarno decided to end the debate unilaterally. On July 5, 1959, he issued a decree that dissolved the Constitution Assembly, abrogated the constitution, and reaffirmed that *Pancasila*, the secular state philosophy first issued in 1945 to be the foundations of the Indonesian state. He then banned *Masyumi*, and arrested its leaders, whom he accused with instigating a plot to undermine his rule.²³ Sukarno's decree and his assumption of authoritarian powers were supported by secular nationalists, traditionalist Muslims, and Christians (Aritonang, 2004, pp. 335-340; Fealy, 1997, pp. 33-37). He continued to tolerate expressions of religious discourses in the public sphere and provided much patronage to the traditionalist Muslim party NU as well as to the Christian parties (Aritonang, 2004, pp. 339-340; Fealy, 1997, pp. 36-37). However, Sukarno's regime support for passive secularism came under a heavy price: authoritarian rule in Indonesia that lasted for nearly four decades (1959-1998), under both Sukarno and his predecessor, General Suharto.

²² For more on the role of the Indonesian Armed Forces in instigating the collapse of Indonesia's parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, see Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* and Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy in Indonesia: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1966).

²³ Some *Masyumi* leaders such as Natsir and Syafruddin Prawiranegara openly supported a rebellion staged by disgruntled army officers from outside Java whom sought to lessen the dominance of Javanese-based politicians and political parties in favor to those from outside Java as well as to have a better distribution of state revenue between the Jakarta-based national government and the outer Java provinces. Their rebellion is called the Revolutionary Republic of Indonesia Movement (*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia – PRRI*). For more on the PRRI rebellion, see Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy in Indonesia*.

Conclusion

This article is an attempt to show how further research on varieties on secularism, focusing particularly on Islamic countries could give us insight on how secularism was established in these countries despite the missing conditions that some theorists have argued are necessary to exist before they could be successfully implemented. The Indonesian case discussed in this article shows how a determined coalition of secular nationalists and Christian minorities forcefully imposed secularism in Indonesia at a critical juncture period between May and August 1945, when the country was about to declare its independence and its leaders were deliberating a new constitution that would served as the foundation of the new state.

Through numerous political maneuvers, they successfully defeated a counter-proposal from Indonesian Muslims who proposed an alternative plan that would have created at least an Islamic-inspired state, if not a full-fledged Islamic state. They did so by arguing that secularism was the only ideology that were acceptable to all Indonesians, especially members of Indonesia's religious minorities, particularly Christians, because secularism was the only ideology that would have protected the rights, as well as the religious liberty, of these religious minorities.

The case of secularization in Indonesia introduces several possible modifications to the varieties of secularism theory proposed by Hurd and Kuru. First, it serves as a partial disconfirmation of Judeo-Christian secularist thinkers whom argued that secularism could only be successfully implemented in Western countries that shares a similar Judeo-Christian political culture that promoted its emergence. Indonesian secular nationalists were primarily Muslims, but due to their nominal and syncretic religious practices as well as the influence of Western-style education they had received in the Netherlands, they absorbed the secularist philosophies of Enlightenment philosophers. Based from these secularist philosophies, they made an argument that due to the ethnic and religious heterogeneity of the Indonesian population, a secular nationalist state is the appropriate state-religion regime for Indonesia, given that it would best preserve and protect the rights of all of these religious minorities and include them in Indonesia's post-independence state-building project.

Nevertheless, the role of Judeo-Christian secularism could not be dismissed entirely in this case study. Elements of Judeo-Christianity also had influenced the development of Indonesian secularism. This could be seen from the policies of the Dutch colonial government that, despite its official neutrality on religious matters, had encouraged Christian missionaries and their proselytization activities, and had provided substantial political and financial resources to support them. The policy of the Dutch colonial government clearly favored Indonesian Christians. It helped to create a political culture that privileged Indonesian Christians over the country's Muslim majority population.

The crucial role that Indonesian Christian minorities played in the debate between secular nationalists and Muslims over state-religion relations in Indonesia also served as evidence that some elements of Judeo-Christianity have served as a foundation of secularism in Indonesia. A common linkage that unified secular nationalists and Christian politicians at the dawn of Indonesia's independence as well as its early state-building period until the late-1960s was the common philosophy they learned from their Dutch education that framed separation of religion and politics as an appropriate policy in a modern nation-state, especially one that is ethnically and religiously diverse like Indonesia. However, they did not make an argument for a strict separation between religion and politics either, because they recognized that most of Indonesia's population (both Muslims and Christians) considered themselves to be religious and would have resisted a strict separation between the two realms. They also wanted to appease some Muslims whom have originally wanted an Islamic inspired state, by arguing that religion would continue to have a significant role to play in the new state, despite the fact that it is secular, and the government would continue to provide financial support to some Islamic groups. Thus, unlike Kuru's prediction that a severe conflict between secularists and the dominant religious tradition would have resulted in an assertive secularist (laicist) state, the Indonesian state instead became a passive secularist (civil religionist) state.

Two additional insights could also be drawn from the Indonesian case. Firstly, the case provides additional evidence to support Jose Casanova's thesis

on the deprivatization of religion in modern societies. In fact, one could argue that at least in the Indonesian case, religious groups never retreated to the private sphere. Instead, both Muslims and Christians have always played an important role in shaping Indonesia's political discourses. This was seen from the very public role they took during the Dutch colonial rule, the Japanese occupation, as well as during the preparation of Indonesia's independence and thereafter. This serves to support the argument that unlike the predictions of laicists/strict secularists, religion was never completely privatized in Indonesia and in fact, have an important role to play in periods of critical junctures in developing societies such as Indonesia.

Secondly, the Indonesian case also supports the assertion that the promotion of secularism often came about through a confrontational and sometimes violent struggle between different actors who were involved in the formation of state-religion policy in a given country. Secular nationalists and Christians were able to impose passive secularism in Indonesia only after a protracted struggle with Indonesian Muslim groups, whom strenuously proposed a different state-religion policy than what were adopted by secular nationalists. The tactics used by Indonesian Christians were coercive (e.g., threatening the secession of Christian-dominated Eastern Indonesia in 1945 should the constitution continue to declare *sharia* as a foundation of the new Indonesian state, developing a research think-tank that helped the Suharto regime in its repression of Indonesian communists and conservative Muslims). Christians also helped brought about two successive authoritarian regimes in Indonesia that while often violently repressed the aspirations of reformist Muslims, were receiving support from the Christians. This in turn helped brought about direct confrontations between the two religious groups that often (especially within the last decade) had resulted in violent clashes between their adherents.

In conclusion, the Indonesian case have brought about some interesting findings that should be noted by other social scientists working in the field of religion and politics, particularly those who are investigating state-religion relations as well as varieties of secularism in different parts of the world. It also brought an interesting insight to scholars working on inter-religious relations

and conflicts, especially those who wish to study how the struggle over secularism could have promoted conflicts between different religious groups, particularly between Muslims and Christians.

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Revisiting New Global Governance in Capture Fisheries: Lessons from Indonesia under COVID-19 Pressures

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(Submission 29-4-2022, Review 5-5-2022, Revision 27-5-2022, Published 28-06-2022)

COVID-19 suffers fishers all over the world, including those in Indonesia. While the pandemic triggered the state to provide relief for fishers, initial interviews and media tracing suggests that in Indonesia, the world's second largest producer of capture fish, the reaction was not enthusiastic. This paper explores the possible factors behind such reaction, taking the focus on how existing new global governance affected the perspectives of fishers. This paper explores the dimensions of governance that link the perspectives of problem solving at the global level and the way fishers operate. Through in-depth interviews of state apparatus and fishers, also tracing past studies of governance, the paper noted problems that current global governance offered to solve and describe the layers of convergence on "common problems" but not necessarily on "specific problems" that stakeholders try to solve nationally, locally or operationally under the umbrella of global governance. Bringing in the wicked problem discourse, this paper humbly suggests an improvement of country's horizontal governance while the regional and global governance seek to solve the specific problems faced by fishers and fisheries business as an inseparable part of new global governance for the sector.

Keywords: Capture fishery, COVID-19, governance, problem solving, Indonesia

Introduction

Governance at the trans-national level, i.e. global governance, is driven by a belief that certain kinds of cooperation, sharing of information or self-voluntary submission to a higher authority could either achieve certain common goals, or overcome problems that one state cannot possibly handle alone. Given sovereignty of states, global governance emerges to incorporate the principle of networking among peers in which trust have grown. While the old governance model focuses on negotiating comprehensive and legally binding agreements at

the government to government level and thus provide the non-state actors the paths to acceptable policies; the new governance model talks about multistakeholder participation, responsive regulation (Abbott & Snidal, 2013) as well as partnerships between state and non-state entities including businesses (Grainne de Burca et al., 2014). In short, new global governance is to enhance the manageability of challenges and to tap into opportunities at hand when global government is not possible, reaching out to broader stakeholders for responsive regulation and partnerships.

Global governance in the capture fishery sector is quite often tied to the “wicked problems” discourse (Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 2009; Rittel & Melvin M Webber, 1973). It has been pointed out that wicked problems are not necessarily about the nature that challenges the system, such as that fish is mobile resources or that climate affects governance, but rather about the actual problem that the governing system tries to solve. They called a problem wicked when:

“...they are difficult to define and delineate from other and bigger problems and when they are not solved once and for all but tend to reappear. Wicked problems have no technical solution, it is not clear when they are solved, and they have no right or wrong solution that can be determined scientifically.... wicked problems must rely on the collective judgement of stakeholders involved in a process that is experiential, interactive and deliberative.”

The study of Jentoft & Chuenpagdee (2009) guides this paper when upon seeing the devastating impact of the spread of COVID-19 pandemic we find the capture fishers were being less than excited to the announcement of the provision of the state relief. Further, national and regional dialogs among stakeholders in South East Asia in 2020 revealed the potential gaps in the global new governance that state relief has difficulty to bridge. Through in-depth interviews we find that larger-scale fishers in ASTUIN (Indonesian Tuna Association), who are mostly based in Java and Bali islands, said that none of the incentive is about them; it is about the smaller fishers. While such statement is not entirely accurate given that the state did declare incentives for the large fishers too, the small fishers did get a special attention from the state. The pandemic incentives for small fishers include conditional cash or in-kind transfers to subsidize credit interest and to provide stimulus funding for capital.

Interestingly the small fishers still feel insecure, raising concern about the pricing of their catch, illegal fishing, and the inconvenient subsistent livelihood.

We ask what are the factors behind such reaction? Knowing that Indonesia has been active participant of new governance in the fishery sector, positioned as the world's second largest producer of capture fish and is sited on the world's largest location of fish stocks that the world is hunger for, we wonder if factors affecting such reaction is shaped by the existing global governance. If wicked problem has been detected before in the sector, the circumstance of COVID-19 gives us the chance to assess how the new global governance troubles or helps fishers when facing shocks especially when the state offers assistance. This paper explores the dimensions of new global governance that link the perspectives of problem solving at the global level with the contexts and the way fishers operate.

This research contributes to the lacunae of discussion on factors behind businesses response to new global governance. Taking the context and the way capture fishers in Indonesia operate and interact with the state allow us to identify the diversity of perspectives on problem solving that new global governance fails to capture, not just amongst Indonesian fishers but also between these fishers and the fishers of other countries that operate in Indonesian waters and its Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

Global Governance in Capture Fisheries, What's Overlooked

Global *governance* in the capture fisheries sector, both the old and new models, has been basically driven by three principles: 1) territorial-use rights, 2) sustainable fishery, also 3) business and human rights. In each principle, governance is directed towards specific goals that are expected to solve "common problems". Each principle is developed to overcome the limits of *government* in the sector and thus the common problem and proposed problem solving are abstracted to the global level to earn agreement from stakeholders.

First, governance in territorial-use rights is about access rights and resource sharing that recognize the importance of respecting territorial and geographic boundaries to allocate harvesting rights. Communities or individuals can define marine territories by distance as agreed by coastal countries or with

coastal countries. Regulations on fishing techniques and gear, the use of technology to monitor activities in the seas and to patrol exemplified the principles; ensuring respect to the higher goals of distributing wealth. When it comes to migratory species such as tuna, territorial-use rights are localized to allow certain flexibility of rules. The governance of this principle is an interplay between biology, market forces and the governing institutions (James E Wilen et al., 2020). In the territorial-use rights, diplomacy between states is employed at different segments: from establishing exploration and exploitation rights in territorial waters and in EEZs, to monitoring the activities and settling disputes about boundaries with neighboring countries.

Second, governance in sustainable fishery is about conservation of fish stocks to prevent declines and depletions given exponential rise of consumption. It is linked to biology of fish as well as techniques and technology to fish. While the Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987) mentioned that the root of sustainability is comprised of the environmental, the social and the economic concerns, what has become more well-known in the implementation of this principle is the consumer demand to restrict buying from non-sustainable sources. Certification standards emerged as means and tools to assure consumers of fulfilment of this principle. To date there are hundreds of certifications for fishery products. Three hundred of those are issued by an international non-profit organization the Marine Stewardship Council. Combating the crime of IUU Fishing is another practice that convinced developing countries to take part in becoming parties to this governance.

Third, governance in business and human rights which stems from the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights developed by John G. Ruggie. This Guiding Principle (GP) was then adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Council on 16 June 2011 as a set of standards that had since then guided states and non-state actors to develop policy template or advocacy tools for various sectors where human rights violation is prone to happen. The intent of this recognition is to push for state's responsibility to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business, through appropriate policies, regulation, and adjudication; to push for the independent corporate responsibility to respect human rights and avoid infringing on the rights of

others and address adverse impacts with which companies are involved; and to push for greater access by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and nonjudicial (Ruggie, 2014). The examples of human rights violation in this sector include torture, slavery, and human trafficking.

The three governance models recognize that the state plays an important part in providing framework for compliance, cooperation or partnership, in allocating quotas for fishing in certain territory, and in preventing human rights abuses, including by business, and to provide greater access by victims to effective remedy whenever human rights violation is found. The models also raised the need to outreach to non-state actors, particularly business, given the trans-national economic transactions. In an ideal world these three principles are supposed to align to each other; assuming at least three things: that businesses are interested to comply to territorial boundaries that would grant them protection from their state; to extend the sustainability of the fishing ground for their own future good; and to avoid tainting their business with the issue of crimes such as torture, slavery, and human trafficking.

The reality has been that principles are translated differently across the world. While many has been written about the pluralism of (legal) concepts at the global levels which at the national levels may create incoherent regulations, expose the weaknesses of the global frameworks, and the orchestration deficit problem (Abbott & Snidal, 2013), little has been discussed about how fishers cope with the governance pressures to survive their business or economic activities. The discourse focuses on state's lack of competence or capacity to execute global governance. But it has been recognized that every global governance carries limitations: some may worsen the survivability of fishers in the market and some may help the fishers. Not all fishers have the resilience to survive, compete and adapt (Satumanatpan & Pollnac, 2020). After all, there are countries that suffer from overfishing in their territorial waters (Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Thailand, 2019; Wolanski et al., 2020; Woody, 2019) but switching job is not an option and thus fishers have few choices but to cope in "their own ways". In short, we need to look beyond state-centric explanation.

Knowing that new global governance in the fishery sector is tied to economic interactions and transactions, this paper sees the pertinence of revisiting the concept of problem and solutions in the global governance of capture fishery by bringing in attention to how the private sector, which in this case includes fishers and fisheries businesses, operate and interact with the national authorities and with their peers. The consideration is twofold. *One*, after World War II the principle of liberal international economic order is prominent and that the capture fishery is among the sector proud for being private-based and market-led. Even in its heyday of old governance, the capture fishery sector depends on the cooperation and partnership of the fishers and the industry. Quota to fish, monitoring of vessels, permits for vessels are expected to make fishers competitive. *Second*, liberalizing the sector according to demands from international economic order is (often) controversial. While in principle liberalization may open some opportunities to operate in new fishing grounds with incentives from the state, fishers and the industry must interact with local authorities and other fishers, both from their own nationalities and beyond. The capacity to adjust and to remain competitive becomes important to monitor here.

With this focus, we can explore the bridge between the environment, people, and the economy because the liberal market that the capture fishery sector lives in is embedded in the state-society relations; liberal market is driven by legitimate social purposes in pursuit of what society expects the state would do for its economy. Ruggie (1982) argues that policymakers seek purpose in its participation in the global order. This is why, as Ruggie further explained, a state would increase support for trade by compensating those who may be harmed by trade, mitigating the negative aspects of free trade instead of refusing it altogether. The means may include support for labor, providing equipment to protect the environment, or strengthening demand to help producers get better price for their products. Ruggie noted, however, that the international authority of global governance often focuses on power only, ignoring the dimension of social purpose; deciding on the form of international order but not its content (p. 382). It is about the state towards the marketplace, and not about the marketplace itself. While some called this “protectionism”, Ehrlich (2010)

argues the opposite; namely that there are market players who believe in fair trade that trade should be somehow regulated or limited (whether by government or the market) to prevent harm to the society and business.

The COVID-19 pandemic represents a disruption, a deep shock in the liberal market, one that leads many businesses to bankruptcy and pushes economies into recession. When the fishers express less than enthusiastic reaction to what the state provides, this is a signal to revisit how the global governance works. Bringing in attention to how the private sectors respond to the authority and their peers helps to identify the factors affecting such reaction. State's stimulus to businesses amid COVID-19 is often an inseparable part of their respond but one needs to assess how the stimulus is connected to how businesses operate and to the global governance principles.

Research Method

The research started by noting actions from Indonesian state authorities about COVID-19 for the capture fishery sector and the stimulus packages announced following the declaration of the first COVID-19 infection. The study captures the first wave of COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. How the pandemic affect fishers and the reactions of fishers to the stimulus packages, both the larger-scale ones and the traditional small fishers, are traced from media news published between March 2 to August 17, 2020, that is the time between the first day that COVID-19 was announced as a pandemic in Indonesia and the first wave of the pandemic. The writer used keywords such as "harga ikan" (price of fish), "insentif perikanan" (fisheries incentive), "insentif nelayan" (incentive for fishers), "pandemi" (pandemic), and "COVID-19". The total relevant national and local media news were 43 articles. The media news reveal government programs as well as the reaction pertaining to the pricing of fish and other difficulties to sustain operation and export during the pandemic.

The writer also did a series of in-depth interviews with fishers representatives. The sample is purposive, aiming at hearing the views of the association of fishers and the traditional fishers from different parts of Indonesia. We obtain the views of 2 (two) representatives from one association of fishers, the ASTUIN (Indonesian Tuna Association) whose members are tuna

fishers from Java and Bali, and 2 (two) representatives of traditional small fishers groups: one from Kepulauan Riau and another from Maluku island. The COVID-19 pandemic hindered the researcher's ability to find other fishers to interview.

The search for factors affecting fishers' reaction to the state COVID-19 stimulus to the sector is done by doing purposive sampling of state authorities who can provide in-depth description of global governance in practice and how they understand business operation in the sector. We interview 15 (fifteen) state authorities in the sector namely officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Marine and Fishery, Coordinating Ministry of Maritime and Investment, Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and Security, the BP2MI (the Protection Agency for Indonesian Migrant Workers), and the local government officers from Central Indonesia. All interviews were done by google meet and zoom application between July 6 and August 13, 2020.


Data from the media news for this research helps capture the overall feel about state's expression to COVID-19 and the stimulus packages for fishers. The change to the pricing of fish from across areas in Indonesia is noted to highlight the shock and how fisheries businesses operate. From the in-depth interviews, we explore the implementation of the three mentioned global governance principles: territorial use-rights, sustainable fishery and business and human rights in the fishery sector. The finding is presented as a descriptive analysis of new global governance in practice, particularly how fishers (from various countries) interact at the practical levels, including with the states.

Indonesia's Governance in Capture Fisheries

Indonesia is world's largest archipelago, lying in between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, with no less than 13,000 islands spanning three time zones. Indonesian territory, therefore, borders many countries. In the sea, it borders with India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, China, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste, and Australia. As *per* Regulation from Minister of Marine and Fishery No. 01/MEN/2009, Indonesia is divided into eleven fishing grounds or Fishing Management Areas (*Wilayah Perikanan*

Laut Negara Republik Indonesia – WPPNRI), which is number coded (see picture 1) and for every fishing ground there are multiple agencies involved in the governance, including the local governments. The coding of fishing ground adheres to the map coding of International Hydrographic Organization, International Maritime Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations conventions, and boundary agreements with neighboring countries (Triyono et al., 2011). Every fishing ground has its own champion species. Larger and expensive tuna such as yellowfin is abundant in WPPNRI 572 and 573. Panaeid shrimp, lobster and crab are abundant in WPPNRI 571, 572, 712, 713, 714, 715. Squid and pelagic fish are abundant in WPPNRI 714, 715, 716, 717, 718. In WPPNRI 711 by Karimata Strait, Natuna Sea and South China Sea where illegal fishing is most often found, and the area is abundant with small pelagic fish, reef fish, small/blue crab, crab and squid. Between Bitung and General Santos in the Philippines, by WPPNRI 716, smaller pelagic fish are found.

Figure 1. Eleven Fishing Grounds in Indonesia according to Regulation of Minister of Marine and Fishery No. 18/PERMEN-KP/2014



As a country, Indonesia benefits from rich fish stock and a combined size of fishers. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in its 2020 report mentioned that in 2018 the top world producers of marine capture include

China (15% of world total), Indonesia (8%), Peru (8%), The Russian Federation (6%), the United States of America (6%), India (4%) and Vietnam (4%). The world's largest importers on the other hand includes the European Union (34% of market value), the United States (14%) and Japan (9%). Interview with ASTUIN reveals that tuna fishers are flocking in WPPNRI 572 and 573 with a total vessel of approximately 400 from 200 companies but in the past 5-7 years the size of vessels is getting smaller. The tuna fishers represent the larger-scale fishers in Indonesia. In other fishing grounds, the fishers are typically small and traditional fishers. Small fishers gather in groups to help them getting permit, assistance, and monitoring from the national government; they usually have vessels of less than 30 Gross-Tons or slightly larger. Before 2014, large foreign vessels that are tripled or more in size can be easily found in the Indonesian fishing grounds but since 2014 unless the vessel is registered as Indonesian vessel and of specified size then it cannot operate in the Indonesian fishing grounds.

Indonesia has been active in international arena for governing fisheries including to combat Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU Fishing), namely as Member of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) based on Presidential Regulation No. 9/2007, as Member of Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) based on Presidential Regulation No. 109/2007, member of Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) based on Presidential Regulation No. 61/2013, and as cooperating non-member of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) and International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and by 2015 issued a national human rights certification framework for capture fishery. It becomes significant to explore why fishers in Indonesia are less than enthusiastic about the COVID-19 stimulus.

The Covid-19 Pressures and the Stimulus Packages

As soon as COVID-19 is announced as a global pandemic, the capture fishers around the world immediately felt the blow. The United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization in its website (FAO, 2020) described the sector as highly dependent on international trade and therefore have suffered quite early in the development of the pandemic from the restrictions and closures of global

markets. The fisheries sector also experienced logistical difficulties such as increased air freight costs and cancellation of flights, whereas the whole supply chains of fish and seafood products have been severely impacted by the closure of the food service sectors (e.g. hotels, restaurants, catering facilities, school and work canteens). The FAO mentioned quite rightly that as the consequence of pandemic, fishers changed the species to catch in order to cater for domestic market. Unfortunately, such tactic does not help fishers much. Technically domestic markets have limits in demand and price. The ones giving higher and better price is usually abroad.

Immediately after the COVID-19 virus spread, stimulus packages are offered by the government of Indonesia to the fishers. The government allocates, from the central state budget, a 2020 stimulus packages of an approximately 695.2 billion Rupiah (estimated 46.34 million USD) and another 356.5 trillion Rupiah (estimated 23.76 million USD) from the proposed state budget of 2021, which are equal to 0.039% of total state budget. Indonesia is reported as one of Asia's countries providing the smallest COVID-19 fiscal response packages (Rajah & Grenvile, 2020). The funding is dedicated for assisting local government (Regulation of Ministry of Finance No. 105/2020) and tax exemption program (Regulation of Ministry of Finance No. 107/2020).

For market players, a national stimulus policy, as issued and documented by the Ministry of Finance, includes government guarantee for credit of capital for labor intensive corporations as long as the corporation is export-oriented with minimal 300 employees and not categorized as Micro Small Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) or State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs); exemption of income tax PPh. 21 for 1,189 sub-sectors, exemption of PPh 22 import tax for 721 sub-sectors, acceleration of paying return tax for 716 sub-sectors, tax credit deduction of 30% for 1,013 sub-sectors including for companies operating with KITE licensee (*Kemudahan Impor Tujuan Ekspor*) and in EEZs, and tax exemption of 0.5% for MSMEs. These interventions clearly prioritize retaining the capacity to export, to produce, and to retain workers. KITE licensee companies and companies operating in EEZs also receive the incentives of getting the COVID-19 health equipment for workers and reward if they allocate some of their production for helping the government in suppressing COVID-19

pandemic. Indeed, these stimuli are means-tested, applied with specific pre-requisites. Even for MSMEs the help is not automatic; there are specification of industries deserving incentives as written in the Rule of Minister of Finance No. 86/PMK.03/2020. To prevent COVID-19 infection, the Ministry of Transportation issued Regulation No. 25/2020 during Eid Mubarak celebration affecting fishers' schedule to fish. Fishers cut their days on the sea, just 3-4 days (Mardhia et al., 2020).

Based on interviews with government officials, the incentives were focused on retaining the strength of certain businesses in the sector. The logic was to provide incentives to continue exporting while protecting their workers from being laid off and from infection of COVID-19. On paper the coverage may sound large but in practice only a fraction of the fishers is eligible to get the incentives.

The day-to-day challenges, as officials from the Ministry of Marine & Fishery and Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Human Rights revealed, are tough to cope with. During COVID-19, they cited increased aggressivity of fishery vessels from Vietnam to enter Indonesian water and to crash the patrol boats upon being caught red-handed. The practice of IUU Fishing in Indonesian water has increased too during the pandemic, both the ones done by foreign vessels and by Indonesian vessels (e.g. the use of potassium). Between October 2019 and July 2020, the Ministry of Marine and Fishery noted the IUU Fishing activities of 22 Vietnam vessels, 12 Malaysian vessels, 14 Philippines vessels, and 1 Taiwan vessel.

The response of the Indonesian government was to promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation such as to develop National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing with 8 countries (Australia, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Philippines, Timor Leste and Vietnam), to ratify Port State Measures Agreement with Australia and Thailand, to issue Module for Port Inspector training and Modul for Monitoring, Control and Surveillance training, and to develop Strategic Plan of Action to prevent IUU Fishing in the region. On human rights standard, efforts have been low-key if not slow following the changes of personnel inside the Ministry of Marine and Fishery but cross-ministerial dialogs on the issue continued. All suggest that

even under COVID-19 shock, the tendency at the government side is to focus on continue aligning to global governance with “just enough support” for day-to-day challenges of fishers.

Fishers beyond state’s stimulus package reveal that the domestic market could not absorb fish that usually caters the export market. The closing and reduced time to work in factories have resulted in full cold storages. The prices of fish and seafood products in most ports in Indonesia has been down by 10% - 50% while in places with stable or upward price adjustment is just temporary. In general, there are less buyers following COVID-19 pandemic (see table 1). Some fishers and fish workers became construction workers or processing salted and dried fish to make ends meet (Baihaki & Muawanah, 2020). As the regional dialogue revealed, a similar fate was experienced by the Philippines, another archipelagic country of Southeast Asia near Indonesia. Following the cancellation of some domestic and international flights to and from Luzon, tuna exports via air routes through Manila was disrupted. This costs the livelihood and income of as many as 30,000 workers in the local tuna sector (Dao, 2020). Groups of small fishers revealed in the interview with author that containers of cold storage in Java are still full that those buyers refuse to buy more from fishers.

Table 1. The impact of COVID-19 to Fishers and Fish Price Around Indonesia

Area	Price
Teluk Saleh, Sumbawa, West Nusa Tenggara (Mardhia et al., 2020)	Price reduction by 10%
TPI Desa Glondonggede, Kecamatan Tambakboyo, Tuban, East Java (Sudarsono, 2020)	Price reduction by 10%
Pelabuhan Perikanan Nusantara Kecamatan Brondong Kab Lamongan Jatim (Mubarok & Fajar, 2020)	Price reduction by 50%
TPI Karangsong Kabupaten Indramayu Jabar (Rofahan, 2020)	Price reduction by 30%
TPI Pelabuhan Sukabumi	A slight increase of price after Eid-

(Sukabumi Update.com, 2020)	Mubarak; fishers are back to fishing but local buyers are declining.
Kecamatan Wanasalam, Kabupaten Lebak (Fachreinsyah, 2020)	Price reduction by 10%-20%. Usually send fish to Jakarta area (Muara Baru and Muara Angke) but now the market is quiet or closed.
Kecamatan Brondong Lamongan (Memontum.com, 2020)	Price reduction for blue crab and squid by 45%-50%.
Pasar Citra Niaga (Pasar Legi) Jombang (Supriyatno, 2020)	During the fasting month some fish are up in price by 10%, but this is not good for the fishers because consumers were unhappy.
TPI Padalarang, Cilacap Jateng (Cilacap, 2020)	It is actually the time of the year when the East Wind from Australia comes, so fish is coming nearer the shore. Unfortunately, price declines by 40% due to less demand and limited transportation out of town.
TPI Paotere Makassar (Antaraneews, 2020a)	Price declines by 15%-25% because there are time limits for market operation; fishers fear consumers won't buy with normal price and indeed consumers would rather switch to buying tofu and soybean cake instead.
Kab. Tuban, TPI Desa Glondonggede (Sudarsono, 2020)	Price declines by 10%
Desa Tambakrejo, Kab Malang (Erwin, 2020)	Price declines by 50%
Kec. Kalipucang, Kab. Pangandaran (Rachman, 2020)	Price is stagnant but buyers are scarce
Kab Kendal, Jateng, juga Nelayan Serdang Begadai di Sumut (CNN Indonesia, 2020)	Price declines by 50% in the midst of stormy season. Fishers ended up selling even less than that price to the middleman to ensure getting the money needed by the family. Fishers in North Sumatera cannot afford to fish due to stormy season. While crab and blue crabs is usually expensive commodity for export, now they can only be sold in the local auction market.
Kec. Muncar, district of Banyuwangi (Affandi, 2020)	Going to Eid Mubarak, the price of fish is crawling up by 10% simply because no one is fishing.
Tambaklorok, Semarang	In Java it is entering the dry season with

(Ardyansyah, 2020)	high waves, and thus fishers get only small amount of fish. Each small vessel can only go as far as 4 km from the coast. Consequently, fishermen is trapped in debt.
National level (Adi, 2020)	There are 718 units of fish processing business across Indonesia. National stock for sardines and mackarels are now 35,000 million cannes which would be exported, sold online and to fulfil national program of social assistance. The challenge under COVID-19 is the increasing price of can, pasta sauce and thickening flour that are imported and thus limited in stock due to lockdowns of some countries.
Binongko, Labuan Bajo, NTT (Lewar, 2020)	Fishers chose to stop fishing due to the death threat of COVID-19.
Morotai Island, Maluku Utara (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, 2020)	Vietnam stopped buying tuna loin. Consequently, the pricing of fish is reduced by 10%-30%. This is sad given that usually between February and April is tuna season and the size of tuna reaches 20 kg and beyond; by June fish would be scarce. Harta Samudera, a company doing export of tuna loin to Vietnam, still has 6 containers. On 6 April 2020 fishermen from Wasileo village in East Halmahera Island ended up burying the fish they brought to Morotai due to rejection from buyers.
TPI Prigi, Kab. Trenggalek (Rozik, 2020)	Demand has declined and thus price is reduced by 50%.
Pasar Arumbai, Kota Ambon (Antaraneews, 2020b)	Fresh fish of <i>cakalang</i> (skip-jack tuna) and tahitu is getting rare in Ambon.
Maluku (“Wabah Virus Corona Pengaruhi Ekspor Ikan Maluku,” 2020)	Price reduction of 10%. Destination of fish export is to Japan and China.

Note: - TPI = Fish Auction Market.

Source: various sources as mentioned or calculation of author.

COVID-19 reveals the vulnerability of capture fishers. While record has shown that Asia as a region, and Southeast Asia in particular, has exhibited a continuously increasing volume of production and value of the capture fishery sector, such mechanism of increasing production to catch up with demand turns out risky. Increasing demands grow hope that the cost of operation (from

permit, fuel, labor, equipment, capacity building, and in some cases certification) will be paid off when buyers pay the products; but when the activity is paid on daily basis transaction instead of long-term agreement, the risk of loss becomes high.

The top ten global capture producers by 2018, in an order of scale, was China, Indonesia, Peru, India, Russian Federation, United States of America, Vietnam, Japan, Norway and Chile (FAO 2020, 12). The Philippines ranked 11, Thailand ranked 12, Malaysia ranked 14. This happened parallel to the increase in global food fish consumption, which is an increase at an average annual rate of 3.1% from 1961 to 2017 or a rate almost twice that of annual world population growth (1.6%) for the same period (FAO 2020b, 3) and Asia having the largest deployment of motorized vessels in the world, that is 68% of the global total of vessels is in Asia although the size distribution is largely of less than 12 meters (FAO 2020, 42-44). For job creation, the capture fishery provided over 30 million jobs in Asia by 2018, which is nearly double the job created from the aquaculture fishery in Asia (FAO 2020, 37). All of these crumble like a tall house built on sand.

The Layers of Interactions in Capture Fisheries Global Governance


What have escaped our attention on global governance of capture fishery? We often hear about global value chain, about cold chain in logistics, and about tracing sustainability practices, but are we looking at the problem thoroughly? The wicked problem discourse taught us about the need to look closer into the perspectives of stakeholders when seeing problems, because the problem may not be presented objectively. Problems may be understood differently from one person to the next, conditioning on the extent to which the person in question is affected by it (Jentoft & Chuenpagdee 2009, 554). We are called to be cautious to the various scales (of problem) at operative level. Governance is not just top-down or bottom-up but also horizontal. And this is what we discover from fishers in Indonesia. And Indonesia may not be the only one experiencing such challenge.

Global governance in capture fisheries includes layers of interactions, some between equal subjects or peers of the same authorities and

responsibilities, some between the authority and the subject of laws. The interaction between equals is named here as horizontal governance. The interaction between the authority and subject of laws is either top-down or bottom-up governance. See Figure 2 for the illustration of fisheries governance that include these layers of interactions in the Indonesian context.

There are two layers of horizontal governance: among the ministries within the Indonesian government and among the business (small and larger scale fishers). The relations among these subjects are tailored by laws, norms and by practices. Among the ministries, the numerous ministries and agencies affecting the effectiveness of capture fisheries governance in Indonesia showed that horizontal governance matter to how the global governance is perceived and implemented on the ground. By rules and norms, these ministries should report and are coordinated by the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime and Investment Affairs, but in reality, there are multiple lines of reporting. Only the Ministry of Marine and Fisheries and the Ministry of Transportation report to the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime and Investment Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the law enforcement authorities (which include coast guards and navy) reports to the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and Human Rights. The Ministry of Finance receives order from the President and not from the Coordinating Ministers. Thus, programs and incentives that the Ministry of Finance issued to fishers are not necessarily a reflection from the horizontal coordination let alone agreements among the ministries dealing with fisheries or the relevant aspects of fisheries.

Fishers cope with this multiplicity by way of their direct or indirect dealing with buyers. The small-scale fishers rely a lot on collectors of their catch to maintain operation; not just because they are used to it from generation to generation, but they are dependent on debts from the collectors. In time of difficult seasonal circumstances, small-scale fishers often borrow money from the collectors for daily expenses in their families. The larger scale fishers focus on maintaining their network with foreign buyers. These are what keep their businesses afloat. Consequently, the governance from the top (namely the government) is perceived from the viewpoints of practicality for the business.



In-depth interviews with Indonesian government officials of various ministries and agencies confirmed that Indonesia may have big and rich seas but the resources to tap into the resources or to monitor the exploitation of those resources is weak.

First, the vessels are limited in number and less than able in terms of size to patrol safely in areas where waves are high and the foreign vessel intruders are triple or more in size than the patrol vessels. Worse, in certain fishing ground there is disputed border problem with the neighboring countries. For example, Vietnam, where the status quo has been for the Indonesian patrol to monitor Vietnamese vessels operating in the disputed water and to expel vessels of other countries, e.g. China, from the disputed area. A senior official from the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and Human Rights, interviewed on 3 August 2020, remarked:

A disagreement remains between Indonesia and Vietnam on the border of EEZ for exploration. Vietnam refers to a single line for both the EEZ and continental shelf while Indonesia refers to a double line thus the continent land is an area

beyond 150 miles. Therefore, the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and Human Rights issued a circular in 2017 or 2018 to monitor the area more closely and expel any vessels from the disputed area and to deploy the coastguard for enhancing the sense of peace in the area. The same policy is applied between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Unfortunately, as our informant revealed, the vessels of the third country are way bigger and well-equipped that they can afford ignoring the Indonesia's patrol.

All government officials interviewed mentioned the era under Minister Susi Pudjiastuti, the first female Minister of Marine and Fisheries in 2014-2019 who also own fisheries business, as a breakthrough to counter this problem of patrol and safety from intruders. Susi Pudjiastuti enforced a policy of confiscating foreign vessels and selectively sink the vessels and boats that are legally proven to be involved in IUU fishing. The aim was to create a deterrent effect for IUU fishing and other illegal activities across Indonesia's territories while conserving fish stocks. She was assisted by a cross-sectoral national task force to combat IUU fishing called "*Satgas 115*." Such policy, however, was discontinued by the two Ministers who replaced Susi.

Second, the frontline areas of the seas are poorly equipped with refueling sources. Local fishers as well as patrols complained about the difficulty of sustaining operation in areas that are actually rich with fish and yet to be overfished. This was raised by informants who are fishers from Riau islands who operate in fishing ground 711. Informants who are fishers from Maluku Island who operate in fishing ground 715 shared a similar concern where their boats are small while the distance to fish is far in deep water.

Third, the national budget to support capture fishery is relatively small compared to the allocation for other ministries. As per state budget 2020, the Ministry of Marine and Fisheries are not among the top 10 ministries with the largest allocation (Ardyansyah, 2020). In 2021 the dedicated budget for the Ministry is reduced by approximately Rp. 0.54 trillion (DPR RI, 2021). Further, the allocated state budget is split into several national priority programs and thus several agencies (see table 2), leaving the local offices of the Ministry of Marine and Fisheries which technically is burdened with the day-to-day detection of

fisheries legal violation, with meager budget for monitoring and capacity building. As one of the official from the local Ministry of Marine and Fisheries shared in the interview, of the 356 days in a year, the “normal” monitoring budget for a provincial marine and fishery agency is 45 days and the COVID-19 pandemic cut the budget to only approximately 20 days in a year. Based on our interviews, the local officials take the position of waiting to support national programs.

Table 2. National programs relevant to fisheries sector

No	National program	Ministries involved and the appropriated state budget
1.	<i>Program Ketahanan Pangan Nasional 2020 and 2021</i> (the national food resilience program) aimed at enhancing the production of food through building infrastructure and embed the use of technology. Specifically for fisheries sector, the program is for fish production, where the aim is to reach 8 million ton production of fish, and to provide insurance subsidy for 120,000 (small and poor) fishers.	Ministry of General Development and People’s Housing (PUPR): Rp. 26.7 trillion; Ministry of Marine and Fisheries: Rp. 713.63 billion; Ministry of Agriculture: Rp. 4.94 trillion.
2.	<i>Program Transfer ke Daerah dan Dana Desa</i> (Transfer to the provinces/districts and villages) aimed at improving the role of local government in recovering from the pandemic. The program for fisheries sector include rehabilitating ports in several fish landing sites.	Ministry of Village and Local government: Rp. 10.2 trillion for food security and to improve the prosperity of farmers/fishers
	Fuel subsidy to targeted group. The program of fuel subsidy for fishers started in 2014 where every year the Ministry of Marine and Fisheries determine the number of eligible beneficiaries. Every beneficiary would receive a card mentioning the boats, owner of the boats, and quota of diesel fuel per boat.	Rp. 1,000 per liter of fuel (diesel fuel)
4.	<i>Dana Desa</i> (village fund) to support the economic activities of villagers include an allocation for creating boat anchors (a total target of 5,371 units in 2020).	Ministry of Village

Sources: (Kementerian Keuangan RI, 2020, 2021)

Fourth, the state expects income tax from reported catch, but the catch permit is carried by the vessels instead of being turned in to the coastal agencies

and thus the catch becomes unreported. Local fishers also complained about the hike of income tax rate that they chose not to fish in the national fishing grounds to avoid the tax, all while envying the foreign vessels operating in their fishing grounds for not doing proper reporting of their catch. The three fishers interviewed here testified of the poorly monitored fishing methods by the foreign vessels. A local authority from the Ministry of Marine and Fisheries testified about businesses doing misrepresenting the size of the vessel just to get cheaper permit. Such maladministration is confirmed by fishers interviewed for this study, saying that it is quite challenging not to violate the law given that the law is making businesses difficult:

It takes a long time to get permit, and we need to bring the bigger boats/vessels to Jakarta for proof while it is impossible to do so for a lengthy time. We need to eat; we need to use the boat to fish.” (Fisher from Maluku island, interview 7 July 2020)

Fifth, capacity building is scarce and not thorough due to limited resources. To combat border violation, for example, the national authority distributes *only* hard-copy maps to fishers while fishers need radar instead to recognize the boundaries allowed by law. Small fishers also testified not having the capacity to adjust their equipment to catch up with the foreign competitors. They lack capital to do so, but they also believe that their catching method is more sustainable for the environment.

The wicked problem discourse implied that stakeholders should not conclude those phenomena as problem of poor governance or problem of small fishers. Indonesia and neighboring countries have both small fishers and larger fishers. These fishers testify care to the three principles of global governance but there is a gap in how these stakeholders benefit from what they have supported.

Governance of the capture fisheries is a collective effort. As mentioned, the relevant stakeholders discussed are not just Indonesians; they are also foreign nationals who are familiar and tap into the creaks of governance to benefit for themselves. We also noted the distrust of business to the government vice-versa. The businesses (local and foreign) would not mind evading the cost of responsibilities whenever possible and the state would rather impose stringent (often suffocating) rules and tax to businesses to finance its operational costs.

Government officials also point to tragedy of Benjina where hundreds of fishers from neighboring countries were trafficked and slaved by neighboring nationals in Indonesian waters.

Existing global governance do not solve problems for segments of capture fishery sector. *First*, the fact that territorial use-rights is enacted does not help countries lacking fishing grounds. In fact, given that areas at the outskirts of Indonesia are overfished, and this is confirmed by our interviews with fishers from Vietnam and Philippines, it is tempting for neighboring fishers to fish in the weakly monitored territory of Indonesia. Some third countries even deploy their military patrol to escort their fishers. *Second*, on sustainable fishery, in reality the principle is only applied to stakeholders operating inside country's own territory; when fishers operate in other countries' territory there is operationally no means to declare the unsustainability of their fishery practice unless they are caught red handed by the coastal state. *Last*, about commitment on human rights. Our interviews revealed that human rights remain a challenging issue to enforce. Fishers are assumed as competent in articulating their skills and needs, just like in any workplace in land while the working environment are of course different. A fish worker that we interviewed testified working for several nationals, and he compared the challenges to adjust his articulation of needs by how other nationals respond. When the captain is bossy and tough, he either follows the lead, get punished, or resigned. It is in the exploration stage that fish workers may experience less than decent treatment. And as Allison et al. (2012) said, governance of human rights is built on the assumption that fisherfolk themselves as rights holders (whether individual or communal) will have every incentive to participate in this process. And it becomes clear as COVID-19 pandemic swept fishing communities that fishers and their family are highly vulnerable to demands for their products or labor. Without routine and sufficient demand, capture fishers easily collapse.

The discourse on the role of private sector is enlightening here. The government as the representation of new global governance use the logic of supporting the market mechanism but it has difficulty being thorough to respond to coping mechanisms of fishers in market. What has been overlooked globally is the mechanism for states to channel domestic support that'd allow

participants of the governance to have win-win solution. Notice the following layers of “common problems” and “specific problems” that stakeholders try to solve nationally, locally or operationally under the umbrella of global governance (table 2). The common problem may converge in some aspects of problem solution, but the ones colored yellow shows divergence of problem solution. The global governance principles have not responded to such yellow-columns problem, or has no clear solution for the problem, and the problem is left to the affected and relevant parties to solve.

Table 3. Layers of Common Problems and Specific Problems in Capture Fishery Given New Global Governance Principles

Common Problems			Solution for the following levels		
Global	National	Local	Global	National	Local
Territorial-use rights Principle					
Disrespect to territorial boundaries	Monitoring permit	Small vessels, no radar, misuse of flags	Territorial-use rights	Dispute settlement	Provide map, self-help among small fishers
Overfishing in some areas	Monitoring catch	Switch job	Territorial-use rights	Allow for undown in some areas	Fish in non-territorial water
Some wish to fish in other countries' waters	Diplomatic agenda is stagnant	The locals cannot compete with the incoming foreign vessels	Territorial-use rights	Taxing the incoming foreign vessels, but the national vessels choose to under-report size of vessel	Only fish in nearby shore at the expense of not getting bigger & expensive fish
Destruction of fish & fishing environment	Poor resource to measure, prevent, combat	Switch job	Territorial-use rights	Territorial-use rights	Work with foreign vessels at any cost
Unregulated fishing	Adaptability of	Fishing equipment	Territorial-use rights	Territorial-use rights	Work with

equipment or technique	regulations and monitoring	it is not recognized as sustainable globally; switching equipment is costly			foreign vessels at any cost
IUU Fishing	Adaptability of regulations and monitoring	Small operational budget, not enough fuel to catch criminals	Territorial-use rights	Territorial-use rights, deploy coast guard to accompany fishermen vessel do illegal activities in foreign waters	Not reporting catch, not using legal equipment whenever possible
Declining fish stock	Adaptability of regulations and monitoring	Competing with bigger vessels	Territorial-use rights	Bilateral or multilateral negotiation	Sneaking when patrol is absent
Sustainable Fishery Principle					
Consumer demand for traceability	Multiple knot of governability	Cost of doing certification	Certification	Unclear	Unclear
Business and Human Rights Principle					
Slavery	Awareness raising, capacity to enforce	Awareness, Skill of recruiter, poverty	Conventions	Human Rights Standard that is yet fully implemented	Unclear
Human Trafficking	Awareness raising, capacity to enforce	Awareness, skill of recruiter, poverty	Conventions	Human Rights Standard that is yet fully implement	Unclear

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Torture	Awareness raising, capacity to enforce	Awareness, skill of recruiter, poverty	Conventions	Human Rights Standard that is yet fully implemented	Unclear

This is to say that the limit to new global governance is serious. What is quite certain here is that there is the element of market mechanism that has not been reconciled by the three global governance principles. The governance of these three principles has yet to solve the market-generated problems from the competition arising from territorial-use rights, sustainability fishery, and human rights certification. Given the nature of the contention between countries, immediate drafting of agreements and negotiations among governments become pressingly inevitable. Judging by the findings of this study, there is a sense of urgency within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to do so but the limit of horizontal governance in Indonesia has kept the process slow. There have been some indications that the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime and Investment Affairs is geared to synchronize perspectives among ministries working on fisheries sector thus improving the horizontal governance, but the proof remains to be seen.

This study shed lights on the tendency to overlook what the private sectors face on day-to-day operations in the oceans. The global governance discourse and dialogues may increase the items of agreements on common issues, but they are not necessarily about facilitating the private sectors, the larger and smaller ones, to transition into the global governance standards. The issue of territorial disputes, moreover, remain untouched by the global governance dialogues that involve the private sectors. The fishers are expected to follow the global development and bear the consequences for not keeping pace with the global discourse.

In terms of incentives or stimulus from the national government, especially under deep shock such as COVID-19, we learn from Indonesia that the stimulus may only affect the supply side or demand side in insignificant manner if the governance of the fisheries sector remain fragmented. The fishers

care about their livelihood, the change, adaptability and resilience; not the temporary numb shot from the state amid shocks. Therefore, bringing back the private sector role in the global governance discourse of capture fisheries would be imperative as an inseparable part of new global governance for capture fishery sector. If states cannot assure the non-state stakeholders of the benefit for integrating self to global governance, then who will?

Conclusion

This paper identifies the wicked problem in capture fishery of Indonesia as fishers relate with state and fishers of other countries. Clearly there are limits to using global governance principles in solving the national and local problems as faced by state and especially by fishers. The new global governance principles may be important to bring states and certain businesses to the same table but if the fishers in a country as important as Indonesia could not solve their daily problems under the global governance, what can we say about the global governance of the sector? Knowing that the states participating in global governance seek to comply to global standards, the COVID-19 shocks remind us to consider what states could do more to get buy-ins from their own fishers who suffer from the global governance that is supposed to pacify them.

The limit to new global governance is serious. The divergence of problem solution at national and local levels from the principles of global governance shows that policy discourse on new global governance should shift from state compliance to global principles, or state's bringing in their fishers to the global standards, to states' bridging to market survival and winning. If a country sitting on the rich area of fish suffer badly under the new global governance principles, it is only appropriate to revisit the layers of new global governance designs and implementation.

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Defining Terrorism: how Ambiguous Definitions and Vague Classifications Open Doors for Power Acquisition

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(Submission 20-4-2022, Review 2-5-2022, Revision 15-5-2022, Published 28-06-2022)

In this article, I want to reflect on the difficulty of categorising the threat of terrorism within existing security frameworks and our theorising of threat assessment. As more types of terrorism get academic and political attention, various state and non-state actors use terrorist tactics or borrow some elements of terrorism to achieve their agenda. This article discusses the difficulties surrounding terrorist threat classification and how it perplexes our understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism.

What have we learned over more than twenty years of researching terrorism? Terrorism is often conceptualised as both a traditional and non-traditional threat, complicating the execution of counterterrorism strategies. This ambiguity creates the need for a "special treatment" of the terrorist threat in politics proportionate to its importance, and it bears the danger of fostering opportunities for power abuse. This article reflects on different ways of categorising the threat of terrorism, showing that, indeed, terrorism is multifaced, and there is no one-size-fits-all approach to defining and fighting terrorism. However, I also argue that there is a danger of assigning terrorism an extra-legal status and exclusive priority, resulting in power abuse and restrictions of people's rights and freedoms.

Keywords: Terrorism, terrorism definition, securitisation, power acquisition, counterterrorism

The threat of terrorism: definitional problems and ambiguous classifications

The absence of consensus on the definition of terrorism, as well as confusion surrounding classifying terrorism as both a traditional and non-traditional threat, open possibilities for the threat of terrorism being used for alternative political purposes, namely, to gain power and resources. Since creating the Ad Hoc Committee in 1996 by the United Nations, we have seen terrorism changing, acquiring new strategies and techniques while global counterterrorism efforts keep developing, as both practitioners and scholars work on understanding terrorism and perfecting counterterrorism defences. However,

there has been no legally binding definition of terrorism produced by the United Nations, only a draft with an ambiguous explanation of how terrorism could manifest (Schmid, 2018; United Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee, 2018).

In the last ten years, we have seen more media coverage of terrorist attacks, which might have created an impression that the threat of terrorism is on the rise (Ritchie et al., 2020b). However, on the contrary, the number of terrorist attacks has fallen by 43% between 2014 and 2018 (Miller, 2019). The occurrence of most terrorist attacks was regional: According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 95% of deaths from terrorist attacks in 2017 occurred in Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia (Ritchie et al., 2020c). What does it mean for the future of terrorism studies? Undeniably, it is too soon to attribute the decrease in terrorist attacks solely to a better global understanding of terrorism and, consequently, better counterterrorism strategies. The increase of far-right terrorist incidents and white supremacy in the United States of America suggests that a decrease in major international terrorists' attacks (especially against the West) such as 9/11 does not mean a reduction in other types of terrorism (Ritchie et al., 2020a). Terrorism keeps changing and developing in the global South. We could also see an increased number of terrorist attacks in Africa, particularly during the COVID-19 outbreak at the beginning of 2020 (Welle Deutsche, 2020).

Terrorism is an elusive concept, which has provoked much debate starting from how to define terrorism and to what is a terrorist act, who terrorists are, and could different entities (state and non-state) be seen as terrorists. Despite extensive research on terrorism, we are still far from finding common ground on the terrorism definition. Scholars disagree on almost everything regarding terrorism, and as Michael Kronenwetter (2004, p. 4) aptly notes, "one thing we know for sure: terrorism is wrong". Some scholars believe that creating a universal definition of terrorism is inevitable (Ganor, 2002; Hoffman, 1984); others argue that this would be close to impossible to do so (Bruce, 2013; Homolar & A. Rodríguez-Merino, 2019; Martini & Njoku, 2017; Richards, 2012). Some research is focused on the state vs non-state actor's

dilemma, arguing that any government-produced definition of terrorism is self-serving; thus, it would be inevitably worded in a way to serve and protect the government (Kronenwetter, 2004; Meisels, 2009). Scholars and practitioners alike continue to research and theorise terrorism, and one of the ways of looking at terrorism is the approach to categorising threats as traditional and non-traditional.

It needs to be said that any categorisation of threats is problematic. Every threat is different, it could appear in various circumstances, and its perceived or real hazard would be ranked differently by diverse actors. Not to mention that threats can occur so quickly, especially in an existing conflict, that security providers would be completely unprepared to deal with them. An example of this is 9/11 which was an unimaginable attack at the time, thus impossible to prepare for in advance (Managhan, 2020). Besides, security threats are often interconnected: for example, terrorism can be linked to illegal revenues from weapons sales and drugs trafficking, as well as organised crime (Jordan, 2019). Thus, any attempt to categorise terrorism and terrorist acts would not produce a universally applicable framework, as proven by the last twenty years of research in terrorism.

The division into traditional and non-traditional threats echoes the realist take on security, focusing on how tangible security threats are: Traditional threats endanger the state in a conventional, somewhat military capacity (Jones & Hameiri, 2021; Swanström, 2010). When traditional security is discussed, it implies that the state is under a threat that can be processed within existing state security frameworks (Zimmerman, 2016). Therefore, the state would manage the danger because it holds the mandate for state security. However, terrorism may not necessarily represent an immediate tangible threat, which creates the basis for seeing terrorism as a non-traditional threat. An urgent, tangible threat when dealing with terrorism might not be present straight away, which adds to the difficulties of categorising terrorism and preparing counterterrorism actions. Terrorism has been labelled in many ways: non-traditional threat, non-traditional security, asymmetrical warfare, hybrid warfare - all pointing to its uniqueness as both political strategy and tactics. The current research on

terrorism has been enriched by some scholars exploring terrorism from the constructivist perspective, for example investigating terrorism as communication (Workneh & Haridakis, 2021).

Yet, terrorism, or some of its parts, is not new. Many tactics and strategies that we would call terrorism have been used by partisan formations, insurgencies, freedom fighters, and other groups that opposed authority in the past (Boyle, 2019; Wilson, 2020). An idea of a group fighting a more resourceful opponent is hardly new: modern terrorist strategies have been in use for decades (Jordan, 2019). However, we keep conventionally categorising threats, including the threat of terrorism, into traditional and non-traditional, but perhaps it is time to reconsider this approach.

Terrorism can be (and often is) contemplated as a non-traditional threat because of its transnational nature and the involvement of non-state actors (Zimmerman, 2016). However, terrorism-related violence, economic and political disarray, and casualties that terrorism brings can be comparable to war in its devastating consequences. For example, terrorism is often referred to as asymmetrical or hybrid warfare, which implies that the threat requires more than just a traditional “fight” response from the government to counteract it. One can argue that the conflict in Chechnya is an example of such dual threat categorisation. The war between the Russian government and the Chechens, fighting for independence, has been seen as both traditional (a conventional threat to the state's unity) and non-traditional (terrorist) threat, with minimal to no change of the conflict itself (Kramer, 2005; Marten, 2012; Pokalova, 2015). The Russian state's approach to the war has been changing over the years, but the source of the Chechen peoples' discontent remained largely the same. Unfortunately, the deeper causes of the Chechen conflict have not been addressed by the Russian government, and even if we have seen some de-escalation of violence in Chechnya and North Caucasus, it is impossible to solve the conflict without addressing the root causes that pushed the Chechens to use terrorist tactics (Hedenskog, 2020).

Thus, it can be seen that the same threat can be labelled as both traditional and non-traditional, complicating threat assessment and obscuring

means to solve the conflict. Such ambiguity in the terrorist threat classification also adds confusion to who should respond to the threat, blurring the lines of authority and accountability of counterterrorism actors.

Terrorism definitions: the criminalising approach vs the wartime approach

Another difficulty that obfuscates the study of terrorism and influences the categorisation of the terrorist threat is the theorising of terrorism definitions. Most terrorism definitions can be vaguely divided into either the criminalising approach and the wartime approach (Martin & Weinberg, 2014). Under the criminalising approach, a terrorist act is recognised as a crime and prosecuted according to a criminal code (Kovač, 2007). Ideally, this approach should ensure that terrorism is dealt with according to the rule of law, both domestic and international (Kovač, 2007; Saul, 2005). This approach is practiced by many Western countries. Unfortunately, even in societies where such an approach is practised, terrorism-related cases are often treated extralegally. Governments exercise renditions, use black sites for torture, and treat terrorism as a special case crime. The "ends justify the means" approach is somehow more tolerated when dealing with groups that have been labelled as terrorist formations. As Boyle (2019, p. 2) aptly notes, "the definition of who was a "terrorist" was notoriously changeable as the political wind blow". The American pursuit of alleged Al-Qaeda operatives after 9/11 by drone strikes disregarding civilian casualties (casually referred to as collateral damage) can be seen as an example of this attitude (Grossman, 2018). Ultimately, the extralegal processing of terrorism offenses erodes the trust in the legal system being capable of dealing with terrorism offenses according to the rule of law.

The wartime approach to terrorism implies that a terrorist act should be seen as equivalent to a war crime (Banks, 2005). Thus, terrorists and terrorist groups should be considered military formations and treated accordingly (Tauber & Banks, 2017). This approach gives the terrorism issue a special treatment that might appeal to the urgency that many would share. Still, it also allows governments to withdraw information regarding terrorist cases and suspects. Because war crimes belong to the military jurisdiction, the trials of

terrorist cases would give the government a legal loophole to make such cases disappear. For example, as Tauber and Banks (2017, p. 806) argue, in the case of the US:

Although federal courts might assert their authority to defend civil liberties against possible executive abuses of power during wartime, they might opt not to second guess the executive or public opinion because the government has the institutional expertise to manage national security crises and protect public safety.

Therefore, using the wartime approach alone could lead to less transparency and accountability in dealing with terrorism and more opportunities for the abuse of power.

As one might argue, it is almost impossible to find a pure wartime or criminal approach to terrorism being practices in real life. The most practical definitions of terrorism used today are a synthesis between the two approaches, for example, one used by the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Schmid, 2004, 2005, 2013). Scharf (2004, p. 360) sensibly defines terrorism as "the peacetime equivalent of war crimes", bringing the two approaches together. Under both methods, terrorist acts and the threat of terrorism are dealt with by a particular branch of legislation: a criminal code or the wartime rules. Thus, counterterrorism would be in the jurisdiction of existing law enforcement agencies: the police in the criminalisation approach and the military in the wartime approach. Therefore, the threat of terrorism would be part of the existing traditional security framework provided by the state. So, if we look at the threat of terrorism from the point of view of counterterrorism responsibility, then the state would be the ultimate decision-maker in most cases (Boyle, 2019). This relation reinforces the tight connection between the threat of terrorism and state security, firmly embedding the threat of terrorism in domestic and foreign policies.

However, the concept of terrorism is ever changing. The fluidity of the concept of terrorism can be seen in the myriad definitions of terrorism and how it can change depending on the political situation. This grey area of politics and terrorism studies is aptly described by Alex P. Schmid (2011, p. 2): "As trends in the use of terrorism change, one type of interpretation can become more

appropriate than another. Terrorism changes as the instruments of violence and communication change and as contexts evolve". The threat of terrorism has become omnipresent and has been somewhat normalised: references to it can be found in popular culture (Mahon, 2021). The way J.K. Rowling describes Dark Arts in the Half-Blood Prince, the sixths of Harry Potter books, stunningly resembles Schmid's theorising of terrorism elusiveness:

The Dark Arts," [...] "are many, varied, ever-changing, and eternal. Fighting them is like fighting a many-headed monster, which, each time a neck is severed, sprouts a head even fiercer and cleverer than before. You are fighting that which is unfixed, mutating, indestructible." [...] "Your defenses," said Snape, a little louder, "must therefore be as flexible and inventive as the arts you seek to undo (2005, p. 169).

Terrorism scholars and practitioners have not agreed on what terrorism is or how to define it comprehensively (Bruce, 2013; Homolar & A. Rodríguez-Merino, 2019; Martini & Njoku, 2017). Some, as Meisels (2009) argue that the absence of wiliness of the academic community to commit to a definition of terrorism shows the bias and political inclinations of the community. Still, the world has come to understand that terrorism, regardless of the approach we use to define it, can be seen as an ever-changing instrument of violence, flexible and adaptable, and counterterrorism responses should be as well.

Power acquisition and abuse as the result of multi-(and cross-)classification of the terrorism threat

One might argue that the elusiveness of the terrorism concept and its potential to be classified under more than one threat category is the nature of terrorism and should be accepted as such. However, the terrorist threat, when treated as a non-traditional threat and thus falling outside the traditional security institutions, might have more dangerous consequences than just some scholarly disagreement. Such an approach would allow unprecedented power acquisition by political actors. There are various avenues that political actors can exploit the threat of terrorism to gain more power: For example, the securitisation of terrorism or labelling their political opponents as terrorists to silence them (Buzan et al., 1998). When politicians use the threat of terrorism for

securitisation purposes, they look at gaining more power and resources in the case of successful securitisation (Bourbeau, 2014; Buzan et al., 1998). The threat of terrorism is treated as something endangering an entity's survival; thus, the threat and following counterterrorist activities are granted special status, the emergency political measures (Buzan et al., 1998; Workneh & Haridakis, 2021). Hence, assigning the highest priority to the threat of terrorism can potentially help counterterrorism providers and open possibilities of the terrorist threat to be used for political gains.

In addition, the threat of terrorism is connected to other politicised matters such as immigration, refugees, border control and overall people movement, to name a few, that might not be associated with terrorism on their own but could be used to highlight the importance and urgency of the terrorist threat. Any threat has the potential for being securitised, including, for example, the 2020 COVID-19 outbreak, which showed that counterterrorism resources can be easily used for non-terrorism related purposes without incurring more transparency from the state actors (Mahon, 2021). Still, the threat of terrorism is one of the few that can influence the securitisation of other matters, increasing the chances of successful securitisation (Bacon et al., 2013; Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008).

For example, the question of immigration can be securitised by associating immigrants with a (potential) terrorist threat, which would consequently shape the public opinion in the desired direction (d'Appollonia & Reich, 2008; Gattinara & Morales, 2017; Moffette & Vadasaria, 2016). The securitisation of immigration based on the threat of terrorism was demonstrated by the Trump administration introducing the Muslim ban in 2017, which was officially titled Executive Order 13769 Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States. Another example can be seen in the way the Russian forces have conducted a trial of foreign fighters that had been captured during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Regardless the existing evidence against it, the British fighters have been accused and convicted on the charges of terrorism, which was clearly used as a label in this case that allows to expedite the trial proceedings and allows for severe sentencing (Roth & Sinmaz,

2022). Thus, one should be wary of assigning the terrorist threat the extralegal status and exclusivity beyond existing security frameworks as it might create opportunities for power abuse (Buonfino, 2004). Therefore, it can be seen how the threat of terrorism can be used by a state in practice to send a message and achieve other political goals than genuine counterterrorism.

Such mistreatment of the threat of terrorism for power acquisition would boomerang at genuine counterterrorism efforts. The level of trust of the public in counterterrorism is affected, as one does not need to be an expert to see political opposition and civil activist being unfairly accused of alleged terrorist activity (Ortner, 2021). For example, new counterterrorism measures in Russia introduced the law that prescribed all civil society organisations to disclose foreign funding and register as "foreign agents". The Kremlin reassured the public that the law aims to increase transparency in financial and civic sectors (Baev, 2006; Ortner, 2021). Still, instead, the law has led to shrinking civil society, the destruction of civil society interconnectedness, and the alienation of actual and potential political opposition (Barkovskaya, 2017; Ortner, 2021; Weiss, 2013). Thus, overutilisation and possible abuse of counterterrorism resources for power-grabbing is a risky political move with many unintended (and undesired) consequences.

Conclusion

This article has reflected on a few aspects of terrorism conceptualisation, namely the definition of terrorism and how the threat of terrorism has been classified as traditional and non-traditional. It has been noted that, despite more than twenty years of research and an extensive body of literature produced on the topics of terrorism definitions, scholars and practitioners have not arrived at a definite conclusion on what is terrorism. This is not to condemn the field as unproductive or lacking cutting edge research but to emphasise the elusive nature of terrorism as ever-changing indiscriminate violence. This article aims to show that we need to keep discussing what terrorism is and what terrorism is not to keep developing our theorising of terrorism and decrease the potential of terrorist threat abuse through political manipulation.

In this article, I discussed the challenging task of defining and classifying terrorism. As can be seen, finding a universal definition of terrorism proves to be an impossible enterprise as terrorism is multifaceted and ever-changing. However, it should not discourage thinkers from analysing and reworking our concepts when discussing terrorism. This article emphasised the danger of classifying terrorism as both a traditional and non-tradition threat. In doing so, I argued that the possibility of misuse of the terrorist threat is far more significant when it is seen as a non-traditional threat. Nonetheless, this is not to say that confining terrorism to the sphere of traditional threats is safe – it is not. We need to keep working on a definition of terrorism and its place within security studies for the scholarship to reflect the contemporary situation.

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Duterte and Alliance Behavior of the Philippines

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(Submission 25-5-2022, Review 31-5-2022, Revision 8-6-2022, Published 28-06-2022)

Many have defined the Philippines' dominant alliance behavior to be hedging; that is, an alignment choice adapted to address the security challenges often faced by small and middle powers in relation to major powers. Hedging should be understood as a strategy to manage the security risks that small and middle powers face, whereas balancing and bandwagoning are security strategies created in response to security threats. This paper argues that before President Duterte's election in 2016, it could be argued that the Philippines was engaging in hedging or low intensity balancing between the U.S. and China. However, Philippine foreign policy underwent a swift about-face as a result of Duterte's objectives, and as a result the country began bandwagoning with China

Introduction

Few states have changed their alliance policies as intensely and quickly as the Philippines. A former U.S. colony turned treaty ally since 1951, the Philippines has enjoyed a vital security partnership with the U.S. amid ever-changing strategic contexts in Southeast Asia, particularly in terms of China's rise. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty established collective self-defense obligations as well as emphasized a commitment to peacefully resolve disputes, separately or jointly developing capacity to resist attack, and the need for consultation when the security of the U.S. or the Philippines is under threat in the Pacific (Albert, 2016). Tensions have often arisen due to the United States' more conservative interpretations of security agreements, particularly the failure of the U.S. to state whether or not disputed territories fall under the provisions of the defense treaty (Albert, 2016). Despite friction, many Filipinos remain supportive of the security alliance and the benefits it incurs; for example, defense against insurgent groups, humanitarian and natural disaster response, and a legitimate counterweight against China (Albert, 2016).

President Rodrigo Duterte began shifting the Philippines' stance on the U.S. and China almost immediately when he came into office. During a four-day visit to Beijing in October 2016, Duterte announced a military and economic separation from the United States, adding that the Philippines would be dependent on China for all time (Hiebert, 2020, p. 468). For several years, political ties warmed and exchange between Beijing and Manila increased dramatically as a result of Duterte's pro-China tilt (Hiebert, 2020, p. 468). However, China's consistent rejection of Duterte's calls to rethink its behavior in the South China Sea and remaining strong anti-China sentiment among Philippine voters make it difficult to determine whether or not Duterte's pivot represents a long-term policy trend (Hiebert, 2020, p. 469). In fact, in recent months Manila has moved to fully reinstate security ties and trust with Washington (Grossman, 2021).

The back-and-forth nature of Philippine alliance activity begs several questions. Is the Philippines engaging in strategic hedging, balancing, bandwagoning, or all three at different times and in different contexts? What are the conditions under which the Philippines chooses to hedge, balance, or bandwagon? Were the Philippines' most recent policy changes the result of the whims of Duterte as an individual actor, or is this a longstanding pattern of alliance behavior? These are the questions I will be grappling with in this paper.

Alliance Strategies

Before proceeding, it is necessary to discuss the various strategies of balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging from a small-sized state perspective, as well as the strategic context of Southeast Asia with regard to a rising China before discussing the Philippines specifically. The question of whether states tend to balance or bandwagon against rising or threatening powers is a fundamental issue in foreign policy, and one that provides important insight into the alliance activities of the Philippines (Walt, 1988, p. 275). Balancing can be defined as alignment against a threatening power to deter it from attacking or to defeat it if it does, while bandwagoning refers to alignment with the dominant power, either to appease it or to profit from its eventual victory over other powers

(Walt, 1988, p. 278). States generally balance in two ways; internally and externally. Internal balancing is the process of an individual state mobilizing its national resources to match those of an adversary. External balancing is the establishment of alliances directed against the rising state (Johnston, Ross, & Schweller, 2010, p. 7). Balancing can involve different levels of intensity. In instances of low intensity balancing, the balancing state attempts to maintain a constructive relationship with the rising power, whereas in high intensity balancing, the relationship between the balancer and the rising power is more adversarial (Roy, 2005, p. 306).

Some scholars consider bandwagoning to be the riskier choice as it requires trusting the dominant power to be benevolent (Roy, 2005, p. 279). In the same vein, balancing is considered to be more pragmatic due to the anarchic nature of the international system; balancing ensures that a hegemon capable of threatening the sovereignty of all does not emerge (Walt, 1988, p. 279). However, Schweller argues that states often bandwagon for profit because rising powers offer incentives to smaller states in exchange for alignment with them (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 169). Balancing has its own costs that some states, particularly small states, may not want to engage in. Bandwagoning is inherently less costly and may even entail some sort of gain (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 169). In short, Schweller suggests that a state's decision to balance or bandwagon depends on if they view a rising power in terms of the challenges they pose or the opportunities they create (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 169). Extremely weak states may be more inclined to bandwagon when allies are unavailable and if they perceive themselves as having very little deterrent capabilities or defensive strength (Walt, 1988, p. 279). Historically, the strongest and most revolutionary of the rising powers have been the ones that attracted the greatest number of bandwagoners (Johnston, Ross, & Schweller, 2010, p. 10).

The policy choices available to small and medium-sized states facing a rising power go beyond just balancing and bandwagoning (Roy, 2005, p. 306). Schweller explores four additional strategies; preventative war, binding, engagement, and distancing or buckpassing (Johnston, Ross, & Schweller, 2010, p. 7). Preventative wars are waged when war is viewed as inevitable, threats are long-term, and the dominant perception among statesmen is that it is better to fight now than later (Johnston, Ross, & Schweller, 2010, p. 8). The historical record shows that risk-acceptant leaders of rising dissatisfied powers have been the makers of preventative war most often, rather than declining great powers (Johnston, Ross, & Schweller, 2010, p. 8). Binding occurs when states forgo the opportunity to balance against a threatening state, and instead ally with it for the purpose of managing the threat by way of a pact of restraint and in hopes that it will be able to exert some measure of control over the threatening state's policy (Johnston, Ross, & Schweller, 2010, p. 13). Engagement is the policy of utilizing non-coercive means to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of the rising power's behavior to ensure that its increasing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in the regional and global order (Johnston, Ross, & Schweller, 2010, p. 14). The most common engagement strategy is appeasement (Johnston, Ross, & Schweller, 2010, p. 15). Buckpassing refers to a state's attempt to freeride on the balancing efforts of others, while distancing occurs when less directly threatened states distance themselves from more directly threatened states by refusing to coordinate their diplomatic and military strategies with the latter (Johnston, Ross, & Schweller, 2010, p. 16). When presented with a threat, small and medium-sized states often choose a mix of these strategies according to their perception of the situation.

One such mixed approach that small and medium-sized states may pursue is hedging. Hedging is a relatively recent term in the literature, and one that is admittedly difficult to define. There are a few broad conceptualizations of the term. Most compelling for the purposes of this paper are the concepts that hedging is an alignment choice adopted to address security challenges, such as those experienced by small and middle powers in relation to major powers; and that hedging is a specific type of alignment strategy designed to optimize the

risks and rewards of security cooperation with a major power (Haacke, 2019, p. 390). Haacke argues that hedging should be understood as a strategy to manage security risks, whereas balancing and bandwagoning are security strategies created in response to security threats (Haacke, 2019, p. 393). The difference between threats and risks is therefore crucial to distinguish. Security risks are probabilistic and assessed in terms of their likelihood and potential magnitude, whereas threats can be defined as a function of capability and intent (Haacke, 2019, p. 394). As such, risk management behavior is anticipatory and proactive and managing threats tends to be more reactive (Haacke, 2019, p. 394). Indicators of hedging include military strengthening in the absence of a declared adversary, increased participation in bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the absence of firm balancing or bandwagoning, and the simultaneous improvement in relations with the two greatest regional powers (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 169).

Preferences of Secondary States

Secondary states tend to prefer an external environment in which a rough balance between great powers exists. When this is the case, small states can reap the benefits of good relations with all major states (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 167). Conversely, secondary states fear power transitions like the one facing Southeast Asia today (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 167). Power transitions upset the equilibrium in the international system and often trigger conflict, particularly if the rising power is viewed as revisionist (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 168). Non-alignment or neutrality is the most desirable stance for secondary states, as it enables them to avoid dependence on others and permits the greatest freedom of maneuver between competitive great powers (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic*

Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages, 2017, p. 168).

The prospect of choosing sides is not an attractive one to the small and medium-sized states of Southeast Asia. Due to non-alignment preferences, hedging is often an attractive policy option for secondary states. Hedging represents the lack of alignment assurances with great powers in the international system; once countries send clear alignment signals to great powers, they lose their flexibility in conducting foreign policy (Wu, 2019, p. 560). This is particularly concerning for Southeast Asian states as the principal foreign policy objective in the region tends to be preserving autonomy and sovereignty (Roy, 2005, p. 306). Many Southeast Asian states, including the Philippines, have made the desire to retain their independence explicit in constitutions, strategic doctrines, and bedrock principles (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 173). This desire is further enshrined in the ASEAN Charter, of which the Philippines is a member. The Charter states in Article 2 Point 2(f), “ASEAN and its member states shall... respect the right of every member state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, and coercion” (ASEAN, 2007).

It becomes difficult to maintain non-alignment in the strategic environment of a power transition, which is another reason why secondary states prefer a rough balance between great powers. As such, engagement becomes a key aspect of any hedging strategy. Engagement is defined as the use of non-coercive means to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power’s behavior (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 170). Engagement is considered successful if the rising power becomes a stakeholder in the international system (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 170). Southeast Asian states use ASEAN as a tool to engage both China and the United States.

The Southeast Asian Context

Southeast Asia has had to adapt to its emergence as a region of increased interest and strategic importance on the part of extra-regional powers. There are several extra-regional powers with significant interests in Southeast Asia, including Australia, China, the United States, Japan, and India (Weatherbee, 2015, p. 39). The foreign policies of each of these powers greatly influence the economic and political parameters for Southeast Asia's autonomy (Weatherbee, 2015, p. 39). However, the central strategic issue that Southeast Asia is currently faced with is coping with the China's rise and U.S. reactions to this phenomenon (Weatherbee, 2015, p. 56). The worst-case scenario is that China is engaging the United States in a zero-sum competition for power and influence in the region to ultimately exclude the United States from the regional economic and security context (Weatherbee, 2015, p. 56). Increasingly, Southeast Asian states are being placed in a position where they are expected to choose between alignment with either the United States or China.

Southeast Asia is crucially linked to China, but many Southeast Asian leaders remain concerned about China's political, military, and territorial ambitions in the region, particularly in the South China Sea (Weatherbee, 2015, p. 53). These leaders must take several, often conflicting, strategic contexts into account when attempting to adopt policies toward China.

First, China's assertiveness in the South China Sea produces disequilibrium in the regional and international system and directly threatens the national interests several states, including the Philippines (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 172). The publication of China's nine-dash line map, which claimed most of the South China Sea, encroached on the exclusive economic zones of four different states, and impacted freedom of navigation agreements, elicited the response of not only regional powers but also the United States (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 172). This map was characterized by the U.S. as a revisionist action, prompting a rebalance policy and public opposition that increased the existing level of great power rivalry in

the region (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 172). This runs counter to Southeast Asia's preferences for equilibrium and balance.

At the same time, China has been offering numerous economic incentives to Southeast Asian states. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative, and foreign direct investments from Chinese state-owned enterprises offer significant economic aid and financing (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 172). In the Philippines' case, China pledged \$24 billion in investment and loan pledges, including for infrastructure projects during a visit from Duterte in October 2016 (Hiebert, 2020, p. 466). These kinds of economic pledges are seen as beneficial to the development goals of Southeast Asian states and are therefore attractive to their leaders, although there is a significant risk of becoming overly dependent on China (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 172).

The United States produces its own incentives for Southeast Asian states. On one hand, the Obama Administration's "pivot to Asia" in 2011 demonstrated the intentions of the U.S. to defend the status quo in the region (Weatherbee, 2015, p. 7). The pivot further enshrined Southeast Asia's status as the new centerpiece of great power competition, a designation that is unwelcome. However, the pivot strategy had security, economic, and institutional components that many welcomed wholeheartedly. As part of the security component of the pivot, the U.S. promised to shift 60 percent of its naval assets to Asia and promised to strengthen its alliances and partnerships in Southeast Asia (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 172). The major economic component was the TPP, and the institutional component included Obama's commitment to ASEAN-led multilateral institutions such as the East Asia Summit (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 172).

On the other hand, well-founded doubts exist in Southeast Asia regarding Washington's commitment to the region. This is exemplified in the shift from Obama's pivot to Trump's Southeast Asian policy. Despite many positive inducements for Southeast Asian cooperation with the United States, the Trump administration injected uncertainty into the relationship with its withdrawal from the TPP (Murphy, *Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages*, 2017, p. 173). This withdrawal was a huge blow to economic reformers hoping to diversify their trading partners, such as those in Malaysia and Vietnam (Murphy, et al., 2021, p. 68). Trump's trade war with China was unwelcome both because it disrupted supply chains and because it added to perceptions that the great powers expected regional countries to choose alliances with either the U.S. or China (Stromseth, 2019). Now, Southeast Asia is experiencing the Biden Administration's policy, which maintains the competitive stance against China that Trump exhibited while exerting that the Indo-Pacific is the most consequential region for America's future (Murphy, et al., 2021, p. 68).

Strategic Context of the Philippines

President Rodrigo Duterte performed a volte-face for Philippine foreign policy (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy*, 2017, p. 220). In May 2016, he declared a new foreign policy course in which the Philippines would no longer be dependent on the United States, choosing instead to re-align with China. In October 2016, Duterte chose Beijing as his first major state visit instead of Washington or Tokyo, which have traditionally been Filipino leaders' first overseas trips (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy*, 2017, p. 221). During his visit to Beijing, Duterte vowed strategic separation from the United States, despite The United States' stance as the Philippines' sole treaty ally (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy*, 2017, p. 221). He also declared that he would set aside the UNCLOS arbitration ruling which determined that China's claims in the South China Sea had no legal basis

(Hiebert, 2020, p. 466). In this section, I will explore the calculations behind this reorientation, as well as attempt to define the Philippines' recent alignment activity.

President Duterte is constitutionally granted the responsibility of acting as the Philippines' chief diplomatic architect, meaning that the country's foreign policy is more aligned around his personal preferences (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy*, 2017, p. 221). This is a common phenomenon in developing nations; according to Wetherbee, foreign policy decision making is less institutionalized, more personalistic, and largely reactive to the behavior of great powers in secondary states (Weatherbee, 2015). Another element to the Philippines' foreign policy shifts is the nexus between domestic politics and state behavior in the international system (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy*, 2017, p. 221). Putnam suggests that foreign policy takes place at both the national and international level, creating a two level game in which the national leader sits at both boards (Putnam, 1988, p. 434). In this view, Philippine foreign policy can be conceptualized as a function of changes in both the domestic political calculations of the ruling elite and changes in the regional security environment (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy*, 2017, p. 221).

The Philippines has a winner-takes-all electoral system, weak political parties, and a democracy in which a massive amount of power is concentrated in the executive (Timberman, 2019). However, there is also a group of political and economic elites in Manila that exercise a powerful influence over elections, legislation, policymaking, and distribution of government resources, among other things (Timberman, 2019). These elites have made it difficult for several successive governments to adopt and implement socioeconomic policies that address the needs of the poor and middle class (Timberman, 2019). Duterte embraced anti-establishment populism as a cornerstone of his campaign, winning a landslide victory over four other well-funded candidates (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine*

Foreign Policy, 2017, p. 230). The overarching theme of his campaign was that his strong leadership would produce rapid change (Timberman, 2019). He found support based on the unevenness of economic growth in the country, his wholesale rejection of the political elite, and his vow to undertake a nationwide assault on illegal drugs and criminality (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy*, 2017, p. 230). He also capitalized on growing questions regarding the United States' commitment to the Philippines' national defense and to its role as the underwriter of freedom of navigation in the region (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy*, 2017, p. 231).

In these domestic contexts, Duterte was able to build a broad political base. The regional security environment was also at a crossroads when Duterte took office. Despite Obama's pivot strategy, there was a decline in military aid to the Philippines from the United States between 2010 and 2015 (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy*, 2017, p. 231). Furthermore, the United States' constant equivocation on whether or not the Mutual Defense Treaty covers territorial disputes has been a source of contention, particularly as China continued to make advances in the South China Sea (Murphy, 2017, p. 175). Another source of uncertainty has its origins in the fact that Washington did not enforce the 2012 agreement for mutual withdrawal by China and the Philippines in the Scarborough Shoal, ultimately enabling China to establish control of the feature within the Philippine EEZ (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy*, 2017, p. 231). The U.S. also showed little to no support during the Philippines UNCLOS arbitration case against China (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy*, 2017, p. 231). The Philippines depended on the United States to play its role as the regional hegemon, upholding rule of law and preventing the encroachment of China on the sovereign territory of Southeast Asian states (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy*,

2017, p. 231). In the eyes of about fifty percent of surveyed Filipinos in 2016, the United States was not doing so (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy*, 2017, p. 231). The final straw for Duterte was Obama's criticism of his controversial war on drugs, which took on a scorched-earth approach and claimed the lives of thousands of people during Duterte's first year in office (Heydarian, *Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy*, 2017, p. 231).

Amid strained U.S.-Philippine relations, China began offering Duterte carrots and sticks. After shunning Duterte's predecessor, Beijing invited Duterte to visit China in October 2016 (Hiebert, 2020, p. 466). That visit culminated in \$24 billion in investment and loan pledges from China to the Philippines (Hiebert, 2020, p. 466). Trade with China increased substantially upon Duterte's rise to power, as has the number of Chinese tourists in the Philippines (Hiebert, 2020, p. 466). Duterte's ruling party has signed an agreement with the Chinese Communist Party to step up exchanges and training for Philippine officials in Fujian, and the two countries have agreed to hold a bilateral strategic dialogue every six months (Hiebert, 2020, p. 475). The Chinese government looks the other way as the Philippine online gambling industry generates massive amounts of revenue by targeting Chinese customers, despite the ban on gambling in China (Hiebert, 2020, p. 490). Chinese investment in Philippine real estate rose to over \$190 million in 2018 as compared to only \$13 million in 2017 (Hiebert, 2020, p. 491). China has also consistently supported Duterte's war on drugs, offering to help with logistics, equipment, investigations, and rehabilitation (Heydarian, *Duterte's Art of the Deal*, 2017). China has made it clear that they are willing to provide maritime and economic concessions in exchange for Manila's capitulation on the UNCLOS arbitration issue and decreased ties with America (Heydarian, *Duterte's Art of the Deal*, 2017). Chinese officials forced Manila to consider whether or not the Philippines could forgo important investment opportunities and risk continued military confrontation in the South China Sea (Hiebert, 2020, p. 474).

In this regional security environment, Duterte calculated that a recalibration was needed; the Philippines could not risk a direct confrontation with China without explicit strategic assurance from the United States, which had not been provided (Heydarian, 2017, p. 231). Duterte's calculus left him with the perception that support from traditional allies such as the United States and from regional bodies like ASEAN was lacking, and that appeasing China was a better strategy in these conditions than risking a conflict with them in the future without adequate support.

Defining Philippine Alliance Activity

Does Duterte's about-face regarding China and U.S. policy represent balancing, bandwagoning, hedging, or something else? Prior to Duterte's election in 2016, the Philippines enjoyed an extensive and longstanding security partnership with the United States. This did not prevent the Philippines from maintaining an economically cooperative relationship with China, but it was clear that the Philippines was aligned more significantly with the U.S (Roy, 2005, p. 314). Roy defines this low intensity balancing with the United States against China, as the alliance activity was triggered in part by Manila's perception of an external security threat in growing Chinese power (Roy, 2005, p. 314). Duterte swiftly abandoned this balancing policy. In order to be labeled hedging, the Philippines would have to maintain some ambiguity about alignment assurances in order to maintain flexibility when conducting foreign policy, particularly with great powers (Wu, 2019, p. 560). Beijing clearly laid out the costs and risks should Manila continue to pressure China on the international stage as well as continue to facilitate the U.S. military pivot to Asia (Murphy, 2017, p. 175). Duterte responded with open calls to downgrade the U.S. alliance while simultaneously taking steps to improve ties with China (Heydarian, 2017, p. 231). This signals that the Philippines engaged in bandwagoning with China, rather than hedging between the United States and China.

Recall that states can bandwagon for two reasons; either to appease a rising power or to profit from its eventual victory (Walt, 1988, p. 278). It appears

that the logic for bandwagoning in the Philippines contained elements of both. Duterte recognized that his options for defending the Philippines' territory militarily against China were slim, stating at one point, "What do you want me to do? Declare war against China? I can't. We will lose all our military and our policemen tomorrow and we [will be] a destroyed nation" (Agence France-Presse, 2017). Doubts regarding the U.S. commitment to defending the Philippines against China likely left Duterte with the perception that it would be better to concede to China than be destroyed by them. He also assumed that bandwagoning with China would bring in significant profits to the Philippines, leveraging the Belt and Road initiative and other Chinese investments to support his own domestic infrastructure plans (Grossman, 2021).

Now, Duterte and the Philippines more broadly are being faced with the consequences of bandwagoning. Rather than decreasing its encroachments in the South China Sea, China has only become more assertive. It has continued military buildups on reclaimed islands in the Sea, sent ships to encircle Thitu, a strategically vital archipelago that is still under Philippine control, and has increasingly used aggressive fleets to keep Philippine fishers off traditional fishing grounds (Kurlantzick, 2021). China has also disappointed Duterte with regard to the economic benefits that the Philippines was promised. Construction has only begun on two proposed Chinese infrastructure projects, presenting a lack of follow through which contrasts sharply with other Southeast Asian states (Kurlantzick, 2021). China's development aid to the Philippines remains small compared to other donors like Japan, which provided 17 times more than China provided in the first half of 2020 (Kurlantzick, 2021). These circumstances help to explain why Duterte has begun to take significant steps to fully reinstate security ties and rebuild trust with Washington in recent months (Grossman, 2021).

Individual Influence on Philippine Foreign Policy

Since the 1990's, Manila's policy toward China has been described as bipolar in the sense that it shifts regularly and with varying degrees of intensity (Hiebert, 2020, p. 473). This is because Philippine foreign policy is determined

largely by the perception and views of whoever is president, and each president seems to reorient relations between China and the United States (Hiebert, 2020, p. 473). Duterte's reorientation toward China can be explained by his long-standing anti-Americanism, his own personal preferences, a desire to obtain Chinese economic benefits, anger at U.S. criticism of his war on drugs, and a lack of confidence in the U.S. as an ally (Murphy, 2017, p. 174).

However, despite Duterte's harsh rhetoric his individual preferences can only guide Philippine foreign policy so much. He faced distinct backlash among the Philippine security establishment which is deeply entwined with and dependent on U.S. logistical support, hardware, training, and intelligence (Heydarian, 2017, p. 233). Trusted insiders within the security establishment played a key role in convincing Duterte to preserve the foundations of the U.S.-Philippine security alliance (Heydarian, 2017, p. 233). The Philippine military's long distrust of China probably played a role in preventing a significant increase of Sino-Philippine military relations (Hiebert, 2020, p. 507). Duterte as an individual actor no doubt had a measurable impact on the Philippines' shifting China policy, but this seems to be a larger trend in Philippine politics.

Conclusion

This research has explored the alliance activity of the Philippines under President Duterte and has attempted to categorize the country's most recent orientation toward China as bandwagoning. After exploring what constitutes bandwagoning, balancing, and hedging in depth, it is clear that Duterte chose to bandwagon with China at the beginning of his six-year term. When the benefits of bandwagoning did not meet his expectations, Duterte began to pivot back to the Philippines' longstanding alliance with the United States as observed in the last few months. This research also explored the impacts of domestic politics and the President as an individual actor in Philippine foreign policy. The Philippine President must operate within a two-level game at any given time, taking both domestic politics and the regional security environment into account. This is especially tricky for a small state like the Philippines that prefers equilibrium in the international system and is heavily impacted by the policies of

two competing great powers. The political system of the Philippines concentrates a great amount of power in the individual executive. As such, Duterte certainly had a measurable impact on the foreign policy prerogatives of the Philippines during his term, but this phenomenon in general is not unique and the Philippines has experienced several notable foreign policy shifts in the last three decades.

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Understanding Indonesia's Response to Russia's war in Ukraine: A Preliminary Analysis of the Discursive Landscape

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(Submission 25-5-2022, Review 15-6-2022, Revision 20-6-2022, Published 28-06-2022)

This article maps the Indonesian discourses on Russia's war in Ukraine. Using the logic of poststructuralism, this article argues that the discursive structure of the official, popular, and academic discourse actually limits the potential for pro-Ukraine policies and constrains the policy options into a hesitant and cautious approach. At the same time, assuming foreign policy as a discursive practice, the hesitant practices strengthened the discourse about neutrality by allowing the popular discourse, which is primarily anti-Western, pro-Putin (due to his hypermasculine and strongman image), and susceptible to Russian propaganda, to be amplified by the expert's discourse who is mostly sympathetic to the Russian position.

Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, war, Indonesia, discourse, policy practices.

Introduction

This paper is a preliminary effort to understand the main discourses about Russia's war in Ukraine in Indonesian politics and whether it impacts Indonesian foreign policy practices. Using poststructuralism and discourse analysis to understand foreign policy, I tried to map the existing discourses, from the official and wider academic discourse to the societal discourse, such as social media narratives regarding the war in Ukraine.

When Russian President Vladimir Putin declared the so-called "special operation" in Ukraine on 24 February, the new stage of the war began. As a direct continuation of the Crimean annexation, Russian incursion into Donbas, and the ongoing war in Donetsk and Luhansk since 2014, the current stage of open war has been going on for more than 100 days, without any clear indication when it will stop. It has created many refugees in the surrounding countries while pushing the world into a food crisis.

The war has been perceived differently across the globe. Most Western countries are united in condemning, giving sanctions to Russia, and helping Ukraine with humanitarian and military aid while pushing for Ukraine's EU candidacy. Meanwhile, the rest of the world has a more diverse view, from Singapore, which supported the sanction, to China, which plays safe, and to Iran, which wholeheartedly supports Russia.

As the current holder of the G20 presidency, Indonesia responded in a very hesitant and cautious way. President Jokowi initially published a statement on Twitter asking both sides to stop the war. Then, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an official statement condemning the war without mentioning Russia. At the UN forum, Indonesia supported the initial General Assembly resolution condemning Russian action. However, the government abstained in a later resolution suspending Russia from the Human Rights Council. At the societal level, most surveys and analysts have argued that Indonesian society tended to be more sympathetic toward Russia, especially on social media. Although pointing to the silent majority, the latest in-person survey by Saiful Mujani Research Consulting still shows a very active and loud minority on social media being pro-Russian. Meanwhile, academics and experts are divided, with more pro-Russian op-eds and analyses being published that strengthened the pro-Russian public narrative.

This paper is divided into two main sections to understand this ambiguous and messy situation. The first section will discuss the importance of discourse in understanding foreign policy, and the second is the empirical findings, which are divided into three main issues: the official discourse, the societal, and the experts.

The importance of discourse in foreign policy analysis

Holzscheiter (2014) argues that discourse is the space where human beings make sense of the world and attach meaning to the material world. It is expected to be structured in a binary oppositional term and limit what could be said and done (Miliken 1999, p.229). As Hansen (2016, p.96) has argued, "foreign policies are

dependent upon particular representations of the countries.” In this case, it is essential to see how Russia and Ukraine are represented in the domestic discourse in Indonesia, whether one is considered as opposed to the other in a binary term, and whether some narrative is forbidden to be said (especially by the official discourse). This mapping of discourses is essential since it actually represents and informs how Indonesians view the world and how Indonesia would act in foreign policy.

Furthermore, as Hansen (2006) also argued, to understand foreign policy, we need to look at several intertextual levels of discourses, from the official (either from the President or the Minister/Ministry of Foreign Affairs), wider debate (primarily the academic and experts’ debate), and the more popular representations from the public and media. It resonates with what foreign policy analysis scholars such as Hudson and Day (2020) and Neack (2019) have argued about the need to integrate many levels of analysis. Therefore, this project tries to integrate more elite-based arguments which focus on the officials and elites, with the popular-based arguments focusing on the public discourse in social media.

Using Waever’s (2002) argument that discursive structure puts limits on the possible foreign policy practices, this paper argues that Indonesia’s ambiguous and hesitant response to the war in Ukraine is because of the possible policy choices (such as supporting Ukraine symbolically, giving sanctions to Russia, or even criticizing Russia directly and openly) were limited by the existing discourse on Russia and Ukraine. The public, media, and academic discourses, which are most sympathetic towards Russia, do not allow the government to pursue a different direction, even if they wanted to. Nevertheless, understanding foreign policy as a discursive practice, as Hansen (2016) mentioned, means that we consider the possibility that policies are part of the effort to reproduce the existing discourse. It means that the ambiguous governmental response to the war, already being limited by previously existing discourses about Russia/Ukraine and how Indonesia should act, is strengthening the discursive structure and producing a weaker position for the Indonesian government amidst the humanitarian crisis.

The findings: A preliminary map

Official discourse

The initial governmental response can be interpreted from Jokowi's tweet on 24 February 2022. He said, "stop [the] war; war brings misery to mankind and puts the whole world at risk." He repeated this call when he was interviewed on 9 March 2022 by Nikkei Asia. Even in June, the same narrative was used by Jokowi when he was interviewed by CNBC, saying that "we want the war in Ukraine to be stopped." Jokowi's initial comment and the unwillingness to mention Russia while portraying the war as the responsibility of all parties is strengthened by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on 25 February. The statement echoed the unwillingness to mention Russia as the aggressor and repeated the stance of asking "all parties" to stop the conflict and enmity. It is clear that even while condemning the action of violating other countries' territory, the official discourse did not want to put Russia or Ukraine in an aggressor-victim axis. Even when confronted with the Bucha tragedy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Teuku Faizasyah, on 7 April, only mentioned the need for an independent investigation because outsiders do not have clarity regarding the actual situation. It reaffirms the hesitancy to condemn and criticize Russia directly. Supporting the initial UN General Assembly votes condemning the war but abstaining when the votes are about suspending Russia from the Human Rights Council is another indication of this neutrality discourse.

Another indication of this "neutral" and "non-aligned" discourse can be seen in how Jokowi invited both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the G20 Summit in Bali this November. I had argued before that it is a buying-time strategy. Indonesia hopes a ceasefire will happen before the summit in November, making the summit an ordinary meeting not focusing on the war in Ukraine. After all, the government still hopes that G20 will be a successful summit as a legacy for the Jokowi administration. Inviting both leaders will lessen the pressure and criticism toward Indonesia. The initial decision to keep the invitation to Putin has been

criticized by many Western countries. However, following US President Joe Biden's advice to invite Ukraine, Indonesia finally decided to invite Zelenskyy. Inviting both of them, especially since there are still several months before the summit, is a way to delay the final decision and hope the situation will change.

Another way to interpret this double-invitation strategy is to see this as another way for Indonesia to be independent and walk a fine line between global powers. As Ripsman and Levy (2008) argued, buying time and appeasement can be a strategic balance-of-power calculation, not just wishful thinking. This tendency to be neutral between blocs or to keep distance between great powers can be traced back to the Indonesian foreign policy doctrine of independent and active foreign policy (Hatta 1953). Evan Laksmana (2017) previously called this essential principle in Indonesian foreign policy a "pragmatic equidistance," engaging with one power while maintaining autonomy and keeping equal balance with the others. However, Laksmana (2017) actually only focused on the balance between China and the US, not Russia. Nevertheless, the long history and tradition of Indonesian strategic culture create fear of interference by other countries, leading to wariness of great power politics in the region (Sulaiman 2016). By invoking this long-standing principle, the official discourse conforms to the existing discursive structure while also avoiding potential criticisms from what Scobell (2014) called the vanguard or keepers of strategic culture.

However, this ambiguous response has prompted many criticisms, arguing that Indonesia only acted as a fence-sitter or had no strategic doctrine. Nevertheless, one narrative is significant in understanding Indonesia's discourse: territorial integrity. Even from the beginning, the official Ministry statement put territorial integrity in the first part of the statement. Jokowi also mentioned it again on 16 June, highlighting the importance of territorial integrity and sovereignty in an interview with CNBC. This is a crucial topic for Indonesia, which already had problems regarding territorial integrity in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua, while also losing the Sipadan-Ligitan Islands to Malaysia in 2002 and having a dispute with China in Natuna Island. In that regard, the logical move would be for Indonesia to hold the principle and criticize Russia for

violating the principle. Nevertheless, what happened was a disjointed official discourse with two primary and opposite narratives: that we do not want to call out Russia because we do not want to play this great powers politics; and yet, we want to reiterate that territorial integrity is essential, and the violation cannot be accepted.

To understand why this ruptured discourse occurs, we need to look at the other level: society and the experts.

Societal discourse

A lot has been said about the societal discourse in Indonesia regarding Russia's war in Ukraine. In social media, many Indonesians expressed support for Russia while using this husband and wife analogy to weaken the Ukrainian position and portray Russia positively (Al-Jazeera, 19 March 2022). Social media analysis by Evello showed that in March, most Indonesian users on Instagram and TikTok supported Russia. Meanwhile, the in-person survey by SMRC found that only 20% actually support Russia.

The first thing to note concerning the societal discourse is that not many Indonesians follow foreign affairs. Based on the latest Lowy Institute Survey, only 17% of Indonesian follow news from abroad. However, the SMRC survey also shows that most respondents know about the war in Ukraine. It says two things about the current situation in society. The first is the absence of credible knowledge regarding Russia, Ukraine, and the current war. The government's ambiguous position did not help since it created this information vacuum. Unfortunately, this vacuum is being filled by pro-Russian experts and disinformation, which then creates the second issue: namely, the firm opinion of those online media users, propagating what they think they know (albeit it came from a disinformation campaign)

It is more important to understand the societal discourse on how they perceive Russia, Ukraine, and the war. As I have explained in another article, there are several main themes of the societal discourse. The first is the solid anti-Western narrative. This is not new in Indonesia since Mujani (2005) already

mentioned it before in the context of the war on terror. This trend is also not unique since many other developing countries have experienced similar narratives. For example, Loh and Mustaffa (2022) reported that in Malaysia, the same and dominant anti-Western discourse could be found, ranging from NATO's fault in its expansion to Russia's territory to similar *whataboutism* related to the US's invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq or the West's neglect of Palestine.

In this discourse, Russia is seen as an anti-Western power challenging the Western hegemony. By portraying the war as a regular conflict between NATO or the West and Russia, it is easy to reposition Russia as an anti-Western force. Furthermore, Russia's image in Indonesia is always related to the history of the Soviet Union. One central theme that repeatedly occurs in the narrative dimension about Russia in the mind of Indonesian elites and scholars is the nostalgic view of history. For example, then-Ambassador to Russia, Hamid Awaluddin (2010a), mentioned his memory of the historical narrative under the New Order, where Russia was always connected to communism, military (with the symbol of AK-47 and Russia's help to the Indonesian military forces in West Papua), and the myth about KGB (related to espionage, secret police, and coup d'état). Then-Deputy Ambassador Agus Sriyono (Kompas, 28 November 2009) also highlighted this "honeymoon and low points" when he compared the period of 1950-1965 with 1966-1991. According to the previous Ambassador, Wahid Supriyadi (2018), this period between 1950 and 1965 could be considered the "golden age of the Indo-Russia relationship." As Suryakusuma (2020) mentioned, for many Indonesians (especially the older generations), this nostalgic view of the Soviet Union still lingers.

By tying the narrative about Russia into its temporal identity (Soviet Union), the discourse portrays Russia as a great power with immense capability. Then-Ambassador Awaluddin (2010a) chose to highlight the memory of Yuri Gagarin, Soyuz, and the Soviet's outer space mission as reminiscent of the golden era of the Soviet Union. Ambassador Supriyadi (2018) underlined the Soviet's contribution to the infrastructure projects in Indonesia during Sukarno's years, including the National Monument, the National Stadium, the Monument

of Hero (Tugu Tani), the Statue of Youth, and the Krakatau Steel plant. The troubled history of communism is suddenly forgotten, as we could see the continuous efforts from the Indonesian policymakers to argue that it is essential to forget the Soviet's communist past and that Russia is different from the Soviets. The problem arising from that stance is it underlined the binary nature of identity formation. By saying that "Russia is no longer communist" or "ideology no longer matters" (as then-Ambassador Awaluddin and Deputy Ambassador Sriyono emphasized in their articles in 2009 and 2010), elites inadvertently show the connection between the current "Russia" and the Soviet "communist past."

This discourse portraying Russia as a great power (and a continuation of the Soviet Union) and as a hero to a developing country is problematic since it neglects the collective trauma of Russian imperialism and colonialism in the post-Soviet spaces. Many countries in the region have suffered from Russian brutality. For example, Estonia and Latvia suffered from the intense "russification" from sending many ethnic Russian workers to those countries to the mass deportation in 1941-1951. Even more so, after their independence, the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) kept being influenced and manipulated by Russia (Ciziunas 2008). However, this insensitive discourse explains why many Indonesians still feel that Russia is a friend, being completely unaware of the imperial legacy of Russia.

I would argue that this also connects to the disinformation campaign by the Russian government regarding the brotherhood between Russia and Ukraine. This is not a new campaign by the Russian government. For example, the then-chairperson of the State Duma's Committee on Security and Fighting Corruption, Irina Yarovaya, said that the Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood is an "it is deep blood, spiritual and historical connection, and no one can change that" (TASS, 21 August 2015). Even Putin himself argued last year (12 July 2021) that Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian are one people. Many scholars criticized this issue and debunked it, including a renowned Ukrainian historian Serhii Plokhyy in his interview with the *New Yorker*. However, the notion that

Russia and Ukraine are one nation with a similar language is still present for many Indonesians.

Another aspect is the popularity of Putin due to his hypermasculine image. A social media analysis by Centrius showed that Putin's masculinity played a role in driving the societal support from Indonesians. For example, more than half of Indonesian social media users supported Russia because Putin is "brave" to fight against the West. The researcher argued that Putin's image of traditional masculinity is connected to the Indonesian perception of a strong leader who wears a military uniform while acting as the father of the nation. It also resonates with Ismail's (2022) argument about militarised masculinity creating the basis for Putin's supporters in many countries, including Indonesia. Putin's strong man image also echoes Indonesian domestic political discourse. Prabowo Subianto's popularity in the 2014 and 2019 elections is related to the idea that Indonesia needs a strong leader like him to safeguard and protect the country (Rakhmani & Saraswati 2021). In 2018, Gerindra politician Fadli Zon argued that Indonesia needs a leader like Putin, who is "brave, visionary, smart, and authoritative."

Expert's discourse

As I have argued elsewhere, many op-eds and statements by academics and public intellectuals in Indonesia were mostly either sympathetic towards the Russian position or advocating hesitancy, caution, and neutrality, which is an indirect way that actually supports the current status quo: the de facto Russian invasion and occupation of some of Ukraine's territory. It is also illuminating that experts can influence societal discourse due to the government's ambiguous position and the society's lack of knowledge and interest in the region of Eastern Europe. For example, a popular video by Connie Bakrie was seen more than 3 million times, even though it advocates for a pro-Russian position. Several op-eds in Kompas and Media Indonesia, for example, are more sympathetic towards Russia, centered on the idea that this war is all about NATO and the West provoking Russia to attack Ukraine. It can range from saying that Russia is trying to "teach a lesson to NATO and the US," blaming US hegemony and

NATO expansion, or at the very least saying that the “Russian position is understandable” and comparing it to Cuba in 1962. Another example, while commenting on Indonesia’s abstention in the UNGA resolution, Universitas Indonesia’s IR professor Evi Fitriani argued that the war is not about Ukraine but about NATO using Ukraine to fight Russia. A similar motion was made by a European Studies expert from Gadjah Mada University, Muhadi Sugiono, stating that Ukraine’s insistence on joining NATO is the main reason for Russia’s invasion. Meanwhile, others, such as former Ambassador Darmansjah Djumala, who became an IR professor in Bandung, portrayed Ukraine as a small country with no choice but to “dance between two lions.”

What is more interesting about this discourse is that it actually shows a lack of expertise in Eastern European studies. The issue of Russia and Ukraine is seen through the prism of Russia, the aftereffect of the domination of Russian graduates in the field of Russian and East European Studies in Indonesia. There are only two programs in Indonesia: one in Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta and the other in Universitas Padjajaran, Bandung. There is no East European Studies program with lecturers and professors who either initially or at least graduated from the countries in the region, such as Ukraine, Latvia, Belarus, Estonia, and others. This situation, which not only happened in Indonesia, has already resulted in a worldwide call to decolonize Russian studies (Kassymbekova 2022). This dominance of Russian graduates in East European Studies affected how Indonesian society still falsely perceives that Russians and Ukrainians are brothers with similar languages, akin to Indonesia and Malaysia. For instance, Russian Studies expert from Padjadjaran University, Supian, argued that this is a conflict between brothers and should be dealt with internally. A similar notion was stated by Ahmad Fahrurodji from Universitas Indonesia in a webinar on 24 February, the first day of the war. It also directly follows Putin’s repeated propaganda about the Russia-Ukraine brotherhood, not only in his essay in 2021 but can be traced back at least also in 2014 during his Crimean speech.

This lack of knowledge pushed many experts to fall back on the prevalent but flawed explanation of John Mearsheimer (2014). Mearsheimer’s argument

has been heavily criticized, which basically put the blame squarely on the West and NATO for the 2014 crisis in Crimea and Donbas while overlooking the tendency of Russian imperialism and identity. Mearsheimer made similar claims now (Chotiner, 2022) in response to the current war. Adam Tooze (2022) criticized the article for omitting the moral consequences of war. Meanwhile, Paul Poast (2022) made a very informative rebuttal on Twitter to explain that even though Mearsheimer's 2014 article is faulty, realism can still be used to explain what happened in Ukraine. Furthermore, as Kazharski (2022) argued, Mearsheimer's (and Stephen Walt's) neorealist logic is faulty since it downplayed the role of Putin's ideology and propaganda in Russia's domestic context.

Unfortunately, many Indonesian experts used Mearsheimer's argument to explain Russia's invasion without reflecting on what Mearsheimer may have mistakenly argued. For example, an article by former Indonesian Ambassador to Russia, Wahid Supriyadi (Supriyadi, 2022), was logically derived from Mearsheimer's idea, and it arrives at a problematic policy proposal, such as the inclusion of Ukraine in the Eurasian Economic Union. Another consequence is the push for Ukraine to be a neutral country (Djumala, 2022), following Mearsheimer's advice, without asking the Ukrainians what they want. In short, Indonesian scholars and experts also fell victim to this idea of "westsplaining Ukraine" (Smoleński & Dutkiewicz, 2022), using a Western understanding of Ukraine and then using it for our viewers. What is interesting is that in the previous years, there have been some efforts to discuss the possibility of an Indonesian IR perspective ("Menbangun Perspektif Indonesia", 2021). However, when the issue of Ukraine arises, the expert community quickly leans back and depends on the Western perspective, which brings a bigger question: clearly, Russia is seen as some anti-Western entity, but what about Ukraine? Is Ukraine seen as part of the West? Russia? Or something in-between?

A limited and early conclusion?

In official discourse, the long-tradition of non-aligned principles and the historical doctrine of "independent foreign policy" limit the government's

pursuit of pro-Ukrainian policies. Even if the government wants to listen to much pressure from the West, it is more challenging to appeal to the public, which has already exhibited the strong societal discourse-based also on the long history of anti-Westernism and non-interference from external actors. What the government does is a balancing act between the principle of territorial integrity and neutrality. Another way to interpret the official discourse is that the government is pragmatic, with little at stake in terms of military threat.

The societal discourse is connected to the history and Indonesian people's views of Russia and Ukraine. In the issue of history, Russia is seen as this anti-Western force, whereas Ukraine is seen as the weak puppet of NATO. At the same time, many admire Putin for his hypermasculine image, while Zelenskyy is criticized for being a clown. It could be that it criticizes Indonesia's president, as the Centrius team has argued (2022). However, it could also be read as an aspiration of what kind of leader the people want.

The academic and expert discourse is focused on the issue of the West and NATO, similar to the societal discourse. As I have argued earlier, due to the lack of knowledge about the region and the governmental hesitancy, experts play a role in constructing the societal discourse. It strengthened the existing discursive structure related to how Indonesia views itself and how it sees others while at the same time limiting the pragmatic options of the government.

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