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NOTES FROM THE EXECUTIVE EDITOR

Yohanes Sulaiman
Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani

Dear readers:

We would like to thank you all for your continuing interest in the Journal of Global Strategic Studies. As a new journal, we know that achieving prominence and respect in the field is going to be a long and arduous task, but with your support and prayers, we believe that we can achieve it.

In this issue, we also have several excellent contributions from scholars all over the world, who incidentally and independently contributed articles on Indo-Pacific, bringing distinct perspectives from different countries. Professor Srabani Roy Choudhury, Chairperson of Center for East Asian Studies, Professor in Japanese Division School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University, India, contributed an article on origin and evolution of Quad, and how it will in the future contribute to the creation of a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

Corey Wallace, Assistant Professor at Kanagawa University, Japan, an expert in Japanese foreign policy and geopolitics of East Asia, contributed our second article. Professor Wallace describes and explains the evolution of Japan's Self Defense Forces' capabilities, missions, and the political limitations it faces internally. In light of growing tension in East Asia, and Indo-Pacific region as a whole, I believe that this is a very important and insightful contribution that would help us understand Japan's defense policy and its possible impact on Indo-Pacific.

Our third article is written by Dino Patti Djalal, the head of the Master's Program in International Relations, Agus Subagyo, Dean of Faculty of Social and

Political Sciences (FISIP), and Marianne Delanova, vice-head of the Master's Program in International Relations; all three are faculty in Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani (UNJANI). These three distinguished scholars analyzed Indonesia's health diplomacy during Covid-19 pandemic period and argued that Indonesia's engagement in health diplomacy helped maintaining regional and global stability during the pandemic.

Our fourth contributor is Ms. Quinissa Putrirezhy of Universitas Indonesia. Ms. Putrirezhy in her excellent contribution discusses the possibility that the Quad may hasten the collapse and disintegration of ASEAN. Whether one may agree or disagree with her argument, it is clear that she is asking an important and timely question, making her article worth reading.

Mr. Miftachul Choir, a graduate student at Institute of Human Rights and Peace Study, Mahidol University, discusses why Indonesia took an assertive stance in combatting illegal fishing issue instead of applying the ASEAN-led mechanism, the usual problem-solving mechanism between states in Southeast Asia. This article further illuminates the debate within Indonesia's bureaucracy and how disagreement on threat within the foreign policy foreign elite led to a decision that simply bypassed ASEAN's mechanism.

Last but not least, is an essay by Donald Greenlees, Senior Advisor of Asialink, a research center affiliated with the University of Melbourne, Australia and a visiting fellow at Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. Dr. Greenlees provides a thoughtful essay on the linkage between regime type and sectarian violence and whether Indonesia's nascent democracy is helpful in combatting sectarian violence. This article concludes by arguing that democracy offers the best way to solve political contention peacefully and the need for the government to act decisively to contain violent contention.

Finally, my last words: we would like to thank you again for your willingness to read this note to the end, and we hope that you will enjoy reading

this issue. Please do let us know if you have constructive comments, and better yet, do send your contribution for our next issue in June 2022.

Cimahi and Bandung, December 2021

Yohanes Sulaiman
Executive Editor

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QUAD: ORIGIN AND EVOLVING DYNAMICS

Prof. Srabani Roy Choudhury
Professor Japan Studies,
Centre for East Asian Studies,
School of International Studies,
New Delhi India.

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Abstract

Quad is not a formal treaty, and for its members, it is not the only platform in Asia. It has brought like-minded maritime democracies together to create a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. It has responded to disaster crises and the pandemic more promptly than China's aggressive moves in the Indo-Pacific region. This article aims to understand the origin of 'the Quad' referred to as Quad 1.0 and its failure in 2007 and re-emergence of it as Quad 2.0. Quad 2.0 is further divided into the pre-pandemic Quad 2.1 and pandemic onset Quad 2.2. This article articulates the trajectory that Quad has traversed to reach Summit level meetings and its pursued agenda. The latest development in this arena is forming a trilateral agreement between Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom (AUKUS). This article questions the role of Quad in view of the formation of AUKUS and draw on its implications. It concludes that Quad has faltered in answering the security concern, paving the way for AUKUS. Quad's role is likely to turn towards a developmental paradigm of 'productive global public good'. In the long run, this will help create an equitable cohesive region and realize the ambition of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

Keywords: Formal treaty, developmental paradigm, security

Introduction

As nations came to realize the vulnerability of the Indo-Pacific region, the Indo-Pacific construct gained strong momentum. Over time, the overarching objective of ensuring shared prosperity by securitizing the maritime domain and gaining

equitability by economic integration through the understanding and incorporation of differing perspectives and strategic objectives has established itself. Deliberations on these lines firmed up in the form of "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), which calls for a rule-based global order establishing the Indo-Pacific region's undeniable geopolitical and geo-economic influence. Quad is one such mechanism.

As is often the case, a need for a framework of an agreement with a vision to potentially build an institution is the order of the day. In this region, it looked towards a security and economic architecture in which it was a predetermined conclusion that free and open in security parlance will mean that nation will conform to international law and abide with rules and regulations as mapped by the international order. Concerning economics, it meant free and open trade, drawing developing and developed nations into a network of a complementary ecosystem, deriving "betterment" for all. The once seemingly foregone conclusion that economic architecture will reinforce liberal, rule-based global order and help in strategic consideration, it is today being put to the test. The complex, fluid and complicated environment that characterizes the Indo-Pacific region necessitates some reflections.

This article seeks to understand the origin of 'the Quad' (hereafter referred to as Quad 1.0), its failure in 2007, and its re-emergence as Quad 2.0. Quad 2.0 can be further divided into the pre-pandemic Quad 2.1 and the pandemic onset Quad 2.2. The article then looks at Quad from the now established alignment theory and articulates the trajectory that Quad has traversed to reach Summit level meetings by focusing on the agenda marking its presence in the Indo-Pacific region. The latest development in this arena is the formation of a trilateral agreement between Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom (AUKUS). This article, therefore, questions the role of Quad in view of the formation of AUKUS and reflects on its implication.

While the cold war was all about alliances, approaches developed by Alliance Theory were a good explanation of the system that prevailed. However,

the post-cold war has necessitated international theorists to revisit the alliance theory to find an explanation for groupings that emerged which were marked by continuous oscillations and fluidity and where cooperation did not necessarily centre on the traditional military security, and as many theorists claimed that orthodox alliance theory was a dominant subset of the alignment theory but not the only element. This article, therefore, makes use of the definition that 'alignment' is a "value-neutral concept that neither infers nor connotes any particular content to an inter-state relationship",[1] that it is a "persistently evolving process"[2] allowing for "sustained realignment, upgrading or downgrading of cooperative relations."[3] This article provides an explanation and evaluates the origin of Quad by tracing its evolving dynamism through the prism of alignment theory.

Quad 1.0 Origin and Debacle

The genesis of Quad can be traced to the tsunami that struck most nations of Southeast Asia on December 26, 2004, leaving overwhelming devastation and claiming close to 226,000 lives, including a large number of tourists from across the globe[4]. In light of the devastation, four nations came together in this hour of crisis—the United States, Japan, Australia and India, to form "the Core Group" on humanitarian grounds, helping affected nations address and manage the disaster. The world witnessed a "new type of diplomacy."[5] In the face of the chaos and inchoate challenge, these four nations, because of their proximity, regional interest, economic strength, and military capability, swiftly mobilized tsunami aid and worked in a synchronized fashion to give support in the form of rescue operations, provisions and re-establishment of governance.

While the group disbanded after this disaster management activity, one country was keen to deepen the engagement of the other three nations in this region: Japan. A new vision was first floated through the idea of the "Arc of

Freedom and Prosperity" by Abe during his election campaign and formulated with conviction by Taro Aso, Minister of Foreign Affairs, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's leadership.[6] Accordingly, the arc would encompass Northern Europe traverse the Baltic states, Central and South-Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, then cross Southeast Asia, finally reaching Northeast Asia. In centring "freedom" and "prosperity," Aso laid the foundation of the current "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" as he pointed out that each country within the arc has unique characteristics in their way of life, be it religion or culture. Yet, Aso pointed out that all of them are hoping to develop and seek opportunities for greater affluence. In this, he clarified that these countries are trying to "find ways towards greater prosperity"[7], at the same time working to "demonstrate its own individuality as a point of national pride"[8]. Thus, to reorient Japan's foreign policy approach in the post-cold war, Abe and Aso put forward a new diplomatic game plan for Japan, expanding its role to address nations' concerns beyond its previous sphere of Asia as it searched for a place in the new world order. When Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh visited Tokyo and a joint statement was released announcing that both nations were eager to begin a dialogue with other "like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific region" to address themes of "mutual interest"[9], the first peg for the formation of the Quad was established.

The momentum gained speed when, driven by his conviction, Abe in parallel persuaded then Australian Prime Minister John Howard and US Vice-President Dick Cheney to join the dialogue. Abe's intention was to create a club of major maritime democratic powers in the Indo-Pacific as he was troubled by the rising assertiveness of China.

Abe's vision found credence when the four nations held their first exploratory meeting on the sidelines of the Asia Regional Forum held in Manila in 2007. The meeting was significant as four maritime democracies in an "informal grouping" discussed areas of common interest, including disaster relief. The

consensus was to find common platforms for conversation, cooperation and mutual benefit. Thus Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) was formed.

China was not a silent observer to the formation of the Quad. Describing it as an "Asian NATO", China filed official demarches with the four nations and forewarned the implication of the coming together of major powers.[10] It pursued its view of Quad as an anti-China forum and reached out to the ASEAN nations seeking support. Having strong economic linkages with China, many ASEAN nations also put forth their concern about how ASEAN is positioned with Quad. There were signs that rising China had slowly but surely eroded American influence in this region.[11]

As an affirmation of the four nations' intention to give Quad a maritime security dimension, the Malabar exercises, which until then were held only between India and the United States, saw the participation of Japan and Australia. A fifth country, Singapore, was also invited, signifying the Quad's intention of inclusivity.

Failure of Quad 1.0 rests with the indecisiveness of its member parties. First, the informal meeting of Quad did not set any agenda, nor did it give any direction. India and Australia were keen to play a balancing game with China and showed reluctance to formalize the dialogue. Despite Abe's address to the Indian parliament describing the power of the "confluence of the two seas" (2007), post-Malabar exercise, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh emphasized that Quad contained "no security implication."[12] Australia position faltered right from the beginning. In July 2007, the Australia defence minister Brenden visited China and stated, "I have explained the nature of, and basis of, our trilateral strategic dialogue with Japan and the United States. But I have also reassured China that so-called quadrilateral dialogue with India is not something that we are pursuing",[13] and withdrew its participation. In the United States, the first Quad meeting was described as a US project, "an axis of democracies", a "security diamond", or a way to contain China.[14] The loss of the proponent of the Quad, Shinzo Abe, due

to his health-related resignation in 2007, created a chasm as the dialogue lost favour with Japanese power brokers. Quad 1.0 ended as a non-starter.

The narrative of Quad 1.0 brought to the forefront China's sway over the Indo-Pacific region. The Quad 1.0 attempted two initiatives—security dialogue and maritime exercise (Malabar exercise). In both cases, China drew the world's attention, positioned Quad's agenda as a "containing China", and acted swiftly through diplomatic channels to raise its concerns. As a result, it was able to create a tentativeness not only among the nations in Indo-Pacific but also among Quad members. In a year, it was evident that the members faltered in finding common ground to address the challenges of this region; both Japan and India fell to domestic challenges of 'democratic set-up',[15] and with the change of guard in Australia to Mr. Kevin Rudd, who had a stronger affiliation to China, the Quad lost grounds.

Hiatus: Recalibration

The demise of Quad 1.0, though unfortunate, in hindsight played a critical role in illustrating that these four democracies have a responsibility to this region. The Quad 1.0 meeting never raised China's concern nor set any agenda that forewarned a security alliance. Yet, the angst of China towards this forum was visible, and China made it a point to bring it into discussions with Quad nations and sought allies in ASEAN nations, marking out the Quad as different. China had never been so vocal and active when other multilaterals were formed, demonstrating that China feared that this forum had the potential to work at 'containment' of China's ambitions.

What followed in the interim period between 2007-2017 is noteworthy because, in many ways, these nations avoided drawing China's attention and engaged in bilateral and minilaterals regarding strategic and non-strategic concerns. Prominent development during this period was the strengthening of Japan-India

relations, as both nations realized a large canvas of mutual interests and swiftly incorporated strategic concern into their economic engagements. Japan's keen interest in India's developmental programmes enabled India to gain economic dividends. The India-US relationship also enjoyed a quantum leap, especially with the signing of the US-India nuclear deal. The warmth between India-US and India-Japan would come to play a significant role in negotiating the establishment of Quad 2.0.

With the disintegration of Quad and no strong leadership among the Quad nations with a determination to put Quad back on track, the strong bilateral developments among these nations culminated a trilateral among Japan, India, and the United States. It started with a meeting of assistant secretary level officials in 2011, which by 2017 had graduated to Ministerial level.[16] Along with this, military engagement deepened, with Japan becoming a permanent member of the Malabar exercise in 2015.

Quad 1.0 failure was pegged to Australia's withdrawal. The withdrawal was perceived as showing Australia's leniency towards China, and India feared Australia's strategic intent. Australia, in turn, was wary of China's reaction if it reverted to Quad: it readily settled for deepening bilateral engagement with the three nations, especially India, as it was not within the alliance system. Bilateral coordination gained precedence. India's relations with Japan and the United States strengthened, as did US-Japan relations, and India-Australia relations also found some footing. With small incremental moves in the interim period, a Japan-India-Australia trilateral was established in 2015 at the vice-ministerial level. While India accepted this trilateral, its tentativeness towards Australia was evident as it continued its military exercise at bilateral level-AUSINDEX, though it grew in size and scope. Significantly, the two countries agreed to start a 2+2 dialogue at the level of defence and foreign secretaries.

As the world witnessed the rise of 'peaceful China', there was a bonhomie that China will work towards seeking acceptance within the world order. However,

in this period, China's assertiveness was witnessed in multilateral forums of WTO and RCEP and as it pressed its territorial claims in the South China Sea. Among the Quad nations, each one of them had their apprehensions with China to contend with. For Japan, China as its neighbour, on the one hand, faced territorial infringement, such as around the Senkaku Islands, or China's establishment of an ADIZ, but on the other, it had deeply entrenched economic relations. The United States was faced with China's geopolitical ambitions as it emerged as the second-largest economy and initiated alternatives like Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)—the former an infrastructure developmental programme, the latter a financial arm to support this initiative. Tariff and trade issues crept in as obstacles to the relationship despite United States acceptance of China's WTO membership in 2001. Further, in its backyard the United States faced economic espionage allegedly sponsored by the Chinese government.[17] Australia, which feared the repercussions of antagonizing China because of its dependence on trade with China, found its sovereignty threatened by the political influence of China in politics and universities. For India, historically, China's behaviour had created mistrust. However, India had no intention to confront China and was seen holding off another attempt at Quad.[18]. The Doklam face-off with China and moves by China's BRI moves, such as initiating China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, considered a strategic concern of India's, impelled India to recalibrate its alignment orientation within its foreign policy of 'strategic autonomy'.

Quad 2.1: Restore and Rebuild

While Abe's vision of the "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" and the "confluence of the two seas" did not result in the outcome he envisaged, the implanting of this idea in the minds of strategic practitioners and academics was nevertheless an achievement. When Abe came back to power in 2012, he brought back his vision in a new avatar of "democratic security diamond" to "safeguard the maritime

commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the Western Pacific."[19] The notion of the Indo-Pacific as a region has grown since 2006 mainly because it was becoming an economic hub. This shift of economic activity from the Atlantic-Pacific region emphasized the necessity of maintaining law and order in this vast expanse. Hence, the Indo-Pacific concept increasingly appeared in most countries defence or strategic papers. Along with ASEAN nations, the five tigers had become the fulcrum of the economic activity, and ASEAN put forward its "centrality" within the Indo-Pacific framework. China's overall behaviour, particularly towards the Quad nations, necessitated that this group harness its strength and provide an alternative in light of eroding American regional presence. Moreover, the bilateral, trilateral, mini-lateral engagement among Quad members in common areas, including military exercise, begot trust, confidence and cooperation, thus, paving the way for the re-emergence of Quad. The exercise of setting in motion Quad 2.1 was similar to that of Quad 1.0. The US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Japanese foreign minister Taro Kono proposed re-formulation of the Quad. Officials at the assistant secretary level of the four nations met on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila on November 12, 2017. While there was no pre-determined agenda, the discussion included the concern of North Korea's nuclear ambitions, strengthening the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific", and promoting the rules-based order and shared values.

Lessons learnt from Quad 1.0 were apparent as each nation gave their statements which showed differences in their focus. For instance, the United States, Japan, and Australia emphasised freedom of navigation, overflight, and coordination of maritime security efforts, while India, the United States, and Australia discussed connectivity issues. There were also efforts in place to appease ASEAN and give reassurance about adherence to ASEAN centrality and "inclusivity" in the Indo-Pacific region, while keeping any notion of that Quad 2.1 was geared towards 'containment of China' out of its discussion. The principal outcome that came from this second initiative was establishing a meeting of senior

officials biannually and working towards ministerial-level meetings with a view to holding summit level meetings in future.

Nevertheless, two common threads of contention featured around the advent of Quad 2.1. First was that the Quad group was still a military alliance to contain China, and that it was provocative, acrimonious and disruptive to the region's harmony. This was not only a narrative in China and Southeast Asia but also within Quad nations themselves. The other narrative was whether Quad had any additional useful role to play since these four nations had already sufficiently created a nexus in military cooperation and other areas of concern through their trilateral and bilateral engagements. For instance, all six bilateral nodes had 2+2 dialogues involving the foreign and defence ministries. India, the weakest link as it was the one out of the alliance system, had improved its relations with all three nations. Even with Australia, India's Air Force participated in Australia's Pitch Black exercise in 2018, and India and the United States had reached a logistics supply and communications agreements after a long drawn-out negotiations. India-Japan relations had moved to summit level meetings and was considered the strongest, deepest, and warmest. Among the other three nodes, within the American alliance system, the United States and Japan had reinforced their alliance, and the maintenance of the American presence in Asia had been underscored. The US–Australia relationship had also been strengthened with US Marines rotating into Darwin and high-level political relations continued. All this pointed to a growing degree of comfort with defence cooperation in the regional context.

What both of these narratives were missing was the context that the Indo-Pacific region is a vast expansive space, and primarily requires freedom and openness to enable each nation to conduct its economic activity without any threat. Hence, the above trends that were set in motion of steadily deepening shared strategic worldview through nurturing habits of cooperation would hold grounds

in Quad format as a balance of power to ensure free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific.

The two basic questions that were revisited with Quad's rebirth were defining the role of Quad and the issue of institutionalization. In both areas, there were uncertainties. A survey by Huong Le Thu of Southeast Asian nations showed strong fear of dilution of existing institutions such as ASEAN and East Asia Forum.[20] A survey of strategic elites of the four Quad nations by Buchan and Rimland showed that the Quad required a working group meeting with an agenda and focus.[21] The survey pointed out that while a military task force did not find acceptance, especially among Indian strategic thinkers, softer initiatives in regional development and economic assistance and human rights promotion policies in Indo-Pacific found large acceptance especially, as did joint infrastructure development projects. As far as institutionalizing the Quad was concerned, the general sense was that it would impinge into Southeast nations fears and was a cumbersome effort.

China was by then unabashedly challenging the liberal rules-based order. China, therefore, continued its attempt to obstruct the Quad. Five distinct ways of portraying Quad were seen. The most common was to reveal Quad as a forum to confront China as viewed from "zero-sum" Cold War mentality. China continued to put forth its view strongly that Quad was a Tokyo initiative to marginalize China and that it was an exclusive club embracing Cold War calculations.[22] China, therefore, argued that the formation of Quad essentially promoted instability in the region. At the regional level, China often portrayed Quad as a bloc that undermines existing regional multilateral institutions. It sowed the seed of mistrust by portraying Quad as a bloc that overtime will undermine other regional multilateral institutions.[23] The result was that ASEAN, in no uncertain terms, expressed its discomfort in taking sides in US-China strategic competition. Nevertheless, few ASEAN nations had a clear notion of where they were positioned, and no formal opposition was witnessed. China also came up with a narrative that Quad, as a

group was led by the United States, were 'pawns' of the United States; China also pointed to the fact that all four nations of Quad differed in their policies towards China and thus, Quad was a built on weak foundations.

Despite China's confrontational attitude to the established rules-based order and down-riding the importance and strategic heft of Quad, and the asymmetrical power equations and divergence of views on what constituted the aims, purposes, and objectives of Quad 2.1, this forum gained momentum. This was built on a sense that the new Quad agenda needed to be positive, productive, and constructive towards this region in order to expand its presence and gain the trust of a multitude of diverse concerns of nations in the Indo-Pacific. Thus by 2019, Quad had surfaced in the Indo Pacific rim as a more viable group with a stronger commitment towards finding common areas of cooperation, without directly outlining the need to compete with China in the security realm even as it identified strategic sectors like infrastructure, critical technologies, and intelligence sharing for cooperation.

Quad 2.2: Pandemic and Roll-Out

Certain structural geopolitical changes characterized the pre-pandemic scenario. Under the Trump administration, the US adopted a confrontational approach, and the trade war between the nations grew. Japan's disposition towards China was shifting from "*seikei bunri"* to a more security-based orientation.[24] India's "Act East Policy" was gaining currency, and China's presence in the region was a considerable threat. Australia, too, because of its domestic politics, had distanced itself from China. On November 24, 2019, a Quad meeting of senior officials reflected a more directed agenda. The officials agreed that the Quad would enhance practical regional cooperation in fields such as maritime, counter-terrorism, cyber and humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief,[25] and looked forward to a foreign ministerial meeting in early 2020.

Little did one envisage that from March 2020, the world would witness a threat that would impose itself on every quarter of existence. Whle a health issue, its tentacles would impact society, economy, politics and re-orient the world, bringing forth the basic instinct of survival and a strong sense of nationalism. China was the 'bad boy' as it was established that the virus originated and spread from Wuhan. Protecting one's people from this outbreak was uppermost in the leaders' minds, leading to the closer of borders. "Lockdown", "masking", and "social distance" became the singular vocabulary of nations and all attention was focused on the health and related sectors. PPE, covid testing kits, mask manufacturing and vaccine acquisition drove nations to divert resources and establish manufacturing on emergency timelines. As the pandemic lay siege to nations, health sectors crumbled, showing just how vulnerable many nations really were. While governments became cognizant of looking beyond traditional security to embrace a model for "comprehensive security," a new variable called "supply chain security" raised alarm as industries in countries shut down because of lack of supply of resources and inputs—primary resources, semi-processed inputs, components, and assembling units. The integration that globalization had achieved, especially in the Asia-Pacific under the principle of 'free trade and comparative advantage', stood exposed due to the pandemic, and many nations became inward-looking. With no roadmap available of either how to control the virus or how to put the economy back on track, nations grappled the best they could, bringing forth the critical need for good leadership.

Against this backdrop, Quad officials held a virtual meeting to discuss the all-encompassing issue of the COVID-19, inviting three new partners: South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand. They looked for ways to synergize collective efforts to contain the spread. This move is comparable to the origin of Quad 1.0 when yet another disaster had brought them together. This would pave the way for a more pragmatic model as most nations in this pandemic crisis faced predicaments on the economic front and desired stability in the region. It was well accepted in

these meetings that they would not contest China's aggression in their neighbourhood at a bilateral level.[26] The outcome was officially low key. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a readout of the March 20, 2020 meeting, only said that these countries had a telephonic conference to share best practices and collaborate in their efforts to contain the spread of the virus.[27] Coverage of subject included the vaccine development, stranded citizens and coping with economic impact. While the meeting got much visibility because of the addition of members, it was criticized for offering neither a direction nor a plan of action.

As the pandemic continued to rage, China continued increasing its presence in the Indo-Pacific region by swarming the Sea of Japan, circumnavigating Japan, and conducting exercises simultaneously in the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. For Japan, protecting its territory and committing its allies to the cause of free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) had become a critical security concern. This was furthered by awareness of the supply chain issues that unfolded during the pandemic, causing severe distress to Japan's already faltering economic recovery. While domestic policies were formulated to encourage Japanese companies to delink from China, Japan desperately needed the world to recognize China's aggressive behavior and support the principle of rules-based order. For India, it was not only the presence of China in the waters of the Indian Ocean that caused alarm, but closer to home, China moved its military into Indian territory of Galwan Valley, which resulted in a stand-off, incurring a loss of men and material. Prime Minister Narendra Modi also addressed the nation, stating, "India wants peace. But on provocation, India will give a befitting reply[28]." This incursion from China happened at a time when India was crumbling under the onslaught of Covid-19 and facing the worst surge. While keen to maintain strategic autonomy, India was driven to align itself with the American cause of "containing" China. Australia had distanced itself from Quad 1.0 in 2007 to buy peace with China. In the interim period between Quad 1.0

and Quad 2.0, China's power projection beyond the first island chain, namely Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines, to the second island chain including Guam and into the Pacific, raised Australian anxiety. As Australia asked for an investigation on Covid -19 origin and spread from Wuhan, it faced the wrath of the Chinese embargo—the days of Australian balancing between China and the United States as a policy had waned considerably. The United States, under the Trump Administration, had embarked on a confrontational policy with China, and over time, the three other Quad members under these new circumstances converging with the United States.

The determination of the Quad nations was revealed when the foreign ministers met in person in October 2020. While a much-desired joint statement did not eventuate, sending signals that the four nations were yet to come to an agreement on China, the readouts of each nation gave certain indications as to where the Quad was heading. Each of these nations gave their vision of Indo-Pacific. In either one or two of the nation's opening remarks, four words were mentioned: inclusive, resilient, peaceful, and stable. As expected, an inclusive Indo- Pacific found mention in Australia and India's version, thus confirming these nations' hesitation to draw swords against China. Resilient was mentioned only in Australia's opening remark, pointing to their economic focus of delinking with China. India and Australia used "stability" in their vision, desiring more directed permanence. On the other hand, Japan preferred the adjective 'peaceful' for this region. The nuanced argument would be that India and Australia's use of stability pointed to their security concern, and Japan avoided such strong references to bypass China's attack. However, the inclusion of both security and economic interests were common to all of the opening remarks.

The most positive outcome of this meeting was an agenda encompassing long-lasting concerns of the centrality of ASEAN in Quad activities, maritime security, and counter-terrorism as well as new issues of Covid response and recovery and the importance of resilient supply chains. But, to the watchers of this

forum, a lack of a joint agreement foretold that a common China policy was yet to have been achieved. Nevertheless, if one carefully lists out the activities that Quad members had engaged in through working groups or otherwise, fifteen activities like official meetings, ambassadors' meetings, signing of logistic agreements etc., have taken place. Thus, slowly but surely, Quad cooperation on a larger canvas was in the making. These types of working groups helped create interdependence among members and augurs well for further institutionalization.

As President of the United States, Joe Biden pledged to improve and make amends with his allies. Within 100 days he called for the Leaders' Summit of the Quadrilateral Framework, held virtually on March 12, 2021, with the other three leaders—Suga, Morrison, and Modi, showing their commitment to Quad and Indo-Pacific region. The Quad meeting happened took place on the heels of the 2021 Munich Conference, reflecting the importance that the United States gives to the Quad. The meeting highlighted cooperation among the member countries to beat the global COVID-19 pandemic, with the joint vaccine partnership and the need for an "open" and "free" Indo-Pacific region. A joint statement, "The Spirit of Quad", outlined "we will join forces to expand safe, affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable access to speed economic recovery and benefit global health."[29] The virtual summit concentrated on the immediate needs of the members. Nevertheless, an open statement on maritime security focused on "collaboration, including in maritime security, to meet challenges to the rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas"[30], suggesting a potential for future common action and also reflecting buy-in by India. Traditionally, the maritime security issue was dressed down due to the uneasiness of India. Further, a paragraph on North Korea's denuclearisation spoke volumes in the Quad as a vehicle for seeking stability in the region. In addition, five working groups, namely the vaccine expert working group, a critical and emerging technology working group, a climate working group for technology, and working groups for capacity building and climate finance, were identified during the summit. In a nutshell, the

virtual summit meeting heralded on the one hand the urgency of Quad and its importance in diplomacy, and on the other, that it would work on a multitude of areas of need and cooperation beyond security cooperation.

Between the virtual and in-person summit-level meetings, official working groups and the foreign ministerial meetings were held. These meetings continued to reiterate the same lines: "They recognized that the changes underway in the world makes a strong case for their countries working closely together. It was important for the international community that the direction of changes remains positive and beneficial to all."[31]

While the virtual summit set an agenda and put to rest fears of the fragility of this group, the in-person meeting within six months showed commitment of the four democracies. The joint statement, which concentrated on global health, climate change, critical emerging technologies, cyber security, and a Quad fellowship as part of people-to-people exchange, put forth "softer" projects in line with Indo-Pacific needs instead of promoting a singular counter-China orientation for the grouping. Given India's hesitancy of naming China as well as that of ASEAN, whose "centrality" has become a defining proposition in the Quad's public billing, the future of Quad is increasingly defined by the role it will play carrying along with it smaller states as it seeks to work a larger canvas.

AUKUS and its Implication

A new trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States was announced on September 15, 2021, for the Indo-Pacific region. It was not a treaty per se, but an agreement. In a joint statement,[32] Joe Biden, Boris Johnson, and Scott Morrison announced that in order to "deepen diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, we are announcing the creation of an enhanced trilateral security partnership called AUKUS", that, the leaders claimed, "will strengthen the ability of each to support our security and

defense interests" through fostering "deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains." The objective was clear: strengthening Australia's defense capability and enhancing Australia's naval power. What caught the attention was that the deal called for the United States to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines. This sends a significant message to China, as these submarines can quickly reach and sustain presence in the waters of China. Further, the US has never shared this technology with anyone beyond the United Kingdom. Through this agreement, the liberal order is positioned to push back against China's ambitions and aggression for the first time.

AUKUS raised a few questions, especially around timing: it came just as the United States lost diplomatic ground after the disastrous exit from Afghanistan, and now it had to deal with the angst of France (beyond the purview of this paper). In addition, because it came close to the in-person Quad summit , many questioned the relevance of Quad in view of AUKUS and what role Quad will play in light of this agreement, which has two members of Quad, and brings the United Kingdom into the Indo-Pacific region.

AUKUS is, however, is more decisively addressing an essential concern of this region: aggressive China, although this element was couched in avoidant rhetoric to appease nations in the Quad forum. Having the advantage of comprehending the joint statement of the in-person Quad summit meet, it is clear that AUKUS has ventured into the military domain in which Quad has been reluctant to step in and had evolved away from. It exposed the Quad's self-imposed limits and either its inability or lack of desire to pursue a military role. The joint statements, which provide mention of North Korea and Myanmar, provide evidence of this even as they directly avoiding mentioning China.

This takes us back to the origin of Quad, which, after all, was for a humanitarian cause in which the four nations showed lightning speed in decision-making and deployment and during which time there were recurring references to the need to delivering global public goods and addressing security and strategic

concern through infrastructure building, cooperation in technologies and 2+2 dialogues while avoiding antagonising China. This is how we should assesses Quad and its relationship to AUKUS in the security domain of the Indo-Pacific region. It implies that Quad, with its crowded agenda, no institutional framework and a large canvas, will work on building the Indo-Pacific FOIP vision through developmental projects and counter China by synergizing on critical technologies by harnessing each other strengths, and post-COVID-19, will focus on an alternative resilient supply chain which could negatively impact China's economy. Thus, the Quad approach is long-term oriented, which will not pose any threat through its immediate actions yet could strengthen this region for the future.

India welcomed AUKUS because, internationally, it showed American political resolve to engage militarily in the Indo-Pacific. It put to rest the longstanding dilemma of transferring military nuclear propulsion technology. India has its own nuclear submarine programme, and as India is consumed by threats from China in its Himalayan border, AUKUS helps protect its maritime flank. Thus, it reassures India which could have felt marginalized in this environment. Further, with yet another Quad between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and India in the making, India is gaining the confidence of multilateral engagement. It seeks to use these platforms to gain international standing.

Japan appreciated AUKUS because for Japan containing China needs an alliance system. Burdened by its pacifist constitution, Japan does not have the capacity to handle China on its own. AUKUS brings in the heavyweight United Kingdom into the picture, it furthers US commitment, and Australia's increased power projection, especially as it has shifted out of the pro-China mindset over the years, also assures Japan of Australia's definitive orientation.

ASEAN nations' responses to AUKUS have been more tentative. ASEAN is the most dynamic region of the world, follows consensual decision-making, lacks strategic ambitions as the epitome of multilateral groupings, decided to stay away

from US-China rivalry and tried to position itself as a neutral broker. Of late, China's presence in this region's economic and strategic outreach had pushed ASEAN nations to demand centrality in any strategic game plan. AUKUS has definitely shaken the balance of power equation. The reaction of Indonesia's Foreign Ministry was targeted towards criticising the continuing arms race and power projection in the region and said that Indonesia was "deeply concerned" about "Australia's commitment to continue meeting all of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations".[33] Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob, in a telephone call with Morrison the day following the AUKUS agreement, "expressed concern over the AUKUS cooperation, which will catalyze the nuclear arms race in the Indo-Pacific region."[34] While Philippines Duterte welcomed the agreement, he seconded the concerns of Indonesia and Malaysia. While the issue of the arms race and nuclear proliferation is being raised, Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand's silence is an implicit recognition of the fact that AUKUS stands to neutralize China's influence.

In a nutshell, the AUKUS is decisively a military agreement with a strong focus on technology sharing, having opened doors to sharing military nuclear propulsion technology, amongst other weapons systems. While it has implications for nations in this region, Chinese now encounters a formidable force driven by the United States, positioned through Australia. AUKUS has been derided for its Anglo-Saxon overtones and some claim that it distorts peace and stability. AUKUS does not, however, replace Quad, and all Quad nations understand the significance of this agreement. Instead, it allows Quad to pursue a more natural agenda "providing global public goods" as a policy, which will strengthen the nations in this region by embedding critical technologies, communication networks, and infrastructures.

Conclusions

Quad is not a formal treaty, and for its members, it is not the only platform in Asia. It has brought like-minded maritime democracies together. Further, bilateral and trilateral agreements also bind them. Quad cooperation has peeked and waned depending on the leader's commitment and domestic politics of these four nations. It has responded to crises, like the pandemic, more promptly than China's aggressive moves in the Indo-Pacific region. Quad achievements are in developmental and humanitarian areas. It has been fluid, engaging with more nations; an example is the inclusion of Singapore in maritime exercise in Quad 1.0 and South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand in the Quad 2.2 virtual meet of officials at the beginning of the pandemic. The Quad journey from Quad 1.0 to Quad 2.2 lines up with the argument that nations realign, upgrade or downgrade according to the current strategic ecosystem. Quad, therefore, illustrates the crux on which alignment theory rest. AUKUS, on the other hand, resst on the alliance theory as it currently stands as a security alliance between alliance partners with a focus on the Indo Pacific.

Quad critics have questioned it for crowding the agenda and playing on too large a canvas. Quad nations have their differences, but because of engagement through many platforms, they have had increased interactions and cooperation, helping to iron out differences and develop trust. Even when the Quad was temporality defunct, the Quad nations were involved in many forms of bilateral and trilateral engagement, reiterating the importance of "alignment".

Quad is here to stay because one witness many new formulations, in line with the current Quad, like India, the United States, Israel, and United Arab Emirates. The pandemic has created uncertainties that have compelled nations to recalibrate their domestic policies and international relations. The vulnerabilities beyond traditional security concerns like the issue of the supply chain, health inadequacy, digital insufficiency etc, has necessitated more cooperation. While

China continues to show its belligerence, the defence of the liberal order requires countries to work in multi-faceted options to push back against China.

The signing of AUKUS led to a debate over the role of Quad. While the initiation of Quad contained security elements in its initial schema, as discussed above, the containment of China could never be overtly nor covertly embraced. Rather, it has been apparent from its agenda that stronger convergence is visible in the developmental paradigm. This is appropriate given that the impromptu coming together of these nations was originally as a humanitarian act. Thus, the Quad will cooperate on strategic infrastructure and technologies to underpin economic development and stability. In the long run, strengthening and securing the economies of this region will require cohesive, networked nations. Thus, given the current world disorder, establishing platforms for "productive global public goods" will help connect the smaller nations to the realization of the Quad's ambition of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

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JAPAN AND FOREIGN TERRITORY STRIKE: DEBATE, DETERRENCE, AND DEFENSE STRENGTH

Corey Wallace

Kanagawa University

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Abstract

The increased frequency of debate in Japan over foreign territory strike points to it being officially affirmed as a Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) mission in the near future. This article explores the foreign territory strike debate through the lens of the four key questions that have structured the post-war debate on all new overseas SDF operations: is it constitutional?; is it (militarily) plausible?; is it (strategically) wise?; and, is it (politically) acceptable? After discussing the contours of the Japanese post-war legal and policy debate on the use of force in foreign territory, the article describes contemporary doubts over the tactical effectiveness and strategic opportunity cost of configuring the SDF to conduct overseas strike operations—especially for missile defense purposes. Foreign territory strike would divert scarce fiscal resources and political attention from adaptations that enhance the US-Japan alliance's posture resilience and enable it to sustainably generate force even after an initial attack, thereby augmenting regional deterrence. The article concludes by noting that political barriers could also still prevent the mission from being substantively and credibly implemented. Acrimonious domestic debate on foreign territory strike could also hamstring government attempts to attract public buy-in for future defense transformation in areas of greater priority and that add more to deterrence than the acquisition of modest strike capabilities.

Keywords: Self-Defense-Force, overseas strike operations, legal and policy debate, political barriers

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New Overseas SDF Operations

The Japanese government has incrementally and consistently affirmed a wide range of new missions for the SDF since the 1970s. Then, a quiet focus on anti-submarine warfare operations against the Soviet Union to Japan's north was embraced by the SDF as an alliance contribution (Patalano, 2008). The SDF soon began participating in overseas training exercises like RIMPAC (Woolley & Woolley 1996), and the government also authorized the SDF to defend Japan's Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) out to 1000 nautical miles in the 1980s (Graham 2005). In the 1990s, the government passed legislation enabling SDF contributions to United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKOs) and post-ceasefire non-combat operations such as minesweeping (Hatakeyama, 2014). Legislation passed in 1999 also established the legal basis for the SDF to provide non-combatant, logistical rear area support (*kōhō chiiki shien*) to foreign military operations in areas around Japan (*shuuhen jitai*) that, "if left unchecked, could result in an armed attack against Japan" (Galic, 2019). Special measures laws were enacted based on this legislation in the new millennium, and Tokyo dispatched all three branches of the SDF to the Indian Ocean and/or Iraq to provide logistical or reconstruction assistance to the United States and other foreign militaries (Harano, 2015). The dispatch of naval vessels to the Gulf of Aden to protect foreign commercial vessels followed the passage of anti-piracy legislation in 2009 (Cabinet Secretariat, 2015). The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government later established Japan's first long-term post-war military base in Djibouti ostensibly to cooperate with other nations on anti-piracy operations. The base was subsequently expanded and became a base for SDF training and for regional evacuation operations.

In 2015, the Japanese parliament passed omnibus legislation that, to an unprecedented degree, loosened prior restrictions on both the "use of weapons" (*buki no shiyō*) and the "use of force" (*buryoku no kōshi*) during overseas SDF operations. In legal terms, the use of weapons is simply the use of equipment and

machinery to directly kill or harm people, or to destroy physical objects. The 2015 Peace and Security Legislation (PSL) granted Japan's National Security Council (NSC) the authority to permit the SDF to use weapons to protect foreign military assets during select peacetime operations, and in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to protect or even rescue members of the same operation (Bosack, 2017). The SDF would also be able to use weapons during rescue missions in foreign territory to protect evacuees if operations took place outside of a combat zone and Tokyo attained the consent of local governing entities. This authority was eventually invoked in August 2021 to evacuate Japanese and Afghan nationals from Afghanistan (Bosack, 2021).

However, not all uses of weapons are equivalent to the use of force. The use of force is defined by the Japanese government as acts of combat by agents of states or state-like organizations engaged in international armed conflict (MOD, 2019: 248). The post-war Japanese government proscribed the use of force by the Japanese military outside of a direct, organised, and pre-meditated attack on Japan up until the 2014 reinterpretation of Article 9 of the constitution by the Abe administration (Kurosaki, 2018). The reinterpretation process resulted in new conditions for the use of force and envisaged the development of "seamless security legislation to ensure Japan's survival" that would enable the SDF to exercise 'limited' collective self-defense rights for the first time in the post-war period (MOD, 2019: 198). The 2015 passage of the PSL resulted in the SDF being able to make contributions in international waters and airspace to use of force operations by other nations in a "close relationship with Japan" during so-called "survival-threatening situations" (*sonritsu kiki jitai*) where an attack on Japan may be imminent or anticipated (Kurosaki, 2018; Liff, 2018). The PSL also expanded and regularized the SDF's ability to provide non-combatant logistical and other support contributions to international peace support activities that have "an important influence on Japan's security" as well as operations authorised by the United Nations (Bosack, 2017; Effinowicz, 2019).

The Use of Force in Foreign Territory in Post-War Japan

While still highly regulated by law, the accreted adaptations over the last 40 years have enhanced the Japanese government's ability to use the SDF for Japan's own security and as a tool of diplomacy and strategy. As various formerly assumed-to-be red lines regarding overseas dispatch, the use of weapons, and the use of force have blurred, one important line stands out in sharp relief as marking the barrier between the antimilitarist restraint of the post-war era and the full 'normalization' of the SDF as a military: the purposive use of force in the territorial land, sea, and air space of another country. Post-war Diet debates have focused on the exercise of two forms of such force: combat dispatch (*kaigai hahei*) and foreign territory strike.

Kaigai Hahei

Kaigai hahei is the dispatch of troops for the explicit purpose of engaging in combat against a state or state-like actor inside another nation's territory. In Japan's post-war constitutional debate all governments have affirmed that combat dispatch is proscribed—even if a state consents to Japan dispatching the SDF to its own territory during an ongoing conflict (Komori, 1961; Kurosaki, 2018). *Kaigai hahei* is distinguished in Japanese constitutional interpretation from *kaigai haken*, which is the dispatch of the SDF overseas for "peaceful purposes" not requiring or anticipating the use of force or the entry of forces into a combat zone (Keddell, 1993: 177-8; Haley, 2005:30-32).

Even when Abe announced in 2014 that he had reinterpreted the constitution to allow Japan to exercise limited collective self-defense rights, he emphasised that the new interpretation or enabling legislation would still not allow Japan to become a "nation that can go to war" (*nihon ga futatabi sensou wo suru kuni ni naru to itta gokai ga arimasu*). Abe's comments pointed to Article 9 of the Japanese constitution and its prohibition on the possession and use of war

potential for inflicting "catastrophic damage" (*kaimetsu-teki na hakai*), and on the exercise of belligerency rights, which under international law govern the ability of militaries to use lethal force against each other and occupy/invade foreign territories during wartime (Moriya, 1999; Inaba, 2020: 42-43). According to Abe, the SDF would still not deliberately enter a combat zone outside of Japan, "would never join armed conflicts such as the Gulf War and Iraq War with the intent of using force", or engage in "acts like launching air strikes, shelling, and forcibly entering the enemy's territory" based on the exercise of collective self-defense (Wallace, 2015: 282-286).

PSL deliberations did, however, raise a unique scenario pertaining to the Strait of Hormuz and whether *kaigai hahei* would remain proscribed going forward. Ships carrying 80 percent of Japan's crude oil imports currently use a narrow three-kilometre passage to transit the Strait of Hormuz, and blockage of this passage with mines or active forces would have a major impact on resource and energy-poor Japan. The Strait of Hormuz is, however, entirely covered by the territorial seas of Iran and Oman. If a coastal state decided to mine Hormuz, safe passage would require minesweeping in foreign territory. This "simple act of removing a dangerous object" during an ongoing conflict also technically constitutes the use of force under international law (Fujisue, 2015). Would Japan be able to conduct minesweeping missions in the Hormuz Strait without a formal ceasefire?

The Japanese government argued that, "in general", *kaigai hahei* would remain prohibited. However, it claimed a Hormuz exception where SDF dispatch to use "passive and restricted" force (like minesweeping) might be required in the foreign territory of another nation to ensure Japan's survival (Fujisue, 2015). The implausibility of the hypothetical scenario together with the unrealistic conditions placed on minesweeping operations in these waters during Diet deliberations, however, gradually transformed the 'Hormuz exception' (Kurosaki, 2018) to the *kaigai hahei* ban into the epitome of 'the exception that proves the rule'. The

government established that the SDF could not be dispatched to the Strait of Hormuz for "economic impact reasons" (Mainichi Shimbun, 2015) alone and could only conduct minesweeping there without a formal ceasefire—and only minesweeping—if failure to do so would precipitate a threat to Japan's existence. Thus, dispatch could not take place until Japan's energy reserves had run out and "life-or-death" effects were being felt (such as citizens dying from cold). The government estimated in the Diet that this would take 6 months (Jiji, 2015).

Furthermore, the hypothetical Hormuz activities would require prior Diet approval, and minesweeping units could only use force in a "passive" and "restricted" sense by removing the mines—that is, they could only operate if they did not require protection and there was little possibility of their being attacked and their activities could be completed "safely"—despite nearby Iranian military installations (Fujisue, 2015). The SDF could also not conduct minesweeping in Hormuz waters while it was also providing logistical support to partner militaries operating close by (NHK, 2015). The very premise of Japan being starved of energy due to Iran enforcing a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz with mines alone for an extended period was also questioned. If it succeeded, Iran would create its own 'survival threatening situation' by mining the Strait for an extended period. More likely, however, Iran would fail: its ability to lay mines is extremely limited relative to the offensive counter-mine warfare capabilities possessed by the United States and others (O'Neil & Talmadge, 2009; Montani, 2015). The plausibility of the Strait remaining mined for 6 months, without intervention by others or Iran militarily challenging minesweeping activities (a condition of Japanese dispatch), and where only Japan's minesweeping capabilities could resolve the situation, was, according to one former Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) officer and military analyst, "beyond absurd" (Montani, 2015). The answer to the constitutionality question around *kaigai hahei* effectively remains 'no'.

Events soon revealed the continued salience of combined constitutional, legal, and public opinion restrictions on Japan's ability to operate overseas,

including during a Hormuz contingency. In July 2019, amid US-Iran tensions and an unidentified attack on two tankers, the United States proposed a military coalition to patrol the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait off the coast of Yemen. Donald Trump soon named Japan as a nation that "should be protecting [its] own ships" in the area, including Hormuz (Fang, 2019). However, the Japanese government reviewed its legislation and found no suitable basis to meet the President's demands (Ishinabe, 2019). Despite one of the attacked tankers being operated by a Japanese company, Minister of Defense Iwaya Takeshi elaborated that "not every violation of the prohibition on the use of force triggers the right to self-defense", and that, even if Iranian agents were involved, the attack was not directed towards Japan as "an organized, premeditated use of force against a state" (Effinowicz, 2019). In fact, Tokyo determined that the situation could not even be considered an "important influence" situation.

Tokyo decided to shelve deliberation on the publicly sensitive mission until after the July 2019 House of Councillors election, hoping international tensions would settle. Tokyo eventually dispatched the Takanami destroyer and two P-3C surveillance craft in February 2020, but limited operations to independent "research and study" as allowed by an obscure provision in the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (Pugliese & Maslow, 2019). The MSDF would not, however, operate in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. If an attack was initiated on civilian vessels (MOD, 2019b), operations could be switched to a Maritime Security Action (*kaijō keibi kōdō*)—a form of maritime policing under the SDF Law rather than the use of force, and an action that can only be carried out on the high seas or in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone or territory. The use of weapons would also be limited to the immediate protection of Japan-related ships (registered in Japan or carrying cargo to Japan), meaning foreign ships would have to be left alone even if attacked in front of the SDF.

Foreign Territory Strike

Tokyo has more constitutional leeway on the second form of the purposive use of force in foreign territory: missile strikes by the SDF on military positions in foreign territory to stop missile attacks on Japan. In a 1956 Diet statement, Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō straightforwardly said: "I cannot believe that it is the constitution's intention for us to sit and wait for our own destruction" (Hatoyama, 1956). Hatoyama indicated that Japan could respond to overseas missile attacks in the face of an "imminent illegal invasion" by targeting foreign missile bases if there were no other options, and the Japanese response was limited to the "the minimum measures unavoidably necessary". Whether Hatoyama and subsequent governmental statements on the issue constitutionally permitted pre-emptive strikes (*sensei kōgeki*) in foreign territories before the onset of an attack on Japan has been contested (Samuels, 2007: 47, 58; Schoff & Song, 2017). Government interpretations insist that attacks on foreign military positions cannot be justified by reference to strategic advantage or convenience, thereby ruling out "preventive" strikes (Ino, 1959; Schoff and Song, 2017). The government also notes that preemptive strikes based only on a perception of imminent threat are prohibited under the UN Charter and that Article 88 (Paragraph 2) of the Self-Defense Force (SDF) Law requires any use of force by Japan to remain consistent with international law (Norota, 1999; Abe, 2017). Recent statements by some government officials do, however, acknowledge the international legality and constitutional permissibility of (militarily implausible) "at launch" or "armed-attack-initiation" strikes (Schoff & Song, 2017; Kurosaki, 2020).

Legal parsing aside, it is nevertheless clear that striking missile positions in foreign countries once an attack has begun is a constitutionally admissible form of self-defense. Until now, however, Tokyo eschewed even this narrow 'missile defense'-focused conception of foreign territory strike as declaratory policy, as a component of alliance role sharing, and as a legal mission under the SDF Law. Until recently, it also avoided accumulating the necessary military components

required for such a mission. Relying on alliance role division of 'spear' and 'shield', where the (nuclear tipped) spear of the United States would suffice for strategic deterrence, the strike-as-missile-defense scenario was considered highly unrealistic and far beyond the capabilities of a Japanese military only then beginning remilitarization during the Cold War. In addition to plausibility doubts, Tokyo's attempt to strategically reengage with Asia while still burdened with its wartime reputation also made it sensible to de-emphasise the SDF's power projection capabilities. The Japanese public also required reassurance. It remained sensitive throughout the Cold War to any possibility of the SDF engaging in opportunistic or destructive actions overseas that would bring back the "horrors of war through the action of government" to the Japanese archipelago, thereby undermining Japan's nascent economic recovery, its citizens' enjoyment of democracy and social and cultural wellbeing, and Japan's international rehabilitation (Wallace, 2015). Thus, while foreign territory strike missions were not automatically deemed unconstitutional, the Japanese government's commitment in 1957 to the principle of *senshu bōei* (Abe, 2015; Iwama & Murano, 2021), or "exclusively defense-oriented policy", essentially represented a 'no' answer to the questions of strategic wisdom and political acceptability around foreign territory strike.

A New Debate Stirs

As North Korea enhances its power projection capabilities in the post-war period, different answers to the foreign territory strike question are being entertained in Japan. Schoff and Song (2017) note that the first official ruling LDP study panel on strike capabilities directly followed North Korea's Taepodong-1 missile test in 1998. The first significant public debate, however, took place in 2003. Less than a month after North Korea's demonstration of a missile with the speed, range, and accuracy to reach Japan within ten minutes and do significant damage, the United States initiated its second war against Iraq. Like the 1991 Gulf War, the

Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile (hereafter, Tomahawk) took centre stage as American and British militaries relentlessly and precisely dismembered Iraq's political and military infrastructure. Tokyo was watching: one Japanese defense official marvelled at the time how the Tomahawk "could hit a soccer goal in Hakata if launched from Tokyo" (Hirata, 2003).

In response to Diet questioning by Maehara Seiji, then defense chief Ishiba Shigeru explicitly affirmed that the Tomahawk was not a constitutionally prohibited, "exclusively offensive" weapon capable of causing catastrophic destruction inside another country's territory, and therefore was not "war potential" (Ishiba, 2003). Later the same day, Prime Minister Koizumi backed up his cabinet colleague: "isn't it fine to investigate? We're committed to *senshu bōei*; this won't change" (Hirata, 2003). The Japan Defense Agency (now Ministry of Defense) was soon investigating the acquisition of the Tomahawk from the United States. It failed to gain its ally's acquiescence and the pursuit of ballistic missile defense (BMD) in the alliance context refocused discussion temporarily in Japan. Various LDP politicians, including former prime ministers Asō Tarō and Abe Shinzō, and even major opposition politicians such as Maehara, nevertheless continued to raise the possibility of Japan needing its own strike capabilities (Schoff & Song, 2017) until the DPJ took power in 2009.

When the LDP stormed back into power in late-2012 under Abe, it appeared determined to push forward on the strike agenda and effect a change in alliance role sharing. The LDP announced support for an official government study on strike capabilities to be included in Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), a key statement detailing Japan's mid-range defense priorities (LDP, 2013). In the official NDPG for 2014 and Beyond, the suggestion was watered down out of consideration for the LDP's still nominally 'pacifist' coalition partner, Komeito: it called for a general study on "response capability" to ballistic missile threats and for "appropriate" alliance role-sharing (MOD, 2014). Schoff and Song note that the Abe administration in the 2017 Defense

White Paper then "laid the rhetorical groundwork" for a more concerted push on foreign territory strike by highlighting that North Korea's military development constituted a "new level of threat" (*aratana dankai no kyōi*) to Japan and the region." The 2019 NDPG followed this up with a section on "Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capability" that identified Japan potentially adopting a "form of response capability to address the means for missile launch and related facilities", although it only committed to "continue to study" the option (MOD, 2018).

Aegis Ashore's cancellation in 2020 then provided another opportunity to advance the strike debate by drawing attention to interceptor-focused BMD limitations. Using active electronically scanned arrays (AESA) more resistant to jamming and difficult to detect, Japan's selection of Lockheed Martin's AN/SPY 7 radar for the land-based Aegis Ashore system promised greater precision and three times more coverage for the interception of incoming ballistic missiles than the passive phased array AN/SPY-1D radars then installed on Aegis-equipped MSDF and US Navy destroyers. In addition to enhanced power generation capacity, land-based deployment would allow 24/7 coverage and free up the MSDF and US Navy from ballistic missile defense duties. The alternatives to a land-based Aegis Ashore would, however, be both less effective and more expensive. Subsequent to Tokyo's initial 2017 commitment to procure Aegis Ashore, North Korea had also demonstrated different types of ballistic missiles with harder-to-intercept trajectories and enhanced its ability to overwhelm interceptor-based defenses with barrages of cheaper missiles (Kosaka, 2020; Murano, 2020).

These regional military developments, Aegis Ashore's cancellation, President Trump's enthusiasm for foreign arms sales compared to previous presidents who refused to sell Tomahawks to Japan, together with renewed doubts about Japan's "excessive dependence on the U.S. for its defense", moved the LDP to establish a task force to re-evaluate Japan's missile defense options in July 2020

(Tajima, 2020; Tanaka, 2020a; Corben, 2020). One option strongly supported by some defense conservatives, such as former defense minister Nakatani Gen and former Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Satō Masahisa, was for a Tomahawk-enabled long-range strike capability (Mori, 2020a; Sato, 2020; Tanaka, 2020a). When the task force submitted its proposals to Prime Minister Abe in August, it recommended the "need for new measures that will heighten deterrence, including possession of the capability of preventing ballistic missile launches even from within enemy territory" (Nikkei Shimbun, 2020a), or what it called "missile interdiction" (*aite ryōikinai de soshi*). Abe immediately convened a meeting of the NSC to consider the changes, promising to "move ahead in setting a new direction and swiftly implement" new measures (Asahi Shimbun, 2020a). In a prime minister's statement released just before leaving office, Abe questioned his government's own BMD plans by asking, "is it really possible to protect people's lives and peace of mind simply by improving our interceptor capability?" (Maeda, 2021: 17).

Abe's successor, Suga Yoshihide, did not move swiftly or implement the measures. However, candidates vying to replace Suga as LDP leader and prime minister showed greater enthusiasm during the September 2021 LDP presidential race. Takaichi Sanae argued that Japan needed the ability to retaliate against North Korea with longer-range missiles and should also acquire electromagnetic pulse weapons and cyber-capabilities to neutralise missile attacks at launch (Jiji, 2021a). Prime minister-to-be Kishida Fumio, formerly a dovish politician on national security, labelled "foreign base attack" (*tekikichi kōgeki*) a powerful and viable option for Japan. The LDP's manifesto for the October 2021 House of Representatives election, strongly influenced by Takaichi, indirectly referenced the option (LDP, 2021). China and North Korea's testing of new missiles just as election campaigning began in Japan provided Kishida the opportunity to demonstrate his hawkish bona fides by proposing that "enemy base attack"

capability be included in the revisions to the 2013 National Security Strategy (NSS) and other defense-related policy documents (Oohashi, 2021).

Is it (Militarily) Plausible?

On paper, long-range guided missiles like the Tomahawk appear to meet Japan's need for a precise countermeasure against North Korean missile launches (Sato, 2020). It would allow the SDF to launch long-range strikes from Japanese territory "when unavoidably necessary" against missile positions on the Korean Peninsula well beyond North Korea's threat envelope while limiting the scale of destruction. The battle-proven Tomahawk ($1.8 million for Block IV) is also considerably cheaper than a SM-3 Block IIA BMD interceptor ($18.4 million), which is still untested in battle. The Japanese government has other options for "missile interdiction" strike missions if Tomahawk acquisition is denied (Jiji 2020a; Kyodo, 2020). Tokyo recently purchased the Norwegian Joint Strike Missile (JSM) for a planned procurement of over 100 F-35 fighter jets (Sankei Shimbun, 2017). The JSM has a range of 500kms and fits into the F-35's internal weapons bay, thereby preserving the fighter's low observability characteristics while extending its kinetic reach. Tokyo purchased four KC-46A in-air refuelling tankers that will extend or sustain in flight Japan's new fighters and their now enhanced ordnance (Jiji, 2019), and is also modifying the Izumo and Kaga helicopter destroyers to enable them to support F-35B operations as an aircraft carrier. The Japanese government also plans to reconfigure Japan's Type-12 missile for multiple launch platforms and extend its maximum range to 900 kilometres or more (Maeda, 2021: 18). In November 2021, it announced it would dedicate ¥100 billion (US$880 million) to develop a land-based variant for deployment after 2025, and ship-launched and fighter variants from 2026 and 2028, respectively (Nikkei Asia, 2021a). Tokyo is also investing in development of indigenous hypersonic "elemental technologies" such as SCRAM-jet propulsion, hard-to-intercept hyper velocity boost-glide vehicles (ostensibly for

"island defense"), and stand-off electronic warfare capabilities (Maetani, 2018; Axe, 2020).

The type of missile threat North Korea poses in 2021 is, however, quite different from when Ishiba initiated public debate in 2003. North Korea's base hardening and the building of underground tunnels, hangars, and military facilities makes pre-emption very unlikely with conventional cruise missiles. The 'subsonic' Tomahawk is also too slow as a first-line missile defense option, especially if fired from its 'safer' outer ranges as envisioned by strike proponents (Iwama & Murano, 2021). North Korea now fields solid-fuelled intermediate range ballistic missiles launchable from tracked transporter erector launchers (TELs)—manoeuvrable, multi-terrain, and increasingly reusable mobile launch platforms. TEL operators require fewer support vehicles compared to fixed site launches, need less preparation time to launch missiles (as little as five minutes), have greater choice of launch location, and can take advantage of concealment. Few practical options also exist for neutralizing North Korean platforms at launch with (non-nuclear) electromagnetic and offensive cyber capabilities (Chuunichi Shimbun, 2021). Cruise missile-enabled strike is also not going to be useful against submarine-launched missiles (Park & Kim, 2016).

Furthermore, even partial success in a missile interdiction role requires the SDF to become familiar with expensive and costly-to-maintain support platforms that it would ultimately have to operate close to contested DPRK territory (Takahashi, 2020a; Hornung, 2020a). Such platforms include space and ISR-enabled support systems to identify, locate, and track targets; airborne platforms to suppress enemy air defenses, conduct electronic warfare, disrupt communications, and deploy anti-radiation missiles against radar installations; and systems to replenish fuel and ordnance for sustained operations after an initial counterattack (Takahashi, 2020a; Hornung, 2020a; Jiji, 2020b). Japan has already started acquiring (E-767 AWACS, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, KC-46A in-air refuelling tanker aircraft) or thought about acquiring systems (EA-18G Growler,

Global Hawk) that would help. Much greater unit numbers will be needed, however, as well as UAVs and loitering munitions, due to distribution, disaggregation and redundancy requirements (Kata, 2018). Assuming Japan pays the initial outlays for the necessary equipment, estimated to be tens of billions of dollars (Reuters, 2014), simply maintaining these sophisticated systems could add an additional US$1 billion dollars to the annual defense budget (Abe, 2020).

Despite this cost, a 'Nodong Hunt' by Japan even with enhanced ISR and support is likely to be at best partially successful and mostly an exercise in operational disruption and damage mitigation (Jimbo, 2020; Taoka, 2021; Mori, 2020c). Such effects can contribute to deterrence if it ensures that the United States and Japan remain capable of generating force following an initial attack. However, prioritization of traditional interceptor-based BMD and other measures designed to enhance the resilience or survivability of US-Japan forces—and for civil defense—is essential on the assumption that some missiles will make it through the midcourse and terminal BMD layers (Mori, 2020c; Iwama & Murano, 2021). Only after addressing these priorities would a long-range strike capability usefully contribute to suppressant effects that disrupt the rate and simultaneity of subsequent attacks and decrease the raw number of attack nodes capable of attacking Japan (Mori, 2020c). However, given that the United States and South Korea enjoy geographic proximity to North Korea relative to Japan, they are much better situated to establish air dominance over the Korean Peninsula and to hunt and eliminate missile launchers (Taoka, 2021). Japan, on the other hand, could maximize its contribution to deterrence by supporting the deployment of regional BMD architecture and enhancing posture resilience to assure adversaries that the United States and its allies will remain capable of responding following any sudden attack (Heginbotham & Samuels, 2018a: 131-137, 153-156).

Is it (Strategically) Wise?

Reservations about the strategic opportunity cost of committing to developing strike capabilities have also been raised inside and outside Japan. Former defense minister Kōno Tarō argued during the recent LDP leadership race that Japan needs a "debate on deterrence instead of [on] base strike capabilities," and that strategy should drive capability acquisition and spending targets, rather than the other way around (Tajima, Tobita, & Kobara, 2021; Jiji, 2020d). Former defense minister Ishiba Shigeru also now questions the wisdom of Japan pursuing long-range strike capabilities despite his past advocacy. Ishiba and former defense minister Iwaya argued in mid-2020 that contemporary foreign territory strike discussions failed to consider likely mission effectiveness relative to costs, alliance functioning and American preferences, and potentially communicated unintended messages to its ally and the region regarding Japan's faith in the alliance and United States' nuclear umbrella (Mainichi Shimbun, 2020; Jiji, 2020c; Nishii, 2020).

Other sceptics note that Japanese defense debates tend to focus on high-tech, expensive, and symbolic silver bullet solutions to Japan's security problems while investments into affordable, but symbolically prosaic, lower technology adaptations are overlooked (Newsham 2020a; Jimbo, 2020; Heginbotham and Samuels, 2018a; Schadlow & Murano, 2021). While acknowledging areas of operational excellence such as minesweeping and anti-submarine warfare, RAND's Jeffery Hornung questions whether the SDF can effectively, and sustainability contribute to a high-end East China Sea contingency alongside a United States burdened with establishing and maintaining maritime control/aerial dominance. With extra spending, Tokyo could instead address long-standing SDF deficiencies in ISR capabilities, air/sea lift, and logistical support, as well as purchase greater numbers of agile and affordable air and maritime platforms (Hornung, 2020c). To make Japan's military posture (and the alliance's) more resilient and survivable, Tokyo could also invest in more extensive

base hardening initiatives, look at options for disaggregating capabilities and dispersing bases, airfields, and ports, and consider deceptive deployment of units, fuel, and ammunition (Heginbotham & Samuels 2018b; Hornung, 2020a; Newsham, 2020a; Tanaka, 2020b).

A serious attempt at configuring the SDF to undertake foreign territory strike missions would, however, be one more capability set to compete for already limited defense yen. Rising maintenance costs soak up a significant amount of new spending due in part to the higher intensity of SDF operations as Tokyo seeks to project greater power beyond Northeast Asia as well as contend with "attrition" strategies from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia closer to home (Patalano, 2020; MOD, 2020). These pressures contribute to procurement and system rollout delays, as does the increase in purchases of expensive foreign platforms with a weakened yen. Recently there has been a crowding out of naval shipbuilding by the purchase of high-end American aircraft, and only a modest uptick in Japan Coast Guard shipbuilding (Nikkei Asia, 2018; Wallace, 2020). Tokyo also does not invest enough in R&D to future proof Japan's military capabilities (Sankei Shimbun, 2020, 2021).

The likely long-term outcome is the erosion of 'core' capabilities as temptations for the SDF to adorn itself with disparate pockets of high-end capabilities accelerate in the current geopolitical environment. Ken Jimbo (2020) is most pointed when he notes that:

If Japan doesn't make clear the strategic rationale for allocating scarce resources to certain security or defense priorities, the risk of an inefficient or half-baked defense posture is high. For example, while leaving the defense budget as it essentially is, introducing a strategically meaningless level of long-range strike capability while not enhancing further BMD (after Aegis Ashore cancellation), will leave Aegis warships (over)burdened with missile defense duties, ultimately resulting in the neglect of the defense of the southwest maritime regions around

Japan. It is thus easy to see how this might lead to the collapse of Japan's overall defense portfolio [Author's translation].

Foreign territory strike also raises some tricky diplomatic questions regarding command-and-control structures for Japan (Hornung, 2020b). The US-Japan alliance provides strategic depth for the US-ROK alliance, while South Korea could provide essential intelligence and real time information on North Korean activities as well as a forward operating launchpad for Japan for any Peninsula contingencies (Mori, 2020b). This remains a political distant prospect, however, as neither Japan nor South Korea appears willing to turn down the heat on pointed historical issues that confound military cooperation and intelligence sharing. Japan's inability to deepen the military relationship with South Korea even while wishing to play a role in strike missions on the Korean Peninsula thus places additional diplomatic and coordination burdens on the United States that would be most unwelcome during wartime.

Foreign Territory Strike Beyond Missile Defense—and North Korea?

North Korea, and missile interdiction, are not the only concerns stimulating Japanese debate over foreign territory strike. The PRC has also accelerated its acquisition of conventionally armed missiles that can overwhelm Japan's missile defenses and destroy its military infrastructure and bases. The PRC has also built out its manoeuvre forces, thereby making it unlikely that Japan could prevail in defending "forward" in head-to-head naval and aerial engagements between Chinese and Japanese forces (Heginbotham & Samuels, 2018a: 131). China's military posture has also been configured to complicate United States' operations throughout East Asia and its ability to surge its forces into theatre (Kelly et al, 2014), thereby undermining the ability of America's armed forces to intervene on behalf of Japan and other allies who cannot match China individually.

This geopolitical background compounds residual anxiety in Tokyo about United States' commitment or interest in the region, exacerbated by the Trump administration's questioning of American alliance commitments (Samuels & Wallace, 2018). Tokyo is also watching whether the American withdrawal from Afghanistan under President Biden will result in the United States refocusing its significant military might on deterring Chinese military adventurism in East Asia (Akita, 2021), especially given pressures coming from within the Democratic Party to decrease defense spending (Heginbotham & Samuels, 2021: 160). Renewed ambitions in Japan to leave behind senshu bōei ('defensive defense') by enhancing the SDF's ability to strike deeper into Korean and Chinese territory are, therefore, unsurprising (Sato, 2020). Former prime minister Abe asserted in parliament in 2018 that trying to defend Japan based on the restrictions imposed by senshu bōei was "extremely difficult", noting that those who attacked first had an "overwhelming advantage" (Suzuki & Wallace, 2018: 720). Former defense minister Nakatani Gen insisted in 2020 that "we cannot take for granted that the United States will retaliate [against North Korea] if we are attacked. There is a need for us to enhance deterrence by developing our own retaliatory capability" (Mori 2020a). Kishi Nobuo—Prime Minister Abe's natural brother and current defense minister—expressed similar sentiments about the alliance in a 2019 Seiron article (Kishi, 2019: 217). Kanehara Nobukatsu, a leading strategic thinker, and Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary to Prime Minister Abe for seven years, told NHK in mid-2020 that focusing on attacks against enemy missile positions was too narrow for deterrence purposes (Masuda, 2020). On her appointment to the prime minister advisory board on Future Investment Strategy in July 2020, prominent commentator Lully Miura lamented to the board that dependence on foreign countries "for 60% of its food, 90% of its energy, and 100% of its offensive security capability" had made Japan's prosperity fragile (Miura, 2020).

Japan's accumulation of enhanced power projection capabilities over the last thirty years may have positioned Japan's military establishment to go beyond

deterring attacks on Japan through 'denial' (or 'interdiction') and pursue a more ambitious strategic doctrine: deterrence through punishment (Pugliese & Maslow, 2019). Deterrence by punishment requires the effective communication of the willingness, ability, and preparation to exact an unacceptable cost on the opponent that deters them from initiating hostilities (Iwama & Murano, 2021). Tokyo would therefore need to credibly communicate its ability to assail, weaken or remove the political regimes in Pyongyang or Beijing, systematically destroy the military and socio-economic infrastructure of both countries, and/or inflict massive civilian casualties. However, conventional weapons—and especially cruise missiles—lack sufficient destructive and penetrative power to generate the expected strategic and deterrent effects for even 'bloody nose' retaliatory strikes or counterforce operations, let alone countervalue punishment purposes against North Korea or China. The advisability of committing to conventional long-range strikes to deter enemies by threatening them with unacceptable punishment and/or exaggerating the value of such capabilities is also questionable (Heginbotham & Samuels, 2018a: 161; Murano, 2020) given that the likely targets are nuclear-armed authoritarian states that nurture historical antagonism towards Japan due to its militaristic imperial legacy.

A credible autonomous deterrence by punishment posture for Japan in the current environment is, therefore, ultimately a nuclear weapons-enabled posture. Could discussion of moving beyond defensive defense therefore represent a wedge for gradually opening the public up to greater debate about a strategic nuclear deterrent? Japanese politicians publicly arguing that the only way to truly defend Japan is through nuclear weapons are a minor but vocal constituency in Japan. For example, long-time advocate and former Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintarō (The Diplomat, 2011) has been joined by former prime ministers and Osaka mayors in proposing public debate on Japan's nuclear armament options (Mochizuki, 2007: 303; Johnston, 2012, 2016). Greater public tolerance for such

discussion (Mochizuki, 2007) also suggests a diminished public nuclear aversion (Heginbotham & Samuels, 2021: 161-163).

Nuclear weapons are also not completely off the table from a constitutional point of view. Former prime minister Kishi Nobusuke consistently insisted during his tenure that just because a given weapon is labelled 'nuclear' does not automatically make it unconstitutional (Kishi, 1957; Samuels, 2007: 47, 58). This has remained the government's interpretation ever since (Asahi Shimbun, 2016). Post-war Japanese leaders have also on multiple occasions quietly considered the nuclear option, and Samuels and Schoff (2013) note that Tokyo maintains "viable—and unconcealed—options for the relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons" as a recessed nuclear hedge.

Japan, nevertheless, continues to eschew nuclear weapons as a policy choice, and has legally limited itself to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in domestic law (1955 Basic Atomic Energy Law) and international law by joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The constitutional issue may also not be so easily surmountable. Even Kishi was clear that Japan could not possess large-scale nuclear weapons that would serve as a nuclear deterrent for 'catastrophic' punishment purposes as such weapons would constitute war potential well beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense (Kishi, 1958, 1959a,b). It was understood at this time that the constitution would at most allow for "small scale nuclear weapons for defensive purposes" (*bōei-yō kogata kakuheiki*) that do not pose an "aggressive threat to another nation", rather than for "strategic" purposes (Kotaki, 1957; Ino, 1959; Emmerson, 1973: 343).

It is important to recognize that the international environment Kishi was operating within was the high cold war era before nuclear weapons came to be conceived of predominantly in terms of high-yield weapons for 'mutually assured destruction'. This was an era where lower-yield weapons for in-theatre deployment or devices for defensive—or even industrial—purposes were gaining increasing attention (Emmerson, 1973: 348-9). Tactical nuclear weapons—many

of which were deployed to Okinawa by the United States military—included nuclear depth charges, nuclear artillery, surface-to-air missiles (Nike Hercules), nuclear tipped anti-ballistic missile (Hercules Zeus), air-to-air missiles (AIM-26 Falcon), and "Honest Johns". In fact, when asked about permissible forms of nuclear weapons, Kishi in 1959 noted that, "as a matter of pure constitutional interpretation," if Japan wanted to introduce the nuclear variant of the Honest John, it would not automatically be constitutionally proscribed just because it was a nuclear weapon (Kishi, 1959b). Kishi noted its fundamental purpose was, after all, defensive—the land-launched Honest John only had a 25-kilometre range. Nuclear explosive power for construction purposes was also considered by Japan into the 1960s (Kyodo, 2012). Given extant interpretations, and the difficulty of arguing that a deterrent based on modern 'strategic' nuclear weapons would be anything but the archetypical form of war potential capable of catastrophic damage, the deployment of nuclear weapons without constitutional change seems unlikely. As Abe's only semi-successful attempt at rolling back the ban on collective self-defense shows, the capacity for flexible reinterpretation is not limitless.

Predictions of Japan's 'nuclear taboo' or allergy weakening also have a long, and until now, unsuccessful history. John K. Emmerson, adviser to General MacArthur during the Occupation and deputy chief of mission at the United States Embassy in Tokyo in the 1960s, extensively detailed in 1970 increased technological fascination with nuclear technology in Japan that he felt indicated a rapid softening of the nuclear taboo or allergy (Emmerson, 1973: 339-351). Hudson Institute founder Herman Kahn similarly argued that the Japanese nuclear allergy was "very shallow" in 1970 (Mendel Jr., 1970: 1054). In 1976, 70 percent of American experts in a joint Yomiuri-Gallup survey (Yomiuri Shimbun, 1976: 3) anticipated Japan would go nuclear, including a majority believing it would happen within 10 years. This may have made sense at the time. Several surveys in 1968 and 1969 found a spike in Japanese supporting nuclear armament

to over 20 percent after a decade of antimilitarist agitation and as a brasher, post-war generation of politicians entered conservative politics (Mendel, Jr., 1969: 639; Welfield, 1988: 264-266).

However, these numbers are higher than almost all subsequent surveys touching on independent Japanese nuclear armament (Wallace, 2015: 140-141). For example, NHK asked whether Japan should possess nuclear weapons three times between 2005 and 2015 and found support dropping from 18.9 percent to 15.4 percent, and opposition increasing from 78.3 percent to 81.2 percent (NHK, 2021). The 2020 iteration of the survey, limited to younger respondents in Japan and the United States, found 85 percent of Japanese and 70 percent of Americans rejecting the necessity of nuclear weapons for their country (NHK, 2020). This is consistent with previous findings (Wallace, 2015: 142-143) showing that younger cohorts are more averse to nuclear weapons than older cohorts. Japan Electoral Survey (JES) respondents were asked eight times between 2004 and 2016 whether they agreed with the statement that "Japan should never have nuclear weapons" (JES, 2021). A variety of methods were used to deliver the surveys, but all surveys found disagreement with the statement varied between 8.4 percent and 10.8 percent, except for a 2011 internet-administered survey (13.9 percent). JES shows some evidence of softening in the intensity of agreement between 2004 and 2016, although this softening does not result in affirmative support increasing. In any respect, both the JES and NHK surveys show contemporary Japanese support for nuclear armament is unremarkable when compared with past results going back to the 1950s (Mendel, Jr., 1959).

Why Does Japan Have Stand-Off Missiles and Other 'Offensive' Weapons?

Why does Japan have "offensive capabilities" at all unless it is for the purposes of attacking foreign territory (Maeda, 2021: 19)? Tokyo's acquisition and development of long-range weapons, the military effects they generate, and

constitutional interpretations of their necessity for defense, cannot be disassociated from Japan's strategic geography and the relative qualitative and quantitative capabilities of Japan's adversaries. For example, for the missile interdiction role, the mission effectiveness of long-range cruise missiles depends on adversary air defenses, launcher mobility, and posture resilience. For other operations, not only does it become increasingly dangerous for Japanese forces to approach the Asian mainland during a conflict, but Japan's adversaries also have their own stand-off weapons that threaten Japanese military assets at significant ranges. Enhanced PRC capabilities therefore undermine the utility of SDF anti-ship and anti-air missiles currently in inventory and reduce Japan's ability to contest prospective PRC attempts to assert aerial and maritime control to its southwest.

Enhanced missile ranges and different launch modalities, however, provide the SDF with greater options to hold adversary forces at risk from a variety of different locations in contested battle domains and allow defense in depth. For example, the extension of the range of the Type-12—a truck-launched, anti-ship missile—would allow the SDF to deploy the system to Okinawa's main island. The island has denser air defense networks and topological cover than isolated and vulnerable islands like Miyakojima and Ishigakijima where the Type-12 is currently deployed. Increased range would allow the Type-12 to still cover the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan. Enhanced range will provide options for deploying diversified launch systems up-and-down the Japanese archipelago to frustrate PRC attempts to achieve sea control and hold land taken from Japan, especially as other locations in Japan offer greater opportunities for concealment and system mobility than Okinawa.

Similarly, the F-35B's short take-off and vertical landing ability allows the fighter to use shorter or unimproved runways, as well as partially destroyed airfields, adding to the flexibility and operational survivability of those platforms. Even deployed on Japan's aircraft carriers, physical limitations on operational

intensity, fighter numbers, and fuel and armament carrying-capacity make the F-35B more useful as a naval aviation platform for contesting aerial dominance within Japan's extensive maritime domain than as a platform for inflicting unacceptable costs on an adversary through sustained bombing. On balance, the procurement of these platforms and the military effects they would generate relates more to enabling the SDF to flexibly operate outside or at the outer limits of the enemy's threat envelope in aid of contesting on a more equal footing attempts to assert maritime and aerial control by an adversary in the East China Sea or occupy islands in Japan's southwest (Iwama & Murano, 2021). Indeed, even as he avoided discussion on foreign territory strike missions, former prime minister Suga confirmed Japan's policy of strengthening Japan's "stand-off defense capability to deal with ships" in December 2020 as a supplement to the 2019 NDPG (Cabinet of Japan, 2020).

Such weapons do, nevertheless, allow for "tactically offensive" operations to frustrate an adversary's ability to generate and project power (Heginbotham & Samuels, 2018a: 160-161). If Japan was able to survive an initial conventional attack by the PRC on Japanese military bases and infrastructure, attacks on PRC coastal bases, ports, airfields and runways, ammunition depots, chain-of-command systems, and other fixed facilities could degrade the Chinese military's ability to sustain operations. No longer able to assert maritime and aerial control over the East China Sea during a maritime conflagration or Taiwan contingency, this could potentially deter the PRC from initiating a saturation attack on Japan itself in the first place as it would not be able to subsequently fulfil the conditions for victory (Murano, 2020). While this raises several questions of escalation that seem unwise for Japan to consider outside of the US-Japan alliance context, within the alliance context Japan could offer added value during a US-China conflagration (Akita, 2020). Ballistic missile-based strike would be more effective (and cheaper) for this role than cruise missiles, which are slower and less destructive, even if more precise (Murano, 2020). However, the deployment of

even conventionally armed ballistic missiles by Japan (or the United States) is a politically much more fraught policy option, especially with past constitutional interpretations denying Tokyo the possession of such weapons.

Political Acceptability and the Domestic Debate

The Kishida administration could straightforwardly 'declare' foreign territory strike a new SDF mission by writing it into the next iteration of the National Security Strategy (NSS). Several practical political questions stand in the way of its full implementation, however. The Japanese government would still lack an explicit legal basis to authorise such missions due to the positive list approach embedded in the SDF Law (Hikotani, 2018; Bosack, 2020). Parliamentary deliberation could, in turn, agitate an already sceptical public (TBS, 2020; NHK, 2020: TV Asahi, 2020: Nikkei Shimbun, 2020b). Recently enhanced alliance cooperation based on the 2015 PSL, exemplified by Japan's acquisition of Cooperative Engagement Capability systems which promote integrated fire control between United States and Japanese forces, would feature as opponents questioned whether long-range Japanese missiles would be used in concert with or even by the United States to attack foreign territories in "American wars" in Asia (Maeda, 2021:20) and the Middle East (Handa, 2020). This possibility was raised during security legislation debate in 2015, forcing the government to insist that an illegal and imminent armed attack on Japan would still need to take place for foreign territory strike of any kind by Japan to be considered constitutionally permissible (Mutō, 2014; Schoff & Song, 2017; Kurosaki, 2018).

Following the 2021 House of Representatives election, the LDP does have the option of relying on smaller hawkish parties instead of Komeito to pass legislation through both houses (Nikkei Shimbun, 2020c). The LDP, however, relies as much as ever on electoral cooperation with Komeito in single member districts (SMDs) and, therefore, its lower house majority. Citing public scepticism,

Komeito is likely to exert considerable pressure on the LDP to water down any strike proposal (Asahi Shimbun, 2020b; Harris & McLaughlin, 2021), and the LDP has already delayed revision of the NSS until after the July 2022 House of Councillors election out of consideration for electoral cooperation with Komeito. While the public has greater tolerance than a decade ago for defence strengthening, there are limits to how quickly any Japanese leader can bring the public along on the most controversial of national security issues. Furthermore, addressing Japan's military insecurities may not be possible without also addressing domestic insecurities around economic wellbeing and long-standing concerns over the ideological commitments of some of Japan's conservative elites (Suzuki & Wallace, 2018).

Symbolism over Substance

While foreign territory strike is constitutionally permissible, militarily plausibility, strategic wisdom, and political acceptability remain questionable. The debate is, nevertheless, increasingly a perennial fixture in Japan (Maeda, 2021: 17). One reason for this is due to foreign territory strike being a wedge issue that could open a path to rolling back Japan's post-war commitment to exclusively defense-oriented defence. *Senshu bōei* is ultimately a symbolic policy stance rather than a strategic doctrine, and like revision to Article 9 of the constitution, rolling back *senshu bōei* retains totemic symbolism for many revisionist conservative politicians looking to transcend the "post-war regime" that, in their view, has undermined Japan's international status and weakened its ability to influence foreign affairs (Suzuki & Wallace, 2018; Miyake, 2020; Smith, 2019: 172).

The term *heiwa boke* (literally, being peace-stupefied) has been a common epithet directed at political defenders of *senshu bōei* and Article 9, and even the Japanese public by these conservatives (Hasegawa, 2014). They argue that Japan's enjoyment of post-war democratic and economic development has been

facilitated by American military protection, and this has enabled a pacifist public, encouraged by the Japanese political Left, to be oversensitive to internal threats from Japan's own military establishment while ignoring the external threats to continued enjoyment of these benefits. Military journalist Taoka Shunji has, however, described the influence in Japan's defense debates of "peace-stupefied hawks" (*heiwa boke takaha*). Taoka (2018, 2021) argues that many political supporters of increased Japanese muscularity are unable to imagine concrete tactical and operational challenges or articulate a strategic rationale for the acquisition of military strength. The concerted focus of many Japanese conservatives on overturning symbolic post-war restraints has facilitated a distinctly revisionist brand of distorted priorities when it comes to national security debates and defence procurement (Asahi Shimbun, 2020a).

Conservatives in the LDP, for example, appeared to intervene in 2018 to push the SDF to proceed with the conversion of the Izumo and Kaga into an "aircraft carrier" despite MSDF concerns over the already tight budget allocations (Handa, 2018). The foreign territory strike debate also exemplifies the prioritization of highly symbolic, technology-driven silver bullet solutions to Japan's security predicaments when other, more prosaic solutions could be prioritised (Taoka, 2021; Newsham, 2020a). Kōno Tarō during the LDP leadership race even termed the foreign territory strike idea a remnant of the "Showa era" (1926-1988) that would be expensive while delivering negligible strategic effects (Asahi Shimbun, 2021). Like "theological" debates (*shingaku ronso*) about Article 9 of the constitution (Hikotani, 2018: 796), the emphasis on the symbolic elements of Japanese security debates and capabilities, including efforts to distinguish between "offensive" and "defensive" capabilities (Iwama & Murano, 2021), often obscures needed discussion about the strategic rationale for ensuring Japan's security and prioritization of defence options given Japan's limited defence budget.

The lack of a domestic debate on making the SDF institutionally fit for purpose is also emblematic of this emphasis of symbolism over strategy. Enhancing the working conditions of SDF members, which compare unfavourably to those in other OECD countries, would go some way to ensuring Japan retains a defence force of sufficient quantity and quality against the background of a demographic crunch (Nishimura, 2019; Newsham, 2019). It would face relatively little public opposition. Establishing a standing joint command system to enhance inter-service operability during peacetime is another priority area that would help the three Japanese services gain greater knowledge about each other beyond "periodic" joint exercises (Heginbotham and Samuels, 2018c), thereby ensuring more effective joint action during a contingency—at virtually no pecuniary cost. Even when the services have a tailor-made opportunity to enhance interoperability, they do not always embrace it. For example, in early 2021 the government decided to procure three medium-sized ships for the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) rather than for the MSDF. This new GSDF transport unit will carry ammunition, fuel, and food to GSDF troops on the remote islands in Japan's maritime southwest, and, during a conflict, transport GSDF's Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade for remote island defence (Kyodo, 2021). Heginbotham and Samuels (2018c) also note that "Japan lacks effective institutional mechanisms to translate specified objectives into force structure requirements or to compete different options against one another". Such analysis, in their view, would "almost certainly…produce major changes in the roles of Japan's three military services" where the GSDF have continued to secure much larger budgets than the ASDF and MSDF despite Japan's "overwhelmingly air and maritime nature of threats" (see also Hornung, 2020c). These capability deficiencies and suboptimal institutional arrangements continue to go unaddressed despite constant reminders of the maritime security pressures in Japan's southwestern maritime domain and no sign of Chinese restraint (Johnson, 2020; Patalano, 2020; Newsham, 2020b; Japan Times, 2020).

Regional Reactions and Defense Spending

Beijing's rhetorical reaction to Japan authorizing the SDF to conduct strike missions is unlikely to be measured, especially as the debate has recently progressed alongside discussion of SDF contributions to Taiwan's defence (Galic, 2021; Klinger, 2021a). However, without a concomitant and substantive rise in Japan's defence spending, China may not be too disappointed about Japan investing in strike capabilities for missile interdiction as it would stretch Japan's defence resources thinner—and arguably make it a less effective partner for the United States. Japan's strategic interest in Taiwan's de facto independence further emphasises the importance of Tokyo making defence choices that enhance the SDF's ability to better contest the PLA's ability to assert air and sea control in Japan's southwest while providing support to the United States. Heginbotham and Samuels (2018c) note that, with "only a fraction of US forces forward deployed to areas around Japan, the alliance will increasingly rely on Japanese capabilities for deterrence and initial warfighting." Despite these expectations, the persistence of symbolic contests—and incessant questioning of the United States' reliability in order to win them throughout the political spectrum—shows little consideration for preferences of allies and Japan's new Indo-Pacific strategic partners, and how such debates are viewed in regional capitals (Hornung, 2020b; Newsham, 2020a).

The most significant change that the Japanese government could focus on—and one with both symbolic and practical import—is the formulation of a long-term plan to increase defence spending. Even though former prime minister Abe reversed a decade-long trend of decreases in nominal defence spending, Japan's defence budget in real terms remains effectively flat (Wallace, 2020), and it struggles to sustain even current levels of force generation capacity due to wear and tear, delayed procurements, and insufficient levels of munitions, including for antiaircraft and anti-missile systems. Meanwhile, even if China starts to spend less in the years ahead, already paid-for procurement orders means that at least

another decade of increases in the inventory of (modern) military systems is already built-in to China's military posture (Heginbotham and Samuels, 2018a: 134).

The topic of defense spending was broached in the recent LDP leadership election, with Kishida, Takaichi Sanae, and Kōno Tarō all recognising the need for substantive increases. Takaichi's support for the NATO target of two percent of GDP was written into the LDP election manifesto and Prime Minister Kishida then announced in November 2021 an injection of ¥774 billion yen (US$6.8 billion) into the defence portfolio through the supplementary budget. This represents a year-on-year defence budget increase of 5.8 percent—the highest single year increase since the 1990s. The Kishida administration is also likely to sign a five-year Host Nation Support (HNS) commitment with the United States that would increase Japan's contribution by 25 to 50 percent. The government allocated 201.7 billion yen ($1.76 billion) in its one-year extension in 2020, but speculation is that the new annual HNS amount could be between ¥250 billion and ¥299 billion (US$2.2-2.6 billion), although Tokyo wants greater say over how the US military spends this money—wanting it to be spent on defence exercises with Japan, for example.

This new HNS commitment, however, may only just exceed the previous highwater mark of 275.6 billion yen in 1999 when troop numbers were lower (37,000, compared to 53,000 in 2021). More than increased HNS contributions, however, American preferences for burden sharing are focused more on an enlarged Japanese defence budget and deepened combined forces and operations (Nikkei Asia, 2021b; Heginbotham and Samuels, 2018c). Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby told an audience at the Hudson Institute in late-2021 that the "practical consequence" of Japan refusing to spend more, even on resilience measures that would help protect American and Japanese forces, is that "it's not going to make sense for the Americans to put our necks out". The United States would not abandon Japan, Colby argued, but

America would "have to look much more after the well-being of our own troops and our own interests" in some cases, such as the Senkaku Islands (Schadlow and Murano, 2021).

However, to get close to even 1.5 percent of GDP in defence spending, Japan will need to sustain increases of seven percent in the defence budget for well over a decade. There was no indication in the LDP election manifesto of how spending will increase relative to other government priorities, and the NATO commitment was only written into the fine print at the back of the manifesto. Given the most recent fiscal injection came as part of a record post-COVID stimulus bill and was not defence specific, it is questionable whether year-on-year increases of this size will be sustained. Furthermore, 55 percent of the appropriated funds from the supplementary budget were dedicated to supporting defence contractors with payments for contracts already agreed to but delayed. Another 36 percent will go to equipment procurement, although mainly for established systems such as the P-1 maritime surveillance and C-2 transport aircraft, and for which integration into the SDF was also delayed.

Prime minister Kishida's opportunistic adoption of more hawkish positions in early 2021 to buttress his conservative credentials ahead of the LDP leadership race also raises questions about the depth of his commitment to risking political capital for increasing defence spending (Jiji, 2021b). If foreign territory strike is prioritized over substantive and sustained defence spending increases in the latter half of 2022, Washington D.C. will likely be disappointed. A limited investment in strike capabilities for missile interdiction purposes would do little to relieve the more intense burdens the United States would have to carry in any regional contingency such as establishing maritime control or air superiority versus a Chinese posture designed to prevent just that (Kelly et al., 2014). A substantive investment could be even more damaging, resulting in a negative strategic opportunity cost given other areas of investment foregone.

There are also public opinion opportunity costs to consider. A focus on foreign territory strike capabilities may be unnecessarily provocative when significant and relatively uncontroversial measures focused on enhancing posture resilience and maritime security would better enhance the deterrence generated by the alliance. A bruising debate on foreign territory strike could also weaken public support and alienate the LDP's coalition partner, Komeito, thereby constraining Tokyo's ability to push forward on more controversial but essential defence transformation programs. This includes substantive increases in defence spending but also changes in the geographic distribution of American forces and deployment of weapon systems within Japan to relieve the strategically problematic and domestically corrosive concentration of forces on Okinawa. Tokyo should first undergo a process of strategic rationalization that identifies the needs of partners and Japan's own strengths, enhances the resilience of the US-Japan alliance posture, and continues institutional adaptation to maximize the deterrence pay-off from existing defence spending. More convincing rationales for investment—especially if paired with concerted efforts to address domestic economic and political insecurities going beyond the defence portfolio—will bolster Tokyo's efforts to attract public buy-in for dedicating more resources to defence transformation.

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HEALTH DIPLOMACY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ERA OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Dino Patti Djalal, Agus Subagyo, Mariane Olivia Delanova

University of Jenderal Achmad Yani

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Abstract

Indonesia's foreign policy is dynamic, especially in the COVID-19 Pandemic Era. When Indonesia experienced an increase in COVID-19 cases, it identified it as a foreign policy issue requiring attention. It focused on promoting national health resilience in health care as one way to protect the Indonesian state during the COVID-19 pandemic. The purpose of this paper is to explain and analyze Indonesia's health diplomacy as an instrument of Indonesia's foreign policy in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic. It argues that, so far, the results of Indonesia's health-focused approach are good and in line with Indonesia's national interests. Indonesia's active role and involvement in international forums has a diplomatic purpose but has also helped other countries. This indicates that the health diplomacy carried out by Indonesia has had a major impact on regional and global stability. In addition, Indonesia's health diplomacy has resulted in it receiving assistance in the form of medical devices and vaccines provided by other countries for handling COVID-19 in Indonesia. Indonesia was also the driving force in the initiation in the 75th United Nations General Assembly of measures giving voice to the availability of medical devices and vaccine equality for all countries in the world.

Keywords: Health Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, COVID-19 Pandemic, Human Security

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Indonesian Foreign Policy in the Era of the COVID-19 Pandemic

Foreign policy is a reaction to stimuli that come from the domestic and external environment (Rosenau, 1980). Foreign policy is an activity carried out by state actors who undertake actions based on decisions to achieve identified goals. The

foreign policy carried out aims to achieve the national interests of a country. In order to achieve national interests, the state in many cases carries out cooperation with other nations at the bilateral, trilateral and multilateral level. During the first period of Joko Widodo's leadership (beginning in 2014), there were four priorities in his foreign policy: namely (1) strengthening Indonesia's identity as a country; (2) enhancing Indonesia's role and building international cooperation as it strengthened middle power diplomacy; (3) expanding the influence of involvement in the Indo-Paqësor Region; and (4) prioritizing the public interest in its foreign policy (Connely, 2014: 6). The foreign policy carried out by Indonesia targets external entities to show that the state's action and control cannot be separated from the Indonesian national interest. National interests are related to the needs of the state vis-a-vis other countries that are part of the social environment (Nuechterlein, 1976: 247).

Furthermore, Nuechterlein (1976: 248) notes that the national interest is comprised of four dimensions which determine a country's foreign policy, including (1) defense interests vis-a-vis external threats; (2) economic interests which refer to the economic welfare of the country and its relationship to establishing relations with other countries; (3) the interests and attitude towards the world order, which refers to the maintenance of world peace and security in the international system if it is judged to be beneficial; and (4) ideological interests that refer to the protection of values that come from universal beliefs embraced in that nation. In Indonesia's foreign policy in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic, the above interests are important because the COVID-19 pandemic has not only penetrated the economic and health sectors but has also affected the world order. Indonesia's foreign policy carried out by Joko Widodo has focused on the people, also known as pro-people diplomacy (Ranny Virginia Utami, 2014). The pro-people diplomacy that is carried out is in line with the foundation and principle of being free-active. In addition, in its foreign policy targets, Indonesia actively participates in international forums and cooperation. As an actor who plays an

active role in international forums and cooperation, this is the right place for Indonesia to achieve its national interests. Involvement in international forums and cooperation will hopefully provide solutions to the challenges faced.

Indonesia's foreign policy has become dynamic, especially the COVID-19 Pandemic Era. In 2019, when COVID-19 hit the whole world, countries changed the direction of their foreign policies for the sake of national interests and protecting their citizens. The change in the direction of foreign policy is in line with Rosenau's (1974) theory that foreign policy is implemented in accordance with changes that occur in the international environment by considering and defending national interests. This is in accordance with foreign policy behaviour itself in that the government must encourage changes in its external environment with the aim of maintaining the existence of the state (Rosenau, 1974: 367). In the development of foreign policy theory, we must not only examine decision making, but the 'psycho-environment' of certain individuals or groups can influence the foreign policy process. This results in the foreign policy-making being carried out not only to influence external actors but also to target domestic entities as part of the national interest. For example, in 2021, the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that Indonesia had five foreign policy priorities and that one of the five priorities was national health resilience in health care to ensure protection for the people of the Indonesian state during the COVID-19 Pandemic (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021). This is supported by President Joko Widodo's statement at the United Nations in 2020 that health is the most important aspect, especially access to vaccines to end the COVID-19 pandemic (Humphrey Wangke, 2021). In ensuring health resilience, of course, it is necessary to have a concrete policy in reviewing these problems.

Determining the direction of foreign policy can be accompanied and strengthened by big data (Pizaro Gozali, 2020). This is because we have greater access to data and data integration, so that in formulating foreign policy in the era of the COVID-19 Pandemic, we do not only look at the economic sector, but also

the health sector. In formulating Indonesian foreign policy, all sectors should be considered in determining the direction of foreign policy (Asep Setiawan, 2021). Furthermore, Indonesian foreign policy is not only limited to issues or problems that occur in the region, but globally. This is in accordance with the statement from the Deputy Chairperson of the Indonesian House of Representatives Cooperation Agency, that foreign policy is an effort by the government to support and contribute to maintaining world peace (House of Representatives, 2021). Through adopting a constructive foreign policy direction in dealing with contemporary issues, one goal is to increase global awareness of Indonesia and its participation in mutual solidarity.

One notable example is Indonesia's foreign policy through health diplomacy. Health diplomacy is a target for the Indonesian government as to seeks to ensure access for all to health in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is hoped that Indonesia's foreign policy will not only be limited to collaborating and being actively involved in health forums. It is also hoped that it will ensure the provision of adequate access to vaccines for all Indonesian citizens. In line with the 1945 Constitution, Indonesia's national interest in the COVID-19 era puts priority on health resilience in order to protect the entire Indonesian nation and create world order with lasting peace and social justice (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 2021). Indonesia's health diplomacy includes short-term and long-term efforts focusing on diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccinations (JPNN, 2020). Indonesia's health diplomacy must be adaptive, innovative and active in dealing with current issues.

Health diplomacy carried out by Indonesia started to run at the beginning of the pandemic. Joko Widodo mandated the Minister of Foreign Affairs along with the Minister of SOEs and the Ministry of Health to pave the way to find vaccines to meet the needs of the Indonesian people (National Resilience Institute of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021). The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Retno Marsudi, also stated that as Indonesia carrying out efforts to find vaccines

for the Indonesian people, it would also fight for equal access to vaccines for all globally. Health diplomacy is, therefore, currently a priority for Indonesia. With the COVID-19 pandemic, of course, the pattern of state relations and interactions has changed, so that health issues become a top priority for Indonesia and other emerging nations in building their national resilience. In addition, the existence of health diplomacy can also build independence in the health sector in the long-term.

One concrete form of health diplomacy carried out by Indonesia in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic was actively involvement in multilateral forums focused on strengthening cooperation around COVID-19. Indonesia carries out many activities in international forums in order to achieve its national interests. This is evidenced by the 67 million vaccines in Indonesia has secured from bilateral and multilateral relations (Indonesian National Resilience Institute, 2021). Access to this vaccine is expected to increase every month because Indonesia's need for vaccination is still lacking. According to the World Health Organization (WHO) that there are at least 3 (three) steps that can be taken in handling COVID-19, namely borderless, conducting global cooperation, and ensuring that all countries are fair in accessing the same health (Humphrey Wangke, 2021). Indonesia's cooperation can be seen in Indonesia's involvement in various international forums such as the International Coordination Group on COVID-19 (ICGC). This forum collectively aims to distribute vaccines for post-pandemic global economic and health recovery (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, 2020). This collective initiative is certainly a framework for multilateral cooperation that emphasizes the importance of joint solidarity in fighting COVID-19, because COVID-19 is a threat to all countries in the world.

When discussing the problem of COVID-19, of course, it cannot be separated from the role of WHO in handling COVID-19. WHO is a forum to pursue common interests, especially in ensuring the distribution of medical devices and vaccines for all countries in the world. The cooperation forum in the

International Coordination Group on COVID-19 should be a study looked at by the WHO as an example of how to build concrete cooperation in handling COVID-19, especially in the procurement of medical devices. Through multilateralism cooperation, it is possible to create trust between people and countries in the world to join forces and fight common problems. This Cooperation Forum is expected to be a forum to improve health diplomacy through joint production in producing medical devices and medicines in handling COVID-19 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2020b).

In addition to playing an active role in international forums, Indonesia also participates in the Southeast Asia Region. Indonesia took part in the 25th Meeting of the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC). In the 25th ACC, four important points in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic that are relevant to health diplomacy. At the 25th ACC, four agreements were made, including to compile a protocol for cross-border public health responses which aims to ensure health among citizens who cross national borders get health services in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic (Rizki Ari Kurniawan, 2015). ASEAN countries also worked together in protecting their citizens, especially migrant workers, as a form of post-pandemic recovery. In this case, ASEAN also pays attention to health protocols. In addition, Indonesia proposed the establishment of the ASEAN COVID-19 Response Fund which is used to help purchase medical equipment and other necessities to achieve prosperity and protect the nation from the COVID-19 virus in the Southeast Asian Region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2020a).

In fighting for equal access to vaccines for all countries, Indonesia, Ethiopia and Canada become Co-Chairs in the COVAX AMC Engagement Group (AMC EG). This is a forum between donor countries for the procurement and distribution of vaccines for AMC countries (Indonesian National Resilience Institute, 2021). In addition, as a form of health diplomacy, Indonesia also participates in the Ministerial Coordination Group on COVID-19 (MCGC) as

well as the ICGC which focuses on the distribution of the medical equipment during the COVID-19 pandemic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2020c). Indonesia's foreign policy in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic is primarily focused on health diplomacy as an effort to create the welfare and health of its citizens, especially in providing access to vaccines for all of its citizens. The lack of access to vaccines in Indonesia, which has not been evenly distributed, makes Indonesia's health diplomacy an essentially strategic and security concern as it threatens state functionality and national wellbeing as well as world peace. It must continue to be carried out through Indonesia's involvement in international forums.

The Success of Indonesian Health Diplomacy

The degree to which Indonesia has succeeded in handling COVID-19 cannot be separated from health diplomacy and Indonesia's foreign policy. The COVID-19 pandemic has become a threat concept that not only threatens national security, but also threatens human security as individuals. In line with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Report (1994), security threats are broad and include the threat of hunger, the threat of infectious diseases, the threat to daily human life—at home, in the work environment, and in the community. The UNDP later identified seven elements that comprise security threats, including: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (UNDP, 2006). Of course, this is a challenge for Indonesia in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic, which does not only carry out health diplomacy, but also looks at other aspects. Broadly speaking, the social disruption that occurred due to COVID-19 not only threatened the stability of the country, but also will have major implications for economic performance, and directly threatens human security. This makes it a big challenge for Indonesia as it continues to make efforts in handling COVID-19 and makes it much more than a simple health issue.

Bilaterally, Indonesia is increasing cooperation with several countries in health, especially in COVID-19 medical procurement. In 2020, Japan provided assistance to Indonesia amounting to US$ 14.5 million or equivalent to Rp. 224 billion to support Indonesia's COVID-19 response (Nugraha, 2020). Japan provided assistance to Indonesia for technical needs for medical personnel in Indonesia. For this assistance, Japan agreed to protect Japanese citizens in Indonesia as a form of reciprocity for the assistance as well as the operational stability of Japanese companies in Indonesia (Baadilla & Daties, 2021). This makes health diplomacy carried out between Japan and Indonesia constructive in that it yields results addressing the national interests of each country and achieving win-win solutions. Indonesia and South Korea also carried out diplomacy in response to COVID-19. In 2020, South Korea provided assistance and support for Indonesia comprising US$500,000, provided 300 units of disinfectant sprayer, and provided assistance for 32,200 PCR test kits (Nugraheny, 2020). This was done by South Korea on the basis that Indonesia is one of the countries in ASEAN that it wants to enhance strategic cooperation and because Indonesia is the main partner in the New Southern Policy for South Korea (Subarkah & Bukhari, 2020). Seeing that Indonesia has not overcome the COVID-19 problem made South Korea get more involved by providing assistance. Indonesia does not only carry out health diplomacy with Japan and South Korea. There are at least 9 other countries that have engaged in health diplomacy with Indonesia including: the United States, Singapore, China, Vietnam, India, Australia, and the United Arab Emirates (CNN Indonesia, 2020).

The success of Indonesia's health diplomacy can't be separated from the implementation of foreign policy and the use of established bilateral relations. In bilateral relations, Indonesia cooperates in the health sector by prioritizing the following priorities: (1) strengthening the health system; (2) improvement of human resources; (3) health technology development including e-Health; (4) dispatching health workers; (5) pharmaceuticals and medical devices; (6) health

at the border; (7) universal health insurance ("Health for All: Indonesia's Global Health Diplomacy Strategy" Independent Study 2018, 2018). Indonesia's cooperation in the health sector certainly has a purpose to it. In addition, the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi promoted the importance of vaccine equality for Indonesia and others. This struggle has resulted in Indonesia being able to enter the Advanced Market Commitment group where Indonesia is entitled to receive access to vaccines for 20% of the population provided by WHO (Humphrey Wangke, 2021). The Indonesian Foreign Minister also visited countries such as China, Britain, and Switzerland to ensure that the Indonesian people received the vaccine. Due to this bilateral approach, Indonesia received vaccines of various types including Sinovac, Pfizer, and AstraZeneca (Purbantina & Hapsari, 2020; Rudolf, 2021). Health diplomacy carried out by Indonesia can be said to be successful, because Indonesia has obtained the objectives.

Indonesia is also actively involved in seeking the availability of vaccines for all countries in the world. Indonesia's proposal in the 75th UN General Assembly emphasised the importance of collaboration in handling the pandemic. Indonesia succeeded in initiating and passing a resolution, namely "Global Health and Foreign Policy: Strengthening Health System Resilience through Affordable Healthcare for All" (Humphrey Wangke, 2021). Based on this resolution, equality in the availability of vaccines for all countries in the world and health services must be strengthened so that they can be accessed easily (Wicaksana, 2020). Real evidence of the success of Indonesia's health diplomacy is not only fighting for the national interest of the country, but also contributing to justice in world welfare and order to increase international solidarity in global health, during the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, the success of Indonesia's diplomacy is not only collaborating and partnering with various countries in the world, but by giving voice and sharing commitment to common problems that challenged sovereignty and global order.

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic has certainly not only threatened health security in Indonesia but has threatened global health. Of course, every country is competing to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic in its own way. The policies carried out by Indonesia are on the one hand taken to deal with changes that occur with the aim of maintaining state existence and national interests. Indonesia, in overcoming these problems, conducts health diplomacy through bilateral and multilateral cooperation and relations with other countries. Indonesia's active role and involvement in international forums has yielded tangible results for Indonesia. Where Indonesia does not only have diplomatic goals in its role, but also helps other countries in voicing health equipment and vaccine equality for all countries in the world. Health diplomacy carried out by Indonesia has had a positive impact on global stability. This can be seen from the results of the 75th UN General Assembly that Indonesia proposed vaccine equality for all countries in the world and succeeded in passing a resolution in the General Assembly. Health diplomacy which is one of Indonesia's foreign policies cannot be separated from the good relations that Indonesia has developed in the past with other countries, such as Japan and South Korea, who also helped Indonesia to respond to COVID-19. This assistance indicates that maintaining good relations between countries will continue to remain an asset into the future. Indonesia's health diplomacy was initiated at the beginning of the pandemic and sought to leverage Indonesia's good relations with others and international reputation. The Indonesian government issued a priority in national health resilience in health care to ensure protection for the people of the Indonesian state during the COVID-19 pandemic. It was then supported by the efforts made by the President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and others who realised the severity of this security challenge for Indonesia.

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COUP DE GRÂCE: HOW THE QUAD IS HASTENING THE DESTRUCTION OF ASEAN

Quinissa Putrirezhy

University of Indonesia

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Abstract

The rekindling of the US-led Quad alliance in 2017 has tested ASEAN ever since. Southeast Asia is at the centre of a simmering strategic rivalry between the two world superpowers, the United States and China. China's meteoric economic ascendence on the global stage has shifted the balance of global power in contemporary geopolitics. This article seeks to examine the potential of the Quad and how it could shake ASEAN's unity and centrality as a result of China's rise. Beijing is aggressively asserting its pseudohistorical irredentist claims in the South China Sea, a vital route for regional trade, and creating territorial disputes with some ASEAN member countries. This article finds that the reactions of Southeast Asian states towards China's rise as well as the Quad countries are diverse, but nonetheless have general likely trajectories. Hitherto, it has been convenient and beneficial for the ASEAN member states to cooperate with each other, with no bones of contention allowed to fracture the organization. This period of nonchalance has come to an end, however. Thus, the article makes the assertion that ASEAN will disintegrate gradually under the pressure of geopolitical realities.

Keywords: ASEAN, China's Rise, Quad, Disintegration

Introduction

The rise of China has been the most significant development for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), simultaneously inspiring alarm, posing a challenge, and offering opportunities for this group of countries. As a regional organization consisting of ten states with various national interests, China is

presently shaking the unity of ASEAN itself. All ASEAN countries have economic ties with China; however, maritime countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and even Indonesia, also share a common issue with China regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The reemergence of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2017, known more conveniently as "the Quad," an informal dialogue among four democratic nations—the United States, Australia, Japan, and India, has been viewed ubiquitously as a reaction to rise of China and added further tension to the situation by quietly coordinating security policy and military activities with China in mind (Grossman, 2018).

The revival of the Quad is undoubtedly being closely observed in Southeast Asia, one of the zones where Sino-American rivalry is most visible. Some ASEAN countries such as Thailand and Indonesia have traditionally attempted to walk a fine line by cultivating good relations with both the Quad nations and China, while one finds the other nations at various positions along the spectrum. Whereas the likes of the Philippines and indisputably Vietnam have taken a more confrontational approach towards China, especially concerning maritime issues, others such as Laos and Cambodia have nurtured warming ties, as both nations enjoy generous sums of loans and investments from China. Moreover, the Quad countries themselves also have economic relationships with China, and some also share security issues, which has caused even more confusion and distrust. It cannot be denied that the ASEAN countries, when discussing China, have varied and complex relationships both with China and these four democratic countries. Thus, this has begun to put a strain on ASEAN, as the member states have been unable to reach a common consensus on these issues in order to tackle them effectively.

This article examines the potential of the Quad's existence to exhaust the unity of ASEAN due to the rise of China, which will slowly but surely dissolve ASEAN's importance as an organization because of their inability to reach

consensus on this crucial matter. The first section of this article discusses ASEAN and its relationship with China, including the countries that are more concerned economically and have a less friendly security posture. In the next section, by noting that Quad is merely a loose cooperation without a specific grouping framework (as of yet), the article will examine the relations between Quad member countries and ASEAN states, particularly security-concerned countries, followed by multifaceted relationships between the Quad countries and China and some issues they have. Lastly, the last section contains the conviction that ASEAN will go through a slow gradual dissolution as a result of this issue by also taking into account ASEAN's objectives and principles, and what might come next.

Quad: An Overview

The precursor to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue arose to cooperate on maritime matters and disaster relief in the wake of the 2004 earthquake and tsunami that struck southern Thailand and the northern Sumatran region of Aceh in Indonesia. The Quad itself emerged in 2007 from a vision of the Indo-Pacific as a unified strategic region in which efforts in one area would inevitably influence activities in another. The grouping fell out of relevance following the Great Recession of 2007-2008 and Australia's decision to leave the Quad in 2008. It reemerged again in 2017, motivated by two fundamental objectives. The first is that the four nations have a strong interest in maintaining the current order's laws and norms, strengthening existing institutions, safeguarding freedom of navigation and trade, and boosting connectivity, economic development, and security within existing codes and regulations. The second point was, international policy watchers believed, though it was never explicitly mentioned, that the Quad members saw China's growth and the scope of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a threat to each country's respective power in the region (Miller, M.C., 2021). Today, the countries—all democracies with

thriving/developed economies—are focused on a far larger agenda that includes addressing security, economic, and health concerns.

In their first virtual summit earlier in March this year, the group's connecting ideals once again were underscored– democracy, a rules-based system, and a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific – and emphasized its position as a "force for global good." These establish the broad framework within which the Quad will function in order to shape international order in an age of transition from the "unipolar" world of the US as the sole superpower to one in which China seeks a significant role (Kutty, S.N. and Basrur, S., 2021).

The Quad is a loose coalition rather than a formal alliance, and their diplomacy has ebbed and flowed throughout time. Japan first stressed the four nations' democratic identities, whilst India appeared more at ease promoting functional collaboration. As for the Australian leaders, they have been hesitant to give the appearance that the organization is a formal alliance. As of 2021, policymakers in all four nations are more unified in their common reservations about China's growing assertive actions in the region, and they are more prepared to establish a constructive agenda of collaboration. In November 2020, the four navies engaged in their first joint exercise in almost a decade. In March 2021, US President Joe Biden hosted a virtual Quad summit in which Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga participated. Working groups were created on COVID-19 vaccinations, climate change, technology advancements, and supply-chain resilience (Smith, S.A., 2021).

ASEAN–China Relations

Ever since the start of the dialogue process between ASEAN countries and China in 1991, both have broken new ground in the relationship featuring win-win cooperation, good-neighborliness, friendship, mutual trust, and mutual benefit

(Bu & Fan, 2016). ASEAN - China economic relations continue to thrive, and 2021 marks the 30th anniversary of ASEAN-China relations. Presently, China is ASEAN's largest trading partner and the third-largest external source of foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2020, the trade in goods reached USD 684.6 billion, and for the first time in history, ASEAN surpassed the EU to become China's largest trading partner (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2021). In 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic slashed worldwide FDI flows by 35%, and Southeast Asian countries suffered a 25% drop in FDI, some figures indicated China's investment in ASEAN increased 52.1 percent year on year to $14.36 billion. With the signing of the major free trade agreement Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in November 2020, numerous trade and economic agreements between China and ASEAN countries are expected to further consolidate this already lucrative relationship (Global Times, 2021).

China's so-called "charm offensive" and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) has given the impression that China was prepared to endure some economic cost to give the impression to ASEAN countries that China can be trusted and that its new regional prominence could potentially be beneficial for the region (Beeson, 2016, p.14). Not merely confined to the economic domain, both have also promoted cooperation in science and technology, connectivity, as well as socio-cultural cooperation (ASEAN, 2018). When the Covid-19 pandemic hit in early 2020, countries in Southeast Asia were quick to collaborate with China from the very beginning of the crisis. Recently in October 2021, ASEAN and China released a joint statement related to the COVID-19 pandemic recovery framework, emphasizing the significance of ASEAN and China cooperation on the COVID-19 response and economic recovery, recognizing the existing accomplishments of the two sides (ASEAN, 2021). Aside from ASEAN as an organization, Indonesia and Malaysia have comprehensive strategic partnerships with China, while Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar have

comprehensive strategic cooperative partnerships with China (Sam & Van, 2015, p. 187). Thus, for the mainland ASEAN countries, China is especially important.

Since the outbreak of COVID-19, China has undertaken a number of steps to demonstrate its commitment to globalization, interdependence, and multilateralism. The most notable of these has been its widespread medical assistance to and unflinching support for the WHO (Feldwisch-Drentrup, 2020). However, China's increasingly bellicose rhetoric and aggressive actions in the South China Sea present a stark contradiction. China appears to support multilateralism when, and only when, it serves to strengthen its own unilateral aspirations.

Some ASEAN countries are very concerned about security cooperation, particularly in ensuring freedom of maritime and aeronautical movement throughout the South China Sea. Beijing's assertions of sovereignty and insistence on special rights within the "nine-dash line" spanning practically the entire South China Sea have heightened regional tensions. With its now-infamous rejection of the historic UNCLOS judgment in favour of the Philippines in 2016, China has further eroded the authority and credibility of international arbiters. The nine dash line is undoubtedly controversial because it covers territories that are deemed exclusive to the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Indonesia (the Natuna Islands) (De Castro, R.C., 2020).

The mainland ASEAN nations of Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are not parties to the issue and have not actively addressed China on the South China Sea. Significantly, most of these ASEAN continent-based countries, such as Laos and Cambodia, have often relied extensively on China. China is the most essential element of the rapid development for both Laos and Cambodia, through development aid programs and FDI. With such a strong reliance on China, these member countries will not allow ASEAN to jeopardize their relationships with China over a scenario in which they are not engaged (Raymond, G., 2021).

This situation has become one principal obstacle in achieving consensus on a coherent ASEAN response to China's actions in the South China Sea. As mentioned by Sheldon W. Simon (2012), "ASEAN states take varying positions on the SCS dispute; Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar lean towards China; Malaysia and Indonesia are cautious about US involvement; Thailand and Singapore are neutral; while both Vietnam and the Philippines welcome an American role."

ASEAN calls for "peaceful resolution of disputes" in the South China Sea; however, it has not been effective so far in preventing China from asserting its territorial claims. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei are the claimants (O'Neill, 2018). Indonesia, even though it does not have any active territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, is involved in a dispute with China over the Natuna Islands, and it also claims the Exclusive Economic Zone in the resource-rich waters around these islands (Wong, 2017). Lately Indonesia has intensified patrols around the Natuna islands following the detection of Chinese and US vessels near these international waters (Aljazeera, 2021).

Therefore, ASEAN countries like Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia are very much pro-China, since their own economic development is highly dependent on Beijing, while some others have cooler relations, like Singapore and Malaysia. Then, there are ASEAN security-concerned countries that feel threatened by China, such as the Philippines and Vietnam (Raymond, G., 2021). With some member states being economically dependent on China, it would be challenging for ASEAN to take a firm stance against or in favour of the situation, even if it ever desired.

ASEAN–Quad Countries Relations

Individually and collectively, the Quad countries have been engaging with the members of ASEAN and affirmed their strong support for ASEAN centrality as

well as ASEAN-led regional architecture, particularly for ASEAN's efforts in developing an Indo-Pacific outlook (Quad backs ASEAN-led system, 2019). ASEAN, though it is not officially part of the Quad, is central to the Indo-Pacific strategies of the US and its allies. However, there is no single, agreed-upon position in Southeast Asia about the Quad. Despite, some would say, strong incentives, most Southeast Asian governments are neither officially embracing the Quad nor are they actively seeking to resist or reject the emerging conversation (Laksmana, E. A., 2020).

Views toward the Quad vary by country. However, most ASEAN states remain uneasy about the four-country grouping, viewing it as a challenge to "ASEAN centrality," the idea that ASEAN serves as the fundamental platform for regional organizations. Simply stated, the Quad has raised concerns about ASEAN's standing in the developing regional architecture (Stromseth, J., 2021). Looking into more specific cooperation between the Quad member countries, despite their wariness of what the Quad might mean for its centrality, ASEAN has generally praised efforts by the United States to broaden the grouping's scope beyond security to include new vaccine cooperation and working groups on climate change and emerging technologies (Stromseth, J., 2021). Back in 2009, the United States launched sub-regional and bilateral initiatives to boost ties with Southeast Asia, including the Lower Mekong Initiative to deepen cooperation between the United States and ASEAN members Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam on issues related to the environment, health, education, and infrastructure development (Mekong-US Partnership, 2021).

Japan and ASEAN adopted a number of activities aimed at reducing the impact on the present economy and increasing economic resilience in the post-COVID-19 period, including initiatives in the digital economy and supply chains (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan, 2020). Former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga chose Vietnam and Indonesia as his first overseas destinations to visit in 2020. In Vietnam, he delivered a remark and stressed that Japan and

ASEAN would continue to work next to each other as equal partners to increase connectivity, people-to-people interaction, and human resource development. He further emphasized that the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which ASEAN approved in 2019, has essential conceptual overlap with Japan's FOIP (Miyake, K., 2020). ASEAN Mekong River country leaders have previously reaffirmed the importance of FOIP after Japan agreed to promote quality infrastructure projects along the Mekong River (Sim, 2018). In addition, the Philippines has also agreed to work toward this strategy (Kyodo, 2019).

In Narendra Modi's (the Prime Minister of India) Act East policy, he is also keen to strengthen ties with ASEAN members in developing maritime cooperation (Chand, 2018, p. 128). Considering India's size and military prowess, India could be the right partner for ASEAN (Wagle, 2018). Such partnership has been underway, for instance, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) proposed by New Delhi at the 14th East Asia Summit in Bangkok in November 2019. This partnership has been seen as a game-changer in driving rigorous interaction between India and ASEAN based on the integration of strategic interests in political-economic and socio-cultural fronts while ensuring safety, maritime security, and stability in the vital Indo-Pacific region (Chirathivat, S. and De, P., 2020). In the meeting between India and Indonesia in May 2018, both countries also agreed on the importance of a free, open, transparent, rules-based, and peaceful Indo-Pacific region (Kaura, 2018).

Indonesia, with its geography as a gateway between the Asian continent and Oceania, as well as between the Pacific and Indian oceans (the critical Malacca Strait being an oil supply bottleneck), seems to be comfortable with the Indo-Pacific concept. In January 2019, the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated the country's interest in leading other ASEAN countries to build a framework for FOIP (Lee, 2019), and up to this day, the cooperation under the FOIP framework is still being established and worked on. The current demands of Indonesia under Joko Widodo, are varied and diverse, but mostly revolve

around economics. Indonesia needs both the United States and China. Given China's status as Indonesia's top economic partner, the US remains economically and strategically important to the country, particularly as a counter-balance to China's influence and strength. In addition, noting the increasingly negative opinion from the Indonesian public towards China (Tarahita & Rakhmat, 2019), there is the possibility that Indonesia will end up leaning more towards the Quad side, or even aligning with AUKUS or the Quad.

Furthermore, Vietnam is a good example of a Southeast Asian country that is willing to build up its defence relationship with the Quad. Vietnam engaged in pandemic-related talks with Quad members and other partners. The US under Biden has continued to follow Trump's approach of building closer ties with Vietnam on security matters, while also rhetorically shifting to a more confrontational approach toward China (Tran, B.T., 2021). A joint statement with India has also been issued to uphold freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. Japan has also come into the discussion, and maritime cooperation was deepened by allowing a Japanese submarine first port in Vietnam (Grossman, 2018). More and more, it seems more a question of when will, rather than if, Vietnam will sign up to the Quad.

Quad Countries–China Relations

The Quad countries share a common interest regarding their concern on the rise of China. The US and its Quad allies have been discussing FOIP in response to China's Belt and Road Initiative. China's strategy has caused these liberal stakeholders to invest in the maintenance of FOIP itself (Foreign Policy Research Center, 2018, p. 8). The significant threat comes from the Chinese military, as indicated by its assertive pursuit of territorial claims in South Asia, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. On the other hand, it is also economic and scientific. China is a key stakeholder in international supply chains, most notably

now as a vaccine provider, a significant worldwide investor through the BRI, and a rapidly developing technology power (Kutty, S.N. and Basrur, S., 2021).

China has been undoubtedly challenging the hegemonic status of the United States in the global power structure. China has always considered the Quad as an American-led effort to control and undermine its global expansion. Despite the polarisation of politics in the United States, with deep animosity growing between the two parties, Democratic President Joe Biden has so far indicated that he would have a similar approach to China as the former Republican President, Donald Trump (although Biden rejects Trump's unilateral instincts, and favours multilateralism). This strategy, which emphasizes strong collaboration between the US and its strategic allies, has been defined by Biden as the foundation of his China policy since he came to power. The Biden cabinet also intends to keep Trump's tariffs on Chinese imports to a large extent, though it will reopen an exclusion procedure to grant exemptions for some commodities. In other words, key aspects of Trump's China trade strategy will remain intact (Chalfant, M., 2021).

The relationship between India and China has primarily resulted in disagreements, and it has been worsening in recent months. The latest conflict was the border dispute in Ladakh in the Himalayan border area. Tens of thousands of troops, backed by artillery, tanks, and jet fighters, are now stationed along the de facto frontier known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The LAC connects the Himalayan territory of Ladakh in the west to Arunachal Pradesh in India's east, which China claims entirely. In 1962, India and China waged a devastating war over the border that spanned for 3,500km (2,200 miles) (Westcott, S. P., 2021). India is forced to rethink China's vision of an Asian structure with India since Beijing has surpassed India and other powers on many accounts to improve its "comprehensive national power" (Panda, 2018, p. 102). China has also interfered in what India considers as its spheres of influence.

Japan is still engaged in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in the East China Sea. Tensions between Japan and China have lately risen in 2020, when Japan claimed that China has "relentlessly continued attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by coercion in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands," and "Japan cannot accept China's actions to escalate the situation" (Mochizuki, M. and Han, J., 2020). There are also deep anti-Japanese sentiments within China which have not dissipated following World War 2, and a recent survey showed that 66.1% of Chinese people have a negative impression of Japan (The Japan Times, 2021). Moreover, a more assertive Chinese military has also threatened Japanese security and maritime strategic interests, since Japan relies on the Malacca Strait as well as the free passage in the seas for its energy imports (Panda, 2018, p. 101).

As for Australia, the government declared that it would "stand up" to China in the latter part of 2016. In early October 2021, the US, UK, and Australia announced the AUKUS pact, a security agreement designed to counter China. Recently, Beijing has launched a trade disruption campaign that has affected over a dozen Australian exports, ranging from coal to wine. Moreover, in April 2020, Australian political leaders gave the impression of conspiring with the Trump administration to launch an assault on China in response to the COVID-19 outbreak (The Washington Post, 2020). There has also been a lot of anxiety among the public and especially the media over the encroaching Chinese influence in Australian politics and society (Thiessen, 2019).

Despite all of this ill-feeling and resentment, these four countries are heavily tied to the Chinese economy. China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has funded many infrastructure projects in India, making India the second-largest shareholder in the AIIB and its largest borrower (Iwanek, 2021). China is Japan's biggest trading partner (Ezrati, 2019). Japan has also enjoyed Chinese tourists' "explosive buying" on such things as cosmetics and health-care supplements (Ryall, J., 2015). China has been one of Boeing's most vital

customers in recent years (Thomas, 2019). More than other Quad country, Australia has maintained strong economic ties with China, with Beijing remaining Canberra's largest trading partner, and Chinese visitors make up 15% of Australian international tourists as of 2019. (Thiessen, 2019).

ASEAN Dissolution

The reactions of Southeast Asian states towards China's rise as well as the Quad countries with their FOIP strategy are diverse. Beijing's commercial influence is powerful in most mainland ASEAN countries, while maritime states are more concerned about their security issues. While this situation itself has brought into question ASEAN unity, it may deteriorate further with the response from Vietnam and Indonesia, the nations that appeared to be the most supportive of FOIP, particularly viewed in the light of both countries' deepened defence relations with the Quad members. If ASEAN remains incoherent in forming a united position regarding China on the South China Sea dispute, eventually, one or more of these ASEAN states adjacent to the South China Sea might align with the Quad, and the Quad would be delighted to see this happen, which would then deepen the cracks within ASEAN.

ASEAN centrality worked well during the Cold War as the original five founding countries had no territorial/political disputes with either of the world's two superpowers, the US and USSR. The current ASEAN members that were parties of the second and third Indochina wars (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) only joined ASEAN in the 1990's, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, spelling an end to the Cold War. Moreover, the Soviet Union was never a major part of the global economy, much less ASEAN's main trade partner as China currently is. There did not exist diverging economic interests between the nations of southeast Asia as there are now. Mainland southeast Asia is deriving greater and greater gains in investment and loans from partnering with China, whereas

maritime southeast Asia looks to lose overall from China's assertive expansionist actions in the South China Sea. As mentioned, these nations have strong economic ties with China too, but the economic loss these countries would suffer from having access to the rich resources of the South China sea withheld from them would far outweigh these trade and investment links, still less the de facto loss of sovereignty that would follow from such a scenario, which would be disastrous. Even if the elites of these nations could be monetarily coerced into accepting this new paradigm, it would put them in a precarious position politically, with no one wanting to appear as content with placing their nation under the suzerainty of Beijing. If one examines the ASEAN Declaration, it states that the aims of the Association are:

> 1. to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region
>
> 2. to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter (ASEAN, 2020).

It is economic growth that the former aim places an unspoken emphasis on, with sociocultural links largely stated as window dressing. As argued above, if some countries are set to gain and some are set to lose economically (as well as politically) from the rise of China and all of the implications that come with it, then this will open up a chasm of diverging interests within ASEAN, and ultimately resentment and animosity that would create institutional paralysis. As for the latter aim, if China merely upholds support for multinational organizations when it works to its advantage and ridicules them when it does not, such as the UNCLOS judgment in favour of the Philippines over the South China Sea Arbitration, then ASEAN will eventually have to confront China when it does not abide by international law, or bow to it and abandon this ambition.

ASEAN member states have espoused fundamental principles in their relations with one another. Among these is mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations (ASEAN, 2021a). If some ASEAN countries do not respect the sovereignty of other members, even if indirectly through passive approval or even non-alignment with their fellow members with regard to territorial disputes with 3rd parties such as China and effectively cooperate on it (another principle), then ASEAN has no future.

Conclusion

To conclude, the existence of the Quad may clearly exasperate the pre-existing institutional indisposition of ASEAN. China has indeed become ASEAN's largest trading partner, but maritime countries adjacent to China have become increasingly insecure due to the South China Sea dispute, which threatens their economic lifelines coming from the West. Moreover, though China also shares economically beneficial relationships with the Quad members, it seems that these four countries' primary intention is to watch over China's Rise, making sure that China will not become the sole superpower in the Indo-Pacific region. Quad only arose as a counterweight to China, thus, it could be an essential factor in maintaining the regional balance of power. If some ASEAN states decide to join the Quad or act against it, this will lead to the dissolution of the multinational body, and in the worst-case scenario, cause a proxy war between the Southeast Asian nations, if a second cold war were to develop between China and the Quad.

Power, for better or worse, remains the essential element in global politics. ASEAN countries might have thought that the institution would have reshaped their internal relations with the external major powers. In lieu of that, the major powers, including China and the Quad members, were actually reshaping the relationship between ASEAN member states. As a final remark, it seems obvious

that ASEAN would have greater autonomy, power, and relevance if it could speak in one voice surrounding these issues, particularly on such salient issues of core power as territorial integrity and coercive force. If ASEAN cannot do this, and soon, it will fracture into subgroups where interests align more readily and in a nightmare scenario, fracture into a geopolitical context akin to the Iron Curtain that emerged in post war Europe.

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UNIT-LEVEL EXPLANATION ON INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY: ELITE CONSESUS AND SINK THE VESSEL POLICY UNDER THE JOKOWI'S PRESIDENCY

Miftachul Choir
Institute of Human Rights and Peace Study
Mahidol University

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Abstract

Neo-realism predicts the state will choose a certain balancing strategy according to the given strategic environment and the relative power of respective states. Since Southeast Asia recognized as informal and norm-based regionalism, state balancing strategy seeks to maximize the regional organization ability to restrain member state's behaviour and manage basic interaction within states. In the case of combating illegal fishing, however, neo-realism is unable to explain why the Indonesian government did not apply the ASEAN-led mechanism and instead became more bilaterally assertive. Applying the neo-classical realism framework, this research examines why Indonesia did not adopt the expected institutional balancing strategy. Neoclassical-realisms argues that it is the intervening variable that determines the state's balancing strategy. Using Randall Schweller's elite consensus framework, this research outlines how Indonesian decision-makers settled on the "sink the vessel" policy and did not agree to implement ASEAN-led mechanism, therefore adopting a more aggressive approach to minimize threat in this specific case.

Keywords: Institutional balancing, overbalancing, elite consensus, neoclassical realism, neo-realism, ASEAN, sink the vessel, illegal fishing.

Background

Despite regime change and domestic political contestation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has become the core of a concentric circle of Indonesian foreign policymaking, ahead of Europe, North America, Africa, and

South America. As a result, scholars and observers argue that Indonesia assumed the role of informal leader and solidarity maker of the regional bloc (Rattanasevee, 2014; Roberts & Widyaningsih, 2015; Heiduk, 2016). Jakarta leadership in ASEAN is evidenced by participation in confidence-building measures during the Indochina Conflict and advancing ASEAN institutionalization in the 1990s. Furthermore, leadership is characterized by Jakarta's effort to implement an ASEAN-led mechanism known as "ASEAN Way" for mitigating regional disputes (Rattanasevee, 2014).

The illegal fishing issue is one example of how the ASEAN-led mechanism has managed the intra-regional dispute. According to the ASEAN Way, the member states should handle the conflict through consultations, dialogue, Track-II diplomacy, and renunciation decisive actions (ASEAN, 2008). The AMS can also use the regional forum to build trust and confidence to prevent the escalation of the issue. Conferences such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), and East Asia Summit (EAS) have contributed to ASEAN cooperation on combating illegal fishing under the framework of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). Therefore, these forums' role in combating illegal fishing consists of convening inter-institutional meetings, sharing experiences, and formulating regional agreements to combat illegal fishing.

However, Indonesian commitment to the ASEAN-led mechanism came into question during the Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo presidency. The former DKI Jakarta governor decided to implement a "sink the vessels" policy to reclaim Indonesia marine resources that had contributed to lost Indonesia maritime income and negative impacts on fishermen welfare, despite its position as a maritime archipelagic state with abundant maritime resources (Setkab RI, 2014). This research argues the vessel sinking policy disregarding ASEAN-led mechanisms as Jakarta became more assertive and showed its military superiority in the region, thereby undermining confidence-building measures, and disregarding the multilayered context of the issues. The action also contradicts Indonesia's

commitment as a 'peace-loving nation' that manages conflict through peaceful rather than coercive means (Nasirin & Hermawan, 2017).

Since its inception in 2014, the vessel sinking policy has led to 556 foreign vessels being sunk from Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and China (KKP, 2019). Most of the actions were performed in disputed territory. The policy led to diplomatic friction, especially as Indonesia has not finished maritime border negotiations with Vietnam and Malaysia. Jakarta also only completed the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) negotiations with The Philippines in 2019 and is still waiting for ratification. Due to the decision, Hanoi protested Indonesia's actions and summoned Indonesia's ambassador in Hanoi (Parameswaran, 2015). While there is no official statement, Thailand also questioned Indonesia's decisions on illegal fishing and blamed Indonesia for the decline in its fish stocks (Bangkok Post, 2014). Indonesia was also accused of hurting the current Continental Shelf Agreement negotiations with Vietnam as both Jakarta and Hanoi have not agreed on the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ). If Jakarta wants to maintain informal leadership in ASEAN, then Jokowi needs to display its commitment to the ASEAN-led mechanism for solving regional disputes and resolving frictions through diplomatic means.

Based on the Indonesian role as the informal leader of ASEAN, the neo-realist approach predicts that Jakarta would implement institutional balancing and apply regional norms and mechanisms to mitigate potential distrust in dealing with the illegal fishing issue (He, 2008). Instead, Indonesia adopted an overbalancing strategy by taking an aggressive turn, perceiving other states as a threat, and enhancing defensive capability. Therefore, this research will look at why the Indonesian government adopted the vessel sinking policy as a response to illegal fishing issues rather than the expected strategy of favouring the ASEAN-led mechanism. Previous research on Indonesia's fishing policy has focused on legal debates about policy (Efritadewi & Jefrizal, 2017), economic rationality (Nasirin & Hermawan, 2017), and Jokowi's idiosyncrasies as key factors shaping decisions

and Indonesia's strategic environment (Situmorang, 2015; Bland, 2020; Andika, 2016).

Despite their significant contributions, this research was unable to explain the existing ASEAN policy, its lack of strategic guidance that resulted in multiple interpretations, and especially the debate within Indonesia's government on which policy should prevail. The finding of this research will demonstrate the elite consensus and elite perception towards external conditions contributed to Indonesia's decision to not follow ASEAN-led mechanisms. Including sub-national actors in the study is also important since post-political reformation Indonesia means foreign policy has been increasingly politicized and actors other than *Kemlu* and the head of state became involved. In this context, the Ministry of Maritime and Fisheries (KKP)—which traditionally is not involved in foreign policy—became a determining factor.

This research contributes to the debate by employing the neoclassical realism framework to explain why Indonesia did not adhere to the expected balancing strategy and implement an ASEAN-led mechanism to solve the illegal fishing issue. It focuses on how domestic agents translated the international environment into policy options. Furthermore, using Randall Schweller elite consensus approach, this paper argued that the decision-maker in charge of sinking the vessel policy disagreed on applying the ASEAN-led mechanism. This left the president to take unilateral action and adopt the "sink the vessels" policy.

Regarding the "sink the vessels" decisions, there were incoherencies within the decision-making elite as the *Kemlu* as viewed fishing issues as diplomatic problems and interpreted Jokowi's preferences through the maritime diplomacy lens mediated by the ASEAN Forum. On the other hand, the KKP viewed Jokowi's preferences through the maritime sovereignty lens and would require strong law enforcement at sea. The coordinating body among those two ministries was the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs (*Kemenko Maritim*) and interpreted Jokowi's '*nawacita'* as building maritime infrastructure to achieve

maritime connectivity. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted that these conditions contributed to Indonesia deemphasizing ASEAN, especially with the growing competition between *KKP* and *Kemenko Maritim* (Fitriani & Panduwinata, 2019). This shows dissensus within ministries in terms of how they perceive ASEAN, leading to policy implementation that did not preference the ASEAN-led mechanism. The approach that ultimately prevailed depended on which lens received Jokowi's support. In this case, the "sink the vessels" policy won out, although there is recognition that Indonesia still needs to show its traditional leadership in ASEAN.

This research is separated into five sections. The first section explains the logic of neoclassical realism and elite consensus that guides the rest of the paper. The second section presents information from ASEAN documents and conflict management mechanisms and argues that an ASEAN-led mechanism is suitable for non-provocative measures. The third section discusses decision-maker perceptions of the illegal fishing issue and how to solve it. Using the elite consensus framework, this research outlines leaders' perceptions on nature of problem, domestic risks and costs, and policy remedies. The fourth section summarizes the findings while the fifth section concludes by arguing that Jakarta's failure to commit to ASEAN-led mechanism was due to the elite disagreement and a lack of confidence that ASEAN was the most suitable mechanism to combat illegal fishing.

Balancing Strategy, Neoclassical Realism, and Elite Consensus

This research uses a variation of the neoclassical realism approach to explain the shifting balancing strategy that Indonesia has applied to its ASEAN-related foreign policy. Gideon Rose argued that neo-realism was limited in determining which balancing strategy a country would adopt given existing international pressure and could not explain in detail how effectively a state—especially at the unit level—

responded to pressure (Rose, 1998). Lobells and Rippsman added that while neorealists set the parameters of how states define their interests and pursue particular ends, neoclassical realists added value by examining the existing policy options and how leaders define the international pressure while compromising with domestic structure (Taliaferro, Jeffrey, & Ripsman, 2009, p. 28).,

Therefore, neoclassical realism focuses on the intervening variable to link international pressure (the dependent variable) and the policy response (the independent variable). As Rose explained in his article (Rose, 1998, p. 126):

> *The scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy are driven by its place in international systems and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. The impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex because systemic pressure needs to be translated through intervening variables at the unit level.*

Hence, neoclassical realism seeks to explain the failure of states adopting neo-realism's expected balancing strategy. The focus goes on to the unit-level which effectively becomes the transmission belt through which international pressure is translated into foreign policy outcomes (Rose, 1998, p. 147). The implication of this approach is that foreign policy choices are greatly affected by political leaders and their perception of international pressure and domestic capabilities and incentives. Therefore, to analyse the linking variable between the dependent and independent variables, one needs to examine the context and the leader's perception of power and international pressure. Power sources, political dynamics, and the structure of the state also need to be examined since the leader does not have unlimited freedom to respond to international pressure (Rose, 1998, p. 147).

Specifically, this research will make use of the insights in Randall Schweller's book, *Unanswered Threat*, to examine the intervening variable. Schweller highlighted the way states respond to their external environment turns on the preferences of relevant political and social actors and the unique structural

characteristics of society and government that constitute constraints on these actors (Schweller, 2008, pp. 46-47). The domestic variable consisting of *willingness,* or an actor's preferences, derives from domestic demands, and *ability* focuses on potential domestic political risks and costs of specific balancing strategies (Schweller, 2008, p. 46). Schweller emphasizes four variables determining how *willingness* and *ability* constitute the transmission belt: elite consensus, elite cohesion, regime vulnerability, and social vulnerability. However, this research is limited to focusing on elite consensus as it was the most important intervening variable.

Schweller defined elite consensus as the similarity between elite preferences over outcomes and their beliefs about the preferences and anticipated actions (Schweller, 2008, p. 46). Schweller argued that the state could only implement a coherent balancing strategy if the elite agreed to do so; otherwise, the process would be incoherent or use the previous status-quo approach. To examine the elite consensus, Schweller provides variables such as select agreement on the existing threat, nature and extent of the threat, agreement on policy remedy, and domestic risks and costs (Schweller, 2008, pp. 47-49). In a democratic regime, it is also vital to acknowledge which perceptions of policy matter.

Since the intervening variable is unit-level threat perception, this research uses Janice Gross Stein's model of threat perception. According to Stein, threat perception is derived from psychological and non-psychological factors (Stein, 2013). The non-psychological factors include the shifting the balance of power that leads to an inability to make credible commitments. These security dilemmas come from mutual misperception of defensive intentions, institutional interest, socio-cultural factors and domestic society (such as the extent of nationalist values), and norm violation (Stein, 2013). Despite including values as a non-psychological attribute, this is not to be confused with constructivism. Rathburn argued ideas able to distort the decision makers' roles are an intervening variable, especially with the uncertainty and complexity of the environment (Rathbun, 2008, pp. 311-318). Therefore, the use of ideas distinct from constructivism made it a dependent

variable. Furthermore, to explain the outcome of threat perception, Schweller categorized threats into *actual* threats evidenced by the clear signal of intent, *potential* threats of which evidence existed but had not materialized into danger, and *imagined* threats were there was no evidence of an existing threat.

To explain the parameters of the international environment, especially in the context of ASEAN, which the realist school traditionally opposed, this research will apply Kai He's work of realist institutional balancing. Kai He stated that institutional balancing is rule and norm-based balancing which states employ through international organizations that practice norm-setting and agenda control to influence fundamental interactions among states, restrain member state's behaviour, and prevent the rise of dominant actors (He, 2006, pp. 195-196). Therefore, the ASEAN-led mechanism is suitably placed to deal with international pressure using this approach, especially as Kai He stated that the distribution of power in the institutions was measured by the leader's perception (He, 2008, pp. 492-295).

Finally, the research also needs to conceptualize Indonesia's balancing strategy options as an outcome of foreign policy incoherence and particular agencies' perceptions. Indonesia adopted an overbalancing strategy in ASEAN. Instead of institutional balancing, Schweller defined this as the condition where the state misperceives other states as a threat, leading to the state becoming defensive to enhance its security (Schweller, 2008, p. 10). To understand the motivation to overbalance, one must determine whether the state is dissatisfied with the international order. The international order is defined as the nature of workable arrangements. It limits the acceptable means to resolve the conflict that arise in a competitive and self-help state of nature. It is competitive and influenced by security dilemmas. It also assumes the state will come into conflict because of the constant conditions of scarcity in terms of raw materials, markets, goods, and security (Schweller, 2008, pp. 27-28).

Rising conflict and threat perception lead the state to question the relevance of international order and motivates it to change the order. Alastair Iain Johnston provided variables to determine whether the state is dissatisfied and motivated to change the international system. The variable consists of the degree of an actor's participation in an international organization, any history of the actor breaking regional norms, attempts to change international norms, change the distribution of power, and use military force (Iain Johnston, 2003, pp. 11-12). This concept could be used to explain Indonesia's assertive move on ASEAN and how President Joko Widodo perceived the regional group.

Expected Outcome: ASEAN-led Mechanism on Handling Illegal Fishing

The ASEAN Way was initiated to manage intraregional relations and provide guiding principles for conducting regional affairs. Anthony-Caballero argued that ASEAN Way was a characteristic of how ASEAN managed conflict and maintained peace and security in the region (Mely--Caballero, 2005, p. 97). This later connected to the ASEAN security objective to formulate an informal conflict management mechanism by setting up policy behaviour built on shared visions and expectations about regional security (Mely--Caballero, 2005, p. 20). Therefore, instead of copying the EU's highly institutionalized quick decision-making process and binding policy outcomes, ASEAN prioritized norm-building to manage provincial affairs (Mely--Caballero, 2005, p. 22). Norms set in ASEAN consisted of Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), Zone of Peace and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), and ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). To 'teach' the norm to the AMS, the informal setting of AMS interaction consisted of the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Senior Official Meeting (SOM), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS) and various sectoral, regional meetings.

The TAC was also seen as an 'informal institutionalization'. It was an effort to put traditional domestic norms into a regional framework and become the basis of interaction for the region in an institutional setting such as ASEAN Summits, SOM, and ARF. TAC indicated that the pattern of ASEAN conflict management emphasized self-restraint values, both restraints in the use of the military and control on involvement in domestic matters (Askandar & Oishi, 2002, p. 38). Thus, the main focus of the TAC was not to solve the conflict but rather to manage conflict so as not to escalate and worsen regional interaction. Values such as restraint and responsibility, patience, informality, and respect for differences was reflected in the TAC principle and consultative means of making decisions (Askandar & Oishi, 2002). During consultations, issues could be voiced bilaterally before being brought into more formal official meetings (Acharya, 2001, p. 6).

Therefore, the practical use of TAC is not ASEAN involvement in each regional conflict resolution, but rather to induce the values in member states, and the member states can use those values when they face an intrastate conflict or dispute. For example, during the Cambodian-Vietnamese battle from the 1970s to the 1990s, despite not being part of ASEAN, the involvement of AMS was reflected by the CBMs and shuttle diplomacy conducted by Indonesia and Thailand to resolve highly political differences before gathering the parties in the Jakarta Informal Conference and the cessation of the conflict represented by the Paris Agreement. Although the Bangkok Declaration and TAC urged the AMS to take disputes to a third party, during the Malaysia-Indonesia and Cambodia-Thailand border disputes, each party resorted to friendly negotiations and agreed not to take the issues to the ASEAN summit. Despite military skirmishes that did occur in the latter, informal conferences conducted by AMS succeeded in convincing the parties to handle the problems through the International Court of Justice.

Regarding the illegal fishing issue, ASEAN fisheries dispute management is closely related to the fundamental ASEAN way of conflict management: preference for dialogue and consultation before bringing the matter to formal

summits, self-restraint of military force, and the application of CBMs between law enforcement institutions. The fisheries dispute settlement post-ASEAN Charter is also shown by the emergence of various ASEAN forums on maritime issues and the use of soft laws to solve the problems.

In 2010, the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) held its first summit in Surabaya. The AMF was intended to promote and develop common understanding and cooperation among AMS on transboundary maritime issues and discuss and identify maritime cooperation opportunities that would intensify regional integration of the ASEAN Community through enhanced maritime security and maritime-related issues. The AMF later expanded to an Extended ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) in 2013, which invited extra-regional actors. The first EAMF discussed the relevance of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), maritime connectivity, capacity building, infrastructure and equipment grading, seafarer training, protecting the marine environment, promoting eco-tourism, fishery regimes in East Asia and identifying best practices of cooperation ("Conference Report", 2011, p. 140-143).

Combating illegal fishing was also discussed in EAS and ARF. Similar to the TAC and the ASEAN Charter template, both forums emphasized the need to promote cooperation through dialogue and collaboration and address the maritime issues through ASEAN-led mechanisms. In regards to solving the territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the East Asia Summit Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation urged AMS to avoid the use of threats and force and to opt for friendly consultation and negotiation thus preventing any conduct of activities that would "complicate and escalate disputes" ("East Asia Summit," 2015, p. 1-2). While in The 2017 ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Cooperation to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated Fishing, the parties agreed to solve territorial and jurisdictional disputes "without prejudice to the positions of the concerned parties. Furthermore, in the ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial Statement on Enhancing Cooperation among Maritime Law Enforcement, the

member states agreed to the need for enhanced cooperation among maritime law enforcement agencies to promote trust and confidence, strengthening capacity and coordination, and exercising self-restraint by all parties, and collectively endeavour to maintain peace, stability, safety and security, and emphasizing cooperation through dialogue and collaboration.

In practice, the statement also included Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) to combat illegal fishing and take all necessary steps consistent with international and national law, in the principle of transparency and non-discriminatory. The ARF also urged the member states to provide appropriate administrative, civil, and penal sanctions, exchange national plans of actions, exchange; information, and undertake multilateral cooperation. ARF also developed a three-year ASEAN Regional Forum Work Plan for Maritime Security in 2011. The purpose of the work plan was to build common perceptions of threats and challenges in maritime security after the previous ARF forum member states agreed on the importance of sharing and the need to identify the gaps in maritime agreements and frameworks to develop a robust and effective work plan. The work plan of the ARF consists of capacity building, coordinated patrols, and 1.5 track workshops.

Elite Disagreement on Sinking the Vessel Policy

President Jokowi: no tolerance for illegal fishing

According to neoclassical realism, the head of government becomes the transmission belt that translates the international environment into foreign policy action (Rose, 1998, p. 147). Therefore, examining Jokowi's administration as a single unit in Indonesian foreign policymaking is necessary as critical issues will be instructed and determined by the head of state, even though Jokowi's foreign policy is highly influenced by his realist-influenced foreign policy consultant, Rizal Sukma and Luhut Pandjaitan (Connelly, 2014, pp. 5-6).

During his inaugural speech, Jokowi stated his vision of Indonesia's return to the ocean (Setkab RI, 2014). Following the previous administration, inward-oriented development leads to minimal maximization of maritime resources and the underdevelopment of the maritime economy. Moreover, Jokowi views Indonesia maritime resources as being robbed by illegal fishing practices and Indonesia has not shown any vigorous law enforcement to eradicate the issues. Thus, Jokowi declared that his government would start sinking vessels that intruded into Indonesian territory, especially as the *Trisakti* doctrine mandated that the government pay more attention to maritime disputes (Chen & Syailendra, 2015). The decision came after Jokowi found out that 5,400 vessels sailed in Indonesian territory every day—despite the exact maritime domain still unclear, and the government suffered RP300 billion losses every year (Setkab RI, 2014). Hence, the numbers became the actual threat Jokowi saw to Indonesia's maritime resources. However, Jokowi also stated that the action should be done cautiously to avoid precipitating quarrels with the respective country during the same occasion.

Jokowi's assertive stance is also evidenced by his intention to initiate the decision as a means of 'shock therapy' and 'punishment' so that neighbouring countries stop pursuing illicit gains from Indonesian maritime territory. Jokowi also instructed the KKP and Indonesian military (TNI-AL) to show no tolerance for illegal vessels and to avoid judicial processes (The Jakarta Post, 2014). Furthermore, he argued that such measures were already conducted in other countries. This precedent justified the action in Indonesia's case, also. Thus, combined with his nationalistic lens of viewing the international environment, his maritime voters as a power base, and his aspirations to turn Indonesia into powerful maritime archipelagic state, the sinking vessel policy was Jokowi's way of making good on his commitment to defending Indonesia's national sovereignty and national resources of the state (Hamzah, 2015). Jokowi also dismissed the claim that the vessel sinking decision is part of megaphone diplomacy and said he regarded the issue as criminal rather than diplomatic (World Bulletin , 2014). Thus,

according to Jokowi, the decision is justifiable as it is an effort to maintain territorial integrity.

Regarding maritime border disputes, Jokowi acknowledged that Indonesia still has maritime boundary issues with neighbouring countries, creating problems in law enforcement (Sekneg RI, 2015). However, the former Surakarta mayor ignores the gravity of maritime boundaries disputes and its compatibility with his policy. Currently, Indonesia only has an EEZ agreement with the Philippines, a provisional arrangement with Malaysia, and ongoing negotiations with Vietnam. The absence of a clear territorial limit might cause misunderstandings or open up conflict between two countries law enforcement agencies (Febrica, 2017). Therefore, the GMF does not include resolving maritime boundary and territorial disputes (Laksmana & Supriyatno, 2018, p. 309).

The Kemlu's moderate stance on illegal fishing issue

The *Kemlu* remains confident that the ASEAN-led mechanism and the use of the ASEAN forum remain necessary and priority measures to combating illegal fishing. The head of *Kemlu,* Retno Marsudi, indicates this through his statement that ASEAN should maintain its stance on downplaying megaphone diplomacy on resolving intra-state disputes and prioritise negotiation and dialogue (ASEAN-Indonesia, 2017). The *Kemlu* noted that consultation and friendly negotiation could eliminate distrust among nations that possibly erupt from unilateral actions. During the talks with the Vietnamese coast guard, the *Kemlu* highlighted the unresolved issues between countries increased the possibility of conflict arising and agreed that respective countries' law enforcement should restrain its use of force and not engage in provocative acts in the area. (Detik, 2018). Vietnam, however, cited that the vessel sinking policy as a provocative measure—120 Vietnamese boats have been sunk, the most among ASEAN countries. Hanoi already summoned the Indonesian ambassador following the incident. The statement also indicated the

Kemlu's stance on following ASEAN-led mechanism and disagreement with law enforcement measures of other institutions.

Due to existing disputed maritime borders, the *Kemlu* also argued that the rules of engagement in disputed EEZ are yet to be fixed. Therefore, national law could not fully be implemented in Indonesia's area with no sovereignty to enforce the law.[1] Especially Indonesia also has not yet reached provisional arrangements on EEZ. The action became an obstacle for the *Kemlu* to finishing the delimitation agreement, aside from other disagreements over principles.[2]

Indonesia's efforts in ARF displayed its commitment to the ASEAN-led mechanism to combat illegal fishing. This shows that the *Kemlu* highlighted that the ARF could push dialogue and cooperation on combating illegal fishing. The forum plays a role in raising awareness and testing the water before proceeding to the more comprehensive forum (Chaniago, 2016). The flexible and non-binding nature of ASEAN that provides member states space and time to understand each other's position without tough negotiation (Yusilawati, 2016). The *Kemlu's* result from using the ASEAN forum as a platform on combating illegal fishing is seen by *the 2017 ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Cooperation to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing.* Comparing the previous ASEAN agreement on combating illegal fishing, the Manila Statement shows more technicalities and displays Jakarta's effort to strengthen AMS commitment to fighting illegal fishing.

KKP's aggressive stance on illegal fishing issue

The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) stance on illegal fishing is contained in its assertive Maritime White Paper released in 2017. The document is the KKP interpretation of Jokowi's calls for Indonesia to 'return to the ocean' as a

[1] Personal interview with Ashila Reza, Directory of International Territory Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
[2] Ibid

maritime archipelagic state, and the president's calls for resources sovereignty. The white paper argued that Indonesia had lost its maritime principles, lost its identity and inability to retain marine integrity and independence (Kementerian Keluatan dan Perikanan, 2015, pp. 12-13). Jakarta's previous inability indicated by the government's failure to convert its maritime resources to public welfare, especially the fisherman dominating Indonesia's impoverished population. *Nawacita* interpreted the document as a 'national awakening' and urged fisheries sectors to be independent, resilient, and pursue the national interest (Kementerian Keluatan dan Perikanan, 2015, p. 28).

Illegal fishing becoming the symbol of Indonesia's faded maritime archipelagic state identity. The KKP argues that, according to the World Bank and Food and FAO, Indonesia suffered losses of USD20 billion annually (Kementerian Keluatan dan Perikanan, 2015, p. 13). Therefore, combating illegal fishing was a priority for the KKP during Jokowi's government. Illegal fishing was a problem and challenge to sovereignty, sustainability, and welfare, the three principal responsibilities of the KKP. The sovereignty principle is defined as independence in managing and optimizing marine resources by strengthening national capabilities and capacity to enforce the law at sea (Kementerian Keluatan dan Perikanan, 2015, p. 17). The code positioned the KKP as realists influenced and taking a challenging power-based approach to combating illegal fishing. However, the main point of sovereignty is not limited to protecting maritime territory, but protecting marine resources and combating illegal fishing as the 'key concrete steps' to achieve that.

The welfare principle is defined as managing marine and fisheries' resources as much as possible for the benefit of the people (Kementerian Keluatan dan Perikanan, 2015, p. 17). The KKP has taken the blame for illegal fishing causing fisherman poverty in Indonesia. The KKP argued that maritime territory should be the source of local welfare, but in reality, could no longer become reliable sources of income. The impoverished conditions are indicated by the decrease of maritime

households, low fishery sector production-consumption, and the fisheries sector's small contribution toward national GDP.

The ministry also seeks to reverse Indonesia's insufficient monitoring capacity and to increase sea patrol to combat illegal fishing. Therefore, the policy option KKP undertakes is to sink the vessel allegedly stealing Indonesia fisheries resources. KKP opts for the policy considering Indonesia's vast maritime territory, and the most effective measures to combating illegal fishing are enforcing the rule of law (Kementerian Keluatan dan Perikanan, 2015, p. 17). According to KKP, the decision is justified by the national Fisheries Law and UNCLOS, and fully supported by the president. The decision departs from the previous government's compliance with illegal fishing convicts, opting for a soft approach by taking the ships to sell it to local fisheries, returning the ships to its last owner after an extended period (Tempo, 2019). Echoing Jokowi's nationalistic nature on illegal fishing or maritime resources management, Susi Pudjiastuti, as the minister responsible for the *KKP,* also views it as a deterrent measure to neighbouring countries (Kementerian Keluatan dan Perikanan, 2015, p. 21). The nature of how Jokowi and Susi looked at policy options on combating illegal fishing was contradictory to the ASEAN-led mechanism and conflict management mechanism that the *Kemlu* has stated.

Due to the assertive nature of the national strategic plan and support from Jokowi, the KKP disregards diplomatic relations while combating illegal fishing. It was evidenced by Susi's failure to acknowledge the existence of unresolved border disputes with neighbouring countries, reluctance to resolve it through diplomatic manners, and her efforts to set the norms by promoting illegal fishing as part of Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). According to Susi, illegal fishing is a TOC due to the involvement of more than two well-organized nationalities, classified as a severe crime, and the stolen goods used for import (Risnain, 2017, p. 390). Susi acknowledged that the policy is indeed scaring other countries, but it still needs to be done (BBC Indonesia, 2019). Regarding the possibility of foreign protest to the

policy, Susi stated that there would be no diplomatic quarrel as she had already informed embassies in Jakarta and explained the necessity of her approach (BeritaSatu, 2016). However, due to her bold move, the Vietnamese government already called in Indonesia's envoy in Hanoi and reminded Indonesia of the 'strategic partnership' between countries (Parameswaran, 2015). MOFA is also troubled by Susi's unilateral action of visiting embassies in Jakarta.[3] Susi's stance disregarding diplomatic relations is also evidenced by her leaving diplomatic relations solely to the *Kemlu* (Detik Finance, 2016). This means Susi views the *Kemlu* as playing the role of 'cleaning up the mess' after her ministry precipitates quarrels.

In international fora, Susi tries to display her realist and zero-sum perception of policy. For example, during Our Ocean Conference 2018 (OOC), Susi stated that the international forum provides a platform for Indonesia to share its bravery in bringing change to fisheries management, especially turning the fisheries sector into a profitable industry (Kumparan, 2018). Susi also stated that an international conference should be beyond 'talk shops' and deliver concrete results (Kumparan, 2018). This statement represents a pessimistic view of ASEAN, seeing the organization only as a 'talk shop' due to its consensual decision making and non-binding outcomes. Susi's pessimistic views on ASEAN are plausible as the regional bloc is unable to provide any concrete steps to enhance law enforcement to combat illegal fishing and regional disinterest in achieving that goal. Therefore, Susi opts for more comprehensive forums such as IORA and UNODC.

Susi also failed to consider the current international strategic environment, especially concerning unresolved maritime boundaries. Following the sinking of the Vietnamese vessels, Susi stated that if the resources remain in Indonesia EEZ, it belongs to Indonesia entirely (Detik Finance, 2016). However, the *Kemlu* argues that the sinking the vessel policy is only fully justified in Indonesia's territorial

[3] Wicaksana

water. In the EEZ area, "it depends on the nature of illegal fishing and current agreement with respective countries."[4] Susi's lack of consideration for maritime boundary disputes lead to the Vietnamese dominating the list of the vessel sunk by Indonesia. Compared to the Philippines, which Indonesia already has EEZ delimitation with, and Malaysia, that already agreed on provisional arrangement, Vietnamese ships have not benefited from clarity. The vessel sinking actions in turn contributes to friction that has hampered both countries' border negotiations.

Susi closed the door for policy remedies as indicated by her rebuttal to intra-ministerial criticism toward her decision, the debate between the DPR and KKP on the revision of Fisheries Bill, and through Jokowi's full support for the vessel sinking approach. For the latter, the previous section of this chapter already highlighted that the vessel sinking policy is seen as necessary and the main operational decision to achieve the maritime archipelagic state. Especially when Jokowi himself announced the decision and explained Indonesia maritime resources losses could not be tolerated any longer. Therefore, the KKP becomes Jokowi's main instrument to achieving his aspirations and keeping public support for him. Susi even has more power in front of Jokowi compared to other ministers. This is proved by Susi accepting the suggestion to prohibit foreign investment in maritime sectors, followed by the president issuing Presidential Regulation No. 44 of 2016 concerning the negative investment list (Kementerian Keluatan dan Perikanan, 2015, pp. 12-13). As investment is a priority issue for the president, the negative list proved that Susi maintains a higher position in Jokowi's pecking order. Susi also suggested the president issue formal presidential instruction on sinking the vessel, as the current bill did not stipulate the KKP's mandate to sink vessels (Antara News, 2015).

Susi's decision also brought her into conflict with her supposed superiors, the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs (*Kemenko Maritim*) Luhut

[4] Interview with Ms. Nia, Head of Subdirectory of ASEAN Political-Security Community, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Pandjaitan and Vice President Jusuf Kalla. Both senior politicians and experienced foreign policy professionals instructed Susi to stop sinking the vessels and auctioning the convicted ships (Bisnis.com, 2018). Kalla stated that the action complicated Indonesia's diplomatic relations given Susi's unwillingness to mention the states that had already issued complaints about the policy to Indonesia's representatives (Kompas.com, 2018). The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and Commission IV of DPR, who supervises the KKP, also agreed with Luhut and Kalla that the vessel sinking should be stopped (Kompas.com, 2018). Nevertheless, Susi ignored the criticism towards her policy as she believed Jokowi would side with her. Answering Luhut and Kalla's complaint, Jokowi stated that maritime law enforcement is still necessary as it shows Indonesia's commitment to protecting its sovereignty. Susi also added if sinking the vessel was to be eliminated, then the head of KKP should be replaced, and the proponents should channel their aspirations directly to the president. Despite numerous high-level disagreements, the sinking the vessel policy remains prevalent until the end of Jokowi's first term.

Susi's next test to maintain her *sinking the vessel policy* came from the DPR, as the legislature considered revision to Fisheries Bills. There were still questions whether the bill will implicitly include the vessel sinking policy. However, seeing legislative reluctance to endorse the policy, it was unlikely that the policy would be included in the revised bill. Therefore, Susi urged that the word 'sinking' should be in the revised bill (CNBC Indonesia, 2018). She even urged her institution to drop out the support if her suggestion was not considered by the legislative (Katadata, 2018). Ultimately, the legislation failed to pass the bill, and Susi could continue her actions.

Coordinating Ministries for Maritime Affairs: rejecting sinking the vessel issue

Luhut consistently criticized Susi's action on the sinking of the vessel. This contradicted his collaborative view of foreign policy, where his ministry needed to ensure friendly relations and a peaceful regional environment to attract foreign

investment. *Kemenko Maritim's* utilitarian views on combating illegal fishing leading to Luhut's disagreement with Susi and he told KKP minister to stop sinking vessels. Luhut argued that the vessel should be granted to local fisherman instead of being sunk. The statement was also backed by Vice President Jusuf Kalla, which stated neighbouring countries are already troubled with Indonesia decisive action in the maritime area, especially on the unresolved maritime border. Luhut also disagrees with Susi's short-term policy. In his view, sinking the vessels was necessary initially, but in the long term, Luhut argued that KKP should focus more on increasing productivity and harmonizing rules on managing fisheries.

His openness also evidences Luhut's collaborative approach of foreign policy and preferences for engaging multilateral forums. Contrary to Susi's character, who tried to set establish unilaterally new international norms and show off Indonesia law enforcement capability, Luhut remained open to mutual gains and a collaborative approach. Luhut argued that Indonesia needs to develop a global network of maritime law enforcement within IORA (Kementerian Koordinator Kemaritiman, 2017). This is consistent with *Kemenko Maritim's* views on combating illegal fishing that prioritize AMS as partners,[5] and contrary to the KKP that tried to legitimize illegal fishing as a TOC in Southeast Asia. Therefore, *Kemenko Maritim's* proposed measures were consistent with ASEAN-led mechanisms such as initiating Track II international workshops, negotiation, and formulating commitment through regional fora such as ARF, EAS, and IORA.[6] *Kemenko Maritim* also announced their disagreement with the vessel sinking actions, especially seeing Indonesia had not concluded EEZ with neighbouring countries and was causing diplomatic quarrels.[7]

[5] Interview with Mr.Basillio Araujo, Deputy Assistant of Maritime Security, Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs
[6] Ibid
[7] Ibid

Summary: Decision-maker Perceptions on Vessel Sinking Issues

The previous section explained and analysed Jokowi's, KKP, the *Kemlu*, and *Kemenko Maritim* statements and stances towards the illegal fishing issue and the vessel sinking policy through the neoclassical realist lens provided by Randall Schweller. As illustrated in the summary in Table 5.1, despite becoming the key foreign policy-making body and promoting Indonesia's government to opt for ASEAN-led mechanisms, the *Kemlu* failed to attract Jokowi's strategic interest in this case. At the same time, the KKP has a better and more compatible strategy to fulfil Jokowi's aspirations and sees that the ASEAN-led mechanism is ineffective. Due to his campaign promise to provide tangible benefits to his constituents, the vessel sinking policy became the option Jokowi chose. Jokowi's motivation to opt for this policy is also due to his strategic mission statement that Indonesia could not tolerate the low profile it had in the region and would pursue regional leadership, contrasting himself with the SBY presidency that did not oversee substantial interest gains for the country. This leads Jokowi to view ASEAN as threatening his nationalist-materialistic aspirations. At the same time, Jokowi also needs positive foreign relations to attract investment to fulfil his national infrastructure program and the experienced Luhut is highly committed to the program. Therefore, the *Kemlu* ultimately came to agree with Jokowi to opt for a non-ASEAN balancing strategy to combat illegal fishing.

Due to the KKP taking the initiative of the 'sinking the vessels' policy, their perception matters and especially seeing KKP has the full support from President Jokowi as the ministry's role is vital to achieving Jokowi's maritime archipelago state aspirations and gaining public approval. As the minister, Susi Pudjiastuti also perceived ASEAN as a platform to promote illegal fishing as transnational organized crime and to show off that Indonesia rather than a mechanism for resolving disputes. Susi is experienced and has the ability and commitment to continue implementing the decision. The KKP also shared Jokowi's nationalistic and transactional nature of the policy. Therefore, the vessel sinking policy is seen

as necessary as it successfully returned to Indonesia its fisheries' resources. *Kemlu* had to accept its lower profile and damange to its image building agenda. At the same time, *Kemenko Maritim* opposed the policy as the ministry's purpose was to attract foreign investment.

Actor	**Interest towards ASEAN**	**Threat perception (Illegal fishing as Threat)**	**Policy remedy (Illegal fishing)**	**Domestic political risk and cost**
President	Legitimates Indonesia's status as maritime archipelagic state.	Actual Threat; extraordinary criminal issue.		Defending sovereignty and providing tangible welfare to the nation's poorest.
Kemlu	Increasing Indonesia leadership role in ASEAN	Imagined Threat; diplomatic issue, intertwined with border disputes.	ASEAN-led mechanism.	Negative international image and troubling delimitation, negotiation.
KKP	Promoting IUU as Transnational Organized Crime (TOC).	Actual Threat; Transnational organized crime		Defending sovereignty and providing tangible welfare to nation's poorest
Kemenko Maritim	Foreign investment.	Imagined Threat; National issue; Diplomatic issue.	ASEAN -led mechanism.	Providing national infrastructure program.

Policy matters	**Joko Widodo**

Table 5.1: Elite Disagreement on ASEAN-led Mechanism

Regarding the nature of the threat, there are stark differences that emerged as Susi views this as an actual threat as exemplified by her stance of characterising this issue as a transnational organized crime that needs an extraordinary measure and relegated the importance of ongoing EEZ delimitation negotiation by the *Kemlu*. This leads to *Kemlu*'s need to juggle Indonesia's bold move, EEZ negotiations, and support for ASEAN-led mechanisms in ASEAN fora. The *Kemlu* was also forced to view illegal fishing as a transnational organized crime. Instead of providing the ASEAN context for illegal fishing issues, their role was relegated to 'cleaning up the mess' after Susi's bold move.

No ASEAN policy remedy is acceptable to Susi and Jokowi to combat and prevent illegal fishing. Susi's rebuttal proves this to Luhut, Jusuf Kalla, DPR, and Jokowi's support for the policy. Especially as sinking the vessel policy was an important prong of Jokowi's attempt to secure popular support for 2019 elections, and its effectiveness already proven by KKP popularity on various surveys. Meanwhile, ASEAN-led mechanisms are seen as ineffective and inefficient to combat illegal fishing, and The *Kemlu* has no say in policy remedy discussions. This is also clearly a top-down approach of policymaking in Indonesia, and none of *Kemlu* officials were included in Jokowi's circle of foreign policymaking before assuming office.

Finally, the reason behind the *Kemlu's* abstention on policy remedy discussion and the pushing an ASEAN-led mechanism was due to the ministry having no supporting base in Indonesian society; the only risk-taking for the *Kemlu* is their credibility in front of Jokowi. Moreover, the *Kemlu's* role itself has been diminished due to Jokowi's preferences for achieving tangible results. Therefore, Jokowi has strong power to dictate foreign policy affairs. However, the same could apply to *Kemenko Maritim,* but other factors such as their political connection to

Jokowi gives them the freedom to conduct their foreign relations in ASEAN. Competition with Susi is, therefore, inevitable.

If Susi is Jokowi's 'tool' for gaining public approval and pursuing maritime sovereignty, Luhut is his way of achieving Indonesia's maritime connectivity and infrastructure building. Both of them are part of GMF. However, Luhut's added value is that he is also the oligarch who funded the Jokowi campaign in 2014.[8] Seeing Jokowi's aforementioned triple minority, Jokowi needs to balance between domestic interest and ruling-oligarch demands. Thus, while Luhut shares with Jokowi's policy support for pursuing foreign investment, he sees ASEAN more positively. As a former Ambassador to Singapore, Luhut is already familiar with the ASEAN mechanism and how the regional group works. Therefore, Luhut rejects the vessel sinking policy as it becomes an obstacle for him to achieve a strategic partnership with neighbouring countries.

Despite his weak position in the first term, Jokowi's policy matters to other ministries. Throughout his five-year tenure, most of his vision and mission statements came into realization despite domestic and intra-ministerial opposition. However, as the president does not make clear his strategic guidance, it causes ministerial interpretation and triggers contestation between over which policy matters. The following approach that matters is Susi's vessels sinking. Jokowi's high support indicates that it is at the forefront of the GMF and provides tangible material and public votes.

On the other hand, Luhut's maritime interest is limited to the foreign investment area. In regards to maritime sovereignty, Luhut still needs to acknowledge Susi's superiority. At the same time, the *Kemlu* became a minor policy player in the Jokowi government—indicated by significant changes from traditional approaches and Jokowi's influence on foreign policy agenda.

[8] Marcus Mietzner, "Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi's Rise, Democracy and Political Contestation in Indonesia," East-West Center Policy Studies, no. 72 (2015): pp. 32-35)

Conclusion

Neorealists predicted that states would adopt a specific balancing strategy to contain the rise of great powers or to manage their relations with neighbouring countries. The most relevant balancing strategy in Southeast Asia's strategic environment is institutional balancing. Primarily as a regional grouping founded to address regional distrust by managing its cooperation using norms and cooperation forums rather than force, institutional balancing has been the strategy Indonesia opted to manage its relations with Southeast Asia nations. This means that if Indonesia falls into a dispute with neighbouring countries, Indonesia should use the ASEAN-led mechanism as a guideline to resolve the conflict. Neo-realism also predicted domestic preconditions that influenced the state's balancing strategy. Jakarta's preferences on institutional balancing also came from the principle and doctrine of foreign policy and the country's willingness to play a low profile to maintain regional stability.

Neo-realism, however, failed to explain why Indonesia opted for a proactive balancing strategy despite the strategic environment and domestic pressure already compatible with the status quo institutional balancing approach. Therefore, the central theme of this research is Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour of opting for overbalancing as a balancing strategy, shifting from the traditionally institutional balancing strategy instead. Using neoclassical realism, this research examined the intervening variable that links international pressure with foreign policy options. According to neoclassical domestic politics realists, the unique structure of the system and the leader's perception are what matters in translating the international environment and contributing to the policy option applied by the state's leader. To examine how the intervening variable perceived international pressure, this article used the elite consensus framework approach proposed by Randall Schweller that seeks to analyse elite perceptions. Using the neoclassical realism framework, this

research focused on threat perception of the agencies rather than the existing strategic environment and that set parameters for options.

This research found the foreign policy elites, consisting of the President, the *Kemlu, Kemenko Maritim,* and the KKP, disagreed on how to combat illegal fishing issues. Therefore, Jakarta did not opt for an institutional balancing strategy to manage the illicit fishing issues. Furthermore, despite the *Kemlu* clearly stating that Jakarta should opt for an ASEAN-led mechanism, the President and the KKP did not see the strategy effectively combating illegal fishing. This led to Indonesia opting for the "sinking the vessels" strategy. Therefore, the threat was answered but the response did not align with the expected approach due to elite disagreement and certain perceptions. Controversy exists on how each agency views threat and how they perceive the international environment, mainly how they see ASEAN as a regional bloc used to manage the conflict.

Neoclassical realist analysis used in this research also found that Jokowi, as the head of state, performed a role as a transmission belt that linked the international environment to policy options even as the head of the state did not have unlimited to translate international pressure into preferences. Using Stein's threat perception framework, Jokowi international perception was distorted by public demands and political pressure, which led him to opt for nationalistic-materialistic policy options. However, Jokowi also needs to ensure that his strategic options are accepted by his ministries. The ministries, including the *Kemlu and Kemenko Maritim*, were forced to follow Jokowi's balancing strategy.

What does this research indicate for the future of Indonesia's foreign policy, especially towards ASEAN? During the second term of Jokowi's presidency, his approach remained unchanged after successfully consolidating his political coalition in 2019 elections. Having the final word on several issues means he will seek a legacy to end his term. However, this does not imply that Jokowi will opt for a proactive strategy. In this term, Jokowi will seek cooperation to complete infrastructure development rather than triggering diplomatic quarrels through the

bold move. Jokowi nationalist-materialist foreign policy views will continue and underpin zero-sum actions towards ASEAN and sustain his focus on the economy rather than political-security issues. As the head of state influencing foreign policy, Jokowi remains strong, and Indonesia still has not fully reformed its foreign policy institutions and processes. The *Kemlu* is still a minor actor; on the other hand, other relevant ministries important to the government strategic plan will have a more prominent role in foreign policy.

Future research needs to examine further the debate around Indonesia's foreign policy towards ASEAN that is currently being debated, especially that Indonesia is 'leaving the ASEAN'. More varied case studies and perspectives could be used and analysed. Regarding intervening variable examinations, future research could study the impact of Jokowi's idiosyncrasies on threat perception, the cartelization culture of Indonesian politics, the role of democratic institutions, and the effects of developmentalism on Jokowi realist nature of the foreign policy.

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A PRAYER FOR DEMOCRACY: SECRETARIAN VIOLENCE AND REGIME TYPE IN INDONESIA

Donald Greenlees
Visiting fellow at Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
Australian National University
Senior Advisor of Asialink
the University of Melbourne, Australia

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Indonesia has a long history of conflict with roots in ethnic, religious, communal and political difference. This was the inevitable consequence of unresolved tensions when the Republic of Indonesia was born in 1945. While a variety of differences over the nature of the state have emerged over the past 76 years, none have been more protracted or resistant to solution than those over religion. In a country where Islam commands the adherence of 87 percent of the population, but five other religions are officially recognized, it is not surprising that these divides should persist.[1]

For the most part, disagreements over the role of Islam in politics and society have been resolved peacefully. The overwhelming majority of Indonesians have managed to sustain an inter-religious *modus vivendi* underpinned by the state ideology Pancasila and the constitution, which acknowledged the belief in "one God" and allowed scope for the practice of other monotheistic religions. Indonesia was neither a theocratic nor a secular state (Elson 2013). But from this initial compromise flowed others. Islamists remain aggrieved over the failure to accord their beliefs what they see as the rightful place for them in political and social life. This tension between the numerical dominance of Islam and the legal foundations

[1] The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) extends official recognition to six religious groups or beliefs: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism.

of the state have been a source of bitter conflict over the years, stoked by political-religious brokers for manifold, and often self-interested, purposes. It remains an unresolved and evolving challenge for the future of Indonesian politics and society (Bouchier 2019).

Grievances over the national role of Islam have provided the impetus for periodic mass protest and episodes of collective violence throughout Indonesia's post-independence history. At times, religion has conflated with local disputes and power struggles to provide the gasoline to inflame them. This happened in Maluku in the late 1990s and in Central Sulawesi in the early 2000s when both regions erupted in what was in effect sectarian civil war (Bertrand 2002; Sidel 2006). Parallel to these conflicts, terrorism re-emerged as a strategy to advance the aspirations of radicals for the replacement of the Republic of Indonesia with an Islamic caliphate (Solahudin 2013).

The violence peaked during the years immediately after the end of the authoritarian New Order as Indonesia consolidated a transition to democracy. As democracy has become more entrenched over the past two decades, religiously inspired, large scale collective violence has waned. That is not to say religious intolerance and discrimination has abated; that acts of sectarian violence have been eliminated; or that there is a clear trend towards greater pluralism and a shift away from hardline interpretations of religious doctrine (Wahid 2018). Yet even in this regard, researchers point to positive signs, including a 2019 decision of the mass Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama to scrap the use of the term *kafir*, or infidel, which has often been used to demonize other religions (Religious Freedom Institute 2020).

The evident decline in acts of sectarian social unrest and acts of collective violence would appear to reflect a long-term trend. Indeed, the idea that democracy has pacific virtue – both internally and in relation to other democracies – has gained a considerable following in both academic and political circles over the years, even as democracy has come under pressure, including in well-established democratic

states. Certainly, it has innate appeal to its champions. US president George W. Bush once argued democracy taught societies "the peaceful resolution of differences", which he believed validated an American mission to spread it (Bush 2003).

The question addressed here: Is that true? If so, the experience of sectarian violence in Indonesia – surely one of the most protracted and difficult to resolve forms of organized, collective violence – should make a good focus of analysis. The following sections will set out the analytical arguments for why the advocates of democracy think it contributes to international and domestic peace. We can then explore how these ideas stack up against the long history of sectarian violence in Indonesia. As Indonesia persists with an unsteady commitment to democracy, blotted by occasional controversial affairs like the blasphemy trial of Jakarta's former Chinese Christian governor, it is worth assessing whether there has been a democratic dividend in pacifying the character of political contention – one that the country might build on.

Does democracy contribute to civil peace?

How reliable a guide is a country's system of government to the behavior of its domestic political actors in the resolution of conflict? Is there a correlation between consolidation of democracy and a reduction of collective violence? Are autocracies any less capable of controlling and channeling contention?

Researchers have matched regime type with the historical record of civil wars, concluding that democracies do "experience significantly fewer civil war years than their non-democratic counterparts" (Krain and Myers 1997: 114). An examination of data of civil war years between 1816 and 1992[2] confirmed the

[2] Krain and Myers utilised data from J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1815-1992", Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Mich., (1994).

"proposition that different regime types have different consequences for internal conflict" (ibid: 114).

Inspired by work on the concept of an interstate democratic peace, this idea has been termed a "democratic civil peace" (Hegre *et al* 2001). It is a domestic political complement to the so-called "Kantian Triangle" – the proposition that shared democracy, joint membership of international organizations, and economic interdependency practically eliminate the risks of interstate conflict (Russett and Oneal 2001).

The existence of a democratic civil peace would be an important discovery. Since the end of the Cold War the prevalence of extreme internal violence has proved to be a greater threat to human security than major interstate war. But a key question is what mechanisms are at work if indeed there is evidence that democracies experience a lower risk of collective violence. Recalling, say, the riots in Los Angeles in 1992, race-based protest in the USA today, and the country's presidential transition this year, surely suggests collective political violence is not absent from even well-established democratic systems.[3] Moreover, autocratic regimes have demonstrated they are effective in suppressing dissent.

While studies confirm a distinct pattern in the relationship between regime type and collective violence, the results do not neatly fit the case for spreading democracy. Established democracies are revealed to be effective in containing collective violence. But established autocracies perform well in this regard too (Hegre *et al* 2001; Muller 1985; Muller and Weede 1990). Indeed, there was little discernible difference between strong democracies and strong autocracies when it came to the risk of civil war.

[3] For example, the death toll from the 1992 Los Angeles riots reached 51 (NYT 1992), paralysing parts of one of the biggest cities in one of the most robust democracies. In contrast, Singapore, which Freedom House (2010) rated as only "partly free" in its world freedom rankings, has experienced major riots only once in its entire post-independence history when four people died during a spill over of riots in neighbouring Malaysia in 1969 (Conceicao 2007).

Rather, the greatest risk occurred in countries either transitioning between the two or that were neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic. In "semi-democracies" or regimes "intermediate between a democracy and an autocracy" (ibid: 33), the risk of civil war was greatest. This inverted-U relationship between democracy, autocracy and civil war was pronounced during changes from one regime to another, regardless of the direction of the transition. Witness Myanmar today.

This pattern of collective violence has been attributed to distinct characteristics of autocracies and democracies. In the case of autocracy, the power and reach of state agents and the penalties imposed by extreme repression affects the capacity of dissident groups to organize and lowers their expectations that collective protest will succeed. Conversely, an open or fully democratic regime created "many feasible nonviolent alternatives" for political participation (Muller 1985: 48). As democracy consolidates, this pattern of resolving political and social grievances is expected to consolidate too, ensuring limits are placed on "life-and-property threatening forms of public, collective claim making, substituting for them highly visible but less directly destructive varieties of interaction" (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 269). It is under regimes of "intermediate repressiveness" that high death rates from political violence are seen as "most likely to occur" (Muller 1985: 59). It follows that the highest levels of collective violence are likely to be found under weak authoritarian or semi-democratic regimes which lack the will or capacity for effective repression.

A further key finding from civil democratic peace research is that a significant increase in the risk of civil war is caused by the act of transition between authoritarian and democratic regimes, with the risk remaining elevated for several years after the transition (Hegre *et al* 2001: 38)[4]. Transitions between types of

[4] The finding of an elevated risk of civil war during democratic transitions has its parallel in the interstate democratic peace. Mansfield and Snyder (1995) are among a number of scholars to argue the risk of interstate war actually increases between two *democratising* states – a significant qualification of the interstate democratic peace.

regimes are likely to weaken central government control over the instruments of state coercion, the effectiveness of coercive powers themselves or the willingness of political leaders to use coercive power. This phenomenon was evident in Indonesia during the years of democratic transition between the fall of President Suharto in 1998 and the first direct elections for President in 2004.

There is an important qualification to attach to the predictions of a lower frequency and intensity of collective violence under democracies and autocracies. As noted, the incidence of collective violence in support of a claim is shown to reduce, not cease under both regime types. It begs an explanation of what factors explain the emergence of collective violence in either the most repressive or most open regimes. The work on the idea of civil democratic peace based on counting incidents in the historical record points to a pattern but would appear to lack a convincing explanation.

One answer is suggested by analysis of the dynamics of social movements themselves (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 2009; Tilly 2003, 2006). This brings into focus factors such as the existence of a grievance or perceived threat experienced by a group (and their gravity), ability to mobilize (via an organization and its leadership), and perceptions of whether an opportunity reasonably exists to resolve the source of group anxiety. All three elements are necessary conditions for collective action. Clearly, group solidarity or the strength of shared identity, as in a religious belief, is a key element driving motive, organization, and resolve (or willingness to take risks).

Of the factors driving or enabling collective action, it is the nature of perceived opportunity that relates most directly to the character and strength of regimes, which can vary over time within and between regime types. Strong regimes can exhibit weakness; weak regimes can demonstrate strength. Factors that increase or decrease the opportunity for claimants include the degree of openness among domestic political institutions; the stability of elite alliances that support a regime; the presence of elite allies for potential challengers; and the state's

capacity and willingness to employ repression (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998).[5] Collectively, these variables have been termed a *political opportunity structure*[6]. In turn, this structure of opportunity can be shaped by a wide variety of changes in political, social, economic and security conditions caused, for example, by wars, pandemics and natural disasters, technological innovation, rising unemployment, and demographic shifts.

Another instructive way of looking at the power relationship between regimes and claimants is in terms of "state capacity"[7] – the "extent to which governmental agents control resources, activities and populations within the government's territory" (Tilly 2003: 41). In a democracy, social movements can engage in claim making by petitions, media conferences, demonstrations, and lobbying (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2009). Under high-capacity democratic regimes, it is both the more peaceful nature of this repertoire of protest and the regime's capacity to respond to and repress claim making that minimizes the potential for violent conflict. But in the case of low-capacity democratic regimes – such as those in a transitional or democratizing phase – institutions are generally less able to respond effectively to claims at a time when expectations are often high and the means to counter popular movements is weak. This might occur for various reasons, including weak and contested leadership, elite splits (especially between civilian rulers and the security apparatus), and ineffective government institutions. The presumed effect is an increase in the risk of peaceful protest actions becoming violent or groups including violent acts in their protest repertoire.

[5] McAdam (1982 [1999]) and Romano (2006) add a fifth variable to the list: international and foreign influences that either support the state or its opponents. This is arguably a variable of growing importance.

[6] This term was first used by Eisinger (1973). However, he referred to the political opportunity structure in municipal-level government. It now is applied to opportunity structure at the national level.

[7] The question of how to evaluate and measure state capacity has been a subject of debate and controversy. See Berwick and Christia 2018.

The same pattern is thought to occur in authoritarian regimes of high and low capacity. High-capacity non-democratic regimes restrict protest performances leaving dissidents to make their claims by "tolerated performances" or "adoption of forbidden performances such as armed attacks" (Tilly 2006: 76). Although this limitation on legitimate expressions of dissent is presumed to make strong authoritarian regimes somewhat more prone to violence than strong democratic ones, the ubiquitous presence and power of government agents in strong authoritarian regimes tends to suppress most forms of protest and collective violence. By contrast, in low-capacity non-democratic regimes government agents are likely to be less effective and command less popular support and legitimacy, while their opponents, who might feel strongly aggrieved or threatened by state policy, are still constrained in how they can pursue claims. In turn, this greatly increases the scope for violence.

An analysis along a spectrum of regime and capacity is expected to produce the following correlations: low levels of collective violence in high-capacity democracies, medium levels of collective violence in low-capacity democracies and high-capacity non-democracies, and high levels of collective violence in low-capacity non-democracies (Tilly 2006: 80-81). This schema suffers from the difficulty of defining and quantifying state capacity. But nonetheless it is a broadly useful analytical framework.

Drawing on the purported pattern of collective violence in the transition from authoritarian to democratic systems described above might tell us something about the history and future risks of sectarian conflict in Indonesia. We will now turn to an analysis of sectarian violence in Indonesia between the early 1980s and 2010s – a period that covers strong authoritarian and democratic regimes and a destabilizing transition from authoritarian to democratic rule that lasted several years. The focus of the analysis will be episodes of public contention and civil unrest, rather than the clandestine methods of terrorism. But if the correlation

between regime type and violence is established, it should be true of all forms of organized violent contention.

Patterns of Sectarian Violence in Indonesia

Suharto Ascendant, the 1980s

By the mid-1980s, Suharto was almost 20 years into his rule and at the "apex of his power and influence" (Elson 2001: 236). Despite the New Order's political ascendency, the mid-1980s were also marked by serious incidents of significant sectarian violence. One of the most infamous occurred in Jakarta's Tanjung Priok neighbourhood on 12 September 1984. In a clash with security forces, dozens of Muslim protestors were killed, including a prominent local Islamic activist and leader Amir Biki. According to various accounts, the proximate cause was the desecration several days earlier of a local *musholla* (prayer house) by soldiers (Bourchier and Hadiz 2003; Burns 1989; Effendy 2003; Sidel 2006; Suparyati 2004; Tempo 2002). Three or four local people were arrested when they retaliated. On 12 September, Biki led a match on the district police station and local military command post to demand the release of those arrested where the clash occurred.

The response of the regime was to launch a crackdown on Muslim activists and political opponents. Several elite political figures were taken into custody, including a former general and minister who, with 21 others, had signed a statement contesting the government's account of the Tanjung Priok killings and calling for an independent investigation (Burns 1989; Elson 2001). Despite several episodes of sectarian collective violence in Indonesia in the 1980s, hostility between the government and Muslims was largely contained. Suharto's supremacy at this time was evident in the "sullen and cynical mood of political quiescence and passivity which descended over the country" (Elson 2001: 243). By then, Suharto had created "a larger and more embracing state apparatus" (Vatikiotis 1993: 37).

At the time of the Tanjung Priok incident, Suharto was engaged in a highly contentious exercise to assert the secular foundations of the state under a new law to require all national organizations, including political parties and religious groups, to make the state ideology *Pancasila* their *asas tunggal,* or sole ideological basis. The maneuver provoked deep hostility among Islamic groups who saw it as a "deliberate attempt on the part of the regime to depoliticize, if not dethrone, Islam" (Effendy 2003: 51).

This heightened tension prior to the violence at Tanjung Priok. But that incident also reflected a range of wider religious, communitarian, economic and political grievances that had been steadily building due to demographic, economic and political change. The mix of grievances was a potentially volatile combination awaiting a suitable trigger. The extent to which the Islamic leaders and residents who mobilized in Tanjung Priok felt threatened, if not existentially, then certainly in terms of core interests, is evident from a close reading of the statements of Amir Biki. On the day of the march, he gave a speech in which he listed a series of complaints: the drafting of the *asas tunggal* law, the takeover of land belonging to local people for sale to Chinese business interests, and evidence that churches were being built in Muslim-dominated areas[8] (Bourchier and Hadiz 2003: 152-153).

The potency of perceptions of threat in framing a decision to mobilize is evident from his speech. But the decision to march against security officials was not perceived as foolhardy. The political environment at the time hinted at an opportunity to prevail. At the time, it was reasonable to assume the presence of elite allies for the cause. Many former senior military and civilian officials, devout Muslims, had expressed concerns over the abuse of *Pancasila*. They included a former army chief, a former governor of Jakarta, and two former prime ministers (Elson 2001: 231). The then Jakarta military commander Try Sutrisno, a future armed forces chief, projected "a cultivated image of Islamic piety" (Vatikiotis 1993:

[8] For a transcript of a tape recording of his speech see Bourchier and Hadiz 2003.

89). On the morning before the Tanjung Priok killings, Biki had met Sutrisno at the latter's office (Suparyati 2004).

Other wider factors eroded the authority of the government. Oil prices collapsed in 1983, causing the devaluation of the Rupiah (Rickleffs 1993). This generated an economic crisis of "unforeseen dimensions and gravity for Suharto" (Elson 2001: 246). Suharto himself felt the protestors had been calling the government's bluff. He said those who "incited the people to rebel" had calculated "the government would not dare take action" (Elson 2001: 239). The climate engendered by this mix of conditions could not have gone unnoticed.

Ascendancy and decline, the 1990s

By the 1990s, as the New Order aged, civil society was openly mobilizing, emboldened by social and political change to press a range of grievances from the religious to the economic and political (Vatikiotis 1993; Schwartz 1999). The longevity of the regime, the fraying of Suharto's links to the military, and demographic, socio-economic and political trends favoring Islam ensured Muslims would win a greater voice (Elson 2001; Liddle 1996; Ramage 1995; Schwartz 1999). These factors formed the backdrop to a wave of collective violence, mobilized by religion. Three episodes of sectarian violence and large-scale rioting by Muslims received special prominence in national debate, having occurred in just three months on the island of Java.

The first occurred in October 1996 in Situbondo, East Java, a town where 98 percent of the population were Muslim (Sidel 2006). The immediate trigger was an internal Muslim matter. It centered on the trial of a mosque attendant, called Saleh, charged with blasphemy. After several packed hearings, on 10 October the court sentenced Saleh to the maximum of five years in jail. According to various accounts (Eklöf 1999; Purdey 2006; Sidel 2006), thousands of Muslims immediately started to riot over the perceived inadequacy of the sentence. Although Saleh was Muslim, mobs torched 24 churches and numerous government

buildings and businesses owned by Christian ethnic-Chinese (ICCF 1998). Saleh was alleged to have confided a series of heretical views, including that the Prophet Muhammad was not the messenger of God and that the Koran was manmade, to a local Islamist preacher K.H. Achmad Zaini. Zaini, a leader of a devout *sufi* brotherhood began a relentless campaign to have Saleh brought to court (Purdey 2006). It is instructive of the mood of the time that Zaini was able to use his influence to have Saleh arrested and prosecuted.

This incident set off a chain of violent sectarian confrontation on Java. On 26 December, churches, government buildings and businesses owned by Christian ethnic-Chinese were targeted in the West Java town of Tasikmalaya (Eklöf 1999; Purdey 2006, Sidel 2006). It too was a devout Muslim town, counting 99 percent of the population as adherents. This time, the trigger was the beating of a policeman's son – a student at a local *pesantren*, or Islamic school – as punishment for alleged theft. Police retaliated by summoning *pesantren* teachers and meting out their own beating. As news of the police action spread, general rioting ensued, setting parts of the town ablaze. Church buildings, Christian schools, police stations, and various businesses were destroyed (ICCF 1998; Sidel 2006). Weeks later, sectarian riots struck Rengasdengklok, in West Java (Eklöf 1999; Purdey 2006, Sidel 2006). As in Situbondo and Tasikmalaya, the population was known for Islamic piety; only two percent were ethnic-Chinese Christian. This time the violence erupted following conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. On 30 January 1997, during the Muslim fasting month, an Indonesian Chinese family was woken before dawn by Muslim youths beating a drum to remind residents to wake and eat before the start of the fast. Complaints by the Chinese family about the noise resulted in an altercation. Word spread, sparking a riot. The house of the Chinese family was the first target. Rioting then spread to the market, where Chinese businesses were attacked. Churches and temples and modern shopping centers and banks were then hit (ICCF 1998).

These episodes of sectarian collective violence between October 1996 and January 1997 were all set against a background of rising tension over the commercial success of Chinese Indonesians and the spread of more and grander churches, which produced fears of "surreptitious Christianization" (Sidel 2006: 79). Moreover, the response of the security forces was deemed either slow or ineffective (Purdey 2006: 72). But they can be viewed in a wider political context. One of the most important shifts in the politics of the New Order occurred in the years leading up to the riots. From the late 1980s, Suharto started to embrace policies long advocated by Islamists, yet previously resisted by the New Order (Effendy 2003; Liddle 1996). For example, in 1989, a new law "strengthened the status and function of religious courts" (Effendy 2003: 157). In 1991, a policy of forbidding the wearing of the *jilbab,* or Islamic head scarf, in state schools was abandoned. Meanwhile, Suharto outwardly displayed his piety. On the eve of his 70th birthday, he made a "heavily publicized" pilgrimage to perform the *hajj* in Mecca (Elson 2001: 270).

A striking innovation in this period was the establishment in December 1990 of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia* or ICMI) under B.J. Habibie, Suharto's confidante and powerful Minister for Research and Technology. The significance of ICMI is that it gave a new breed of professional Muslims, mainly associated with the modernist thinking of Muhammadiyah, a platform for influencing government policy and securing personal advancement (Ramage 1995; Elson 2001; Hilmy 2010). It had a "profound impact on political and ideological discourse in the 1990s" (Ramage 1995: 75). These changes fed Islamic activism, The tenor of comments against perceived opponents of Islam became more bellicose. Statements by Islamic preachers "took a sharper anti-Christian and anti-Chinese tone as the 1990s progressed" (Schwartz 1999: 331). Amien Rais, then chairman of Muhammadiyah, warned that Muslims had become "victimized" by the rapid spread of Christianity and advocated affirmative economic action for *pribumis* because "racial

minorities", code for Indonesian Chinese, had disproportionately benefited from economic development (Ramage 1995: 98-99). The strident rhetoric went largely unchecked.

Suharto's embrace of a modernist Muslim agenda presaged structural changes in the government and TNI. Suharto had fallen out with his powerful military commander Benny Murdani, a Catholic often blamed by Islamists for suppressing their aspirations. This represented the end of the high point of secular nationalist and Christian influence in TNI. It also reflected a fraying of Suharto's relations with the military as his regime aged, prompting some to suggest there were signs of either a weakening of his grip on power or in the coercive capacity of the regime (Liddle 1992; Schwartz 1999). By the time of the riots in Java, the TNI commander was General Feisal Tanjung who "made overtures to national as well as local Islamic leaders" (The Editors 1997). Feisal and his army commander were regarded as a dutiful Muslims and close to Habibie, leading to "much speculation about the Islamization" of the military (Liddle 1996: 629).

There are various theories for what motivated Suharto to shift policy. As he entered his 70s, there was inevitable speculation about succession. Opinions over what motivated the new Islam policy thus ranged from self-preservation ahead of the 1997 national elections (Liddle 1996) to simply recognition of the changing sociological forces in Indonesia, which left Suharto "no option other than to identify with (Muslim) interests" (Vatikiotis 1993: 138). But Suharto's motives are less important than the fact he made a decisive shift in regime policy.

For Muslim activists, the political opportunity was plain to see. First, the institutionalized political system opened considerably – to Muslim claimants at least. Secondly, the broad set of alignments that undergirded the regime was in a state of flux. There had been a clear shift away from the secular nationalists who had dominated the military. Thirdly, mainstream Muslim leaders, particularly those in the modernist camp associated with ICMI, could count on elite allies in

the regime. Fourthly, there were questions about the state's willingness to engage in the kind of repression it had in the past.

It is against the backdrop of greater openness and tolerance of Muslim preferences and grievances, attempts to stir up fears about growing Christian influence, and doubts about the regime's willingness to use repressive measures, that the sectarian riots erupted on Java. In the first of the riots at Situbondo, there was some evidence of prior planning (Eklöf 1999; Purdey 2006). But by the time of Tasikmalaya and Rengesdengklok the rioting appeared to take on a more spontaneous flavor. It strongly suggests the emergence of an expectation of a restrained response from the security forces. The confidence of protesters grew with successive episodes to the point where "this type of violence as an expression of dissatisfaction (could be) carried out with near impunity" (Purdey 2006: 70).

Democratic transition, 1998-2004

In the years after the fall of Suharto in May 1998, sectarian violence increased in intensity spread geographically, and widened in the repertoire of violent acts. As acts of collective violence expanded from Muslim-dominated Java to more contested religious terrain in Indonesia's eastern islands, it also became bloodier. In a part of Indonesia where protestant churches had large congregations, both Christians and Muslims were implicated in public acts of violence and large numbers of followers of both religious traditions were killed. The violence centered on contestation over resources and religious space at the local level, albeit with the national implications widening over time (Aragon 2001; Sidel 2006).

A key feature of sectarian violence in this period was the increased sophistication of claimants in three key dimensions that greatly enabled the capacity for contention – leadership, organization, and mobilization. On all three measures, the capacity of claimants, particularly among Islamic groups, was

greater than during any period of political contention since the era of weak national government in the 1950s and 1960s.

Sectarian violence erupted on a large scale in eastern Indonesia at the end of 1998 and lasted several years. Estimates of the death toll ranged from 5000 to 10,000 (ICG 2002; Van Klinken 2007). There were three primary centers of conflict – the provinces of Central Sulawesi, Maluku, and North Maluku. These locations shared three important features, which help explain both the location and timing of conflict. First, sizeable Muslim and Christian populations lived in proximity. Protestant churches constituted "important alternative structures of authority and access to state power to those provided by their Islamic counterparts" (Sidel 2006: 155). Secondly, the agencies of the state were more significant as sources of wealth and power than on Java because of the relative underdevelopment of the remote eastern provinces. Thirdly, political flux in Jakarta, devolution of the New Order system of centralized control, and impending elections for local office created "tremendous uncertainty and anxiety along the local borders" of religious faith (Sidel 2006: 155). Given the similarities of the environment in which violence broke out and was transmitted, and the fact it played out largely simultaneously, only the case of Central Sulawesi is analyzed here to illuminate connections between patterns of violence and political structure.

The first sign of trouble in Central Sulawesi came on Christmas Eve 1998, in what analysts describe as Phase I of a five phase conflict (Aragon 2001; HRW 2002; ICG 2004; Sidel 2006). Christmas that year coincided with the Muslim fasting month. A scuffle between two youths, one Protestant and one Muslim, resulted in a Muslim youth being slashed with a knife in Poso town, which was to become the main arena of the province's sectarian violence. The following day wider conflict broke out between Protestant and Muslim youths. False rumors of attacks on churches drew in truckloads of Protestants from surrounding areas of Poso district, who attacked homes and other buildings in urban Poso. Muslims too were reinforced by co-religionists from around the district. By the end of the

month, thousands of residents of Poso town and several nearby areas had participated in violent clashes, several hundred people lost their homes and hundreds had been in injured. The situation was calmed with the intervention of security forces, but tensions festered, especially after a weak law enforcement response prompted fears the security forces were "unable or unwilling to control the situation" (Aragon 2001: 62).

The situation remained quiet until April 2000 – the start of Phase II of the conflict. In the intervening period, Indonesia peacefully held its first competitive national elections in four decades. But the opening of the electoral system heightened competition for positions at the local level across the country. In Poso, competition was intense between Protestants and Muslims and among competing Muslim factions. The trigger for renewed violence appears to have been elections for the second highest district official in Poso. Fighting between Protestants and Muslims broke out on 16 April, a day after a Muslim member of the local assembly had warned of renewed riots if his preferred candidate lost. This time paramilitary police were called from the provincial capital Palu to quell attacks on houses of worship and shops and homes. Police shot three Muslims, increasing local Muslim anger. By the end of the month at least seven Protestants and three Muslims were dead. The arrival of 600 soldiers sent by the regional military command halted the bloodshed (Sidel 2006).

The imposed peace did not last long. In late May, Phase III of the conflict began with Protestant gangs launching attacks that sharply increased the bloodshed. In the most violent incident, dozens of Muslim transmigrants from Java were massacred on 28 May at a village in Poso district (HRW 2002). By this phase, Protestants were better armed and had been given rudimentary training, highlighting the growing levels of mobilization and coordination. In early June, hundreds of Protestants and Muslims clashed in pitched fighting in Poso. Alarm was growing among authorities, resulting in 1500 additional soldiers being brought in along with paramilitary police reinforcements from Jakarta. A "peace accord"

was signed in August 2000 at a meeting of governors from around Sulawesi and then Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, leading to violence subsiding for about a year, but the "top-down" agreement was heavily criticized (HRW 2002: 20). Many key stakeholders felt "uninvolved and unconvinced" (Aragon 2001: 70).

The peace that created by this accord therefore remained fragile, with continuing small episodes of violence. In July 2001, fighting erupted again on a large scale, lasting until the end of the year. The outbreak of Phase IV of the conflict was linked by key local leaders to another contest to fill a local government post (HRW 2002; Sidel 2006). In one incident in July, a dozen Muslim villagers, nearly all of them women and children, were killed by a Protestant gang. The resumption of such atrocities set the scene for the entry into the conflict of well-trained and armed Muslim militia from outside Sulawesi Island. The highest profile militia, Laskar Jihad, injected a level of "intense militarization" (Sidel 2006: 165). Although its arrival was "no secret", the "security forces did nothing to prevent about it" (HRW 2002: 23).

The escalation of the conflict coincided with the elevation of Megawati Sukarnoputri to the presidency, which in turn resulted in a firmer security response. In contrast to earlier crackdowns, troops participating in the new operations forcefully confiscated weapons and directly engaged religious combatants, having been urged by superiors "not to let the fear of being accused of human rights violations" prevent them asserting control (HRW 2002: 28). These operations led to the signing of yet another peace agreement in December that proved more effective in ending open clashes, partly because it was seen as more representative of the community and more comprehensive in scope (HRW 2002). Nonetheless, clandestine acts of violence continued in the following years. In Phase V of the conflict in 2002-2003, the forms of violence shifted to terrorist-style tactics of bombings and attacks by small groups who went to considerable effort to disguise their identities (ICG 2004). A series of attacks on buses in mid 2002 resulted in the

deaths of several passengers. Many of these attacks were attributed to fundamentalist Muslim militia waging a "jihad" style campaign (ICG 2004). The pattern of small, isolated attacks attributed to pro-Islamic State groups such as Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) persisted over the years and resisted resolution despite large, periodic deployments of security forces (BBC 2020; Sumpter and Newton 2020).

The national backdrop to the eruption of organized sectarian violence was the chaos of a political system in transition. The six years following the fall of Suharto were marked by "economic instability, security challenges, social fragmentation, and extensive experiments with new institutional concepts" (Mietzner 2009: 195). Indonesia changed presidents three times: B.J. Habibie (1998-1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) and Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004). The frequent changes of leadership were accompanied by reforms aimed at political opening so that it would take "six years before an institutionally coherent framework for the new political system emerged, marking Indonesia's entry into the phase of democratic consolidation" (ibid: 195). The fall of Suharto in May 1998 left a sudden vacuum at the head of government.

When Habibie took office, he was regarded as "unquestionably a much weaker figure than was Suharto" (Liddle 1999: 108). Habibie lacked an independent military power base and, therefore, access to one of the central tools of control exercised by Suharto (Greenlees and Garran 2002). Despite Habibie's weakness, or perhaps because of it, he led a flourish of political reform, including Indonesia's first competitive parliamentary elections since 1955 (Liddle 1999). One of the most far-reaching reforms of his presidency was to initiate legislation that would grant greater autonomy over administration and financial management to provinces and districts, including freedom to choose governors, mayors, and regents without interference from Jakarta (Schwartz 1999). It was hoped decentralization "would appease provincial elites and help keep national borders intact" (ibid: 425). But free national elections for parliament and the devolution of

power to Indonesia's province and district governments intensified political competition. Under Suharto political competition was "confined and channeled… vertically"; under Habibie, local elites found themselves suddenly competing "collectively and horizontally" for power and resources (Sidel 2006: 140-141). It was thus amid intense political uncertainty and instability, a loosening of centralized control over the state, and heightened political competition at the local and national levels that episodes of sectarian collective violence played out.

Sectarian violence in Central Sulawesi and elsewhere in the eastern archipelago started several months after Habibie took over from Suharto. As Sidel (ibid: 161) notes, the violence broke out in the context of the looming 1999 national elections and "mounting uncertainty, excitement and anxiety" over the selection of local officials. The initial phase of violence resulted mostly in property destruction and a relatively low death toll. At the end of 1999, Wahid, then the leader of NU, assumed the presidency. His ascension in theory marked the high point of Islamic control of government and the assertion of popular electoral legitimacy[9]. In fact, his administration was riven with elite conflict because of competition between various strands of political Islam and a contested process of military reform (Honna 2003; Mietzner 2009). Wahid was sometimes viewed as pro-Christian by Islamists, who accused him of "insensitivity" toward Muslim victims of violence in the eastern islands (Mietzner: 263).

During the Wahid presidency – "one of most chaotic periods of Indonesia's post-authoritarian transition" (ibid 2009: 224) – the eastern islands of Indonesia became inflamed in sectarian violence. One of the reasons commonly attributed to the large scale of the bloodshed in this period was the decline in the effectiveness of security responses in the years after the fall of Suharto (ICG 2000, 2001). In the early days of the sectarian violence in the eastern islands "incompetent or

[9] Wahid was elected president by the supra-parliamentary People's Consultative Assembly in October 1999. Although he was not elected by popular mandate, his elevation followed the first free parliamentary elections since 1955, giving him certain democratic legitimacy.

uninterested" security personnel ignored low-level incidents, leading to "an inevitable process of snowballing… and vigilante justice" (ICG 2000: 4).

From the ascension of Megawati, the security response in eastern Indonesia markedly improved. It was under Megawati that a peace accord was signed in Central Sulawesi that ended mass open conflict between Protestant and Muslim forces. The election of Megawati initiated a transition to democratic consolidation. It reduced elite conflict around the presidency, as attention of political parties shifted to winning the 2004 elections (Mietzner 2009). Megawati, a staunch secular nationalist who headed the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (*Partai Demokratis Indonesia Pejuangan* or PDI-P), also established a close relationship with military commanders and adopted a firmer security policy in general. Impatience with the sectarian violence in eastern Indonesia and separatist conflicts in Aceh and Papua led to "an increasingly nationalist and security-focused rhetoric" among Jakarta politicians and the view that sectarian violence would only be solved "by swift and harsh interventions" (ibid: 227).

Analysis of the sectarian conflict in eastern Indonesia during the democratic transition has tended to emphasize local factors in instigating and sustaining conflict (Aragon 2001; Sidel 2006; Van Klinken 2007). The evidence suggests local factors played a bigger role in conflict during the democratic transition than in the violent episodes of the 1990s. But an analysis of the national scene remains pertinent as a key permissive factor in the eruption of violence. In the Poso case, the end of Suharto's rule removed "the military control mechanism" and sowed distrust in the state's ability to provide security and justice (Aragon 2001: 78).

There were several national-level factors that influenced patterns of collective sectarian violence during this period. The first and most important was a weakening of the state's repressive capacity. After decades in which the president exercised effective control over military, sharp divisions emerged within the military's senior ranks over issues such as increasing civilian control and accountability for human rights violations (Greenlees and Garran 2002; Mietzner

2009). Neither Habibie nor Wahid found their instructions to the army and police always being followed. For example, Wahid issued a firm order that Laskar Jihad be prevented from sending militia units by ship from Java to fight alongside Muslims in the eastern islands. But the security forces failed to make "any serious effort to carry out the President's order preventing them from going" (ICG 2001: 13). Simultaneously, the effectiveness of soldiers and police on the ground deteriorated. In sectarian conflicts at times there were signs the security forces had "failed to play the role of an impartial peacekeeper" (ICG 2000: 19), siding with co-religionists.

A second major factor was the opening of the political system and the intensification of competition for power and resources. After decades of politics being "manipulated and constrained" (Schwartz 1999: 386) by the New Order, in the early period of democracy, amid uncertainty over the future constellation of power both nationally and locally, "the level of mistrust and paranoia" (ibid: 386) among the elite and wider community was high. In this climate of sudden opening of the political system and high levels of uncertainty, the sense of potential opportunity and threat among competing interest groups was also heightened. Although violence was often localized, in was widespread, such that "throughout the country there was vigorous competition among local elites to capture state power" (Aspinall 2010: 25).

A third factor in initiating and sustaining conflict was the presence of elite allies for Muslims and Christians alike. At a local level, they included government officials and soldiers and police close to the sources of violence. At a national level, there also were strong signals of support for combatant communities[10].

[10] Amien Rais, one of the most influential Muslims on the national stage, was among a number of prominent Mulsims to publicly support a *jihad* in defence of Muslims in the fighting in eastern Indonesia (Davis 2002; Schwartz 1999). It is hard to trace the direct impact of such statements, but they would have undoubtedly helped bolster confidence among groups such as Laskar Jihad which was sending militias to eastern Indonesia and among local elites. Rais served as speaker of the supra-parliamentary MPR during Wahid's term in office and was a former chairman of Muhammadiyah, Indonesia's second largest Muslim organisation, giving him considerable clout.

The government in Jakarta started to have some success in reducing mass sectarian violence in eastern Indonesia after the elevation of Megawati. Megawati established a closer rapport with the military, installed her own senior commanders and gave them a freer hand to control their internal affairs. This coincided with a shift in attitude in government and military ranks that permitted the reassertion of coercive measures to resolve conflict. Meanwhile, elite political competition at the national level switched to preparing for the 2004 elections. In this environment, the effort to broker more durable peace accords in eastern Indonesia garnered strong elite support compared to the ineffective efforts under Wahid. In this phase the "government at last put resources and clout behind the peace process" (HRW 2002: 46).

Democratic consolidation, 2004-2014

Following the ascension of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in Indonesia's first direct elections for president in October 2004, the form of mass sectarian violence again began to shift. It was manifested in two forms: small scale conflict over religious proselytization and practice and conflict between Islamic groups over the purity of belief (ICG 2010). The peace initiated in eastern Indonesia during Megawati's presidency largely held (ICG 2004; Van Klinken 2007).

The first direct presidential election marks a significant point of departure in post-Suharto democracy. Growth of democratic practice was evident at all levels of government, in large part due to the start of decentralization in 1999. This "blossoming of local democracy" was viewed as one of the "signature achievements of Indonesia's reform" (Aspinall 2010: 26). But in this environment of greater political openness religious hostility persisted. Levels of violence against people and property declined dramatically, yet there were concerns about "a

worrying increase in religious intolerance" over the course of Yudhoyono's presidency (Jakarta Globe 2010a).

Among the flashpoints for religious hostility was the Bekasi area of Jakarta. Rivalries between Muslims and Christians over proselytization, conversions, and church building were at times intense, resulting in protests and occasional physical clashes. Campaigns against what Muslims claimed was a program of *kristenisasi* in Bekasi was spearheaded by a variety of radical Islamist groups that succeeded in mobilizing popular support (ICG 2010). In a report on the tensions in Bekasi, the International Crisis Group (2010) cited aggressive proselytization activities by a Christian foundation, Yayasan Mahanaim, as contributing to increased Muslim anxiety. Plans by Christian groups to build new churches also incited controversy in Bekasi and various other locations, particularly over the management and issuance of building permits (Jakarta Globe 2010b).

Protests over Christian activities tended to be intimidating rather than violent. But in one instance on 12 September 2010 an Islamist group beat a pastor and stabbed a church elder who were on their way to Sunday prayers (Reuters 2010). Inter-religious tensions continued to simmer. On 8 February 2011, two churches were vandalized, and several cars set on fire, in Central Java after a man was jailed for five years for blasphemy against Islam – a sentence deemed inadequate by some Muslims (Jakarta Globe 2011b).

Hostilities were stoked by radical Islamist groups and evangelical Christians. The International Crisis Group (2010) identified a dozen Islamist groups in Bekasi opposing *kristenisasi.* The Islamic Defenders' Front (*Front Pembela Islam* or FPI) was one of the most active perpetrators of violence and intimidation (ICG 2010; Jakarta Post 2010b). FPI, founded shortly after the fall of Suharto in 1998, had initially focused on an anti-vice crusade, although its real motives were often attributed to extortion (Mietzner 2009).

The pattern of low-level violence and intimidation carried out against Christian groups repeated a campaign against Ahmadiyah, a Muslim sect accused

of heresy[11]. Ahamadi members had lived peacefully in Indonesia since the 1920s (Crouch 2009; ICG 2008). This started to change in July 2005 when a group of Islamic leaders issued a religious edict or *fatwa* calling for steps to have Ahmadiyah banned (Crouch 2009; Platzdasch 2009). The following week a group of Islamists, including FPI members, attacked an Ahmadiyah annual meeting in Bogor outside Jakarta, hospitalizing several sect members (ICG 2008). This attack was followed by a June 2008 attack by FPI on protestors at the national monument in Jakarta who were calling for freedom of religion (ICG 2008).

Although some perpetrators of attacks were arrested, the government was often accused of taking a weak stance against displays of religious intolerance or collective violence. International Crisis Group argued Ahmadiyah was cast as a "troublemaker", while the government showed a "tendency to blame the religious group that attracts mob action" (2010: 17). Indeed, in 2006 the government responded to the calls for a *fatwa* against Ahmadiyah by issuing a controversial degree that required Ahmadis to "cease all activities not consistent with the general interpretation of Islam" (Platzdasch 2009: 339). The government action failed to calm the situation. In early February 2011, three Ahmadi sect members were killed when they were attacked by a mob of 1500 villagers in West Java (Jakarta Globe 2011a).

Despite concerns the government was failing to take sufficient action to promote religious tolerance, and the publication of opinion surveys showing a rise of intolerance of other religions by Muslims (Jakarta Post 2010a), Indonesia from 2004 onwards did not experience a repeat of major sectarian collective violence. Still, the persistence of attacks on churches and Ahmadiyah represented a continuing challenge to the suppression of sectarian collective violence and the supposed pacifying effects of democracy.

[11] This group, following the teachings of a 19th Century Indian Muslim preacher, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, adopts a religious doctrine that mainstream Islam regards as heretical, particularly that revelation did not stop with the Prophet Mohammad (see Crouch 2009)

Once the Indonesian government removed electoral restrictions in 1999, new political parties emerged across the ideological spectrum, from secular nationalist to mainstream pluralist Muslim and Islamist. The three elections that followed the fall of the New Order – 1999, 2004 and 2009 – tested how far voters were prepared to go in mixing religion with politics. Scholars noted with interest the poor performance of parties espousing the Islamist ambition of ensuring a special place in the Constitution for Shari'a law. Muslim voters repeatedly showed a tendency "not to cast their vote on the basis of ideological preferences but rather on a pragmatic basis" (Hilmy 2010: 78). At the same time, Indonesia provided a powerful lesson in "the capacity of democratic rule to tame Islamism" (Aspinall 2010: 29).

But with the political winds blowing against Islamism in politics, there was another trend: a move by secular parties to capture a bigger share of the Islamic vote by shifting "towards a pro-Islamic ideological centre" (Platzdasch 2009: 333). In an environment where political parties could "no longer afford to be seen as neutral towards Islamic Interests" (ibid: 333), politicians from secular nationalist parties, including Yudhoyono's Democratic Party, were often keen to support initiatives such as an anti-pornography law and local by-laws imposing shari'a obligations to display their Islamic credentials. The 2006 decree to restrain Ahamadiyah was one example of the government balancing a desire to "accommodate Islamic sentiments" and uphold the "ideals of Pancasila" (Platzdasch 2009: 340). Attitudes to the issue of *kristenisai* and church construction could be viewed in the same light. In political debate over religion, many Muslims saw calls for tolerance as support for Christians as exemplified by the leader of the FPI Habib Rizieq, who was described as "furious" (ICG 2010: 12) over a compromise in Bekasi that would have allowed a church to be built if the site of construction was moved away from a disputed area.

Even as Indonesia opened its political system, aspects of the power structure were supportive of those prepared to pursue sectarian goals through violence.

Groups such as FPI counted on influential elite allies, which contributed to an occasionally muted security response to their acts. The International Crisis Group (2010: 17) observed that "the governor of Jakarta, the newly-appointed national police commander and the religious affairs minister (have) all appeared at FPI events" and added that "taking on allies known for their intolerance is not the way to inculcate religious harmony".

Despite the on-going contention in various locations in Indonesia over how to manage constitutional rights of religious freedom, the consolidation of democracy after the chaos of the transitional period did have a tempering effect on sectarian collective violence. Although some violence has persisted, democratization enabled a repertoire of peaceful protest for mainstream Muslims and Islamists alike, with the prospect of affecting change without the high risk of violent performances. Indonesia's transition became a "dramatic and even inspiring testament to the capacity of democracy" to curb intractable, violent conflicts (Aspinall 2010: 28).

Importantly, democratic consolidation restored institutional capacity and credibility. The combination of political will and effective law enforcement was critical to containing and turning back the threat of serious violence. It was this restoration of the government's ability to employ the coercive power of the state as much as the alternative avenues for advancing a religious political agenda that contributed to a more peaceful environment than experienced in the mid-1990s and early 2000s.

Although the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism was not analyzed here, there is evidence that it responded to similar patterns of regime change and consolidation. Terrorist planning and execution peaked in the transition after the fall of Suharto and steadily declined amid a stronger political and law enforcement response, starting in the latter period of Megawati's presidency, and continuing into the Yudhoyono years. This long-term decline is reflected in data on numbers and types of attacks, choices of targets, and casualty rates (GTD 2021).

Assessing Evidence for the Pacific Power of Democracy

During the four periods analyzed here, some distinct patterns of collective sectarian violence emerged. Changes in the intensity of sectarian collective violence and the forms were apparent between each period, manifested in the intensity of violence, the types of targets, and the patterns of mobilization. Regime type provided a broad context for interpreting and understanding changes in claims and the propensity for violence between each period. But insight into causal factors in the political structure requires a closer examination of each episode. Under the authoritarian New Order regime in the 1990s, it was shown that a range of demographic, socio-economic and political factors had weakened the New Order's bargaining position relative to Muslim challengers. But at the start of this period Suharto was "the master of the political system" (Elson 2001: 253). The regime continued to wield almost exclusive control over the instruments of state policy, particularly repressive capability. Its ability to implement desired policy and control territory, resources and population ensured the regime exercised a high degree of control. Sectarian violence rose, but not as a direct challenge to state authority. Mobilization was directed at changing regime policy rather than toppling the regime itself. It also was manifested against socially and politically more vulnerable groups, in particular ethnic Chinese and Christians. Moreover, the targets were property rather than people. While violence rose, it remained within expectations of regime type.

The sudden fall of Suharto and the rapid unwinding of his New Order regime in the late 1990s initiated a chaotic period of democratization. During the transition, Indonesia was coping with "an imploding economy" and an immediate post-Suharto leadership that "lacked legitimacy" (Schwartz 1999: 372). Senior military officers complained of a lack of control over the army. In this situation, there was a significant loss of the state's ability to implement desired policy, control

security forces, and exercise control over the geographic periphery. The decline in state capacity, particularly in the effectiveness of the tools of state coercion, permitted competing local elites in eastern Indonesia to turn a conflict over power and resources into a horizontal conflict under a religious banner in which the targets of violence included both people and property. The same factors were conducive to the re-emergence of terrorism as a method of pursuing political objectives.

The first two presidents of the transition – Habibie and Wahid – had limited authority and were at the center of intense elite conflict. The erosion of presidential power coincided with laws decentralizing significant power to regional governments. Under a weak democratic regime, horizontal violence is viewed as likely because governments "do not serve as effective third-party enforces of agreements much less inhibitors of escalation" (Tilly 2006: 129). This weakness can be exploited by actors employing a range of violent methods and should not be seen as restricted to civil unrest. The elevation of Megawati to the presidency saw a consolidation of government and the restoration of a tough approach to security disturbances. The government's ability to effectively implement policy in the security realm reflected some recovery in central government capacity. At this point, sectarian violence in Poso and elsewhere in eastern Indonesia started to decline. It is evident that the large-scale unrest in eastern Indonesia did reach its highest levels under the weak Habibie and Wahid governments in the transition from authoritarian rule. The planning and execution of a wave of Islamist terrorist acts also was initiated at that time.

The holding of Indonesia's first direct elections for president in 2004 signaled a vital shift in the democratization process, which some analysts view as the start of democratic consolidation (Aspinall 2010; Meitzner 2009). The election of a president with a direct mandate alongside a directly elected legislature marked a continuing recovery in the legitimacy and capacity of government. This affected the type of claim making so that it was largely directed at government agents,

especially via demands for legal reforms to enhance the social agenda of Islam or its status as the dominant religion. The capability of the state was arguably still weaker than under the New Order. But the broad pattern of sectarian violence was consistent with expectations of lower levels of violence as democracy strengthened.

While the trajectory of sectarian collective violence in Indonesia would appear to be consistent with predictions, a close analysis of individual episodes is vital to understanding the location, timing, and form of violence. In the 1990s, the influence of Muslims grew as the regime recognized the growing political power of Islam and employed a strategy of cooption. For example, evidence of elite allies for Muslims with a modernist or Islamist agenda was apparent with the formation and growth of ICMI and changes in the leadership of the armed forces. The willingness of the regime to embrace an Islamic social agenda underscored the expanding political opportunity for Muslims. In this environment, the risks associated with mass mobilization under an Islamic banner declined, especially if mobilization was not directed against the regime. Vulnerable groups that were identified with a wide range of material and non-material grievances became obvious targets for displays of violent opposition.

When Indonesia embarked on democratization from the late 1990s several elements of the political environment changed dramatically, with implications for challengers ranging from religious groups to separatists. At a national level, the political system was pushed open, elite alignments became very unstable, Muslims could count an increased number of allies among the regime elite, and the state's propensity for repression declined. But there also were significant changes at the local government level. The opening of the local political system under decentralization laws was quickly exploited by elites anxious to ensure they did not lose out from dramatic power shifts taking place at the national level. Perceptions of potential opportunity and threat played an important role in framing conflict in areas in eastern Indonesia where religions were both sources of power and patronage and the size of religious communities was relatively evenly balanced.

The absence of an effective policy response, including the use of repressive measures, to restrain local elites resulted in escalation of what was essentially an intra-elite conflict into mass sectarian violence.

The gradual consolidation of democracy after 2004 saw the restoration of the state's repressive capacity and stability of elite alignments. Although elite allies existed for challengers pursuing an Islamist agenda, most of the elite embraced a moderate view of religion, particularly in terms of its place in the political system. However, the desire of even secular political parties to attract a more devout Muslim constituency saw many politicians support measures such as Islamic bylaws, an anti-pornography law, and restraints on the Ahmadiyah sect. Politicians were slow to condemn signs of Islamic militancy. This, in turn, potentially signaled to Islamists the existence of an opportunity to go beyond prescribed repertoires of protest.

Although this is no more than a preliminary analysis of religious mobilization that led to collective violence in Indonesia, it does highlight the significance of structural factors, particularly the role of regime type in patterns of collective sectarian violence.

Staying the Course of Democracy

The process of democratization proved a bloody experience as Indonesia witnessed a wave of sectarian, ethnic, communal, and separatist violence. At the time, it prompted questions about whether democracy would prove viable; whether separatism might break the country apart or an "Islamist surge" would shatter its "multi-religious mosaic" (Schwartz 1999: 434).

Against the background of that violent democratic baptism, the question here is whether democratization offered a solution to the persistent problem of sectarian collective violence. There are two separate analytical themes that shed light on that question – the idea of a "democratic civil peace" (Hegre *et al* 2001),

which aims to establish proof by historical correlation, and a behavioral approach that proposes social movements have a different propensity to turn violent under different regime types. The two approaches have generally been treated separately in the study of collective violence. Combining them helps increase assurance in both prediction and explanation. According to both approaches, strong democracies and strong autocracies should have a low probability of experiencing civil war, although the propensity for violent political contention should be somewhat higher under autocracies than democracies. The highest risk of civil war is predicted in regimes in transition from one state to another.

The historical episodes assessed here covered four different structures of regime. They incorporated factors including the openness of governments to the aspirations of interest groups, availability of elite allies for interest groups, stability of elite alignments undergirding governments, and the propensity for repression or tolerance of groups and their protest actions. The role of national regimes proved important even in cases where sectarian conflict was triggered by changes in local political structures.

The contemporary relevance of the analysis of sectarian collective violence was underscored by Indonesia's post-2004 experience. The consolidation of democracy coincided with a reduction in the large-scale sectarian violence witnessed in earlier periods. While deadly attacks on Ahmadiyah sect members and vandalism of Christian churches in Central Java in February 2011 were a reminder of the protracted nature of sectarian conflict, the record lends support for the argument in favor of democracy's pacifying effects.

There are two lessons for Indonesia from this analysis. The first is that staying the course of democracy is likely to offer the best means of ensuring that political contention is managed peacefully. It does not mean there will be an absence of violence, particularly if grievances are profound or mismanaged and splits occur within the political elite. Democracy appears to reduce the frequency and intensity of collective violence – evident in the case of sectarian violence in

Indonesia – but it is no panacea. But sustaining and consolidating democracy will help minimize the risk of contention becoming violent.

The second lesson is more complex. It is that governments need to display the will to contain contention when it does become violent by using the coercive and persuasive powers of the state. The record of sectarian contention since the 1980s shows that episodes of violent claim making were resolved when the state employed the power of its security agencies to restrain violent actors. State coercion proved effective in suppressing and preventing public violence even in the absence of measures to address underlying grievances, which is not to say the cause of grievances ought to be ignored. It is a fine line because democracies are expected to exhibit a strong commitment to human rights. The use of coercive power is legitimate – particularly in protecting vulnerable civilian populations – but it needs to be used cautiously and wisely.

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