Journal Of Global Strategic Studies
https://ejournal.fisip.unjani.ac.id/index.php/JGSS
<p>Program Studi Magister Hubungan Internasional<br> Fakultas Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik<br> Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani</p>Master's Programs in International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Jenderal Achmad Yani University (UNJANI).en-USJournal Of Global Strategic Studies2798-4427<h2 id="CopyrightNotice">Copyright Notice</h2> <p>The Authors submitting a manuscript do so on the understanding that if accepted for publication, copyright of the article shall be assigned to <strong><em>Journal of Global Strategic Studies</em></strong>, Department of Master of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani as publisher of the journal.<br>Copyright encompasses rights to reproduce and deliver the article in all form and media, including reprints, photographs, microfilms, and any other similar reproductions, as well as translations.<br><strong><em>Journal of Global Strategic Studies</em></strong>, Department of Master of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani and the Editors make every effort to ensure that no wrong or misleading data, opinions or statements be published in the journal. In any way, the contents of the articles and advertisements published in <strong><em>Journal of Global Strategic Studies</em></strong> are the sole and exclusive responsibility of their respective authors</p>Neither Cold nor Hot
https://ejournal.fisip.unjani.ac.id/index.php/JGSS/article/view/3866
<p>This paper is interested in hybrid warfare and states’ defensive policy responses from a Western perspective. Hybrid warfare has become a critical component of contemporary interstate conflicts, deliberately narrowing the gap between conventional military engagements and grey zone operations. It combines military tactics with non-military tools, such as cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion, to weaken adversaries without engaging in conventional warfare. Russia’s War in Ukraine illustrates the use of hybrid warfare to achieve imperialist objectives, while similar campaigns have targeted other Western democracies. China’s actions in the Indo-Pacific reflect comparable hybrid strategies. While much attention has focused on its offensive use, less is known about how states respond defensively. This paper explores how Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, and Finland respond to hybrid threats. It argues that Western policy responses are uneven, with some states better prepared than others. Effective defence requires a clear definition of hybrid warfare, a whole-of-government approach, and sustained resources. Based on publicly available policy documents, this comparative case study assesses how national interests are protected, despite limitations due to the classified nature of hybrid operations.</p>Ian RobergeDaven Ng
##submission.copyrightStatement##
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
2025-12-162025-12-165213610.36859/jgss.v5i2.3866Feeding the Algorithm
https://ejournal.fisip.unjani.ac.id/index.php/JGSS/article/view/4872
<p>Large language models (LLMs) and generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems are emerging as key intermediaries in the global circulation of news and political knowledge. Yet the datasets that feed these systems are neither neutral nor universal. Governments, regulatory bodies, and corporate ecosystems are now treating training data as a strategic resource—one that can encode national priorities, cultural hierarchies, and geopolitical narratives into the algorithmic infrastructures of communication. This conceptual essay develops the notion of <strong>algorithmic diplomacy</strong>, arguing that nations are actively curating, regulating, and disseminating datasets to project soft power through AI. Drawing on theories of epistemic sovereignty, digital colonialism, and media framing, the paper identifies three main mechanisms: (1) data curation and localization, (2) model fine-tuning and regulatory alignment, and (3) narrative seeding through open-source ecosystems. Comparative illustrations from the European Union, the United States, China, Russia, and the Gulf states reveal how “feeding the algorithm” has become a new instrument of influence within the global information order. The essay concludes that algorithmic infrastructures now constitute a form of <em>epistemic territory</em>—a contested space where values, identities, and political legitimacy are negotiated through data rather than discourse.</p>Nikos PanagiotouIoannis Tzortzis
##submission.copyrightStatement##
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
2025-12-162025-12-1652375710.36859/jgss.v5i2.4872New Colonialism in an Ecological Guise
https://ejournal.fisip.unjani.ac.id/index.php/JGSS/article/view/4675
<p>Waste trade from developed to developing countries reflects systemic environmental racism. Wealthy nations turn poorer nations into dumping grounds, creating structural injustice and geography-based discrimination. The concept of ecological colonialism reinforces this, highlighting environmental exploitation in colonized countries. Environmental issues and so-called “green” policies are often used by developed nations to impose dominance over the Global South. This is manifested in the exploitation of natural resources, dependency on debt and foreign loans, technological domination, and waste colonialism. Such practices demonstrate that environmental protection is prioritized only for the powerful, while marginalized communities are sacrificed, thereby reinforcing structural inequality and dependency. This study frames waste trade not as ordinary commerce but as a form of domination over developing countries, particularly in Asia and Africa. Using qualitative methods and secondary data collection, it presents a theoretical framework to explain how waste trade becomes a tool for developed nations to create structural dependency.</p>Jusmalia OktavianiFirdaus Muhamad Iqbal
##submission.copyrightStatement##
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
2025-12-162025-12-1652587910.36859/jgss.v5i2.4675China's Dual Identity and Its Discourse Toward the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
https://ejournal.fisip.unjani.ac.id/index.php/JGSS/article/view/4878
<p>The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) affects China’s export interests and provides a stage for identity performance in policy discourse. This article examines how China’s dual identity as a developing country and as a responsible major power structures its assessment of CBAM and its implied responses. Using qualitative content analysis with a MIC-mini coding scheme, the study analyzes 41 elite and semi-mass texts and translates four variables (Self, Other, Valence, Action) into comparable indicators, including the Identity Salience Index (ISI), Average Valence Score (AVS), and Action Orientation (AOR) under a 60 percent dominance rule. Findings show a stronger responsible major power framing in 2023, a persistently negative tone that becomes more legal and procedural, and action signals that shift from protest toward technical coordination. Developing country references persist, preserving flexibility between equity claims and rule-shaping. The study offers a replicable way to quantify identity in discourse and to link identity emphasis to tone and implied action.</p>Joshua Kharizetha Evangelize Syauta
##submission.copyrightStatement##
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
2025-12-162025-12-1652809310.36859/jgss.v5i2.4878Joko Widodo and Xi Jinping's Anti Corruption Commonalities and Distinctiveness
https://ejournal.fisip.unjani.ac.id/index.php/JGSS/article/view/5056
<h4>ABSTRACT</h4> <p>Our paper attempts to describe two main questions: first, what anti-corruption strategy that both two President exercised their power and maintain legitimacy crucial for their presidency, Xi from 2012 up to present and Jokowi from 2014 to 2024. We are interested to discuss fuller on why did Xi and Jokowi took these strategies. Second, what are the outlook for the anti-corruption measures can be taken near the future, for Jokowi up to 2024 and for Xi will not have time limit post centralizing power under Xi’s power. We argue that Xi Jinping anti corruption targeted the political corruption related to his Chinese dreams confront with more certainty and stable domestic environment after he could centralized under his power. On the other hand, Jokowi first term has to overcome with a more dynamics domestic environment; although, in the beginnig of his presidency, he was perceived as anti-corruption politicians and acted adhere with good public governance principle, transparency and accountable. However, Jokowi’s second term altered his anti corruption stance. He governed his priority was no longer following transparency and accountable rather than economic development per se. This comparative study seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between anti-corruption strategies, power consolidation, and political legitimacy within presidential regimes that differ in their institutional characteristics.</p> <p> </p> <p>Keywords: Anti corruption, political corruption, comparative case of China and Indonesia</p> <p><strong>ABSTRAK</strong></p> <p>Artikel ini mengkaji dua pertanyaan utama: (1) bagaimana strategi antikorupsi yang dijalankan Xi Jinping (sejak 2012 hingga kini) dan Joko Widodo (2014–2024) digunakan sebagai instrumen untuk mempertahankan dan memperkuat legitimasi kekuasaan; serta (2) bagaimana prospek kebijakan antikorupsi pada periode kepemimpinan berikutnya, khususnya berakhirnya masa jabatan Jokowi pada 2024 dan rezim Xi yang tidak lagi terikat batasan masa jabatan setelah pemusatan kekuasaan di bawah otoritasnya. Kami berargumentasi bahwa strategi antikorupsi Xi berfokus pada pemberantasan korupsi politik yang mengancam konsolidasi kekuasaannya dan realisasi <em>Chinese Dream</em>, terutama dengan menciptakan lingkungan domestik yang dianggap lebih stabil dan terkendali. Sebaliknya, pemerintahan Jokowi pada periode pertama berupaya memperkuat legitimasi melalui citra antikorupsi dan penerapan prinsip tata kelola pemerintahan yang baik, transparansi, serta akuntabilitas. Namun, pada periode kedua, prioritas kebijakan Jokowi mengalami pergeseran menuju agenda pembangunan ekonomi, sehingga komitmen terhadap reformasi antikorupsi cenderung melemah. Kajian komparatif ini berupaya memberikan pemahaman yang lebih mendalam mengenai hubungan antara strategi antikorupsi, konsolidasi kekuasaan, dan legitimasi politik dalam rezim presidensial yang berkarakter berbeda secara institusional.</p> <p><strong>Kata Kunci</strong>: antikorupsi, korupsi politik, legitimasi kekuasaan, studi komparatif, Cina, Indonesia</p>Muhamad IksanKhairizah FahrudinAnggi Lestari
##submission.copyrightStatement##
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
2025-12-162025-12-16529411310.36859/jgss.v5i2.5056Policy Diffusion, Digitalisation, and Governance Gaps in the Implementation of Indonesia's Golden Visa Programme
https://ejournal.fisip.unjani.ac.id/index.php/JGSS/article/view/5090
<p>Indonesia’s Golden Visa, launched in 2023 through Minister of Law and Human Rights Regulation No. 22/2023, is promoted as a residence-by-investment scheme to attract foreign capital and talent for post-pandemic recovery and digital transformation. This article uses a qualitative descriptive approach based on documentary analysis of regulations, internal guidance, official statistics, and scholarly literature on Golden Visa programmes, investment migration, and digital immigration governance. It examines how Indonesia’s scheme is designed and how far its monitoring and governance arrangements are specified.<br>The findings show that Indonesia, as a latecomer, selectively borrows design elements from European models longer residence durations, high investment thresholds, and privileged treatment for targeted investors and global talents—while embedding the programme in a digital-by-design architecture with online application and stay-permit services. However, there is a gap between relatively sophisticated ex-ante design and under-specified ex-post monitoring and evaluation. References to investment realisation, supervision, and revocation lack operational detail on risk-based triggers, inter-agency coordination, and data governance. The article argues that Indonesia’s Golden Visa must move beyond investment-promotion rhetoric toward an end-to-end, digitally supported monitoring model and contributes to debates on policy diffusion, investor migration, and digital governance by emphasising institutional capacity and accountability.</p>Gunawan Ari NursantoSunarto SunartoPandji SukmanaGatot Hery Djatmiko
##submission.copyrightStatement##
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
2025-12-162025-12-165211413010.36859/jgss.v5i2.5090