

## PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS: PRESIDENT JOKOWI'S MARITIME DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL MARITIME FULCRUM

Helga Yohana Simatupang<sup>1</sup>, Michael Romulus Panggabean<sup>2</sup>, Jusmalia Oktaviani<sup>3</sup>

<sup>12</sup>Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences and Education, Universitas Potensi Utama

<sup>3</sup>Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani

<sup>1</sup>helgayohana@potensi-utama.ac.id, <sup>2</sup>michaelpanggabean@ymail.com, <sup>3</sup>jusmalia.oktaviani@lecture.unjani.ac.id

### Abstract

When President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo first came into power in 2014, he introduced his vision and commitment of transforming Indonesia into a global maritime fulcrum (GMF), highlighting the notion as his first grand strategy of his administration’s foreign policy. President Jokowi promoted the concept in multiple international meetings abroad, in which his foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, echoed the same ideas to various international dignitaries. President Jokowi’s administration even took it further by codifying the vision in 2017 through a Presidential Regulation on National Sea Policy. However, when President Jokowi took oath for a second term in 2019, it seems there have been less enthusiasm from himself and his newly sworn-in administration regarding the grand strategy. This is shown with even the words surrounding the grand strategy have not been mentioned by the president or his ministers. Even though President Jokowi and his administration have not been blatant regarding the global maritime vision, the concept is still very much relevant and viable for such a vast archipelagic nation like Indonesia. The first term of Jokowi’s presidency has shown efforts of implementation of the GMF concept, but various limitations in economic, security, and foreign policy aspects have halted the progress. Maritime diplomacy is still a very important concern that President Jokowi must push before leaving office and will be an important legacy for his successor to build upon in the next administration. Despite that economic transformation and recovery have been the priority of President Jokowi’s second term administration, it withholds the potential of Indonesia if a wider spectrum of maritime strategy is not brought forward. Indonesia holds the capacity to become a global maritime power and it is unjust to the nation if the country does not hold the steering wheel of maritime influence in the region. The GMF may have not been the strongest starting point, but neither should the concept be dismissed completely. It could always be built on with a more comprehensive and systematic strategy in order to reach the same means. Though the current state of the GMF lies more on the side of rhetoric, the materialization of the idea should not be a halted relay at the current administration. Bridging the progress of the GMF with the prospects that it holds in the future should be brought upon in the transition of power when Indonesia elects its next president in 2024.

**Keywords:** Global maritime fulcrum, maritime diplomacy, foreign policy, geopolitics, Jokowi, Indonesia

## **INTRODUCTION**

Indonesia is the world's largest archipelago with the archipelagic country located in the South-eastern part of Asia in-between the Indian and Pacific oceans respectively. Alongside with that, Indonesia is neighboured by land with three countries, namely Malaysia, East Timor, and Papua New Guinea, and shares sea borders with nine countries, which are Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, India, Australia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Palau, and East Timor. Indonesia has a land area of around 1,8 million km<sup>2</sup> and water area of around 93,000 km<sup>2</sup>, in which combined it sums up to around 1,9 million km<sup>2</sup> of Indonesia's basic area as whole. Indonesia with its population of around 258 million people, makes the country the fourth most populous in the world. In that approximate 1,9 million km<sup>2</sup> of Indonesia's total base area, Indonesia claims sovereignty over 17,504 islands, with 16,056 of the islands registered under the UN (The Jakarta Post, 2017). With its geographical position and size, Indonesia's significance in the international stage is inevitable, especially in the Southeast Asian region, with Indonesia hosting the secretariat of Southeast Asia's main regional organization, ASEAN, in its capital Jakarta.

Since its independence and the formation of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 and through its years of existence, Indonesia's foreign policy at certain points of time can be seen to be very synonymous to the character of which president was in power during that period, hence leaving Indonesia's foreign policy to have different tendencies at different periods of time. Despite this, the baseline of Indonesia's foreign policy has been consistent through a single doctrine, which defines and guides Indonesia's foreign policy. Since its adoption in 1948, the free and active doctrine has been the foundation of Indonesia's foreign policy ever since, as its objective is for Indonesia to carry out an active non-bloc foreign policy (Anwar, 1994). When Indonesia adopted the doctrine in 1948, the world was at the midst of the Cold War and was divided into two opposing blocs, in which one was led by the Soviet Union and the other by the United States of America. Through the free and active foreign policy doctrine, it was Indonesia's response to the situation that time, in

which Indonesia chooses not to side with any of the two blocs and go its own independent way (Anwar, 1994).

Indonesia chooses to be outside of the two giant blocs, and does not intend to be in a third bloc that opposes the existing two blocs, but rather commit on the basis for international solidarity, meaning that Indonesia does not position itself either as a neutral impartial party in the international community (Hatta, 1953). The meaning of “free” in Indonesia’s foreign policy doctrine can be seen as having no participation in any military alliances, which includes defence arrangements, which defence arrangements was a very prominent trend during the period of the Cold War, and on the broader sense it is seen as a resistance, with nationalism as the basis, to any form of bondage and obligation with an external party which might detain Indonesia to autonomously carry out the variety of policies for the country (Anwar, 1994). In the face of diverse changes in the world, free and active politics may adapt and survive, respond to current difficulties, and serve as a theoretical bridge between academics and real-world realities. The notion of a free and active foreign policy is not going away anytime soon. However, by prioritizing a win-win solution approach, it will continue to contribute and be a part of the answer to the nations’ challenges (Simatupang & Panggabean, 2022).

The Indonesian government claims sovereignty over the waters between its islands making it as part of the country’s sovereign territory. This is declared in the nations’ Juanda Declaration of 1957 through the *Wawasan Nusantara* (Archipelago Principle), in which from that the nation declared absolute sovereignty over all the waters within the straight baselines of the country’s islands (Butcher & Elson, 2017). From the Djuanda Declaration, a new classification for Indonesia’s case was created by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, as Indonesia was categorised as archipelagic state which means that these types of states have sovereignty over their archipelagic waters (Butcher & Elson, 2017). With the Djuanda Declaration, the jurisdiction of the Indonesian is expanded to 4,5 million km<sup>2</sup> (with water making up more than half of the area), the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) sovereignty to over 5 million km<sup>2</sup>, making

Indonesia without doubt the world's largest archipelagic state and the third largest EEZ in the world (Butcher J., 2009).

With that, it can be clearly seen that the waters of Indonesia are one of the most important assets of the country. The Indonesian government realizes this, from the early days of the country when its founding fathers developed the Djuanda Declaration and even to this day throughout all the different administrations of government that Indonesia have gone through in its history. The Indonesian waters will always be an important part of Indonesia's policy both locally and abroad. It will always be a priority for the Indonesian government to be able to protect and make the best use of its waters for its advantage. In 2014, President Joko Widodo made a grand maritime strategy as he announced the Global Maritime Fulcrum during the East Asian in Naypyidaw, Myanmar. In the summit, President Jokowi claims that the centre of gravity of the geo-political and geo-economic world is shifting from West to East, as the countries of Asia are on the rise (Witular, 2014). With this premise, President Jokowi believes that the sea's role would increase in Indonesia and as a maritime country Indonesia must establish itself to force the two oceans it surrounds, the Indian and Pacific Ocean (Witular, 2014). In order to achieve such a goal, Indonesia must be able to develop its islands within and between them, with sea highways to enhance greater connectivity between its islands and an international standard modernised port system in all its ports that can facilitate service accordingly to international procedures (Kementerian Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 2015).

On the other hand, implementing such a grand and ambitious maritime strategy, Indonesia would face challenges just as great. Indonesia's challenges would be both internally and externally. The main challenge for Indonesia internally would be to efficiently manage the coordination amongst the government agencies to be able the development the country wishes to achieve as adherence with the Global Maritime Fulcrum. Meanwhile, externally the main challenge for Indonesia is to obtain extensive cooperation with its neighbours whom Indonesia shares their maritime border with and on the

global level through its maritime diplomacy strategy, along with the country's role of a middle power in global affairs.

For Indonesia to enforce the Global Maritime Fulcrum strategy the challenges for the country could be divided into three main categories, which are as follow (Manggala, 2015):

- 1.) Maritime identity, as Indonesia would need to establish a maritime culture. Preceding from previous administrations, there has not been a prominent identity which has been established to define its policies.
- 2.) Maritime diplomacy, with Indonesia being the largest archipelago maritime diplomacy is important in order to have cooperative regional relationships and accomplish two important outcomes, which is to ensure security and to resolve border disputes that are still faced today while setting an example of leadership in mediating interstate regional boundary disputes. Indonesia lies in important sea-lanes that connect East Asia, South Asia, and Oceania also the crucial maritime choke-points (the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar straits).
- 3.) Maritime connectivity, by developing inter-island connectivity as Indonesia plans to expand its seaports and deep-sea ports and upgrade the ports infrastructure. However, economic challenges will be inevitable to achieve such development. To overcome it, the country must narrow the disparity of the maritime sector in its national development agenda. For that, Indonesia must establish a special fund to boost such infrastructure and development rather than just depend on foreign investments.

At the East Asia Summit in November 2014, Jokowi unveiled a GMF built on maritime culture, resources, infrastructure, diplomacy, and defence. Three years later, the doctrine was codified and expanded by a Presidential Regulation on National Sea Policy. But the GMF disappeared when President Jokowi took office in his second and final term. Neither "maritime" nor "diplomacy" appeared once in his inaugural address (The Jakarta Post, 2019). Instead, Jokowi has pledged to focus on human capital, infrastructure, regulatory and bureaucratic reforms, and broader "economic transformation".

Reappointed Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi also outlined priorities for the next five years. Trade and investment, civil protection, sovereignty, regional and global leadership, diplomatic infrastructure. She calls this focus a "4+1" approach, although she never used the word "maritime" in connection with it (The Jakarta Post, 2019).

## **DISCUSSION**

### **The Progress and Prospects**

GMF was not a well-developed grand strategy to begin with. It is not supported by years of research and concept development. Rather, it was just an excellent campaign platform for President Jokowi to make a name for himself in his 2014 election. Nevertheless, the GMF's logic and philosophy are solid and tailored to the world's largest archipelagic nation (Kompas, 2014). Unfortunately, President Jokowi did not personally invest in using GMF because he was managing his schedule. He mainly focused on development projects, from infrastructure to social welfare, with only occasional foreign policy appearances on investment and trade. The National Maritime Policy was largely a "bureaucratic umbrella" document, linking existing programs across sectors (Laksmana, 2017). He could not put them together in one frame. Because Jokowi left defence policy and civil-military relations on "autopilot" and left his advisers (mostly retired army generals) to shape policy and expand military autonomy, the naval component never got off the ground.

It also took President Jokowi three years to select a military commander he personally trusted: Air Chief Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto. As re-election nears, President Jokowi and his generals are more concerned with the organization of the military, from introducing new units to opening the door to more officers in civilian ministries, rather than aligning the military's operations with a larger naval strategy. Emphasis was placed on supporting expansion. The foreign policy component of the GMF has also weakened. This was because Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi was too 'process-oriented', spending too much time reforming the bureaucracy and relying too heavily on existing multilateral platforms such as ASEAN (Laksmana, Indonesian foreign policy needs to focus more on impact than process, 2018). To be fair, it also took

time to develop a close relationship with President Jokowi while handling important diplomatic issues at home (e.g., trade and investment or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).

Indonesia's geopolitical interests have thus been supplanted by particularities, bureaucratic inertia, and domestic politics. For example, the foreign ministry will use the GMF as a basis for developing strategies and guidelines to effectively manage the South China Sea dispute and China's intrusion into Indonesian waters, and to address the impact of strategic U.S.-China competition. Instead, it shifted blame and spent diplomatic capital only for ASEAN to adopt a deeply flawed outlook on the Indo-Pacific (Asia Global Institute, 2019). In addition, the government agencies responsible for the maritime sector remain fragmented and the "herd shift" continues. President Jokowi appointed the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) as Indonesia's Coast Guard in late 2014, but has radically restructured or restructured the administration of the maritime sector, where more than a dozen agencies and ministries continue to create their own space.

Led by Susi Pudjiastuti, the Ministry of Fisheries has attempted to fundamentally overhaul the way Indonesia tackles illegal fishing, sometimes at odds with other agencies and ministries. That she needed a new presidential task force (known as Satgas 115) to do this symbolizes the bureaucratic power struggles surrounding maritime security. In order to patrol large areas of water, it was necessary to "rotate" and occasionally cooperate with the Ministry of Fisheries, Satgas 115 and Bakamla. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that two different coordinating ministries "shared" the maritime sector. The Coordinating Minister for Legal, Security, and Political Affairs was supposed to coordinate the navy and the foreign ministry, but the fisheries ministry now has its own anti-illegal fishing force, but is subordinated to the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs.

President Jokowi himself faced coordination difficulties as he lacked a central strategic political centre equivalent to the National Security Council. Management of his own office is still divided between chief of staff, state

secretary and cabinet secretary. The GMF was the most conceptually coherent grand strategy for the Indonesian archipelago nation, but President Jokowi squandered it by abandoning the doctrine midway through his first term. In his second term, Jokowi seems poised to drop the guise of institutional reform and instead double down on economic and infrastructure development at the expense of everything else, including Indonesia's geopolitical interests (Gammon, 2019).

### **The Future of Indonesia's Maritime Diplomacy**

According to Gilley and O'Neil, the hierarchical, or locational, approach can be explained as the substantial power capacity possessed by medium-sized states compared to both large and small, weak states (Edstrom & Westberg, 2020). On quantifiable indicators of power between states regarding differences in population size, military spending, strategic geographic location, gross domestic product, etc. Using quantitative metrics has several advantages: Ability to objectively measure state power and facilitate comparisons between states. In other words, a large middle power can use its abundant resources to attract other countries and establish beneficial cooperation. Therefore, we use resource forces as an operationalization from a hierarchical approach. In this case, Indonesia is a middle power country rich in resources, especially natural resources.

One of Indonesia's strengths lies in its vast maritime area and geopolitical location. With this, President Jokowi declared its policy to serve as a global maritime hub to transform Indonesia into a global maritime powerhouse. Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia and the world's largest archipelago. Due to its strategic position between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and between the Asian and Australian continents, this makes Indonesia a region competing for major power interests (Djalal, 1996). Within the Asia-Pacific region and with developed countries economic, political, and military power Countries such as the United States, India, Australia, China, and Japan rely heavily on Indonesia's stability, foreign policy and geopolitical thinking as Indonesia is also the leader of ASEAN (Laksmana, The enduring strategic trinity: explaining Indonesia's geopolitical

architecture, 2011). This means that Indonesia is confident in establishing itself on the international stage through its global maritime hub initiative. This is an important step on the road to world maritime power.

The second is the functional approach, which emphasizes the responsibilities of a central power on specific issues related to achieving specific influence in its functional areas that are reflected in its national interests. It suggests that central powers tend to pursue foreign policy goals in specific areas of highest interest, often referred to as "niche diplomacy." According to Gareth Evans, niche diplomacy means focusing resources on specific areas where they can generate valuable returns, rather than trying to cover areas dominated by smaller countries, rather than being dominated by large powers (Thies & Sari, 2018). Indonesia's 'niche area' in this case is maritime, given that Indonesia has a vast sea area. Through GMF, Indonesia takes responsibility as the world's largest maritime nation. The president also said he would rebuild maritime culture and improve national policy towards the maritime sector.

On February 20, 2017, President Jokowi issued Presidential Decree No. 16 on Indonesia's Maritime Policy. This policy serves as a general guide for implementation through maritime policy and programs and activities within government, whether within or outside ministries. It is hoped that it will help implement GMF more quickly. President Jokowi was the first to officially unveil a maritime doctrine that will lead other international actors to respect the government's efforts to make Indonesia a maritime power and a platform for peacebuilding and security at the regional and international levels (Muhibat, 2017).

GMF has his seven pillars to achieve this goal: (1) Human and Marine Resource Development, (2) Maritime Security and Law Enforcement, (3) Institutions and Ocean Governance, (4) Development of the Ocean Economy, (5) Management of Maritime Peace and Protection, and (6) the maritime culture and maritime diplomacy (Muhibat, 2017). This means that Indonesia not only wants to focus this policy on the domestic front, but also wants this

policy to be a mediator in maritime disputes between neighbouring countries. Indonesia's status as a middle power has been noticed and recognized by international players.

The third is the behavioural approach, which refers to concrete actions of states in international affairs; To be a good international citizen, to support multilateralism, to support the international order, and to act as a mediator in disputes. The label "good international citizen" evokes different assumptions among many scientists. James Souter argues that states must adhere to common rules and values to be good international citizens, including human rights, multilateralism, international law, etc. (Souter, 2016) Nevertheless it can be argued that the foreign policies of the central powers are not driven purely altruistically, but rather that these states also act as instruments (Thies & Sari, 2018). Citizens represent the middle ground between realism and idealism. Since these conditions vary depending on the situation and interests you face, you may not always act kindly. Moreover, middle powers show a strong preference for multilateralism as it can overcome their lack of bargaining power at the bilateral level (Thies & Sari, 2018). Speaking about the GMF, President Jokowi emphasized that Indonesia's power projection is an "Indo-Pacific power."

The ties between the Pacific and Indian Oceans have become a major arena for Indonesia's foreign policy. Indonesia's leadership role in the Indian Ocean Rim Alliance (IORA) from 2015 to 2017 provided an opportunity to expand its influence in the region (Sebastian & Syailendra, 2014). This includes discussions on Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) border agreements with Australia and Papua New Guinea. Indonesia also has continental shelf agreements with various countries such as Malaysia, Australia, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Singapore, and India. As a neutral country, Indonesia also seeks multilateral settlement of international disputes by trying to encourage compromise. Indonesia's role indicates that it sought to resolve disputes in the South China Sea through workshops (Saha, 2016). Therefore, it can be said that Indonesia's maritime diplomacy through the GMF is stronger than before.

### **Trans-regionalism and the Global Maritime Fulcrum**

Capacity refers to middle power capabilities that rely more heavily on diplomatic skills than military prowess. This is important in relationships and how their ideas spread and influence others. As a middle power, Indonesia also emphasizes its diplomatic capacity to promote Indo-Pacific ideas based on ASEAN centrality. How that is done is explored through the relationships with the other four "C's."

During the tenure of President Jokowi, Indonesia prioritized the Indo-Pacific region and set the goal of becoming part of the world's maritime axis. This can be seen as a form of concentration in which the middle power prioritizes foreign policy goals to achieve desired results. Superpowers have the ability to focus on many areas, but central powers lack the capabilities compared to superpowers and need to focus on foreign policy issues. This is known as "niche" diplomacy (Ravenhill, 1998). When Joko Widodo came to power in July 2014, Indonesia emphasized itself as a naval power due to its strategic position between the Indian and Pacific oceans, thereby facilitating India's access through the GMF. emphasized its focus on the Pacific (Scott, 2019).

The Indo-Pacific is seen as a geopolitical issue for Indonesia, and the strategic confrontation between the US and China will only divide or polarize the region. The goal is regional peace, stability, and development. As Southeast Asia is located between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, it is necessary to maintain the centrality of ASEAN in order to ensure the openness, transparency, and inclusiveness of the region, while preventing the Indo-Pacific from becoming an arena for great power competition. I have. Indonesia will not only act as a centre of ocean dynamics, but also bear responsibility (Scott, 2019).

In this regard, central powers have creativity associated with intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership. According to Oran R. Young, intellectual leadership guides the way actors rely on their own abilities in bringing up political energies and ideas that can shape the behavior and

perspectives of other actors through institutional negotiations (Young, 1991). The idea itself is not new, as it can be traced back to Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's second presidency. This is because he turned his attention to the Indo-Pacific. He went on to say that there is a "lack of trust" in the Indo-Pacific region, which threatens peace and stability in the region. have sought to foster relationships based on common interests (Weatherbee, 2019). For example, Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi delivered a speech at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 11 January 2018 stating, "Regarding the future regional structure [...]. It hopes to be established in the Pacific as well. Therefore, Indonesia, together with ASEAN, will help promote strong and positive cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Indonesia will cooperate with other countries in the region. and develop the so-called umbrella of Indo-Pacific cooperation on the centrality of ASEAN.

If intellectual leadership is about generating ideas, then corporate leadership is about encouraging stakeholders to accept deals while allowing central powers to use their bargaining skills to influence and shape issues in a comprehensive way (Young, 1991). In 2018 and 2019, Indonesia promoted and promoted the Indo-Pacific concept to both ASEAN and EAS countries. This concept was presented by President Jokowi at the 32nd ASEAN Summit on 28 April 2018, and was subsequently presented by Retno Marsudi on 16 May 2018 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The concept was also formally presented at the 8th EAS Ministerial Conference on 9 August 2018. She further assured ministers that the concept was not intended to create new mechanisms or replace existing ones, but to improve existing ones according to regional dynamics (Weatherbee, 2019).

Joko Widodo's speech at the 13th EAS on 15 November 2018 further emphasized that Indonesia will discuss the Indo-Pacific concept more openly with EAS countries. He also emphasized that he unites the two oceans into one geopolitical theatre. We must maintain peace and security in the Indian and Pacific oceans. It is not a struggle for natural resources, regional conflicts,

or maritime hegemony. Rather, it is to make the two seas hubs of world routes.

The Indo-Pacific concept itself focuses on three areas of cooperation: maritime cooperation, infrastructure and connectivity, and sustainable development. These areas of cooperation are in line with the GMF's pillars in addition to the seven policy pillars of the Indonesian Ocean Policy: (1) maritime and human resource development, (2) maritime security, law enforcement and safety at sea, (3) ocean governance and institutions, (4) the development of the maritime economy, (5) ocean space management and maritime protection, (6) maritime culture and (7) maritime diplomacy.

However, the concept has not attracted the other ASEAN members as they have shown less enthusiasm, especially Singapore who stated that the concept was lacking in clarity. This is also due to the view of the other ASEAN members that the concept is seen as an initial move to step back from ASEAN and to become more Indonesia-centric. They are concerned with the possibility of making EAS the default mechanism of this concept (Anwar, Indonesia and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific, 2020). After an extensive process, Indonesia then outlined a draft document titled 'Indonesia's perspective for an ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific: towards a peaceful, prosperous, and inclusive region'.

Furthermore, to finalise it, Indonesia held a high-level dialogue on Indo-Pacific cooperation in Jakarta on 20 March 2019. It provided a platform to discuss and exchange views about the opportunities for cooperation (Anwar, Indonesia and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific, 2020). The draft was finally adopted by ASEAN at the 34th ASEAN Summit on 16 June 2019. Sukma said, "This Outlook promises that ASEAN will continue to maintain its central role in the evolving regional fabric [...] and continue to be an honest broker in a strategic environment of competing interests. " (Sukma, 2019)

Finally, the above intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership is geared towards building coalitions. For middle powers, coalitions of like-minded nations are essential to achieving their goals. This is because intermediate

powers are not as powerful as superpowers. They usually form coalitions through multilateral settings. In this regard, as articulated by Joko Widodo at the 9th EAS on 13 November 2014, Indonesia attaches great importance to multilateralism to achieve its goals. "For Indonesia, EAS plays an important role in promoting security, stability, and prosperity in the region. Therefore, I choose this multilateral forum to express our view of becoming a global maritime axis." As a powerful maritime power, Indonesia is committed to maintaining peace and security in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and will take on challenges of all kinds (Ravenhill, 1998).

Credibility comes from the first four 'C's. Ravenhill described credibility as the likelihood that the central power's ideas and initiatives will be accepted by all parties (Ravenhill, 1998). Instead, they emphasize mutual benefit and common good. The Indo-Pacific Initiative set out in AOIP is widely accepted. Tan argued that the US response to China's "One Belt, One Road" is forcing countries in the region to take sides (Tan, 2020). This is exacerbated by the tense competition between the US and China, with FOIP being more widely used to counter China. His exclusive approach could jeopardize ASEAN centrality.

In this context, his AOIP on the Indo-Pacific offers a different approach by emphasizing the centrality and inclusiveness of ASEAN. AOIP will involve all powers within his EAS, including China. Additionally, there is the reliability dimension that Ravenhill mentioned (Ravenhill, 1998). In this context, as Marsudi said, there is no doubt that Indonesia aspires to be a true partner for peace, security, and prosperity. This has been consistently encouraged and they have taken the initiative on this issue. In response to FOIP and the strategic confrontation between the US and China, Indonesia has played a key role in shaping the Indo-Pacific outlook. Given that the AOIP is an extension of her GMF vision, Weatherbee (Weatherbee, 2019) and Anwar (Anwar, Indonesia and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific, 2020) have responded to her FOIP on how Indonesia will ensure the implementation of her AOIP by strengthening Indonesia in the maritime sector and supporting the GMF.

Sukma said to give confidence to: (1) it is important for Indonesia to fully implement its maritime strategy; and (2) Indonesia is committed to promoting multilateralism through discussions within ASEAN-led mechanisms on a common strategy for the Indo-Pacific (Sukma, 2019). It should be actively involved in strategic competition with other ASEAN members. Moreover, Indonesia looks forward to the AOIP serving as an overarching platform for all competing regional visions, while easing power struggles.

## **CONCLUSION**

The hope that through this paper, Indonesia may act in some way in the future. Indonesia uses the GMF as a strategy to increase its prestige, role, and influence in the regional and international order. However, Indonesia still depends on ASEAN, so this does not mean that Indonesia will leave ASEAN. Indonesia also plays an important role in her ASEAN, and there is plenty of room for Indonesia to influence ASEAN decisions. Apart from that, Indonesia has not let GMF act against BRI and FOIP. Indeed, Indonesia would like to develop its relationship and cooperation with BRI and FOIP in all areas of its interest.

Being the most important issue for Indonesia can serve as a prominent geopolitician military power in the Indo-Pacific region medium power. To achieve this goal, realizing the vision of Indonesia as a GMF, improvements are needed, especially in the military field. This meets the growing challenge threats from military sources endanger sovereignty and territorial integrity and the safety of the Indonesian people. Of the current defence budget allocation is still needed to increase about 0.8% of GDP to build a strong defence area. Budget strategy must also be handed over priority is given to defence equipment costs powerful enough and comprehensive defence forces, land, sea, air, cyber, and the space force.

The study recommends that governments draft policies with clear mandated lines and distribution of duties from the President to the responsible ministry or agency. This method the division of duties between

institutions will be clarified, and implementation will not be duplicated. In addition, the government must create a legal basis for implementing each minister's program.

## **REFERENCES**

- Anwar, D. F. (1994). Indonesia's Foreign Policy After the Cold War. *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 146-163.
- Anwar, D. F. (2020). Indonesia and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific. *International Affairs*, 96(1).
- Asia Global Institute. (2019, September 19). *Flawed Assumptions: Why the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is Defective*. Retrieved from AsiaGlobal Online: Geopolitics: <https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/flawed-assumptions-why-the-asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific-is-defective/>
- Butcher, J. (2009). Becoming an Archipelagic State: The Juanda Declaration of 1957 and the 'Struggle' to Gain International Recognition of the Archipelagic Principle. In M. Cribb, & M. Ford, *Indonesia beyond the Water's Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State* (pp. 28-48). Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institut.
- Butcher, J. G., & Elson, R. E. (2017). *Sovereignty and the Sea: How Indonesia Became an Archipelagic State*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.
- Djalal, D. P. (1996). *The Geopolitics of Indonesia's Maritime Territorial Policy*. Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
- Edstrom, H., & Westberg, J. (2020). The defense strategies of middle powers: Competing for security, influence and status in an era of unipolar demise. *Comparative Strategy*, 39(2), 174.
- Gammon, L. (2019, October 25). *What was that election for again?* Retrieved from New Mandala: <https://www.newmandala.org/what-was-that-election-for-again/>
- Hatta, M. (1953). Indonesia's Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*, 31(3), 441-452.
- Kementerian Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia. (2015, November 13). *Indonesia Sebagai Poros Maritim Dunia*. Retrieved from PresidenRI.go.id: <http://www.presidenri.go.id/berita-aktual/indonesia-sebagai-poros-maritim-dunia.html>
- Kompas. (2014, 08 21). *Gagasan Poros Maritim*. Retrieved from Kompas.com Ekonomi: Makro: <https://money.kompas.com/read/2014/08/21/080000726/Gagasan.Poros.Maritim>

- Laksmana, E. (2011). The enduring strategic trinity: explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture. *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, 7(1), 96.
- Laksmana, E. (2017, March 23). *Indonesia Sea Policy: Accelerating Jokowi's Global Maritime Fulcrum*. Retrieved from Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative: <https://amti.csis.org/indonesian-sea-policy-accelerating/>
- Laksmana, E. (2018, December 15). *Indonesian foreign policy needs to focus more on impact than process*. Retrieved from The Jakarta Post Academia: Opinion: <https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2018/12/15/indonesian-foreign-policy-needs-to-focus-more-on-impact-than-process.html>
- Mangala, P. U. (2015, March 22). *Rethinking Indonesia's global maritime axis*. Retrieved from The Jakarta Post: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/03/22/rethinking-indonesia-s-global-maritime-axis.html>
- Muhibat, S. F. (2017). Indonesia's New Ocean Policy: Analysing the External Dimension. *Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India*,.
- Ravenhill, J. (1998). Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australia and Canadian Foreign Policies. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 52(3).
- Saha, P. (2016). Indonesia's potential as a maritime power. *Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India*.
- Scott, D. (2019). Indonesia Grapples with the Indo-Pacific: Outreach, Strategic Discourse, and Diplomacy. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*.
- Sebastian, L. C., & Syailendra, E. A. (2014). Jokowi's "Look West" Foreign Policy: Expanding Indonesia's Sphere of Influence. *Raharatnam School of International Studies Commentary*.
- Simatupang, H. Y., & Panggabean, M. R. (2022, December). The Implementation of Indonesia's Free and Active Foreign Policy Over the Russia-Ukraine War During Indonesia's G20 Presidency. In *International Conference on Sustainable Innovation on Humanities, Education, and Social Sciences (ICOSI-HESS 2022)* (pp. 590-602). Atlantis Press.
- Souter, J. (2016). Good International Citizenship and Special Responsibility to Protect Refugees. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 18(4).
- Sukma, R. (2019). Indonesia, ASEAN and shaping the Indo-Pacific idea. *East Asia Forum*.
- Tan, S. S. (2020). Consigned to hedge: South-east Asia and America's 'free and open Indo-Pacific' strategy. *International Affairs*, 96(1).

- The Jakarta Post. (2017, August 21). *16,000 Indonesian islands registered at UN*. Retrieved from The Jakarta Post News: National: <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/08/21/16000-indonesian-islands-registered-at-un.html>
- The Jakarta Post. (2019, October 30). *Economy permeates foreign policy priorities*. Retrieved from The Jakarta Post News: World: <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/10/30/economy-permeates-foreign-policy-priorities.html>
- The Jakarta Post. (2019, October 20). *Jokowi highlights economic, bureaucratic reforms in inauguration speech*. Retrieved from The Jakarta Post News: National: <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/10/20/jokowi-highlights-economic-bureaucratic-reforms-in-inauguration-speech.html>
- Thies, C. G., & Sari, A. C. (2018). A Role Theory Approach to Middle Powers: Making Sense of Indonesia's Place in the International System. *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, 40(3).
- Weatherbee, D. E. (2019). Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept. *Perspective*.
- Witular, R. A. (2014, November 13). *Jokowi launches maritime doctrine to the world*. Retrieved from The Jakarta Post: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/13/jokowi-launches-maritime-doctrine-world.html>
- Young, O. R. (1991). Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society. *International Organization*, 45(3).