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Counterterrorism Diplomacy:

ASEAN's New Chapter of Regional Engagement

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Counterterrorism has become a global trend since 9/11. Following the incident, the U.S. launched the Global War on Terror, which developed numerous international partnerships in dealing with terrorism. This included the Southeast Asia region. Most ASEAN countries have leveraged their cooperation through counterterrorism diplomacy ever since. This approach, however, endorsed the law enforcement agency due to the adopted criminal justice model. With the rise of the Islamic State (IS) movement, which links with various terrorist networks, the threat of terrorism has gained more attention in Southeast Asia, particularly after the Marawi incident. Complicatedly, the IS merged with separatist and terrorist groups in the South Philippines. Many observers predicted that if it is still uncontrollable, it may create a spillover to surrounding ASEAN countries. Thus, this circumstance has generated an opportunity for greater collaboration among ASEAN countries in dealing with ISIS in the region. Unlike past cooperation, this new chapter may facilitate a more substantial portion of military-to-military engagement. Counterterrorism diplomacy may potentially strengthen regional engagement, which has been restrained due to the South China Sea dispute with China.

The world was shocked when a terrorist attack struck the World Trade Centre (WTC) in September 2001. It collapsed when Al-Qaeda, a group of terrorists, hijacked aircrafts and hit the building twice (Wright, 2006, pp. 357-358). At a different location, the same method was also used to aim Pentagon, the headquarters of the U.S. military. Both incidents resulted in a high number of casualties in addition to the destruction of the targeted infrastructures.

Following the tragedy, the U.S. launched the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which developed numerous cooperation with international partners. It was intended to

cope with any terrorist threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its affiliated networks. This collaboration included the Southeast Asian countries, which the U.S. considered its "second front" in combatting terrorism (Gershman, 2002). Consequently, most of the ASEAN countries have increased their engagements through counterterrorism diplomacy ever since. The initial approach, nevertheless, focused on the law enforcement agency due to the adopted criminal justice model, which was perceived as a more efficient means to apprehend terrorists in urban centres and rural religious schools (Dillon, 2004). Thus, the U.S. military organised joint training and exercises to exchange knowledge and information with several police counterterrorism units in the region, including Indonesia (Acharya, 2015, p. 232).

After over a decade, there have been unbearable dynamics in the development of terrorist networks in the region. In the last few years, with the rising of the Islamic State (IS) movement, known as the Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), numerous terrorist groups in Southeast Asia have linked themselves to demonstrate their solidarity. This phenomenon has gained more attention since numerous ASEAN countries are still struggling to deal with terrorism. Indonesian security apparatus apprehended Abu Wardah, known as Santoso, a local terrorist group leader who was pursued by the police for a year. Santoso and his group have declared their allegiance to IS. With the involvement of the military in the joint operations against terrorism, the fugitive was eventually seized in July 2016 (Cochrane, 2016).

Not only Indonesia but also the Philippines has also included the role of the military in dealing with terrorism. With the occurrence of the Marawi incident, the country adopted martial law, which legitimised the military to take further action to neutralize the situation. Complicatedly, in the Marawi case, IS has merged with local separatist and terrorist groups in the South Philippines. Although the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has been involved, it has not been fully able to cope with the existing problem (Gita, 2017). Many observers predict that if it is still uncontrollable, then it may potentially affect the surrounding ASEAN countries.

Thus, this circumstance has generated an opportunity for greater collaboration among ASEAN countries in dealing with terrorism. Different from past cooperation, this new chapter may facilitate a more considerable portion of military-to-military engagement. Counterterrorism diplomacy is perceived as a means to strengthen regional engagement, which has been restrained due to the South China Sea dispute with China (Tong, 2016).

This article attempts to analyse the shift of ASEAN's regional engagement regarding its counterterrorism agenda. It tries to examine the difference between the phase after the WTC tragedy and the subsequent period after the development of IS. The analysis refers to archival documents posted in books, journals, and the internet, including publications relating to ASEAN countries and their counterterrorism activities.

With the shifting development of terrorism threat in the Southeast Asia region, from Al-Qaeda to ISIS, the article argues that there has been a substantial change in how countries implement their counterterrorism agenda. Since terrorist network is linked regionally and globally, ASEAN member countries, in particular the Philippines and Indonesia, view that it cannot be handled by only employing law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the role of the military has increased in terminating terrorism. How ASEAN countries manage their militaries to be part of their counterterrorism diplomacy has provided an opportunity for greater regional cooperation, which can renew the regional engagement chapter.

The Origin of ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967. Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore on that day committed to initiating a regional intergovernmental organisation through the inception of ASEAN. The initial aims of forming ASEAN were to foster greater cooperation in numerous vital sectors such as economic, socio-cultural, educational and several others. Additionally, it was intended to promote regional peace and stability by expressing respect for justice and the rule of law as well as obedience to the fundamental principles stipulated in the United Nations Chapter (Flores & Abad, 2017).

The Bangkok Declaration stipulated numerous critical points on regionalism in Southeast Asia. It stated that ASEAN was initially established as a foundation to promote regional cooperation in the spirit of equality and partnership (ASEAN, 1967). It also included seven primary aims and purposes. As a regional organisation, ASEAN has managed to develop its Charter. The ASEAN Charter was entered into force on 15 December 2008 (ASEAN, nd). It covers thirteen chapters and fifty-five articles in total. Article 1 defines the fifteen purposes of the organisation, which have developed from the original points in the Bangkok Declaration (ASEAN, 2008, pp. 3-5). The Charter also affirms the motto of ASEAN which is "One Vision, One Identity, One Community" (ASEAN, 2008, p. 29).

Since its establishment, ASEAN has included five additional members along with its development. Brunei Darussalam joined ASEAN as the sixth member country in January 1984. After gaining independence from Britain, the nation joined the regional organisation. It aimed to use the regional cooperation and participation through ASEAN to guarantee its political autonomy (Thambipillai, 1998, p. 80). Brunei has positioned great importance on ASEAN. In 1987, the Sultan of Brunei participated in the ASEAN summit which signified its commitment (Thambipillai, 1998, p. 85).

Following Brunei, Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995. Vietnam shared numerous things in common with other ASEAN member countries. As Vietnam switching to a market economy, its trade and economic relations with ASEAN countries had grown significantly since 1986 (Binh, 1999, p. 25). Joining ASEAN was based on economic consideration. Following its membership in ASEAN, trade and investments have rapidly developed between Vietnam and ASEAN countries. The country viewed that its membership could accelerate the industrialisation and modernisation which had been set as a priority by the government (Binh, 1999, p. 28).

Not only Vietnam and Brunei, but Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR) also joined the organization on 23 July 1997 (Stuart-Fox, 1998, p. 75). It was the time when ASEAN commemorated its 30th anniversary. Sharing the same consideration as adopted by Vietnam, Lao also perceived that its membership could have a long-term impact on its economic development. Following its membership, the country is more connected to ASEAN, in which more infrastructures have also been constructed to facilitate the integration (Stuart-Fox, 1998, p. 77).

Like Lao, Myanmar also decided to join ASEAN. The country gained its membership within the regional organization on the same day as the Lao's People Democratic Republic. Despite the criticism from the West, ASEAN admitted the country as its newest member. The fear of China's influence over Myanmar was one of the reasons (Cribb, 1998, p. 49). Additionally, its resource-rich economy was accounted to help develop ASEAN's economy (Cribb, 1998, p. 49).

Furthermore, Cambodia was the last country to join ASEAN. The country submitted its proposal to join ASEAN together with the Lao PDR and Myanmar in 1995. However, the unstable domestic political circumstances delayed its admission (Thongpakde, 2001, pp. 59-60). Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia led to the Cambodian conflict. This conflict became a crucial issue in ASEAN where it attempted to exercise a limited degree of influence in mediating the dispute (Narine, 2002, p. 59). When the

situation in the country stabilised, ASEAN officially admitted Cambodia as its tenth member in April 1999 (Thongpakde, 2001, p. 60). The acceptance concluded ASEAN's eventual goal to establish cooperation among all the Southeast Asian countries.

Since its inception, ASEAN has significantly leveraged the interaction between member countries. However, there has been a distinct behaviour demonstrated within the recent years, regarding the South China Sea dispute. ASEAN countries have not concluded in dealing with the dispute. There are six claimant states involved in the conflicted territory. They are China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan (BBC, 2016). Four of them are ASEAN member states. Despite its commitment to foster regional unity, ASEAN high officials failed to deliver a joint communique at the Cambodia Summit in 2012, which has since challenged the unity of the regional organisation (Panda, 2016). Thus, the South China Sea dispute has been perceived as a fiasco for ASEAN's regional cooperation practice.

"War on Terror" and ASEAN Countries

ASEAN has a long record in the case of counterterrorism. Most member countries have experienced terror attacks. The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia are acknowledged as the top three ASEAN countries with the highest incident records in the period of 1970-2016 (see Table 1).[1]

Table 1. ASEAN Countries and the Number of Terrorism Incidents

(Period of 1970-2016)

No	Country	Terrorism Incidents
1	The Philippines	6,212
2	Thailand	3,668
3	Indonesia	735
4	Myanmar	430
5	Cambodia	258
6	Malaysia	95
7	Lao PDR	26
8	Vietnam	10
9	Singapore	7
10	Brunei	1

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[1] Adapted by author from (START, 2016)

According to the Global Terrorism Database, the Philippines has suffered from 6,212 terrorism incidents within nearly five decades (START, 2016). The presence of several separatist and terrorist groups in the country have been the primary reason. The perpetrators have also varied. Among them are the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). These groups were initially formed as separatist movements. Hence, the government has considered them as armed rebellion groups (de Inza, 2012). They aim to establish an independent Islamic state since most people in Moro are Muslim.

The former and latter have established peace talks with the government. The MILF signed a peace agreement with the Aquino's administration four years ago (The Guardian, 2014). Meanwhile, MNLF and Duterte's administration also discussed further a peace talk between the two (Romero, 2017). However, there are still different positions taken by the two groups which has slowed down the negotiation (Bacungan, 2017).

Additionally, there is also the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) which was initially instituted from dissenting members of MILF, and it subsequently maintained a connection with terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a close affiliate of Al-Qaeda (AQ) (de Inza, 2012). ASG beheaded a German tourist, Jürgen Gustav Kantner, after holding him for three months. The ransom was not paid which ended up with the barbaric killing of the German (Al Jazeera, 2017). There are similar killings of the local people performed by the group. Seven farmers were found decapitated in Basilan last year (Tayug, 2017).

In addition to ASG, there is another group known as the Maute Group. Maute and ASG have pledged their allegiance to ISIS (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016). This development has complicated the security dynamic in the country. In fact, the recent case of Marawi has taken more attention from the government. In Marawi, the Maute Group cooperated with Isnilon Hapilon and his supporters. Hapilon is head of the Southern militia who has also pledged his loyalty to ISIS (Hincks, 2017). The incident started when the government attempted to capture Hapilon. Unexpectedly the Philippines forces had to face stronger resistance. President Duterte decided to authorize martial law in the region for optimising the counterterrorism efforts, which have been more problematic because of the collaboration of both separatist and terrorist groups.

Meanwhile, Thailand is in second place. The country has experienced 3,668 incidents (START, 2016). Referring to the Global Terrorism Database, most of the

perpetrators are unknown. However, there is a group, namely Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which has continuously staged terror attacks (START, 2016). BRN was formed initially as a separatist movement in the Northern part of Malaysia (TRAC, 2017). But it has operated in Thailand's Southern territory. Bombing has been used by BRN to convey its political message (Montesano, 2017). Hence, it is sometimes perceived as a terrorist group instead of an armed separatist organisation.

In addition to both the Philippines and Thailand, Indonesia has also been identified as a country with the highest terror incidents. The country has experienced 735 incidents (START, 2016). There are some terrorist groups which have been identified as perpetrators of those incidents. Among them are Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Al-Qaeda (AQ), Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). JI has been viewed as AQ's affiliate in the Southeast Asia region.

JI has launched several bombing attacks in Indonesia. Among the deadliest ones was the Bali Bombing in October 2002 which killed 202 people (BBC, 2012). Additionally, it was also involved in the JW Marriott Hotel bombing in August 2003 and the Australian Embassy bombing in September 2004. Its founder Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was detained and prisoned in 2011. One of the top operatives, Noordin M. Top, a Malaysian national, was killed in September 2009. Following the capture of its senior operatives and leaders by the Indonesian Police Counterterrorism Unit, Densus 88 (Mackey, 2016), and the killing of Osama Bin Laden by the U.S military, JI's terror attacks significantly decreased.

The recent development of terrorism in Indonesia has also become more complicated with the emergence of new groups which link themselves to ISIS. Santoso, the leader of MIT terrorist group, pledged his loyalty to Al-Baghdadi, ISIS' leader, in 2014 (ABC, 2016). He was among the first Indonesian terrorist leaders who showed allegiance to ISIS. By early 2015, he had fifty combatants operating with his group, and several of them were Uighurs who fought with the Indonesian ISIS members in Syria (IPAC, 2017).

However, Santoso was killed when the Indonesian government launched joint counterterrorism operations in 2016. The government decided to employ military special operations units to supplement the existing law enforcement effort. For years, the Indonesian Police pursued Santoso and his MIT group but were not able to capture him.

A military unit successfully terminated him and his aide during a fire contact (DW, 2016). This demonstrated that military involvement in a counterterrorism effort was effective. The decision was made based on Decree No. 34/2004 on TNI, which authorised the use of the military in the counterterrorism role (DPR RI, 2004).

In the Southeast Asia region, terrorism incidents have significantly increased within the last two decades (see Graphic 1). This increase occurred after the WTC tragedy in 2001. Post the tragedy, terrorist incidents in the region have levelled up (START, 2016). Regional and domestic terrorist groups in ASEAN countries, like Jemaah Islamiah, operated and linked with Al-Qaeda, the perpetrator of the 9/11 terror attack (de Inza, 2012).

Interestingly, another substantial rise has been identified in the period after the emergence of ISIS in the period of 2011-2012 (START, 2016). Similar to the previous behaviour in linking to global terrorist groups like AQ, many terrorists and, in fact, separatist groups in the region have also pledged their allegiance to ISIS (BBC, 2015). Indonesia's most wanted terrorist group, MIT, adopted the same stance. Like, ASG and Maute Group in the Philippines also demonstrated their connection to ISIS (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016).

Two significant climbs in the case of terrorism incidents in the region, as depicted in the graphic, indicate that there are two essential phases of counterterrorism in ASEAN countries. The first period is between the WTC tragedy in 2001 and the emergence of ISIS in 2011. The second period is after the development of ISIS since many IS supporters have come from ASEAN countries. They fought in Iraq and Syria with ISIS and then returned to their respective or neighbouring countries. This trend has nurtured ISIS' influence in the Southeast Asia region (Muñoz & Taylor, 2017).

Figure 1. Trend of Terrorism Incidents in the Southeast Asia Region (Period 1970-2016)

Source: (START, 2016)

The situation has become more complicated when there are varying perpetrators in the region. Over time, numerous key groups have been acknowledged as the actors behind all the incidents in Southeast Asia (see Table 2). Thus, this article identifies ten separatist and terrorist groups which have extensively performed their terror attacks in ASEAN countries (START, 2016). The first three are the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). They all have predominantly operated in the Philippines. But ASG has also been recorded to launch its attacks in Malaysia. Meanwhile, the Jemaah Islamiah (JI), the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, and the Al-Qaeda (AQ), have mostly operated in Indonesia, though JI also conducted its terror in the Philippines (START, 2016). Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), as explained earlier, is also a principal perpetrator of terrorism incidents in the region, chiefly in Thailand. Lastly, ISIL or ISIS, has also been able to link with its regional affiliates and staged terror attacks in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The complexity of perpetrators makes counterterrorism efforts in the Southeast Asia region not an easy task to do.

Table 2. Prominent Terrorist Groups in ASEAN Countries

(Period of 1970-2016)

No	Group	Country	Terrorism Incidents	Period
1	Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	Philippines, Malaysia	486	1994-2016
2	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	The Philippines	374	1986-2016
3	Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	The Philippines	200	1975-2015
4	Jemaah Islamiah (JI)	Indonesia, Philippines	80	2000-2013
5	Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)	Thailand	39	2002-2007, 2012-2016
6	Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT)	Indonesia	23	2013-2016
7	The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syria (ISIL/ISIS)	Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia	11	2016
8	Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)	Indonesia	9	2011-2012
9	Jamaah Ansharut Daulah	Indonesia	6	2015-2016
10	Al-Qaeda (AQ)	Indonesia	2	2002

Source: Adapted and collated by the author from (START, 2016)

Before the WTC incident in 2001, ASEAN countries had recognised terrorism as one of the most important transnational crimes that should be dealt with through regional cooperation. In 1997, ASEAN adopted the Declaration on Transnational Crime

(Pushpanathan, 2003). Also, the ASEAN Action Plan to Combat Transnational Crime was also formulated in 1999. ASEAN developed the initiative at the regional level to cope with terrorism, which was perceived as a transnational crime at that time.

Post the 9/11 terror attack, ASEAN countries expressed their commitment to fighting against terrorism. On 5 November 2001, the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism was officially announced as a response to the terror attacks in the U.S. (ASEAN, 2012). Later in 2002, there was the Declaration on Terrorism condemning the Bali Bombings in Indonesia, and also terror attacks in the Philippines (ASEAN, 2012). ASEAN also used the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the United Nations, as well as ASEAN+3, which includes China, South Korea, and Japan, as parts of the forum to declare its joint commitment to counter-terrorism with external partners. ASEAN has worked with China, the U.S., and the European Union (EU) in further discussing collaborative counter-terrorism agenda. With the rise of ISIS, there are more events and activities proposed by ASEAN to facilitate counterterrorism issue.

"Criminal Justice Model" vs "War Model"

Some countries have consistently used the police to deal with terrorist acts. Meanwhile, some others have started to involve military units as part of their counterterrorism strategy. There is a big debate on whether it is better to focus on the "criminal justice model," the "war model," or even combine the two into a hybrid one.

There is a big difference between the "criminal justice model" and the "war model." The first prioritises the role of law enforcement. Police carry the primary responsibility. The Rules of Engagement (RoE) which is used in this model to minimise the use of force where it needs an exercise of judgment. Meanwhile, the war model is dominated by the role of the military. As the primary responsible agency, the military leads the process. The RoE utilised in the model is the maximum use of force. This is oriented at overpowering the enemy (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 48).

Both models have their benefits and limitations. The "criminal justice model" serves several functions. First is a delegitimating function where any use of terrorism will be stigmatised through a criminalisation process. This model also provides a general educative function. Any unacceptability of terrorism will be publicly confirmed through a criminal justice process where it is aimed at capturing terrorists. The third is a deterrent function where the threat of criminal sanctions is expected to prevent any terrorist acts. Fourth is a retributive function, those who use terrorism will be reprimanded according to due process. Fifth is a rehabilitative function which allows giving chance for convicted

terrorists to leave the use of violence. And lastly is an incapacitation function. This means that imprisoned terrorists will be isolated from any possible environment that may facilitate their will to execute any terror activities (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 58).

However, the "crime justice model" also deals with several limitations. The existence of "nullum crimen, nulla pena sine lege" principle, argues that there will be no crime or punishment without law. Terror activity will always be performed in secret. Thus, it will be difficult to collect evidence when doing a criminal investigation of a terror incident. Moreover, bringing a terrorist to a trial is difficult. This has become more complex when it comes to the detention and imprisonment process. Every case is different and will end up with different treatment of prisoners. Not only that, but also extradition, expulsion, and deportation will be challenging, and especially there is a probability of a country renouncing extradition should it feel that there will be no fair trial for the suspect. Lastly, the criminal justice model has a problem in addressing the root cause. The model cannot resolve broader contexts like group terrorist. This model relies more on a complex bureaucracy. Hence, the process may be slow and can be perceived to favour the perpetrators over the victims (Crelinsten, 2009, pp. 59-72).

Like criminal justice, the "war model" also shares benefits. The model helps boost morale at home, especially if it is aimed at pursuing the root cause abroad. The war model allows a country to choose a unilateralism approach. The war model also helps maintain a robust image in the international environment as performed by the U.S. This model facilitates the use of science and technology in tackling the terrorism problem. The military is allowed to use its cutting-edge technologies to help trace and terminate terrorists. The use of drones to conduct targeted killings can assist in minimalizing casualties (Crelinsten, 2009, pp. 78-79).

Despite its benefits, the "war model" also has numerous limitations. The model is perceived to possibly lead a play into terrorists' hands where the severe reaction may induce sympathy for the terrorist cause. This may generate more support for the terrorists, which can be counterproductive. The model can also escalate violence and spark revenge. The use of the military may facilitate an anti-democratic practice where the approach is used as an excuse to intervene in privacy for the sake of intelligence. The effectiveness of the model, to some extent, has been questioned since it relies on intelligence, but sometimes it is not reliable. Thus, the war model may not be adequate for a medium or long-term agenda.

There was a significant shift adopted by the U.S. in implementing its overall counterterrorism strategy after the WTC terror attack. Before the incident, the military was placed as a last resort and would be used only in aid of civil power. Nonetheless, the policy changed afterwards, where the military was positioned as the central and primary role while civil power was secondary regarding counterterrorism strategy (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 13). The pre-WTC period was dominated by the perspective of the criminal justice model. Meanwhile, the post-WTC period was influenced by the war model (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 13).

Choosing between the two models is difficult. Therefore, there has been a significant development which attempts to combine both models. This combination is acknowledged as a hybrid model. The model is used in dealing with a complex crisis without compromising the need to tackle the threats and ignoring the legal framework (Steinberg & Estrin, 2014, pp. 206-207). Not only the U.S. but also some of the ASEAN countries have started to adopt this model. Among them are the Philippines and Indonesia. The Philippines has used its military units to deal with terrorist groups in its Southern territory (Griffiths, 2017).

With the latest dynamic in the Philippines, the terrorist group has merged with the separatist group. ASG collaborated with the Maute Group, which both have linked to ISIS. This made the situation in the country more challenging. Thus, President Duterte declared martial law, which legitimised the role of the military. After five months of battle, the military successfully killed Isnilon Hapilon, the Abu Sayyaf Group leader, and Omar Khayam Maute, the leader of the Maute Group, on 16 October 2017 (Regencia, 2017). However, the AFP has not been able to fully terminate the threat. The fighting with the terrorist group in Marawi is continuing (Al Jazeera, 2017).

Similarly, Indonesia has also adopted the hybrid model. In the recent case of capturing Santoso, the Indonesian National Defence Forces (TNI) was involved. The unit which apprehended Santoso was a special operations unit from Kostrad. It is the Army Strategic Reserve Unit which can conduct special operations, including hostage-taking and counterterrorism. Santoso had been chased for years by the police, but he could not be apprehended. When TNI was assigned to the joint operations, he was eventually terminated (DW, 2016).

Counter Terrorism Diplomacy and Regional Engagement

Ronald Crelinsten defines terrorism as "the combined use and threat of violence, planned in secret and usually executed without warning, that is directed against one set of targets (the direct victim) in order to coerce compliance or to compel allegiance from a second set of targets (targets of demands) and to intimidate or to impress a wider audience (target of terror or target of attention)" (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 6). In dealing with international or regional terrorism which is transnational in nature, diplomacy and negotiations are viewed as key counterterrorism means (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 12). Thus, counterterrorism can be used as a means of diplomacy, especially in engaging with international partners, to optimise the domestic and regional counterterrorism efforts.

However, there is no universal definition of counterterrorism diplomacy. The U.S. has used the terminology in its counterterrorism strategy. It is viewed as an effort in diplomacy which is consistent with the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Kerry, 2014, p. 91). The country exercises counterterrorism diplomacy by constructing the capacity of its international partners. Similarly, it also strengthens foreign relations with those partner nations in bilateral and multilateral contexts. Counterterrorism has been perceived as a tool for diplomacy in engaging with other countries. Within the last few years, the country has also formulated its strategy to advance counterterrorism diplomacy (Siberell, 2017). Nonetheless, the U.S. has not adequately explained its meaning.

Other countries have also attempted to exercise counterterrorism diplomacy. China has implemented counterterrorism diplomacy at the United Nations. This effort has been made at the Security Council, the Sanction Committee, and the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) (Duchâtel, 2016, p. 5). China has also used its military in the context of counter-terrorism diplomacy.

Surprisingly, the Chinese military has circumcised the Foreign Ministry. There are three reasons for this. The first reason is to promote intelligence and border control cooperation. Additionally, it is intended to encourage counterterrorism cooperation with partner nations. Lastly, there is the anxiety of facing the rise of ISIS that may threaten China. Within the last few years, there has been a rising number of Chinese nationals killed by terrorist groups abroad (Duchâtel, 2016, p. 9). In November 2015, ISIS executed a Chinese citizen for the first time (Duchâtel, 2016, p. 1). Also, in the same year, 3 Chinese nationals were also killed in Mali by the local terrorists. China's approach to global terrorism has been militarized due to those kinds of terror attacks towards its people.

Nevertheless, despite the existence of counterterrorism diplomacy in practice, there has been no definition proposed to help understand the matter. Thus, based on the practices of several key countries, this article tries to offer an understanding of counterterrorism diplomacy. Paul R. Pillar argues that "[d] iplomacy touches at least as many aspects of counterterrorism as does any other instruments" (Pillar, 2004, p. 73). Incorporating his argument with the previously mentioned international practices, the article tries to define counterterrorism diplomacy as **"the use of available counterterrorism measures as a tool of diplomacy for engaging with partner countries through a comprehensive manner which involves key and related national elements, like the police, the foreign affairs ministry and perhaps the military; such practice may also help exchange information, facilitate and strengthen cooperation in the area of counterterrorism that can ultimately support in achieving national security objectives".[2]** With the presence of counterterrorism diplomacy, every country can interact with other countries by fostering counterterrorism collaboration.

When the Cold War ended, the U.S. put a low priority on the Southeast Asia region. Nevertheless, the attention changed when the WTC incident occurred (Wright, 2006, p. 629). Following the tragedy, the country began to engage with ASEAN countries. The arrest of JI members in Singapore revealed the plan of the regional terrorist group, which was affiliated with Al-Qaeda, to attack Western targets (Wright, 2006, p. 629). This evidence further highlighted the importance of engaging with the region in coping with its counterterrorism strategy. Hence, it was not surprising when Southeast Asia was viewed as the "second front" by the Bush administration (Gershman, 2002). The U.S. managed to use counterterrorism diplomacy in interacting with ASEAN countries since then.

Like his predecessor, Obama also favoured counterterrorism. It became one of his top priorities. He openly expressed his expectation to assist the transnational counterterrorism efforts while undercutting support within the Muslim world for groups like Al-Qaeda (Dueck, 2015, p. 48). He sent troops to Afghanistan. Eventually, the U.S. military killed Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda's top leader, in 2012 (Bowden, 2012). The raid against Osama was considered Obama's most enormous success (Dueck, 2015, p. 49). The U.S., under both the Bush and Obama administrations, consistently supported the counterterrorism efforts in ASEAN countries.

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[2] This definition of counterterrorism diplomacy is interpreted and proposed by author to help understand the meaning of counterterrorism diplomacy.

Despite the killing of Osama, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (QAI) used the momentum of the absence of U.S. forces in Iraq from 2012 through 2013 to reorganise under the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as ISIL (Dueck, 2015, p. 50). The terrorist group demonstrated its violence resurgence during this time frame. Since then, it began staging terror attacks globally, including in the Southeast Asia region.

ISIS is perceived to have produced one of today's best narratives. The group has used falsehood and betrayal of faith to call young people to join in building the Caliphate, the Islamic nation, which the group has aimed (Seib, 2016, p. 129). Sadly, it has proven useful for influencing people, including those who are from Western countries. The presence of social media has facilitated their efforts to spread their propaganda. A speech that is broadcasted through the internet can reach a broader audience (Fletcher, 2015, p. xii). This indicates that social media has reshaped the standard for outreach which has also covered the Southeast Asia region.

With the window of opportunity to implement a hybrid model, the military will have a more significant role. Thus, it needs to be appropriately managed to efficiently support law enforcement (Steinberg & Estrin, 2014, pp. 206-207). With the existing military-to-military cooperation between countries, including intra-ASEAN, it is prospective to use the opportunity to share knowledge and experience in the context of counterterrorism. The Philippines and the U.S. have continuously trained together to help refine their counterterrorism strategies.[3] Additionally, ASEAN, under the ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) Plus, managed to conduct a joint counterterrorism exercise (Commander of U.S. Navy Task Force 73 Public Affairs, 2016). This event involved not only ASEAN countries but also extra-regional partners. The event linked militaries between participating countries. It also facilitated an initiative to share further intelligence that may support the participating countries.

Military cooperation between countries in the Southeast Asia region is important in helping tackle regional and domestic terrorism. Diplomacy, which is required to facilitate international engagement, may also cover counterterrorism. This is why counterterrorism diplomacy is critical since it can connect countries. Historically, numerous terrorist groups in the region have linked themselves with domestic networks. JI, for instance, has operated not only in Indonesia but also in the Philippines. Similarly, ISIS has also acted in several Southeast Asia countries.

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[3] Balikatan 33 Strengthens U.S.-Philippine Defense Partnership through Counterterrorism and HADR Training.

The reveal of domestic and regional terrorist plots to attack Western targets in the region in 2001 has influenced the shift of U.S. counterterrorism strategy towards ASEAN countries. Since 9/11, there has been a rise of counterterrorism engagement between the U.S. and ASEAN. This has facilitated counterterrorism diplomacy in the region. During Obama's tenure, Southeast Asia was perceived as an important geographical zone for U.S. interests. Despite a different approach implemented by his successor, President Donald Trump, counterterrorism diplomacy can still be used by ASEAN countries, not only to engage with the U.S. and other partner countries but also with their fellow ASEAN countries, especially with the shifting front of ISIS from the Middle East to the Southeast Asia region. The Marawi incident is an example of how ISIS has managed to link with its regional affiliates.

With ASEAN's disunity in responding to the South China Sea dispute, the regional association is predicted to falter. Nonetheless, having observed the new security dynamic in the region, where local and regional terrorist groups have linked with ISIS, counterterrorism diplomacy is possible to use to leverage engagement between ASEAN member countries. Thus, counterterrorism diplomacy is important in driving this process.

Most ASEAN countries have experienced an increasing trend of terrorism in recent years. This requires cooperation between member countries. Especially with similar terrorist groups that have linked themselves to ISIS, ASEAN countries may adopt a collaborative approach to cope with the threat. They may also implement a hybrid counterterrorism model that employs the military as one useful means to tackle the terror threat. Hence, the use of the military to engage with other militaries and non-military agencies is vital.

Conclusion

The 9/11 tragedy surprised everyone since sudden terror attacks stormed the U.S. in its territory. Two attacks employing hijacked aircrafts destructed the WTC, one of the tallest buildings in the country (Wright, 2006, pp. 357-358). Not only this landmark but also the Pentagon has been targeted by an orchestrated terror designed by Al-Qaeda. Striking the U.S. military headquarters with a civilian aircraft was never thought of earlier. Many casualties resulted from the terror attacks at both sites.

In response, the U.S. declared its global war on terror. This facilitated a significant number of international cooperation with partner countries. The primary aim was to trace and terminate Al-Qaeda, the perpetrator group of the 9/11 attacks, and its

affiliates. The campaign also covered Southeast Asian countries since there was an indication of collaboration between local terrorist groups in the region with AQ. Thus, the region was perceived as the "second front" by the U.S (Gershman, 2002). Following this engagement, most ASEAN countries have leveraged their interactions via counterterrorism diplomacy, not only with the U.S. and its allies but also among themselves. Initially, the engagement endorsed the "criminal justice model", which promoted the primary role of law enforcement agencies. Especially with the operating environment like urban centres and rural religious schools, it would be more effective to capture terrorists by using this model (Dillon, 2004). In supporting this effort, the U.S. military assisted through joint exercises and training which facilitated the process of information, knowledge and expertise exchanges with various police counterterrorism units in ASEAN countries (Acharya, 2015, p. 232).

Over a decade since the WTC tragedy, there have been unexpected dynamics in the region's terrorist network development. The war on terror was able to terminate a high number of AQ operatives, including Osama Bin Laden. However, in recent years, there has been a significant rise of the Islamic State movement, which was developed by AQ affiliates. Sadly, various terrorist groups in the Southeast Asia region have pledged their allegiances to this IS group. This fact has got more concerns since several countries in the region are still struggling to cope with terrorism. Santoso, the local terrorist group leader, was tracked for a couple of years by the police. His group demonstrated its support for IS. Eventually, the government's decision to involve the military special operations unit in a joint counterterrorism effort with the police was able to capture and terminate him (Cochrane, 2016).

The same approach in employing the military as part of a joint counterterrorism operation has also been adopted by the Philippines. In the recent Marawi incident, President Duterte declared martial law, which even legitimised the military to take further action in dealing with the threat in the area. In Marawi, the situation is more complicated since ISIS has been linked with both local separatist and terrorist groups. The military could eventually kill both the commanders of the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Maute Group, after struggling to fight for over several months. Despite the involvement of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the actual threat has still challenged the country (Gita, 2017). Spectators have predicted that if it is still uncontrollable, then it may affect the neighbouring countries in the region.

Therefore, this situation may potentially develop an opportunity for greater cooperation among ASEAN member countries in dealing with ISIS as well as its local

and regional affiliated networks. Unlike past engagements, this new chapter may accommodate a more substantial role of the military through military cooperation. The military can be used to supplement ASEAN's counterterrorism diplomacy in engaging with other international partners. In fact, counterterrorism diplomacy can help strengthen regional engagement, which has been restrained due to the South China Sea dispute (Tong, 2016).

This article tries to analyse the change in ASEAN's regional engagement in the context of counterterrorism efforts. The article identifies the distinction between the period after the 9/11 tragedy and the recent period after the emergence of IS. With the rise of ISIS, replacing the dominance of AQ in Southeast Asia, there is a key dynamic in the region. Hence, the article argues that there has also been a substantial change in ASEAN countries' implementation of their counterterrorism policies. Referring to lessons learned from the past where the terrorist network is linked regionally and globally, ASEAN member countries perceive that it cannot be managed by only utilizing the law enforcement agencies, primarily the police counterterrorism unit. The involvement of the military is critical to supplement the police effort as depicted in the hybrid model. This strategy has been increasingly practised in coping with terrorism by many ASEAN countries. With this military involvement, ASEAN countries have more opportunities to develop their counterterrorism diplomacy since the military has been consistently used as a diplomatic tool in recent years in the region. By introducing this new approach of counterterrorism diplomacy, it helps set a new chapter of regional engagement.

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